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Abstract 
This dissertation is the first full-length study to explore how the Canadian 
government and military disposed of surplus munitions and supplies after the Second 
World War. By investigating how the state planned and implemented its disposal 
program from 1943 to 1948, this thesis places objects at the centre of attention and 
demonstrates their profound political, social, and economic significance. By examining 
the extended social lives of munitions and supplies in relationship to their postwar impact 
on civilian life, this study offers a new and innovative perspective that links material 
culture with postwar reconstruction, rehabilitation, and demobilization. What follows is a 
history of how Canadians turned swords into plowshares that contributes to the fields of 
military history, Canadian history, material culture, and disarmament studies.  
Disposal was an important element of Canada’s exit strategy for the Second World 
War because the objects accumulated to fight survived long after hostilities ended and 
required diligent procedures to demobilize or destroy. In November 1943, the Canadian 
government established the Crown Assets Allocation Committee (CAAC) and the War 
Assets Corporation (WAC) to plan, control, and implement its disposal program. This 
study elaborates on four critical themes: 1) the continuous and evolving nature of public 
pressure for government action on disposal; 2) the role of the CAAC and WAC in 
controlling disposal operations; 3) the way the objects of war require stewardship from 
one use to the next; and 4) the process through which munitions and supplies were 
reduced, reused, recycled, and upcycled into new forms, functions, and intentions. This 
thesis argues that through the CAAC and WAC surplus assets were disposed of to 
support, and not hinder, postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation. Although disposal was 
not perfect and left behind some dangerous environmental legacies, the conversion of 
surplus assets into peacetime purposes ensured that objects gained new uses and 
meanings thereby mitigating their threatening nature to economic stability, political 
authority, and public safety. 
Keywords: Canadian history; military history; munitions disposal; material culture; 
demobilization; disarmament; reconstruction; rehabilitation; peace.  
 iii 
 
Acknowledgments  
They say it takes a village to raise a child, but I think the same proverb applies to 
writing a dissertation: it takes a village to write one. Over the past five and half years I 
have benefited from the help and support of so many different institutions and people. I 
am eternally grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
(SSHRC), the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program (OGS), Western University, and 
the Department of History for their financial support throughout my degree. Quite 
frankly, their generous funding quashed the “starving student” stereotype and allowed me 
to pursue my studies full time. I would also like to thank the Ley and Lois Military 
History Fund and the Office of the Digital Humanities at the National Endowment for the 
Humanities (NEH) for several travel grants that covered some of the costs related to 
research trips, conferences, and professional development workshops.  
I am indebted to many archivists, librarians, technicians, and staff at several 
institutions. At the Library and Archives Canada (LAC) every single staff-member I dealt 
with was genuinely helpful when sorting out my many requests and questions, but Kathy 
Chow, Suzanne Lemaire, and Martin Lanthier deserve special mention. The research and 
reference staffs at the Canadian War Museum (CWM), the Directorate of History and 
Heritage (DHH), The National Archives (TNA), the Archives of Ontario (AO), the City 
of Toronto Archives, and the Canada Science and Technology Museum were equally 
helpful in facilitating my research trips. At Western, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to the 
History Department’s outstanding administrative staff for all their help and support! The 
Cultureplex and Elika Ortega deserve a special thank you for letting me use their book 
scanner in 2013. I owe an incredible amount of thanks to Liz Mantz, Weldon’s subject 
librarian for history. I cannot recall any instance in which Liz failed to find me access to a 
book, article, or document I needed – no matter how obscure or rare it was. Over the 
years she also forwarded news stories, documentaries, or other books she thought I would 
like. Her help was always appreciated.  
It is difficult to adequately express how thankful I am for having Jonathan Vance as 
a supervisor. Dr. Vance is a towering figure, both physically and intellectually. He is 
easily the tallest, smartest, and most humble human I have ever met. I feel very fortunate 
 iv 
 
and honoured to have him in my corner. Over the years I have witnessed his relentless 
work-ethic and love for teaching firsthand. Quite simply, it still astounds me. During the 
early part of my degree, he was supervising a dozen PhD students and publishing nearly a 
book a year, but he always had time to meet, returned comments on chapters at lightning 
speeds, and always kept his office door open. Every step of the way he remained a 
bastion of buoyant positivity. His energy and enthusiasm for my work never wavered, no 
matter how many pages he read or how many times I bothered him with random facts 
about war junk. Dr. Vance also taught me many things about the historian’s craft. His 
fascination with the cultural ephemera produced and discarded by past societies never 
ceased to amaze me – I mean how many postcards from the First World War does he 
really need? However, his curiosity for ordinary things inspired me to ask different 
questions about conflict and culture and find meaning in the things that people throw 
away. Thank you for everything! 
There are many others who deserve acknowledgement for their assistance. My 
colleagues in the writing group – Danielle Demiantschuk, Steve Marti, and Tyler Turek – 
read and re-read most of this dissertation. Their comments, especially in the early stages, 
were integral to developing my ideas and improving my writing skills. Graham Broad, 
Francine McKenzie, and Robert Wardhaugh also read several chapter drafts and provided 
valuable feedback for which I am grateful. Two other professors in Western’s History 
Department deserve special thanks. Michelle Hamilton, who supervised a field in Public 
History for my comprehensive exams in 2011, first introduced me to material culture and 
by extension this dissertation’s topic. Without Bill Turkel’s help (and patience) in 
teaching digital methods and outfitting the History Department’s Digital Research Lab 
with so many useful tools, writing this dissertation would have been impossible.  
I would also like to thank Tim Cook, Andrew Burtch, Steve Harris, Andrew 
Iarrocci, Alan MacEachen, Peter Neary, Keith Fleming, Rob MacDougall, Nolan Brown, 
and Dave Blocker for taking the time to meet with me, talk shop, answer millions of 
questions, or offer potential research leads. I should also extend some thanks to Terry 
Long, the Chairman of the International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions (IDUM). In 
February 2015, I emailed him out of the blue and after several Skype meetings he invited 
me to join the IDUM’s International Technical Advisory Board as a Senior Historical 
 v 
 
Researcher. I am excited to be involved with the IDUM and look forward to future 
collaborative opportunities. I hope the lessons drilled into me by my Master’s adviser, 
Serge Durflinger, are present throughout. His guidance was instrumental in preparing me 
for the challenges of writing a PhD dissertation. 
My colleagues and friends in the History Department’s PhD Program were a source 
of great entertainment and support. Tyler Turek, my officemate for the past half-decade, 
epitomises that statement. I know we often make fun of each other, but I could not ask for 
a better friend and bromance. Tyler’s better half, Emilie Pilon-David, has been a source 
of great friendship, laughter, and many delicious dinners. My other officemate, Erin 
Pocock, was a tower of stability and wisdom. After some serious lobbying I am happy to 
report that she named me Bethany’s favourite “Honorary Uncle.” Steve Marti’s 
indomitable work-ethic, wit, and puff pastry skills make him one of my most dependable 
and entertaining friends. Even though she moved far away, Danielle Demiantschuk 
remains close. I thought about saying something profound and meaningful in Klingon, 
but everything I wrote was so clichéd: it is an honour to be friends with someone so 
smart, caring, fun, and patient. I can easily say the same things about my “favourite 
person” and conference buddy, Claire Halstead. A fellow Sens Fan, Shezan Muhammedi, 
found his way into these acknowledgements at the last minute when he showed me how 
easily Zotero creates bibliographies.  
A part from Dr. Vance no single person was more essential to writing this 
dissertation than Kristin Bourassa. In fact, she deserves two special mentions, one as 
“Kristin” and the other as “Dr. Bourassa.” Despite living far away from each other, 
Kristin is my rock. It is amazing how much I have come to depend on her organizational 
skills, intelligence, independence, and affection. They are a source of such inspiration 
that I often wonder how I will ever reciprocate. For the better part of five years she has 
listened to me “yammer on” about war junk and disposal. I know I rarely leave my 
“thesis box” so thank you for your patience and love. However, my “yammering” was 
hardly idle chatter since Dr. Bourassa ensured that those conversations were far from one 
sided. Dr. Bourassa is one of the most knowledgeable and efficient scholars I have ever 
met. Her input on war junk and disposal was always welcomed and usually made me 
consider something I had overlooked. A medievalist by training, her advice about 
 vi 
 
methodology and her appreciation for the provenance of primary sources greatly 
influenced how I interpret and approach archival materials. Modernists sometimes 
disregard medieval history, but we do so at our peril. Dr. Bourassa also generously copy-
edited this entire dissertation and offered some of its sharpest feedback. Her heavy-
handed editing skills immeasurably improved this dissertation, though of course, all 
mistakes therein are mine alone. Thank you for all your help!  
I owe a huge debt of gratitude for all the love and support I have received from my 
family and friends back home in Ottawa. My life-long best friends Chris Poulin and 
Kevin Oldland remain my anchors, along with my Mom, Dad, Fiona Boey, and my 
family on both sides (the Downs and the Souchens). I love you all! In June 2011, I 
became a sibling and brother for the first time. My little sister, Emerie Souchen, is now 
four years old and easily the coolest person I know. She is full of curiosity, energy, and 
hilarity. Em is growing up way too fast and I miss her every day I am not in Ottawa. I 
would like to dedicate this dissertation to my grandparents: Flight Lieutenant Russell 
Down (1918-1974), Gladys Down (b. 1923), Walter Souchen (1920-1994), and Margaret 
Souchen (b. 1922). They lived the history that has fascinated me for as long as I can 
remember. Without them none of this was possible.   
 vii 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. ii 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ iii 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ vii 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... x 
List of Photographs .......................................................................................................... xi 
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... xiii 
List of Appendices ........................................................................................................... xv 
Introduction The Disposal Problem ................................................................................ 1 
Mobilizing the Industrial Front ................................................................................. 11 
The Exit Strategy ........................................................................................................ 23 
A Note on Sources ........................................................................................................... 34 
Chapter 1 Preparing for Peace: Creating the Crown Assets Allocation Committee 
and War Assets Corporation ......................................................................................... 38 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 38 
Growing Concerns ...................................................................................................... 41 
Disposal of Obsolete Stores before PC9108 .............................................................. 49 
PC9108: Creating the Committee and Corporation ................................................ 56 
The Surplus Crown Assets Act .................................................................................. 69 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 79 
Chapter 2 From Flow to Flood: Managing Disposal Operations ............................... 81 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 81 
Laying the Groundwork: Early Plans and Preparations ........................................ 85 
The Best Laid Plans .................................................................................................. 104 
The Reorganization and Expansion of the WAC ................................................... 120 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 132 
Chapter 3 Bursting at the Seams: Clearance and Warehousing Operations .......... 134 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 134 
The Cleanup Crew: Clearance and Materiel Legacies .......................................... 136 
Cutting Losses: Abandoned Materiel Legacies ...................................................... 147 
“A Solid Big Gob”: The Challenge of Managing Large Inventories ................... 161 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 180 
 viii 
 
Chapter 4 “The Wonderland of War Assets”: Selling, Scrapping, and Salvaging 
Value............................................................................................................................... 182 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 182 
Corporate Dividend: Established Businesses and Selling Restrictions ................ 186 
Dividend Denied ........................................................................................................ 200 
Munitions and Public Safety .................................................................................... 208 
Reduction to Destruction: Salvaging Value from Weapon Systems .................... 219 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 236 
Chapter 5 Tactical to Practical: Supporting Postwar Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation with Surplus Assets ............................................................................. 238 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 238 
The WAC and Economic Stability .......................................................................... 242 
Starting Points for Peace: Reusing Surplus Assets ................................................ 263 
Assets to Ashes? Recycling and Upcycling Surplus Assets ................................... 282 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 293 
Chapter 6 The Diplomacy of Disposal: Settling War Claims and Selling Surpluses 
Overseas ......................................................................................................................... 294 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 294 
The Disposal of Surpluses Located Overseas ......................................................... 297 
Settling Debts and Selling Arms .............................................................................. 316 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 340 
Chapter 7 Drowned at Sea: Ammunition Destruction and Ocean Dumping .......... 341 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 341 
Storage Wars: The Evolution of Destruction Policies and Practices ................... 343 
Davey’s Storage Locker: Canada’s Ammunition Dumping Program ................. 358 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 378 
Conclusion Prologue to Peace, Epilogue to War ........................................................ 380 
Appendix 1 ..................................................................................................................... 387 
Appendix 2 ..................................................................................................................... 388 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 389 
Curriculum Vitae .......................................................................................................... 403 
 ix 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Declarations of Surplus Received by Month, 1944-48………………………..111 
Table 2: Number of Employees in the WAC in March, 1945-1950……………………125 
Table 3: Employment Trends in the WAC, 1945-1949……………………………...…126 
Table 4: Distribution of Motor Vehicles Sales (All Types) by Province and Vehicle 
Registration, 1944-1945………………………………………………………………...132 
Table 5: Warehousing Operations of the War Assets Corporation, 1946-1947 ……….166 
Table 6: Warehousing Operations of the War Assets Corporation, 1947-1948………..167 
Table 7: Materials Salvaged from the Demolition of Surplus Buildings, 1946-1947….258 
Table 8: Materials Salvaged from the Demolition of Surplus Buildings, 1947-1948….260 
Table 9: Sales of Material for Educational Purposes, 12 July 1944 to 31 March 1946...280 
Table 10: Disposal of Ammunition, Report for Week Ending 29 September 1945……372 
Table 11: Disposal of Ammunition, Report for Week Ending 6 October 1945………..373 
  
 x 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Machine Tools and Equipment Sales (Over $5,000), 1944-1949……………145 
Figure 2: Metal Sales by the War Assets Corporation, 1944-1949…………………….246 
Figure 3: Select Metal Sales by Weight, 1944-1949…………………………………...247 
 
 xi 
 
List of Photographs 
Photo 1: Board of Directors, WAC, January 1944………………………………………64 
Photo 2: The WAC’s Head Offices (circa. late-1945)………………………………….122 
Photo 3: Abandoned Trucks on the Canol Heritage Trail, near Mile 222……………...155 
Photo 4: Group of Inuit with housing made from American military supplies ………..158 
Photo 5: A set of moose antlers tangled in telephone wires found at Mile 170 on the 
Canol Trail……………………………………………………………………………...159 
Photo 6: A rare picture of decommissioned ships at the graveyard near Sorel………...164 
Photo 7: John Brocklehurst checking a pile of khaki uniforms at No. 1 Reclamation 
Depot, Valleyfield, Quebec……………………………………………………………..172 
Photo 8: Painting by Tony Law………………………………………………………...185 
Photo 9: Photo of mutilated Bren Gun, circa 1949……………………………………..214 
Photo 10: Some of the parts and equipment stripped from planes at St. Johns, 
Quebec………………………………………………………………………………….224 
Photo 11: Workers at St. Johns, Quebec scrap old damaged aircraft that cannot be sold 
any other way…………………………………………………………………………...226 
Photo 12: An advertisement in the Winnipeg Free Press for the sale of an Anson training 
aircraft…………………………………………………………………………………..228 
Photo 13:  An advertisement in the Globe and Mail for the sale of surplus naval vessels 
for scrapping purposes………………………………………………………………….250 
Photo 14: Advertisement seeking tenants for the Liberty Buildings, Toronto, 
Ontario……………………………………………………………………………….....262 
Photo 15: View of rows of parts used to make army vehicles at the Ford Motor Company 
plant, 1941………………………….…………………………………………………...268 
Photo 16: Brochure for the Union Steamship’s S. S. Chilcotin…….…………………..291 
Photo 17: Picture showing some of the devastation from the Bedford Magazine 
Explosion……………………………………………………………………………….352 
Photo 18: Picture showing one of the two major craters caused by the Bedford Magazine 
Explosion……………………………………………………………………………….353 
 xii 
 
Photo 19: Picture showing some of the devastation from the Bedford Magazine 
Explosion…..…………………………………………………………………………...357 
Photo 20: Photo of ammunition dumping near Cairnryan, UK………………………...374 
Photo 21: Drums of mustard gas awaiting disposal, 30 January 1946…………………377 
 
 xiii 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AWSC…………………………………………...………Allied War Supplies Corporation 
AOSAC………………………………………Army Ordnance Surplus Assets Committee 
ASDB………………………………………………….Army Salvage and Disposal Board 
BATM……………………………………………….British Admiralty Technical Mission  
BCATP…………………………………….British Commonwealth Air Training Program 
CAAC……………………………………….………Crown Assets Allocation Committee 
CADC………………………………………………...Crown Assets Disposal Corporation  
CNEA……………………………………...Canada Newfoundland Education Association 
CAL………………………………...………………………….Canadian Arsenals Limited 
CIL…………………………………………………………....Canadian Industries Limited 
CMHQ…………………………………………Canadian Military Headquarters (London) 
CUARF………………………………………………Canadian United Allied Relief Fund  
CVT………………………………………………………...Canadian Vocational Training 
CMHC………………………………………..Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation 
CNAS……………………………………...…..Chief of Naval Administration and Supply 
CPRB………………………………………...Combined Production and Resources Board 
DIL…………………………………………………………….Defence Industries Limited 
DEA……………………………………………………….Department of External Affairs 
DMS………………………………………...............Department of Munitions and Supply 
DND……………………………………………………...Department of National Defence 
DRS…………………………………………....Department of Reconstruction and Supply 
DVA……………...........................................................….Department of Veterans Affairs 
EAC……………………………………………………….Economic Advisory Committee 
HE………………………………………………………………………….High Explosive 
 xiv 
 
IRB……………………………………………………....Industrial Reconstruction Branch 
IDUM…………………………...……...International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions 
MGO……………………………………………………….…Master General of Ordnance 
NDHQ……………………………………………………..National Defence Headquarters 
NOIC……………………………………………………………..Naval-Officer-in-Charge 
NATO…………………………………………………North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PJBD…………………………………………………...Permanent Joint Board of Defence 
PDC……………………………………………………Plant Decontamination Committee 
RCAF…………………………………………………………...Royal Canadian Air Force 
RCN…………………………………………………………………Royal Canadian Navy 
SCWEE………………………...Special Committee on War Expenditures and Economies 
UNRRA………………………...United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
USAAF……………………………………………………..United States Army Air Force 
UXO………………………………………………………………...Unexploded Ordnance 
WAA…………………………………………………………..War Assets Administration 
WAC………………………………………………………………War Assets Corporation 
WCDB…………………………………………………War Contracts Depreciation Board 
WICB…………………………………………………..Wartime Industries Control Board 
WPTB……………………………………………………Wartime Prices and Trade Board 
 xv 
 
List of Appendices 
Appendix 1: Disposal of Crown Plants by Wartime Use of Plants as of June 1, 1948...387 
Appendix 2: CAAC Standard Procedures 1-10………………………………………...388 
 
  
1 
 
Introduction 
The Disposal Problem 
Inventories of war material must always be on tremendous scale, with the consequence 
that at the termination of hostilities surpluses of munitions and supplies are enormous 
even if every machine producing war goods ceased functioning as the guns ceased 
firing.
1
 
John Berry, President of the War Assets Corporation 
On 11 February 1946, Corporal William Denniston and several other members of 
his squad were hard at work moving stacks of bedframes at the 14th Central Ordnance 
Depot in Petawawa, Ontario. With the end of the Second World War a few months 
earlier, such anti-climactic work had become commonplace, though Denniston probably 
welcomed the banality after six years’ service with the infantry. A Scottish-born 
immigrant and an older soldier by comparison to his peers, Denniston had enlisted with 
the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa in 1939 and survived the campaigns in Normandy 
and Northwest Europe unscathed. On 10 April 1945, he was repatriated back to Canada 
to deal with a pending divorce and because he volunteered for service in the Pacific 
theatre.
2
 However, the war’s end in September forced him to reconsider his future plans. 
Like many soldiers, he wanted to remain in the postwar Army but had to make himself 
useful to a military facing significant postwar budget cuts. When he arrived in Petawawa 
in December 1945, he must have seen the writing on the wall. Given that Petawawa was a 
major supply base, he found his postwar plans piling up all around him. When hostilities 
ended, the procurement and consumption of munitions and supplies dropped off 
substantially from wartime peaks, yet the objects acquired by the government and 
military did not just disappear. Denniston must have realized that the Army needed 
custodians for all the leftover stuff, so he completed several courses on equipment storage 
and took up a new posting in logistics.
3
 
                                                 
1
 John Berry, “Functions of War Assets Corporation,” Quarterly Review of Commerce, Vol. 12 (1946), 32 
2
 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), RG24, Vol. 25728, File: SC20954 Denniston, William 
Ferguson, “Canadian Active Service Force Attestation Paper,” 6 September 1939; Ibid, “Record of 
Service,” various dates; Ibid, “Personnel Selection Record,” 9 July 1945. 
3
 Ibid, “Canadian Active Service Force Attestation Paper,” 6 September 1939; Ibid, “Record of Service,” 
various dates; Ibid, “Personnel Selection Record,” 9 July 1945. 
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The job of stacking bedframes is an innocuous example of a much wider problem 
that confronted the Canadian military and government after the Second World War. It 
was also a problem that Denniston and his squad were working at solving when disaster 
struck sometime after lunch. Unfortunately for Denniston everything came to an abrupt 
and painful end that day in February. While preparing to load a stack of bedframes into a 
Chevrolet truck driven by Gunner C. Serat, a 24-year-old soldier with two years of 
driving experience, Denniston suddenly “walked between the pile of bed springs and tail 
gate of [the] truck” and “was crushed.”4 He was first rushed to the Petawawa Military 
Camp hospital and later transferred to the Pembroke General Hospital, but his condition 
never improved. After several hours of agony, Denniston succumbed to a traumatic 
laceration of the liver and peritoneal hemorrhage on the morning of 12 February 1946.
5
 
Although commemorated by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission as a fatal 
casualty of the Second World War, in reality Denniston was a casualty of the cleanup. 
Certainly moving bedframes from Drill Hall No. 2 and stacking them in Drill Hall 
No. 3 was not a job usually associated with the death of a war hero, but this was the 
mundane reality of ending war: when the pace of fighting slackened, the pace of disposal 
picked up. Once Canadian soldiers returned home as veterans, the government and 
military were left with all the weaponry and equipment they had used to wage war. In 
effect, victory precipitated a major logistical crisis in transport, storage, and disposal. 
Assets of all types were piling up everywhere as the residues of factory production kept 
arriving, while shipments overseas ended and disbanded military units returned kit to 
storage depots. Against the backdrop of VE-Day celebrations, there remained a lot of 
cleanup and inventory work on the horizon. The vast stocks of munitions and supplies 
had to be collected, appraised, stored, and disposed of so that the war’s material legacies 
would support, and not hinder, postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation. An excruciating 
amount of effort and attention was required to administrate, control, and untangle this 
logistical quagmire. After all, bedframes do not stack themselves. 
                                                 
4
 Ibid, “Report of Injuries Other than Wounds Received in Action,” 11 February 1946. 
5
 Ibid, “Ontario Provincial Police Report of Accident,” 12 February 1946; Ibid, “Report of Injuries Other 
than Wounds Received in Action,” 11 February 1946. See also: LAC, RG24, Vol. 16,166, War Diary – 
14th Central Ordnance Depot, Log Entries 11 and 12 February 1946. 
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The banality of collecting and storing leftover munitions and supplies served an 
important postwar purpose. Such actions allowed the military to manage the war’s 
materiality, tabulate inventories, and determine postwar requirements. Whatever kit was 
surplus – unneeded for future plans or operations – had to be discarded after hostilities 
ended. From bedframes to bullets, all the objects of war transitioned into peacetime 
through similar mundane routines. In doing so, however, they forged profound legacies 
that continued in many different forms and functions long after the fighting stopped. 
Even the bedframes that Denniston diligently stacked possessed a postwar legacy. 
Although this legacy might not have made it to the front page of newspapers, surplus 
bedframes ended up fulfilling a number of important functions in peacetime. Taken from 
empty barracks, they were reused in hospitals caring for injured veterans or university 
dormitories overwhelmed with new students. Some bedframes even ended up in the 
bedrooms of new home owners in suburban communities throughout Canada and others 
were scrapped by junk dealers or metal manufacturers who recycled the materials back 
into the economy.  
Whatever the case, objects impacted their surrounding social, spatial, and human 
relationships in both profound and subtle ways. As Bruno Latour explained in 
Reassembling the Social, objects connect the physical world with human actions and 
experience because they ground the “incommensurability” of social relationships in a 
physical setting.
6
 Objects provide stability to the human experience and have agency in 
shaping its character and outcomes. In other words, a material world forms the structures 
where human experiences transpire. Objects fill spaces, build homes, produce other 
things, provision activities, improve living standards, and connect humans to each other. 
Although their omnipresence can be taken for granted or render them invisible, their 
collective presence remains constant over time.
7
 Eventually, though, like the bedframes 
in Petawawa, an object’s utility and meaning gets used up or becomes surplus. The object 
then enters a new phase of its existence when it transitions between old and new uses and 
owners. In effect, this constitutes a disposal process. Broadly speaking, the term disposal 
                                                 
6
 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 63-86, especially 70-78. 
7
 Ibid, 78-86. 
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defines a two-way process in which one party (in this case the government or military) 
relinquishes something considered unneeded or used up, while another party acquires it 
in order to fulfill a need.
8
 Tracing the patterns of utility and meaning embedded into the 
disposal process is a worthwhile line of inquiry that this dissertation will follow in 
relationship to the political, economic, and social significance of surplus munitions and 
supplies. 
As the full scope and extent of the disposal problem emerged across every category 
of item and weapon, the fate of objects procured for war purposes coalesced in the minds 
of politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, business leaders, community groups, and 
average citizens. From about May 1943 onwards, they all began to realize the important 
and challenging nature of disposal. A great deal of time, resources, and tax dollars had 
been invested in procuring munitions and supplies, so what would happen to all these 
assets now that the war was over? To varying extents, it was understood that the 
liquidation of government assets had to be carefully planned and rationally implemented 
to avoid a postwar economic and political disaster. The vast inventories acquired by the 
government and military could not be wasted or thrown away haphazardly, particularly if 
certain objects maintained residual value in peacetime. Moreover, the unfavourable optics 
of having spent billions in public funds on suddenly worthless things would not appease 
any future electorate. The threat of profligacy and waste motivated policymakers to find 
as many productive outcomes for surplus assets as possible. Yet, at the same time, the 
vast inventories of surpluses posed an economic threat as an unregulated fire sale of 
second-hand goods would precipitate a deflationary economic cycle. If surplus assets 
flooded markets they would lower prices for new goods, shrink corporate profits, and 
decrease employment. Therefore, disposal had to walk a fine line between public 
pressure, political will, and economic stability. 
The question of what happens when wars end and when armies are disbanded is 
incredibly complex. As many scholars have demonstrated, making provision for the 
rehabilitation of veterans and establishing schemes for the postwar reconstruction of 
                                                 
8
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social services, the political economy, and family life were essential for supporting this 
transition between war and peace.
9
 However, there were many other plans and programs 
that occupied policymakers and military officers at the close of hostilities, some of which 
have received scant attention from academics. This is particularly the case in regards to 
cleanup operations and the disposal of Canada’s munitions and supplies. In fact, no study 
– academic or otherwise – was found on the subject. Therefore, this dissertation 
constitutes the first full-length history of the disposal of Canada’s munitions and supplies. 
To be sure, this dissertation is not the first study to identify disposal as a relevant or 
important topic. In fact, the burgeoning field of peace and conflict studies has long 
identified DDR or Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration as fundamental 
principles and strategies involved with ending wars and making peace. In general, 
however, these studies tend to focus on current events and contemporary conflicts (or at 
least those occurring after the formation of the United Nations).
10
 While informative and 
interesting, they are often underpinned with little archival research and tend to focus 
overwhelmingly on the Third World and Global South, even though rich and developed 
countries faced broadly similar challenges when exiting wars.
11
 Often far away from the 
carnage and destruction, developed and industrialized societies must also reintegrate ex-
combatants, demobilize war industries, disband military power, and dispose of surplus 
materiel. This dissertation will explore some of these important subjects by examining 
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how the Canadian government and military disposed of surplus munitions and supplies 
from 1943 to 1948.  
 A number of other studies focus on disposal or related subjects. In general, this 
body of literature can be divided into three categories. First, there exists some scholarship 
explicitly focused on disposal after the Second World War. However, the bulk of these 
studies were produced in the 1940s and might now be better interpreted as primary 
evidence indicative of the growing contemporary concerns for demobilization. 
Additionally, most of these early studies focused on the United States and explored the 
legislative and organizational responses to this gigantic and future problem. A. D. H. 
Kaplan’s The Liquidation of War Production is perhaps the best example, as his book and 
articles pointed out the potential dangers of inadequate disposal policies and outlined 
various solutions.
12
 However, Kaplan’s book was published in 1944, well before disposal 
operations got underway. Later publications from the 1940s, such as James Cook’s book 
The Marketing of Surplus War Property or articles by P. C. Greenland and John Berry, 
helped fill in some important gaps.
13
 Although disposal operations were still unfolding at 
the time, these publications informed readers about their progress and development. In 
particular, Greenland and Berry were well positioned to write their accounts as both men 
were in charge of Australia’s and Canada’s postwar disposal programs, respectively. This 
gave them a wide range of first-hand experience and access to documents and policies 
that, at least in Canada’s case, have not survived. 
A second group of studies consist of books and articles written mainly by collectors 
and material culture specialists. These are some of the most informative and engaging 
                                                 
12
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studies, as they cover the full gambit of an object’s existence – from its creation, usage, 
and destruction – and discuss how objects impacted their surroundings and owners. 
However, these studies tend to get object-fixated and do not reveal much information 
about the full scope of disposal across multiple categories of different goods. The book 
Military Aircraft Boneyards exemplifies this trend as it only covers how the Americans 
disposed of their massive fleet of surplus tactical and transport aircraft and offers little 
comment on any other weapon system.
14
 Other studies, such as Nicolas Saunders’s work 
on trench art, tend to focus heavily on the life histories and the significance of particular 
armaments, war trophies, and memorials. Although incredibly fascinating, these studies 
seek to understand the object’s cultural significance, meaning, and memory. Therefore, 
they tend to focus on the items that were kept or preserved and not consumed or 
otherwise discarded.
15
  
The emerging field of modern conflict archaeology offers valuable insight into the 
concept of “materiel culture” by situating objects within various wartime social and 
cultural contexts. Gabriel Moshenska’s The Archaeology of the Second World War and 
the edited volume Materiel Culture by John Schofield, William Gray Johnson, and 
Colleen Beck are important works that help decipher the “cultural biographies” of objects 
by examining their meaning, utility, memory, and heritage across time.
16
 However, as 
Nicky Gregson, Mike Crang, and Helen Watkins pointed out in an article on salvaging 
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souvenirs from derelict naval vessels, the need to understand how materiel culture exists 
outside the military context and inside civilian life helps further understanding of the 
“extended social lives of military things” and “their passage through value regimes to the 
point of their destruction.”17 This dissertation will add a fresh historical perspective to 
this growing field of inquiry by examining the postwar lives of Canada’s munitions and 
supplies in relationship to their disposal and impact on civilian life.  
The third group of studies mainly consist of book chapters and a small array of 
articles that touch on related themes. However, these studies are not explicitly focused on 
disposal and only cover the topic while in pursuit of other objectives and questions. For 
instance, in books such as Harnessing Labour Confrontation by Peter McInnis or The 
Other Cold War by Christopher Kilford, the disposal of surplus munitions, supplies, and 
real estate received some attention. Yet, these studies were exploring labour relations in 
the postwar period and Canada’s military assistance to developing countries during the 
Cold War. Therefore they tied disposal into these subjects and did not cover it on its own 
terms.
18
 The same observation can be made about the biographies of C. D. Howe, the 
official histories of the Department of Munitions and Supply, and several other books and 
articles focused on various elements of Canada’s reconstruction and rehabilitation 
programs.
19
 In the US, some scholars have covered the disposal of military surpluses 
after the Second World War. Jack Stokes Ballard discussed surplus disposal in a chapter 
of his book on economic demobilization, The Shock of Peace; while Sam Lebovic 
recently examined the fascinating origins of the Fulbright Scholarship program in an 
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article on the sale of war junk and American cultural globalism.
20
 In effect, the history of 
the disposal of munitions and supplies has only received passing interest from academics. 
No study exists that places the disposal of munitions and supplies at the centre of the 
narrative in order to explore the immense political, economic, and social legacies of the 
Second World War. 
Remarkably, Canadian military historians rarely address the subject of disposal. 
Studies on the industrial front, the war economy, and defence procurement – a field 
where one might reasonably expect such attention – are virtually silent on the subject. 
Currently, there is no comprehensive study on the history of Canada’s wartime economy, 
while the official histories of the Department of Munitions and Supply were written 
without a strong evidentiary foundation.
21
 In fact, most studies on the industrial front and 
defence procurement are exclusively focused on mobilization and production. While not 
entirely unexpected or without valuable insights, these studies recount how munitions 
were procured, thereby treating their manufacture and creation as an endpoint for 
inquiry.
22
 Product lifecycles and disposal are hardly relevant, unless they demonstrate 
how obsolescent weaponry requires replacement or justifies additional procurement 
expenditures on research and development.
23
 Indeed, economic demobilization and the 
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disposal of munitions and supplies are never treated on their own terms and remain, 
arguably, the most understudied topics in Canadian military history.
24
 
Most historians studying Canada’s Second World War focus overwhelmingly on 
combat operations by recounting the war’s progress through military operations, tactical 
deployments, and global strategy.
25
 In recent years, a growing social and cultural trend 
within the military history community has prompted more research into the human 
experience in conflict and post-conflict contexts. There is little doubt that this “new” type 
of military history has its benefits. Studying how individuals and communities survive, 
adapt, interpret, and recover from the traumatic experiences of war can yield many 
rewarding insights. However, surprisingly few studies ask questions about the material 
world underpinning the experience of war and peace. Instead, inquiry tends to favour the 
objects, weaponry, equipment, and physical environments in relationship to their impact 
and effect on combat operations, soldiers’ culture, and artifact collection.26 Yet the 
battlefield conditions only constitute a portion of the object’s total existence. Barring 
complete destruction or severe battle damage, the object’s “cultural biography” spanned a 
much wider time frame than combat operations and, depending on the object in question, 
contained many uses beyond killing.
27
 Studying the disposal of munitions and supplies 
explores some of these biographies as well as the changes in utility and ownership 
incumbent to an object’s transition from war to peace.        
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In recent years, the surge of scholarship on the home front has filled important gaps 
in the historiography of Canada’s Second World War. Jeffrey Keshen’s Saints, Sinners, 
and Soldiers, Serge Durflinger’s Fighting From Home, Graham Broad’s A Small Price to 
Pay, and Joy Parr’s Domestic Goods – to name just a few – have all furthered our 
understanding of how the war impacted Canadians politically, socially, culturally, and 
economically.
28
 Although pursuing other objectives and an array of different arguments, 
these studies have demonstrated – both directly and indirectly – a great deal about how 
the war effort and transition period were shaped by the presence or absence of objects. 
Whether it was through rationing and regulation, shortages and substitutions, or 
production and consumption, these themes tend to dominate the scholarship focused on 
the home front. This dissertation expands on these themes by pushing inquiry beyond the 
war’s traditional periodization. The state of war may have ended in 1945, but the tools of 
war outlasted it by many years. In doing so, they survived in different forms and 
functions and acquired new owners and meanings. In effect, this thesis is a history of how 
and why the objects of war were discarded, reconstructed, or rehabilitated in peacetime.  
Mobilizing the Industrial Front 
The disposal of Canada’s wartime arsenals was an essential job given the material 
abundance inherent in the nation’s war effort. Consequently, some discussion about 
procurement and economic mobilization is essential to contextualize the issues involved 
in the history of disposal. Perhaps the greatest beneficiary of Canada’s Second World 
War was the manufacturing sector. The war unlocked an avalanche of public and private 
investment that rejuvenated the national economy after a decade-long depression. 
Between 1939 and 1943, the manufacturing sector’s output nearly doubled, as its net 
value of production increased by 167 percent.
29
 Largely on the back of new 
manufacturing capacities sponsored by the government, Canada’s GNP increased from 
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$5.6 billion in 1939 to almost $12 billion in 1945, and the value of the country’s total 
expenditures on all types of war goods (including munitions, supplies, defence 
construction, and military pay) totalled roughly $28 billion or almost six times the GNP 
in 1939.
30
  
By 1945, Canadian factories had built some 9,000 ships (including over 800 naval 
and cargo vessels), 50,000 armoured vehicles and tanks, 16,000 aircraft frames, 850,000 
military-patterned vehicles, 1.5 million firearms, 72 million artillery and mortar shells of 
various calibers, and 4.4 billion rounds of small arms ammunition – enough to shoot two 
bullets at every human on the planet!
31
 Canada’s industrial effort also went well beyond 
the production of weapons and ammunition. From airports and new office buildings, to 
bedframes, uniforms, cafeteria equipment, radio sets, machine tools, ball bearings, 
typewriters, and much more, the war effort required a seemingly infinite assortment of 
goods, services, and resources – most of which the government acquired with public 
funds spent through the Departments of Munitions and Supply (DMS) and National 
Defence (DND).  
Although dwarfed by the industrial might of Canada’s three largest Allies – the 
United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and Soviet Union (USSR) – these numbers 
were astonishing for several reasons. First, Canada’s smaller population (11.2 million 
according to the 1941 census) and tax base meant that on a per capita basis the Canadian 
economy performed extremely well. Aside from the automobile industry, the country was 
an industrial backwater in 1939, rich in natural resources but poor in technical skill and 
investment capital. Indeed, at the war’s outset the British government reluctantly placed 
munitions orders with inexperienced Canadian manufacturers. That Canada eventually 
supplied Britain with over half of all motor transportation after the fall of France in June 
                                                 
30
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1940 was no small miracle and a testament to the efficiency of the Dominion’s “prolific 
automobile industry.”32 It was also a harbinger for the future of Canada’s disposal 
program. In addition to everything else, there would be a lot of surplus vehicles leftover 
in 1945. 
 
A second reason why Canada’s industrial effort was so surprising had to do with 
the initial war policies of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and his Liberal 
Government. At first there was a general reluctance to mobilize and equip a large 
expeditionary force for service overseas as memories of the horror and slaughter in 
France and Flanders a generation earlier served as an example worth avoiding. In the fall 
of 1939, and starkly contrasting the chaos of Sir Sam Hughes’s recruitment schemes in 
1914, the prevailing policy pursued by the Liberals was a cautious and calculated one 
later dubbed “limited liability” to describe its three main components: the British 
Commonwealth Air Training Program (BCATP), limited overseas military commitments, 
and comprehensive preparations for demobilization and veterans’ rehabilitation.33 The 
irony of Canada’s mobilization for the Second World War was not hard to miss. As the 
late C. P. Stacey, arguably Canada’s most important military historian, noted in his 
landmark study of Canada’s war policies and administration, Arms, Men, and 
Government: “a cynic might remark that in this war the government began planning for 
demobilization even before it had made provision for a really effective war effort.”34 
It was only after the fall of France, a full ten months into the war, that the federal 
government finally started taking steps to expand and organize an efficient war economy. 
In June 1940, the War Supply Board was replaced by the DMS, a new cabinet-level 
portfolio backed by a hefty administrative apparatus and sweeping authority to “mobilize, 
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control, restrict, or regulate” anything needed for war production.35 To head the new 
department, Mackenzie King appointed as Minister, Clarence Decatur Howe, who then 
proceeded to staff the DMS with highly capable bureaucrats, administrators, academics, 
businessmen, and technicians. Many of those hired by Howe were loaned from the 
private sector. At the time, newspaper accounts nicknamed them the “dollar-a-year-men” 
because the government supposedly paid them a dollar for their services, while their 
parent companies covered the rest of their incomes. However, research into civil service 
records showed that the government paid some of these “dollar-a-year-men” far more 
than a dollar per year for their services.
36
 Regardless of their salaries, the strategy was 
nonetheless effective since the DMS assimilated a wealth of managerial, business, and 
technical talent. This was especially critical given Howe’s proclivity for delegating 
authority and relying on his subordinates to get the job done.
37
 
To better acclimatize his new army of career business executives with little 
experience in governmental procedures, Howe created an executive committee composed 
of an inner circle of advisers whom he trusted implicitly.
38
 This executive committee 
became its own type of “Ottawa Men” as personal relationships between career 
bureaucrats and businessmen, plus the growing reliance on so-called “experts” with the 
necessary training in the social and natural sciences, business administration, and labour 
management were urgently required to expedite war production.
39
 Although Howe later 
earned the nickname “Minister of Everything,” it was impossible for him to keep track of 
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every aspect of the department’s business. As Robert Bothwell explained, some 
contemporaries misleadingly described him as the “ringmaster” to a “thirty-ring circus” 
but such analogies implied a micro-managing that did not exist.
40
 In reality, Howe was 
master of the inner-most ring, with all the other rings linked to him through his executive 
committee. In other words, Howe macro-managed his department, as Bothwell 
continued: he built a “highly centralized structure of authority” that was based on a 
“highly decentralized system of management and direction.”41 In making policies, Howe 
was the arbitrator between competing plans and concerned himself only with the big 
picture and let his advisers sweat the details. This pattern certainly held true in reference 
to disposal operations after the war.
42 
A fifty-five-year-old American-born engineer with a penchant for pragmatism and 
a booming budget of taxpayer dollars and foreign investment, Howe set about developing 
Canada’s industrial potential through a myriad of investment strategies, initiatives, and 
agencies. Under the terms of the War Measures Act (1939) and the Department of 
Munitions and Supply Act (1940), the DMS gained a monopoly over all aspects of 
munitions production, from the input of raw materials and labour to the output of finished 
products. In practice, this monopoly was put in place through the creation of several 
dozen production branches, resource controls, and Crown corporations. Production 
branches (such as the Ammunition Production Branch, Automotive and Tank Production 
Branch, or the Priorities Branch) were tasked with negotiating war contracts with private 
businesses and overseeing the construction of war materials.
43
 When private enterprise 
could not or would not fill the needs of the war effort the DMS established more than 
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twenty-five Crown companies to produce, purchase, or regulate essential materials and 
equipment, such as synthetic rubber, explosives, and machine tools.
44
  
Resource controls (such as the Aircraft Control, Metals Control, or Rubber Control) 
were responsible for ensuring that priority access to resources and scarce materials was 
first provided to those companies on war contracts. Controllers would ration, allocate, 
stockpile, and set prices for the supplies and a Wartime Industries Control Board (WICB) 
was established by PC2715 in June 1940 to provide controllers with a forum for reporting 
on their activities and coordinating their efforts.
45
 The WICB was the sister organization 
of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB) which was established to control 
inflation, prices, and all retail sales of commodities not related to war production. 
Eventually, to attenuate conflicts of jurisdiction, a controller on the WICB was also 
named the WPTB’s commodity administrator for the same resource or item.46 Together 
these two organizations formed the nerve centre of Canada’s industrial war effort and 
both organizations played an important role in the disposal of surplus assets after the war.  
The creation of the DMS signalled an expanding federal involvement with 
industrialization and a growing interest in subsidizing production. However, this 
involvement departed from the prewar norm. In the 1930s, most munitions contracts in 
Canada were funded by British taxpayers, and in the early stages of the war, the British 
despatched several Admiralty Technical Missions to North America and established a 
Supply Board in Ottawa. Through these organizations the British coordinated 
procurement, ensured that production was calibrated exactly to design specifications, and 
invested in Canadian industries converting over to war production. But with the creation 
of the DMS and Cabinet’s decision to funnel all munitions orders (both foreign and 
domestic) through Howe’s portfolio, the Dominion government increased its control over 
production. By March 1943, it took over all financial aspects of the industrial effort 
through a Lend-Lease style program called Mutual Aid. However, it is important to note 
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that these changes would not have been possible without the nucleus provided by the 
British expertise.
47
 
Duncan Hall and C. C. Wrigley noted these developments in their official history 
Studies in Overseas Supply, when they remarked that, “after the dissolution of the British 
Supply Board at Ottawa, the [DMS] wielded a wholly sovereign control over war 
production in Canada. It acted largely as agent for United Kingdom supply departments, 
but it was an entirely free agent, accepting or rejecting British supply orders, placing 
contracts, and manipulating priorities at its own discretion.”48 This increasing sovereignty 
over the finance and direction of industrial production was an important policy shift, but 
it also came with an increasing amount of political and economic baggage. The expansion 
of controls and regulations over the economy meant that the DMS was manipulating 
supply and demand to meet the needs of the war effort and also embedding public money 
at the heart of economic activity. Extricating such widespread government influence from 
the economy in order to allow the return of private enterprise – a key government priority 
in 1945 – would not be easy, especially in light of all the assets the government and 
military accumulated in order to prosecute the war effort. After all, the tools of war 
would outlast the state of war by many years.  
 The war emergency following the miracle evacuation at Dunkirk in May 1940 
provoked increasing federal regulation and expenditures. As Howe told the WICB in 
mid-1940, the Dominion would have to produce more of everything and do so within its 
borders.
49
 However, the initiatives commenced in 1940 did not yield instantaneous results 
nor did they cause any immediate dislocation to civilian production. As Graham Broad 
pointed out in his study on wartime consumerism, despite the carte blanche for munitions 
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production, up until the end of 1941 Canadian businesses were meeting most war 
contracts and production quotas by repurposing idle floor space in their Depression-
ravaged factories. Contrary to popular myths of scrimping, saving, and rationing on the 
home front, the production of a whole host of non-war related items (including passenger 
cars, washing machines, and toasters) continued well into the war’s second year with 
little interruption and a steady flow of parts from the neutral United States.
50
  
However, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 significantly 
changed the landscape of Canada’s industrial mobilization. With their entry into the war, 
the Americans initiated a massive rearmament program that took parts and resources 
away from Canadian production lines. Coupled with the Hyde Park Declaration of April 
1941, which alleviated the balance of payments crisis and further integrated the North 
American economies, civilian production in almost all sectors was cut off. For example, 
retail sales of passenger cars, trucks, and busses peaked at 130,552 in 1940 – the second 
largest year of motor vehicle sales in Canadian history – but by 1943 retail sales across 
the country had dropped to a paltry 4,798. The sharp decline was a product of a bevy of 
wartime regulations from the DMS at the beginning of 1942 that, among many other 
things, ended civilian car production and kicked war production into high gear.
51
  
The war emergencies following Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor coincided with, if they 
did not create, a period of unprecedented industrialization north of the 49th parallel. 
Between September 1939 and August 1945, private and public funding for the 
construction of buildings, the purchase of resources, and the import of machinery 
equalled about $4.5 billion dollars, a whopping $3.5 billion of which went directly or 
indirectly to the war effort (and a large portion of that total was spent between 1940 and 
1943).
52
 Through organizations like the War Contracts Depreciation Board (WCDB) 
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which began operations in August 1940, the DMS made the business of war profitable for 
private firms. The WCDB was responsible for approving special depreciation for private 
companies with war contracts that either had to purchase new war-related machinery with 
“no reasonable post-war value” or expand production lines to meet contractual 
obligations.
53
 Private industry also received other special tax benefits and allowances, in 
addition to favourable financial terms in war contracts, so that operating expenses could 
be written off more easily. This acted as a further catalyst for quickly turning over to war 
production and it is estimated that these measures provoked about $514 million worth of 
private investment on facilities and “about a similar amount for tooling costs.”54 In total, 
the government corralled about $1 billion for war production from the private sector.  
However, such investment was not enough to sustain the war effort since private 
companies were unwilling to invest in manufacturing items wholly dependent on conflict. 
Simply put, there was no profitable or sustainable future in the production of explosives 
or the manufacture and filling of ammunition. As a result, the DMS created the War 
Industrial Expansion Program to subsidize industrial production in many key areas (see 
Appendix 1). The program invested about $700 million dollars (or roughly one-fifth of all 
federal spending on the war economy) into two crucial areas: the purchase of machine 
tools and other precision instruments needed for munitions production ($500 million) and 
the construction of additional floor space ($200 million).
55
 From 1939 to 1945, the War 
Industrial Expansion Program sponsored the construction of 33.5 million square feet of 
new floor space at roughly 170 different locations across the country.
56
 It also paid for the 
importation of the most specialized machine tools needed for munitions production. 
Although these expenditures were a wartime necessity, when hostilities ended they left a 
considerable amount of floor space and some of the most advanced production machinery 
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in the government’s hands. Therefore, the disposal of this surplus floor space and 
machinery became a central issue after 1945, as their inherent peace dividend provoked 
widespread competition between public and private interest groups. 
In the wake of such large-scale industrial expansion, war production peaked at 
astonishing levels. The Great Depression and the “Dirty ’30s” seemed like distant 
memories on bustling factory floors. Operating twenty-four hours a day, employing an 
average of over 1.1 million war workers (peaking from April 1943 to June 1944), and 
despite periodic shortages of key materials and machinery, Canada’s war economy turned 
out mountains of munitions and supplies.
57
 By October 1943, the economy started hitting 
record marks and the publicity of production ceremonies soon followed.  In June 1943, 
Howe was photographed with Minister of Defence James Ralston in Oshawa, Ontario, 
where the 500,000th military vehicle (a battery charger lorry) rolled off the assembly 
line.
58
 In September 1944, Howe was also photographed with Edna Poirier, a munitions 
worker at the Defence Industries Limited (DIL) Cherrier plant in Quebec, who presented 
him with the plant’s 100,000,000th projectile. As part of the nation-wide ceremonies 
commemorating the 139th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1944, 
Howe’s wife, Alice Worchester, christened the 1,000th ship built at Canadian 
shipyards.
59
  
There is little doubt that Canada’s staggering production totals were unleashed by 
direct and indirect government expenditures and favourable economic policies. However, 
Canada’s war production was also constrained by the Dominion’s position within the 
Grand Alliance. In order to better coordinate logistics, the Allies created several 
international organizations, known collectively as the Combined Boards, which were 
dominated by the British and Americans. The most pertinent for the purposes of this 
study was the Combined Resources and Production Board (CRPB) established in June 
1942. The goal of the CRPB was to “combine the production programs of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, into a single integrated program, adjusted to the 
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strategic requirements of the war, as indicated to the Board by the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff, and to all relevant production factors.”60 In other words, the CRPB ensured that 
each country produced the goods best suited to its capacities and coordinated the flow of 
resources, parts, and technologies in order to maximize productivity. In practice, this 
multiplied the growth of American branch plants and subsidiary companies in Canada 
and reinforced, if not intensifying, Canada’s dependency on export markets. Moreover, it 
also ensured the standardization of British-patterned weapons and kit which, despite 
several attempts, greatly stunted the development of any trademarked Canadian-made 
products and designs. The ripple effects of the CRPB limited the development of more 
sophisticated industries, such as airplane engines. Canada’s entire aeronautical industry 
did not produce a single engine during the war. Instead, Canada’s aircraft manufacturers 
only produced airframes, parts, and electronics, and assembled aircraft once the engines 
were shipped north from the US.
61
 
Since neither the British nor Americans were willing to standardize their arms, 
equipment, and ammunition, Canada became Britain’s preferred source of supply in 
North America.  Apart from some common tank and aircraft models (such as the 
Sherman tank and the Cornell aircraft), American factories were not ideally suited for 
manufacturing British-patterned kit. Only the Lee Enfield .303-inch rifle was produced in 
American factories, while in Canada British-patterned munitions were fixtures on 
production lines: the .303-inch rifle, the 25-pounder field gun, the 3.7-inch anti-aircraft 
gun, the 2-pounder anti-tank gun, the Bren light machine gun, the Boys anti-tank rifle, the 
Universal Carrier, and the standard 3-ton and 15-cwt trucks.
62
 As a result, when 
hostilities ended the munitions and supplies requiring disposal were generally all British-
patterned. Given that the entire British Commonwealth was also facing disposal 
problems, traditional export markets were not always available or willing to purchase 
Canada’s surpluses. Thus, after 1945 Canada had tons of unneeded British-patterned kit 
to liquidate, but faced the challenging prospects of a domestic market too small to absorb 
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everything, while international markets were hotly contested and easily flooded with 
similar goods. 
However, since Mutual Aid accounted for roughly 70 percent of all war production 
in Canada, the vast majority of industrial output went to the UK and not Canadian troops. 
As Hall and Wrigley pointed out, the British were “the largest customer” of Canadian-
produced items. They estimated that the UK received about 60 percent of all tanks, 67 
percent of all artillery, 70 percent of all rifles, and 53 percent of all combat aircraft 
produced in Canadian factories.
63
 Canada’s production programs therefore benefitted the 
country’s allies ahead of its own armed forces, as the Canadian Army drew heavily from 
British stores and supply channels to offset any shortages.
64
 This arrangement worked 
satisfactorily during the war, but when hostilities ended the Canadian armed forces were 
left in possession of large quantities of borrowed kit. Although this greatly truncated the 
size and scope of Canada’s postwar disposal program, returning borrowed kit to the 
British was not a simple process. Therefore, the disposal of surplus munitions and 
supplies became entwined within broader political and economic questions related to the 
settlement of war debts and the establishment of Canada’s postwar military requirements. 
The expansion of industrial production coincided with the growth of other federal 
departments, most especially the Department of National Defence. Throughout the war, 
1.1 million Canadian men and women enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), 
Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and Royal Canadian Army – about one out of every eleven 
Canadians. Consequently, the DND had to acquire or construct the facilities and 
equipment so its personnel could live, work, and train for combat operations. Thus, 
despite the substantial amount of assets procured for the UK, the DND accumulated 
sizable inventories of every conceivable item. Moreover, the needs of the war effort 
dictated patterns in how the DND distributed its assets. This meant that financial 
investments, infrastructure expansion, and the deployment of military forces occurred 
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according to strategic and tactical objectives. Across Canada, new military bases, 
airfields, coastal fortifications, and munitions factories were established. Sometimes these 
wartime developments were extensive and all out of proportion to the local prewar 
population and economy. In other cases, the war emergency forced the government to 
rely on pre-existing industrial capacities and transportation networks, which were already 
clustered in the urban centres and usually located in Central Canada.
65
 Whether in remote 
areas or densely populated cities, the government spent money on acquiring the facilities 
and assets it needed to prosecute the war effort. However, the future divestment of these 
acquisitions posed a serious postwar challenge, particularly given their wide geographic 
dispersion across Canada and the fact that a large portion was deployed overseas in 
Europe.  
Regardless of the amount of kit returned to the UK or how little Canadian factories 
produced for Canadian troops, at the end of hostilities the military and government 
possessed large inventories of munitions and supplies. Although postwar requirements 
constantly changed, there were few illusions about the necessity of disposal. The postwar 
military needed only a fraction of what its wartime predecessor had acquired. In 1945, the 
Canadian military was poised for seismic reductions, as its total numerical strength was 
rapidly reduced from wartime peaks to barely 40,000 by 1947.
66
 Such profound changes 
and cut-backs generated many surpluses – even large quantities of new and high-tech 
equipment would not be required. In the immediate postwar period, demobilization and 
disposal were the dominant trends in military policies and procedures, not procurement. 
Between 1945 and 1950, Canada disposed of more military assets than it acquired. More 
tanks, planes, ships, trucks, buildings, ammunition, and uniforms (to name but a few 
examples) were disposed of by the government than procured by it.  
The Exit Strategy 
Canada’s war effort fundamentally transformed the country in myriad ways and as 
the defeat of Germany and Japan appeared more certain, the challenges of transitioning 
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between war and peace became increasingly urgent. As Howe told the House of 
Commons in April 1945 when presenting the White Paper on Employment and Income, 
“the central task of reconstruction, in the interest of the armed services and civilians 
alike, must be to accomplish a smooth, orderly transition from the economic conditions 
of war to those of peace and to maintain a high and stable level of employment and 
income. The Government adopts this as a primary object of policy.”67 The White Paper 
outlined the various issues expected to arise during the transition period and it also 
elaborated on what the federal government was doing to fulfill its promises for a smooth 
transition, high employment, and higher living standards.
68
 That this policy would be 
accomplished best through the divestment of public ownership and economic policies 
designed to reinvigorate private enterprise was a central element of the Liberals’ 
reconstruction efforts. As the White Paper explained “the Government does not believe it 
to be either desirable or practicable to look to the expansion of government enterprise to 
provide, to any large degree, the additional employment required. It follows that a major 
and early task of reconstruction is to facilitate and encourage an expansion of private 
industry, including primary with other industries.”69 
A central postwar issue was the unprecedented expansion of the federal 
government, its role in mobilizing war production, and the reconstruction of this new 
political economy into a viable peacetime framework. Government ownership and 
regulation was a wartime necessity, as Canada’s industrial mobilization did not happen 
by happy accident. It occurred because the government had rationalized the normal flow 
of business patterns, effectively suspending the laws of supply and demand for the 
duration of the war.
70
 As Joy Parr explained in Domestic Goods, the wartime economy 
stood normal business practices on their head. During the war, need trumped demand, so 
                                                 
67
 C. D. Howe, “Canadian White Paper on Employment and Income” Federal Reserve Bulletin Vol. 31, 
(June, 1945), 536. Presented to the House of Commons in April 1945. 
68
 W. A. Mackintosh, “The White Paper on Employment and Income in Its 1945 Setting,” in S. F. Kaliski 
eds., Canadian Economic Policy Since the War: A Series of Six Public Lectures in Commemoration of the 
Twentieth Anniversary of the “White Paper” on Employment and Income of 1945, (Ottawa: Canadian 
Trade Committee, 1965), 9-22, especially 15-21. 
69
 Howe, “Canadian White Paper on Employment and Income,” 537.  
70
 Even conservatives conceded the necessity of public-ownership in times of war. See: House of 
Commons, Debates, 19th Parliament Vol. 4, 12 June 1944, statement by J. H. Blackmore, 3725. 
  
25 
 
the normal channels through which goods and resources flowed were reorganized and 
redirected to support the war effort and not patterns of civilian consumption – particularly 
after 1941. More generally, this meant that  federal authorities increasingly intervened to 
regulate almost every aspect of economic activity and public investment was used as a 
tool for redirecting production away from a free market system towards something 
approaching a “command” economy with the federal government at its core.71  
Successfully divesting this power and influence to support private enterprise 
required an immense amount of preparations and diligence. As a result, plans for the 
postwar period began very early in the Second World War and were prompted largely by 
the interwar experience with veterans’ rehabilitation as well as the economic turmoil of 
the Great Depression. As Peter Neary explained, for many contemporaries the 1920s and 
1930s represented a postwar world that none wished to recreate. The hard lessons of the 
interwar period loomed large in the minds of all policymakers and motivated them to 
avoid another postwar disaster.
72
 The sentiment was widespread in government circles. 
As a 28 November 1942 memo from the Economic Advisory Committee (EAC) stated “if 
the government has not prepared a program in advance, the country will run grave risks 
of facing mass unemployment, social unrest, and a chaotic industrial situation which no 
ad hoc improvisations will be able to master.”73 Clearly, Canada needed an elaborate and 
multi-faceted exit strategy. 
Although it was impossible to predict the future, the major challenges of peace 
were anticipated in one form or another. As a result, government officials worked hard 
during the war to create plans and programs for postwar reconstruction, reconversion, and 
rehabilitation. By 1944, the major elements of the government’s exit strategy were ready 
for Parliamentary assent. Consequently, the 1944 legislative agenda became one of the 
most important in Canadian history. That year legislation was tabled creating three new 
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federal departments (Reconstruction, Veterans Affairs, and National Health and Welfare). 
Legislation was also passed establishing family allowances that paid families to help with 
the cost of raising children.
74
 A new version of the National Housing Act was introduced 
that created the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) to alleviate the 
growing housing crisis by regulating the real estate market, guaranteeing mortgages, and 
constructing homes through two crown companies.
75
 Furthermore, a whole series of acts 
were passed to provide veterans with war service grants, gratuities, support services, and 
educational benefits.
76
 Other legislation was passed to help farmers with loans for 
equipment and farming implements, while businesses were aided by the creation of an 
Industrial Development Bank that helped with financing peacetime industrial expansion. 
Moreover, a whole host of laws were also aimed at re-establishing foreign trade by 
loaning export credits for the purchase of Canadian products.
77
  
It was within this larger context of postwar preparations that the plans for the 
disposal of surplus munitions and supplies were formulated. Since the disposal problem 
emanated from wartime procurement, it only emerged as a major concern once Canadian 
industries started breaking production records. As Chapter 1 demonstrates, it was only in 
mid-1943 that policymakers started realizing the future scope of the disposal problem. 
After some extensive studies and discussions over the summer and fall of 1943, Cabinet 
approved PC9108 on 29 November 1943. PC9108 was a critical order-in-council that 
created the Crown Assets Allocation Committee (CAAC) and the War Assets 
Corporation (WAC). The CAAC was an inter-departmental committee designed to act as 
a hub for the paperwork associated with declaring surpluses and formulate general 
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policies about disposal. The WAC handled the physical aspects of disposal by collecting, 
maintaining, storing, selling, or destroying everything declared surplus by the 
government. A few months later in July 1944, Parliament passed the Surplus Crown 
Assets Act which formed a permanent legal, organizational, and administrative 
framework for the disposal of surplus government property. 
The formation of the CAAC and WAC is a starting point for understanding the 
argument and direction of this dissertation. Over the course of seven chapters, this study 
elaborates on four critical themes: 1) the continuous and evolving nature of public 
pressure for government action on disposal; 2) the role of the CAAC and WAC in 
administrating and controlling disposal operations; 3) the way the objects of war require 
stewardship from one use to the next; and 4) the process through which munitions and 
supplies are reduced, reused, recycled, and upcycled into new forms, functions, and 
intentions. Collectively these themes constitute the dissertation’s argument which is that 
through the CAAC and WAC the government disposed of its surplus munitions and 
supplies in order to support, and not hinder, postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation in 
Canada. Although disposal was not perfect and left behind some questionable 
environmental legacies, the conversion of surplus assets into peacetime purposes ensured 
that objects gained new uses and meanings thereby mitigating their threatening nature to 
economic stability, political authority, and public safety. 
The creation of the CAAC and WAC straddles the line between the first and second 
themes and demonstrates how the government responded to the political, social, and 
economic pressures it faced from interest groups. As Chapter 1 explains, business 
interests were initially the first to voice their apprehension about the future economic 
impact of government surpluses, but they were quickly followed by local and provincial 
governments and various other associations from across the country. Business interests 
were most concerned about the deflationary economic conditions that might arise if an 
uncontrolled flood of second-hand goods entered the marketplace. This was threatening 
because it would force the postwar economy into competing with the vestiges of wartime 
production and thereby lower prices for new goods of similar types, employment, and 
profits. Businesses wanted the government to eliminate this threat and some trade 
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associations even went as far as suggesting that all unneeded things be destroyed rather 
than resold in domestic markets.  
By contrast, political and social interest groups were less concerned about the 
economic ramifications and tended to view the impending liquidation of government 
property as a valuable opportunity to acquire cheap assets to assist with their 
reconstruction and rehabilitation programs. Like businesses, they also favoured 
increasing government regulation to control the flood of goods, but instead of 
accommodating corporate greed, they wanted surpluses deployed to improve social 
welfare programs wherever possible. Therefore, the disposal of munitions and supplies 
became entwined within the larger postwar debates about the role of the state and social 
security. It is worth noting that in regards to disposal, neither the right nor the left of the 
political spectrum objected to increasing government regulations and controls, though 
neither side agreed on the ultimate objectives for disposal or how the CAAC and WAC 
should implement their new powers.   
Pressure for government action also emerged within the bureaucracy itself. As 
Chapters 1 and 2 explain, in line with the mounting public pressure, a collection of 
bureaucrats and military officers came to grips with the disposal problem. The rapid 
development of military technologies and the immense training facilities located in 
Canada prompted an increasing need for disposal arrangements for production wastages, 
worn-out equipment, and obsolescent weaponry. As a result, a group of people inside the 
government and military were exposed to disposal early on and foresaw a future problem 
when more than just worn-out and obsolete kit required disposal. As a result, they 
pressured their superiors for action and later formed an important nucleus inside the 
disposal administration created by PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act. Although 
it proved difficult to keep some of these experts (many of whom were dollar-a-year-men) 
employed in the WAC long term, they were instrumental in formulating early plans and 
preparations. Later, once the flood of surpluses developed, their replacements adapted 
and expanded the WAC’s operations to meet a new series of challenges and problems. 
Chapter 2 elaborates more on the problems involved in managing disposal policies 
and procedures to accommodate as many interests as possible. In effect, the government’s 
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attempt to control the disposal of its surpluses ended up becoming a battle against 
diminishing returns. Not only was the value and utility of each asset depreciating over 
time, but every policy and procedure created an inconvenient mix of productive and 
deficient outcomes. In sum, an immense number of forms, receipts, and reports were 
generated when tracking and controlling disposal operations in order to ensure that assets 
were disposed of strategically. This, however, buried the Corporation and Committee in 
paperwork that grew to unwieldly proportions when the tidal wave of surplus declarations 
barrelled into the CAAC and WAC at the end of the 1945-1946 fiscal year. Processing 
paperwork, appraising inventories, and negotiating sales took time and significant delays 
and bottlenecks developed. These delays engendered a renewal of public pressure and 
criticism that was exacerbated by several related postwar problems that disposal 
operations were supposed to help remedy: severe material shortages, delays in industrial 
reconversion, labour disputes, a growing accommodation crisis, and widespread 
unemployment. Therefore, disposal operations were never perfect. Although they 
achieved a great deal, policies developed along pragmatic lines that were not always 
popular or without controversy. Having few precedents upon which to base such an 
extensive program of divestiture, the operations of the CAAC and WAC evolved with 
every trial and subsequent error.   
The third and fourth themes shift the dissertation’s focus to the objects of war 
themselves and the process through which they gained or lost utility in peacetime. When 
the war ended, the munitions and supplies – whether new, used, or surplus – did not just 
vanish on their own. Rather, they continued occupying a physical space, and until the 
disposal process affected their forms and functions, they also remained entirely capable 
of fulfilling their primary and intended purposes. This was quite problematic considering 
the vast stocks of surplus weaponry and ammunition, but less so for supplies and non-
lethal assets with a high degree of convertibility in peacetime. Whatever the case, objects 
cannot change their forms and functions on their own. Instead, the implements of war 
were ushered through the disposal process so that old uses, meanings, and owners were 
discarded for new ones. Change was imposed on munitions and supplies after the war and 
a concerted government program managed, controlled, and facilitated this transition. 
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Chapter 3 discusses two of the most critical aspects in the stewardship of objects: 
collection and storage. Following a major reorganization from August to October 1945, 
the WAC moved quickly to collect and store the objects that were physically impeding 
the return of peacetime operations on factory floors, the closing of military bases, and 
civilian pastimes. The WAC’s clearance and warehousing operations allowed the 
government to maintain custody of its surpluses, facilitate their repair or renovation, and 
ensure that the government received a fair reimbursement for its property. In doing so, 
the WAC formed a reservoir of assets – filling more than six million square feet of indoor 
storage space at its peak – which supplied reconstruction and rehabilitation programs 
throughout the country. The reservoir also acted as a shock absorber in that it allowed the 
WAC to control the flow of goods entering the domestic market. However, clearance and 
warehousing operations were not perfect. In general, the main difficulty surrounded the 
management and handling of an inventory comprising over 200,000 different types of 
items. Moreover, clearance and warehousing were also shaped by their high financial 
costs, the geographic dispersion of surpluses, the abandonment of assets, the extent of 
onsite pollution, and unexploded ordnance (UXO).  
Stewarding objects through the disposal process only started with collection and 
storage. In fact, hoarding assets was only a temporary measure and largely redundant if 
the inventories amassed never left the WAC’s possession. As Chapter 4 explains, there 
were only two ways to divest government property: either through sales or destruction. 
Fears of economic ruin through a faulty disposal strategy were commonplace in the 
1940s. Looking back at the experiences following the First World War, when sales of 
surpluses were largely unregulated and speculators profited handsomely, policymakers 
and politicians tacitly connected the onset of the Great Depression with the booming 
supply of cheap government property in the 1920s. This prompted the WAC to heed the 
advice and warnings of business interests and devise a selling strategy that explicitly 
favoured big business. As a result, the WAC decided to limit the public’s access to 
surplus stocks and only sell them through legitimate trade networks and businesses. In 
effect, this strategy turned established businesses into middlemen who reconditioned and 
resold the surpluses they bought from the WAC.  
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As can be imagined the public despised these measures since they could not buy 
direct from the WAC and had to pay higher prices for second-hand goods marked up by 
dealers and distributors. Moreover, the public’s anger surged whenever reports of the 
WAC’s destruction programs surfaced. The charges of waste and profligacy stemmed 
from what was perceived as the wanton and indiscriminate destruction of public property. 
To individual customers, the WAC’s selling and destruction policies were outrageous: 
there were significant material shortages in postwar Canada and a ready demand for 
cheap things, but instead of accommodating the marketplace the WAC refused to sell 
direct to anyone without proper business credentials and destroyed the remainder. 
Although this infuriated many desperate Canadians, few people understood the full scope 
of the WAC’s situation and responsibilities. The Second World War was incredibly 
wasteful and officials in the WAC faced the daunting challenge of mitigating the 
continuing costs of depreciating assets.  
Victory in 1945 produced vast quantities of leftover junk, while new goods quickly 
deteriorated in value, utility, and condition. Derelict equipment, lethal weaponry, and 
obsolete kit had limited value in civilian markets but their storage, maintenance, and 
marketing continued soaking up public money. Every surplus item entering the WAC’s 
possession cost it financially and over time these expenses far exceeded the profits from 
any sale. If no business wanted to purchase the materials or if the assets were considered 
dangerous to public safety, then the WAC had no recourse except to label them scrap and 
have them destroyed. However, contrary to public opinion, the WAC’s destruction 
program was a carefully conceived and rationally implemented process of reduction. 
Even when destroying assets, the WAC sought to salvage value. For instance, scrapping a 
weapon system meant breaking it down and separating out all the components from the 
whole. Collectively, the objects had little value by WAC’s standards, but as individual 
pieces their value and utility could change, particularly if they fulfilled new purposes or 
joined new systems of objects. In effect, the WAC’s destruction program was the first 
government-led initiative to “close the loop” on industrial production by reducing and 
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redistributing war assets, often but not exclusively, through the manufacturers that had 
originally produced them.
78
 
The fourth theme follows logically from the third by exploring where Canada’s 
materiel ended up and, whenever possible, how it was used or transformed in peacetime. 
When wars end, the objects accumulated to fight are often the only things available for 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. As Chapter 5 explains, given that severe material 
shortages existed in postwar Canada and the fact that everyone required objects to fulfill 
their own respective postwar plans and ambitions, government surpluses became highly 
coveted starting points for peace. A material world underpinned every aspect of the 
postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation. Although the WAC could never satisfy the 
ferocious demand, it provided a steady supply of goods and resources throughout the 
economy that helped mitigate some shortages in several key areas. In doing so, the WAC 
facilitated a process of material demobilization in which end users converted surplus 
materiel into useful postwar purposes. The transition from war to peace occurred as 
munitions and supplies were reduced, reused, recycled, and upcycled into new and 
different forms, functions, and intentions. 
Although many objects maintained residual value and utility in civilian hands, there 
were many other items that could never be adapted or repurposed in peacetime. These 
types of militaria were usually the lethal variety – automatic weapons, ammunition, 
explosives, tanks, and tactical aircraft – which existed in profuse quantities across the 
country and in Europe. Although valuable to collectors today, they provoked deep fears 
and concerns amongst the nation’s contemporary political and social authorities. 
However, since the WAC’s goal was to recoup as much of the original cost as possible, 
funding destruction was not always advisable. Therefore, the WAC saw international 
clients and allied governments as potential outlets for weapon systems and ammunition. 
Chapter 6 covers the overseas disposal of munitions and supplies in more detail, as 
Canada utilized the sale and exchange of surplus assets as a means of settling war debts, 
supporting its allies, protecting domestic markets from the full flood of available 
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 For more on “closed loop” logistics, see: Edward Humes, Garbology: Our Dirty Love Affair with Trash, 
(New York: Penguin, 2012); William McDonough and Michael Braungart, Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the 
Way We Make Things, (New York: North Point Press, 2002). 
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surpluses, and saving the costs of repatriating materiel from Europe just to declare it 
surplus in Canada.  
It is important to understand that Canada never became a full-blown arms dealer. In 
fact, for a variety of reasons, large quantities of its surplus weaponry, ammunition, and 
explosives were never sold, but they continued occupying overcrowded stowage space, 
particularly at the Bedford Ammunition Depot in Halifax, Nova Scotia, where a massive 
explosion occurred in July 1945. In the end, whatever was not sold required complete 
destruction. Chapter 7 explores this subject further in relationship to ammunition 
destruction and ocean dumping. After the Second World War, hundreds of millions of 
tons of conventional ammunition, explosives, and chemical weapons were thrown into 
the oceans. Practically every belligerent nation used ocean dumping for destroying 
surplus and captured arsenals. Ocean dumping became the preferred destruction method 
for a variety of reasons that were generally linked to the numbers involved, storage 
problems, financial costs, a lack of foreign markets, and public safety concerns. The 
long-term effects of saltwater corrosion and the ecological impact of releasing large 
amounts of chemicals, carcinogens, and poisons into marine environments were not 
considered a priority. This has left a frightening environmental legacy that few historians 
have ever researched.   
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A Note on Sources  
 
It would have been impossible to write this study without the records found in the 
Crown Assets Disposal Corporation fonds available at the Library and Archives Canada 
(LAC) in Ottawa. Formed in 1949, the Crown Assets Disposal Corporation (CADC) was 
the successor agency to the WAC and the records of both organizations were turned over 
to LAC in 1985. They are now listed as RG101, a record group that gets very little 
research traffic despite containing some interesting materials. However, while RG101 
was an indispensable source for this dissertation, it was also the greatest weakness. To 
put it bluntly: sometime between 1949 and 1985 large portions of the records of the 
WAC were destroyed. Although I have little direct evidence to support this claim, it is 
quite clear that something drastic happened to RG101 before it arrived at LAC.
1
  
The thoroughness and frequency of missing records is extensive. In total, the Head 
Office and five Regional Branches of the WAC handled 306,014 separate sales orders 
from 1944 to 1949. Every sale order required an immense amount of paperwork 
emanating from Regional Branches to the Corporation’s General Manager in Montreal. 
This created an extensive paper trail of records, which included: sales policies, inventory 
reports, internal correspondence, briefing memoranda, correspondence with purchasers, 
sales contracts, tracking receipts, appraisal reports, maintenance logs, theft and breakage 
reports, financial records, advertisements, and many other useful documents. So where 
did all this paperwork end up? Unfortunately, much of it is not available in RG101. Of 
the 306,014 sales orders, documents associated with perhaps ten are available in the 
fonds. Moreover, not a single set of records are available from any of the WAC’s 
Regional Branches and the records generated by the General Manager’s office were 
mostly created after the 1940s. It is no small irony that the bulk of records recounting 
Canada’s postwar disposal program were themselves disposed of sometime after the 
WAC ceased its operations. 
The silence is deafening. In March 1946 alone, an astounding 96,481 inquiries 
about surplus assets reached the WAC; most were hand-written letters from Canadian 
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 I plan on writing a future publication on the subject of demobilizing bureaucracies and document 
destruction in the Department of Munitions and Supply.  
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citizens and each required a response from the WAC. However, hardly any of these 
inquiries or responses survives in RG101 (for March or any other month). Additionally, 
the internal documents generated by the WAC’s staff to report on the impact or 
ramifications of this surging interest for surpluses are similarly non-existent. Moving up 
the chain of command, surviving records created by the Corporation’s senior executives 
and directors are disproportionately small considering their heavy workloads. In fact, the 
most important people in Canada’s disposal administration – John Berry, J. B. Carswell, 
H. R. Malley, and E. R. Birchard – left no record collections behind for posterity. The 
same can be said, though with less certainty, that few employees maintained extensive 
record collections while working for the Corporation in the 1940s. Although the search 
for private collections is still ongoing, the large gaps in the records of the WAC have 
been the most surprising and frustrating research challenge.  
However, all was not lost. Although RG101 lost much of its connective tissues, it 
still contains a large and complex skeleton. The documents that are available in RG101 
provide a general overview of how Canada’s disposal administration operated. They are 
filled with a variety of files on policies, procedures, and several case studies that 
predominantly span the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Several unpublished histories 
and meeting minutes from the WAC and CAAC are probably the most valuable sources 
available, as they provide a chronology of operations and document high-level policy 
decisions and important events. RG101 also contains some interesting records about the 
disposal of surplus government assets and property generated by the Centennial 
celebrations, Expo ’67, and the two Olympic Games hosted by Canada in Montreal and 
Calgary. Furthermore, since disposal crossed departmental boundaries, RG101 provided 
several important research-leads when accessing other record groups, especially the DMS 
(RG28) and DND (RG24). Most government departments kept tabs on the disposal of 
their surpluses and the operations of the WAC. Some, like the DND, even went as far as 
contacting purchasers to inquire about how their surpluses were being used. The 
correspondence, reports, and other documents available in these record groups were 
invaluable in augmenting the records of RG101. 
Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the use of digital 
technologies. Since RG101 possessed many holes and lacked the voices of those involved 
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with disposal, the discovery of any evidence that filled in these gaps was especially 
critical. In that regard, two bodies of evidence stand out. The first was the five annual 
reports compiled by John Berry and the WAC’s Board of Directors. The information 
contained in each annual report – summaries of events and problems, outlines of policies 
and procedures, reports on departmental operations, statistics on shipping and handling, 
and money recouped from sales – provided a solid narrative of the WAC’s operations that 
greatly expanded on the available archival material. The prize piece of evidence was 
located in an appendix attached to each annual report. Entitled “Sales of $5,000 or over” 
and compiled for each fiscal year (April to March) this appendix provided a critical list of 
selling information that included: year sold, dollar amount, a category description, a 
detailed description, name of the purchaser, and the purchaser’s location (city, province, 
and country). In total, the 6,631 sales listed in these appendices – a small fraction of the 
306,014 total – accounted for over 80 percent of all revenue generated from surplus sales. 
However, there was a problem with the sales lists: spread across 155 photocopied pages, 
individual sales were not easily sorted and patterns could not be readily deciphered or 
visualized. As a result, in January 2013, I created a “Sales Database” with the help of a 
sheet-feed scanner, Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software available in the 
History Department’s Digital Research Lab, an Excel spreadsheet, Open Refine software, 
and many days of elbow grease. This “Sales Database” quickly became a vital tool and 
source of valuable statistical data, particularly for Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
The official testimonies before the House of Commons Special Committee on War 
Expenditures and Economies (hereafter SCWEE) proved to be equally troublesome. 
However, the application of some digital technologies allowed me to make use of this 
other important body of evidence. The SCWEE was established in 1941 to monitor how 
public funds were being spent on the war effort and by 1945 it performed the same 
function for disposal. A whole host of government officials and bureaucrats (including 
John Berry and most senior executives with the WAC), military officers, association 
presidents, and even some outspoken critics testified before the SCWEE. It therefore 
constitutes one of the most valuable sources of information on both war production and 
disposal. However, without digital technologies, making use of this resource was 
prohibitive. The SCWEE produced well over 2,500 pages of meeting minutes, 
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testimonies, and reports that probably total about one million words. Finding relevant 
information inside this opus was like trying to find the right needle in a stack of needles. 
The sheer volume of information made the SCWEE records incredibly valuable, but also 
useless unless digital methods could parse it into something more manageable. Luckily, 
Western University’s library possesses a hard copy of the SCWEE meeting minutes 
spread across three volumes. In late 2013, I used the book-scanning facilities at 
Western’s Cultureplex Lab and OCR software to digitize all 2,500-plus pages and make 
them keyword searchable. 
 
 
  
38 
 
Chapter 1 
Preparing for Peace: Creating the Crown Assets Allocation 
Committee and War Assets Corporation 
The progress of the war has resulted in the needs of the armed forces for weapons, 
munitions, and equipment... Governmental machinery as a consequence has had to be 
provided for the disposal of surplus assets… The establishment of this new machinery is a 
constructive step toward meeting problems which are already facing the country and 
which will grow in magnitude as time goes on. It should help to relieve the anxieties of 
those who are apprehensive lest unneeded war materials, as at the end of the last war, 
should be liquidated suddenly and without consideration of the effect generally on the 
national economy and in particular on employment.
1
 
William Lyon Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada 
Introduction 
Wartime measures, controls, and regulations did not simply disappear without 
incident or recourse once Germany and Japan were defeated. Some controls were 
discontinued completely, but even then their cancellation was planned; others remained 
in full force long after victory was won. Certainly for Canadians living in the moment, 
especially for those who served in uniform, there were clear distinctions between the 
meanings of war and peace that developed organically and locally with the news of 
victory. Yet behind the scenes some of those changes and distinctions experienced by 
contemporaries were influenced, if not created, by the government’s immense postwar 
preparations.
2
 During the Second World War peace was anticipated by government 
officials who started planning an exit strategy long before the fighting stopped. Victory in 
war did not yield an end to centralized government authority; rather, the coming of peace 
required its expansion.  
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 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, Newspaper Clipping, “War Goods’ Disposal Set,” Montreal Star, 1 
December 1943.  
2
 For example, veterans will vividly recall where they were when discharged but few know much about the 
paperwork or inner workings of the government’s bureaucracy supporting their rehabilitation. Neary, On to 
Civvy Street, 160. See also: Henry Rousso, “A New Perspective on the War,” in Jorg Echternkamp and 
Stefan Martens, eds., Experience and Memory: The Second World War in Europe, (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2010), 5-6. 
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This chapter addresses one aspect of the government’s postwar preparations: the 
move towards creating the CAAC and the WAC. These two organizations formed the 
federal government’s entire disposal administration as they were tasked with the 
liquidation of all government assets and property that became surplus when the war 
ended. Yet the creation of the CAAC and WAC was never a certainty. Rather, their 
establishment stemmed from the reformation of an ongoing wartime relationship and 
interdependency between the federal government, business interests, labour unions, and 
all the various communal and public organizations that supported the war effort. With 
war production hitting high gear in 1943 and with a growing confidence in eventual 
Allied victory, some prescient individuals and associations realized that a comprehensive 
disposal strategy was urgently required. As early as October 1942 anxious businessmen 
and their associations drew attention to disposal issues by mailing letters and resolutions 
to government officials requesting assistance and the formulation of policies designed to 
protect their industries. They were followed by municipal and provincial governments, as 
well as educational, agricultural, and veterans associations, which wrote to government 
officials demanding an effective disposal strategy, priority access to surpluses, assurances 
of postwar prosperity, and offers for cooperation with federal officials.  
Throughout 1943 and 1944, these lobbying efforts provoked a changing attitude in 
government circles about the necessity of a comprehensive disposal strategy. Beginning 
around May 1943, officials in the DMS, DND, and Finance started contemplating the 
creation of a single government-wide disposal apparatus to handle all future surpluses. A 
single centralized administration was preferred over the disparate salvage arrangements 
developed during the war (and confined mainly to departmental requirements) and fit 
within the rationalized management structure that officials experimented with during the 
war. Therefore, on 29 November 1943, the Privy Council approved PC9108 which 
created the CAAC and the WAC.
3
 The CAAC was an interdepartmental organization that 
determined the broad and strategic policies related to disposal. It was responsible for 
receiving all surplus declarations from departments, facilitating inter-governmental 
                                                 
3
 The term “WAC” is used throughout this dissertation for ease of reference and consistency.  However, it 
must be noted that PC9108 created the “War Assets Corporation Limited” (WAC Ltd.) which operated 
until the Surplus Crown Assets Act confusingly terminated both the CAAC and WAC Ltd. and then 
reconstituted them as the CAAC and WAC (this time without “Limited” in its title).  
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transfers, and consigning surpluses to the WAC for final disposal. The WAC handled 
physical disposal by maintaining, storing, selling, destroying, or otherwise dealing with 
surplus assets. In line with other postwar initiatives and preparations, PC9108 was a 
prime example of how policymakers anticipated the needs of peace as it was designed to 
help ensure a smooth transition from the state of war to the state of peace. However, it 
was not a perfect document and several revisions were made in the spring, just before 
Parliament passed the Surplus Crown Assets Act on 12 July 1944. 
Given that public money had funded their manufacture or purchase, Crown-owned 
surpluses became entangled with wider political, economic, and social imperatives that 
competed for their possession and use. Severe material shortages caused by cancelled war 
contracts, labour disputes, and delays in the production of new goods added further 
intensity to the demands for surplus munitions and supplies. These items were supposed 
to fill the postwar vacuum in supply, especially since they were often the only materials 
and finished products available for reconstruction and rehabilitation purposes. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, many enterprising individuals, businesses, and organizations 
lobbied bureaucrats and politicians for special considerations in 1944 and 1945, and in 
doing so, helped shape the early history of the state’s disposal administration.  
The Parliamentary debates about the Surplus Crown Assets Act can be viewed as a 
microcosm as they came to encapsulate the broadest issues and implications of disposal. 
The Conservative opposition complained bitterly about the centralization of power inside 
the Privy Council and about a lack of public accountability on disposal operations, and 
highlighted several loopholes in the Act itself. Yet no political party objected to the 
creation of the CAAC or WAC and an uneasy alliance emerged across the entire political 
spectrum, as everyone appeared to recognize the importance of disposal operations and 
understood that the government would have to take the lead. When disagreements and 
criticisms surfaced they usually centred on how the government should proceed: should it 
divest all the assets it acquired or maintain them for future purposes? In effect, the 
disposal of surplus assets became enmeshed within the early development of Canada’s 
welfare state. After all, providing Canadians with social security required the retention of 
big government as well as the assets and property that enabled to state to fulfill its 
expanding obligations to its citizens and veterans. 
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Growing Concerns 
As the industrial effort reached its peak between 1942 and 1944, the issue of 
disposal started concerning apprehensive manufacturers who recognized that Allied 
victory would abruptly terminate lucrative war contacts and empty bustling factory 
floors. Many felt that government action was required to mitigate any dislocation and its 
potentially dangerous side effects, but at least initially, federal officials seemed less 
concerned with disposal and more enthusiastic about expanding production. However, 
over time concerted lobbying efforts from a variety of interests groups forced the 
government’s hand as these groups mailed officials dozens of resolutions and messages 
demanding action. In general, most resolutions from the business community voiced 
concerns about postwar reconstruction and reconversion, demanded the curtailment of 
certain war regulations, requested more information about the disposal of surplus assets 
and future tax and export policies, suggested favourable policy alternatives, and offered 
to send delegations to Ottawa for consultations.
4
  
Some of the earliest overtures from the business community were sent to J. L. 
Ilsley, the Minister of Finance, just before the war economy started hitting its peak. On 
15 October 1942 the Executive Secretary and Treasurer of the Canadian Association of 
Garment Manufacturers, Thos. W. Learie, contacted Ilsley about “a situation in the 
clothing trade which is giving the manufacturers very great concern. It has to do with the 
question of stocking materials for officers’ uniforms.”5 The problem related to the 
accumulation of cloth used for fabricating officer uniforms, the substantial financial 
investment this required, and the fact that the cloth was entirely dependent upon military 
specifications and therefore would be “an asset of comparatively little value” when 
hostilities ended. On behalf of Canadian garments manufacturers, Learie pressed the 
government for “reasonable consideration” on the matter by either allowing clothiers to 
set up allowances exempt from the Excess Profits Tax so they could cover potential 
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 For example, see: LAC, RG19, Vol. 387, File: 101-102-34, R. M. Brophy to Ilsley, 5 November 1943 and 
16 March 1944. 
5
 LAC, RG19, Vol. 387, File: 101-102-34, Thos. W. Learie to J. L. Isley, 15 October 1942. 
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losses in the future, or making some arrangements for the government to purchase all the 
inventory at the end of hostilities.
6
  
Ilsley passed the letter on to R. B. Bryce, Secretary of the EAC, who then 
canvassed officials in the WPTB and the DMS for their opinions on the matter. By 
January 1943, Bryce had heard back from Douglas Dewar, Chief of the Prices Division at 
the WPTB, and C. D. Howe, both of whom found no reason for urgency on the matter. 
Responding to Bryce on 6 November 1942, a few days after the Allied victory at El 
Alamein and just before Operation Torch, Howe stated that if the government assumed 
responsibility for the materials it would set a dangerous precedent and “invite 
overstocking.” Although he suggested the possibility of some income tax adjustments for 
inventories, his cautionary tone was unmistakeable. Drawing from his wartime 
experience with businessmen, Howe advised Ilsley and Bryce that “the suggestion [by 
Learie] is typical of the tendency of business to fall back hopelessly on the government 
for an easy solution of a problem that industry should settle itself.”7  
In early January, Dewar informed Bryce that the WPTB’s commodity administrator 
for Fine Clothing was adamant about the urgency of the problem, but that he personally 
felt that this case was exaggerated and that if action was needed in the future the 
facilities, controls, and purchasing authorities already established for procurement could 
be repurposed if necessary.
8
 Although both Dewar and Howe saw potential dangers 
ahead and offered some advice, they gave only token appreciation for the potential losses 
facing the garments industry. Howe’s dismissal of the matter is quite telling. At a time 
when Allied armies were just recovering from earlier defeats, his priorities for 
procurement were trumping his concerns for disposal. Moreover, his assertion that 
industry “should settle itself” demonstrated a certain ideological reticence about the 
future postwar economy. Even as Howe’s DMS created crown companies with haste and 
largely funded wartime productivity with public funds, a certain ideological 
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 Ibid, Thos. W. Learie to J. L. Isley, 15 October 1942. 
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 All quotes from: Ibid, C. D. Howe to J. L. Ilsley, 6 November 1942.  
8
 Ibid, D. Dewar to R. B. Bryce, 8 January 1943; Ibid, Memorandum for Mr. Ilsley “Re; Representation 
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preconception about a future with substantially less government regulation still existed. 
In early 1943, final victory was still an abstraction, much like the future shape of the 
postwar economy. It would take some time and effort to curb priorities and convince 
officials of the need for new government regulations. 
On 11 January 1943, Ilsley informed Learie that “after investigation and 
consideration” his lobbying efforts on behalf of garment manufacturers had failed. While 
appreciating that “a special type of hazard” might exist in the future, the government 
could not accept his suggestions. Ilsley then pointed out “that the manufacturers of 
officers’ uniforms will have to be prepared to assume the usual trade risks in connection 
with the materials which they stock.”9 However, almost as soon as Ilsley informed Learie 
there would be no support for garment manufacturers it became apparent that the decision 
contradicted other developments. While Ilsley, on the advice of senior bureaucrats, 
rebuffed the notion of assistance, lower-level bureaucrats and commodity administrators 
in the DMS and WPTB were forced into action.  
Perhaps Dewar should have listened more closely to the urgent warnings from his 
Fine Clothing administrator, because without guarantees for covering potential losses, 
clothiers stopped carrying large and expensive stocks of inventory. The long-term risks 
were just too prohibitive especially when in January 1943, the British Board of Trade 
made changes to its export laws that limited shipments of wool to Canada, thereby 
increasing prices.
10
 As a result, by the spring a shortage of both cloth and uniforms 
materialized just as a surge in new officer commissions coincided with the deployments 
of additional Army divisions to Europe and the invasions of Sicily (July) and Italy 
(September).
11
 To mitigate the problem Melbourne Merchandising Company and the 
Canadian Wool Board (crown companies established by the DMS and WPTB 
respectively to purchase and distribute wool) started buying bulk supplies of cloth and 
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wools in March. By October, the two organizations had approximately 445,000 yards 
valued at $1.65 million. Moreover, officials also discovered that considerable savings 
were accrued when the two government agencies stockpiled materials, set prices, and 
distributed inventories according to necessity and contractual obligations.
12
 
However, this was a somewhat belated discovery for officials involved in the 
garments trade, as the practice of stockpiling inventories ahead of production was well-
known in other industries. For instance, the WICB’s Aircraft Control purchased special 
parts, materials, and equipment to distribute to manufacturers two months in advance of 
any future production.
13
 Perhaps, the largest stockpiles were built up by the motor car 
companies on war contracts. As Howe told the House of Commons in November 1945, 
car companies and the associated WICB Controls usually accumulated production 
materials “five or six months ahead of final assembly” but once VJ-Day happened 
“everything stopped” thereby creating the large surplus of parts, materials, and equipment 
that businesses were dreading.
14
 Thus, the needs of the war effort forced the government 
to invest more public money across an increasingly wider spectrum of industries and 
stockpile more resources and parts. 
The increasing scope of government expenditures prompted another letter from 
Learie on 9 November 1943. However, this time it was accompanied by a “Resolution 
Passed at a Conference Work Garment Industry.” This resolution was typical of many 
received by the government because it stated the nature of the disposal problem in 
relationship to “excess military supplies” and argued that “a serious accumulation of 
wearing apparel for military purposes” would exist after victory. In a common refrain, the 
resolution brought attention to “the most serious effect on the operation and development 
of industry” should surpluses be dumped indiscriminately on Canadian markets.15 In 
other words, Learie’s November letter had a substantially different objective than his 
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earlier one. Rather than asking for the government to purchase more supplies at the end 
of hostilities, garment manufacturers were now worried about the state’s plans for 
liquidating its inventories of clothing and uniforms accumulated during the war. To that 
effect, the resolution offered some policy alternatives. It suggested that surplus clothing 
be “used for the relief of sufferers in the war areas” and that if distribution happened in 
Canada, it should be “done through the recognized and authentic channels” so the 
industry was not destroyed by a flood of cheap, used clothing and fabrics.
16
  
More generally, Learie’s efforts fit into a prevailing pattern of activism on the part 
of businesses and provided an “indication of growing public interest” that deserved 
further attention.
17
 Prompted largely by the DMS’s regulatory powers, stimulus for 
industrialization, and mandate for all-out production, an increasing number of other 
interest groups, commercial associations, companies, and eventually municipalities began 
contacting the government with serious concerns about disposal issues. For example, on 
16 June 1943 a resolution from the Board of Trade of the City of Ottawa arrived at 
Ilsley’s office. It called on the government to give manufacturers preference and priority 
for purchasing future surpluses to “prevent economic waste and not create undue 
disturbance in domestic and export markets and the usual regular channels of business.”18 
Later in October the North Bay Board of Trade issued a resolution that fully endorsed the 
resolution from Ottawa’s Trade Board.19 Another example was J. F. McMullen, the 
President of Marshall-Wells Canadian Companies Ltd., who wrote to Ilsley in August 
with his suggestions and to inform the Minister that his company was willing to purchase 
back most of what it produced, particularly if the items were still packaged and in good 
condition.
20
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The pattern of activism only intensified throughout the fall of 1943. In September 
the Edmonton Ex-Service Men’s Rehabilitation Committee mailed the government a 
resolution that was unanimously endorsed by practically every veteran association across 
Canada.
21
 The resolution demanded that, at the end of hostilities, the Dominion “retain all 
rights and title to all war material” until an Advisory Board was established and 
composed of “a representative body of ex-servicemen and women” together with 
government officials.
22
 In November the deluge of resolutions, inquiries, and 
representations took off and did not let up. That month four important commercial 
associations petitioned the government. On 5 November, the Radio Manufacturers 
Association of Canada, contacted both Ilsley’s and Howe’s offices. This was followed by 
a letter to Clifford Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance, from Fred R. Smart, Secretary 
Manager of the Stationers’ Guild of Canada. At the end of November, both the Canadian 
Institute of Plumbing and Heating and the Canadian Builders Supply Association also 
sent resolutions to Howe’s office and copies to Ilsley’s.23  
These associations represented some of the most crucial manufacturers in Canada’s 
war effort, as they furnished it with radio and telecommunications equipment, typewriters 
and office supplies, furnaces and plumbing, and building materials of all shapes and 
sizes. All four associations were very concerned that the items originally produced by 
their members for war purposes could be recycled back into the domestic economy after 
victory, thereby undercutting the production of new items and undermining their 
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respective industries.
24
 Fred Smart and the Stationers’ Guild even went as far as to 
suggest that “if surplus goods cannot be reasonably absorbed through regular channels, 
that they be offered in foreign markets” and that “if no foreign market is found…that 
such merchandise should either be frozen for an indefinite period or as a last resort 
completely destroyed.”25 Destroying perfectly useable assets rather than allowing them to 
enter a materially-starved marketplace was a completely self-serving and drastic 
suggestion, yet the Stationers’ Guild was not alone in making that recommendation. In 
fact several other commercial associations saw the destruction of all surpluses as the 
preferable option rather than allowing their resale, as both the Automotive Chamber of 
Commerce in January 1944 and the Allied Drug Council (representing the manufacturers 
of pharmaceuticals, medicines, and medical supplies) in September 1944 informed the 
government of this strategy’s viability.26 
The situation in the garments trade was not unique. Rather, it reflected a common 
situation facing almost every manufacturer at war’s end. The government’s expansion 
and expenditures across all sectors – aircraft, motor vehicles, garments, and many more – 
had created a major political and economic conundrum. The measures taken by the 
Canadian Wool Board and Melbourne Merchandising might have mitigated severe 
wartime shortages in officer uniforms, but they did not solve the overarching issue. 
Through these agencies the government took on the financial risk of owning potentially 
worthless assets, thereby relieving the civilian economy of absorbing the losses so it 
could continue production without the final price tag overhanging its output. By 
manipulating supply and demand the government was not only accumulating vast 
inventories of assets (some of which would require disposal long before the war ended), 
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but it was also blurring the mandates and accountability of its various departments and 
agencies involved. Considering the plethora of militaria produced in record numbers, 
federal interference in economic matters set a serious precedent and came with a 
potentially large price tag that no department’s budget could absorb alone.  
Absorbing financial losses became the bureaucracy’s proverbial hot potato. 
Although the DMS and DND claimed the lion’s share of the war’s financial 
responsibilities, this was not always the case. Subsequent correspondence throughout 
early 1944 sought to iron out the accounting details relating to officer uniforms. On 22 
November 1943, Donald Gordon, the Chairman of the WPTB, wrote to G. K. Sheils, the 
Deputy Minister of the DMS, to ascertain his department’s views on the matter and 
suggested that National Defence absorb any losses. Sheils wrote back in December 
indicating that the DMS had no “status in the matter.” He also agreed that any losses 
incurred in the procurement of officer uniforms should be carried on the accounts of the 
end user: National Defence.
27
 By March, W. P. Walker, Vice-President of the Canadian 
Wool Board, wrote Ilsley informing him that the RCAF had agreed to cover the losses 
but required a special grant from the Treasury Board to purchase the necessary fabrics.
28
 
This clever ploy to pass the buck back to Finance failed because Ilsley refused the 
request. After considering the issue Ilsley felt that it gave the RCAF a chance to make 
purchases “on an extravagant scale” while setting a precedent for the other services to 
follow.
29
 The special grant would result in even larger inventories requiring disposal. In 
the end, Ilsley’s decision meant that the Wool Board and WPTB were on the hook if 
DND declined to cover the losses and had to prepare arrangements for this eventuality.  
With similar situations bound to emerge in the future, officials started realizing the 
necessity of coordination. Budgetary considerations and bureaucratic competition 
threatened the development of a comprehensive and practical disposal strategy. However, 
they also served as warning signs. From mid-1943 onwards, the disposal problem began 
receiving more consideration from officials who were motivated to create a workable 
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solution that would mitigate financial losses by recouping some of the original cost, 
address the needs of businesses, help prevent another postwar depression, and solve any 
inter-departmental conflicts or confusion. It was obvious to all involved that an inter-
departmental committee was required, as this would centralize everything related to 
disposal within a single administration. Moreover, forming a new inter-departmental task 
force minimized duplication and conflicting policies, would allow a centralized group of 
experts to consult with interest groups, and would ensure that policies were uniformly 
implemented and monitored over time. But how exactly would this administration work? 
And who would be in charge? 
Disposal of Obsolete Stores before PC9108 
Before November 1943 there were only three government agencies that handled all 
disposal operations: the Treasury Board’s Chief Salvage Officer in the Department of 
Finance, the Army Salvage and Disposal Board (ASDB) operated by the Canadian Army, 
and the Scrap Disposal Branch established by the DMS. The experience of these three 
smaller organizations was of inestimable value to the future disposal administration. 
However, with the exception of the Salvage Officer, each one was formed for specific 
departmental requirements and therefore they were not well suited for providing the 
necessary inter-departmental administration. Instead, they provided a cadre of expertise 
that was essential in the initial stages of preparations. That such experience existed before 
the creation of the CAAC and WAC demonstrates that the problem of disposal was not 
simply confined to postwar matters. Rather, the disposal of surpluses and obsolete stores 
was also a wartime necessity. 
Of the three, the Chief Salvage Officer had the widest mandate and was the only 
one that predated the outbreak of war. J. C. Kelley, the Chief Salvage Officer, and his 
staff of ten in Ottawa handled all of the government’s disposal needs, except for the DMS 
and DND (Army).
30
 Once surpluses were declared by a department, Kelley’s role was to 
either facilitate an inter-departmental transfer or sell the goods by public tender. 
According to an article in the Ottawa Journal in October 1940, Kelley was in charge of 
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“the biggest and strangest second-hand business in Canada” as he oversaw the sale of a 
diverse amount of things: old typewriters, old bridges, an old lighthouse, real estate, used 
auto tires, old cars, old bones, polar bear rugs, fur coats, and even “false teeth, ancient 
style...a hangover from an old government supply of dental stores.”31 Over time Kelley 
developed some talent for the sale of junk. He could find a buyer for practically anything, 
even one for “a badly-battered car lying at the bottom of a 200-foot ravine in British 
Columbia.”32 The article concluded that Kelley and his staff provided an important 
service for the government by acting as “a clearing house and agent for all government 
departments.” Its set-up was small and economical, something that ran contrary to all the 
stories read by taxpayers about “Government extravagance.”33    
Although both the RCAF and RCN relied on the Chief Salvage Officer for the 
disposal of surpluses and obsolete kit, the Canadian Army established a procedure and 
organization for managing its internal needs. On 25 June 1941, the Obsolete Stores 
Committee and the ASDB were created.
34
 The Obsolete Stores Committee was 
responsible for inspecting the condition of all kit and supplies and then recommending 
whether they be disposed of to the ASDB or destroyed. The ASDB was placed under the 
command of Lt-Col. W. G. B. Dailley, who was a senior executive with the T. Eaton 
Company. in civilian life and had acquired extensive experience in both “salvage disposal 
for the British Armies in the last War” and “the merchandizing of goods in Canada.”35 
Dailley and the ASDB sold items by tender to the public or found other potential users 
within the government or military. Eventually the DND created the Inter-Services 
Committee for Interchange of Surplus Assets which relieved the ASDB of its latter task 
and formalized the administration and exchange of surplus goods from one service to the 
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other.
36
 Judging by the sales reports found in the ASDB’s war diary and records relating 
to the exchange of assets within the DND, the military developed some workable 
arrangements for transferring surpluses between the Services. These arrangements 
worked efficiently since the ASDB did not handle many new or gently-worn assets. 
Instead it mainly dealt with the derelict items unwanted by the Services, such as: a variety 
of scrap metals and wood, derelict or worn out equipment, component parts, rags and old 
socks, old uniforms and clothing fabrics, old boots, spent ammunition casings, used food 
containers, and jerry cans.
37
 
The Scrap Disposal Branch of the DMS was established around the same time as 
the ASDB. Its job evolved out of the need to manage the waste caused by production. 
Early in the war, the disposal of scrap metals and materials incurred through 
manufacturing war goods was handled by the war contractor under special authority 
granted in the terms of their contracts. However, as the official history of the DMS 
pointed out, few contractors knew what to do with the waste and would dispose of it 
haphazardly in dumps or in storage rooms on site, or they sold it to junk dealers (and kept 
the profits).
38
 This situation changed as the demands of the war increased on industry and 
with the development of resource conservation and streamlining programs designed to 
ensure that production quotas created as little waste as possible.
39
 A survey 
commissioned by the DMS in the summer of 1941 found that better controls over the fate 
of refuse, trimmings, and used materials could help increase production, especially if the 
scrap resources were recycled back to manufacturers or if the DMS controlled the 
proceeds of their sale. On 15 October 1941, the Scrap Disposal Branch was formed and 
W. B. Gordon, its first and only Director General, and his staff of nine subordinates 
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handled the disposal of all scrap derived from war contracts, scrap derived from the 
operations of crown corporations, and any materials that required disposal because of 
design changes.
40
 These arrangements remained in place until PC9108 was issued and in 
May 1944 the Scrap Disposal Branch was absorbed into the WAC.
41
 
None of these organizations were capable of managing what lay ahead. Although 
all three gained valuable experience in selling obsolete things, few new goods or large 
quantities of expensive items ever became available during the war. Consequently, most 
of what they sold was surplus because of obsolescence and not because the need had 
terminated. Moreover, as the war progressed, the scale of disposal expanded beyond the 
original capabilities of these organizations. By mid-1943 disposal had become an 
increasingly larger wartime necessity and a source of great consternation for the DND. 
Just before industrial production peaked in October, the war effort reached its watershed 
in supply. At that point, several types of weapons systems and other assets employed 
continuously from the outbreak of war started reaching the end of their lifecycles. 
Moreover, technological innovation resulted in the development of newer and better 
models that were starting to replace a wide variety of weaponry. J. B. Carswell, a 
Director-General of the DMS stationed in Washington and later appointed President of 
the WAC, summarized the situation that summer: 
In the summer of 1943 the production of war munitions by the Allies had 
reached a rate approximately four times that of the Axis. In all three 
countries, U.S., U.K., and Canada, it was realized that at last we had reached 
a stage where we had both time and elbow-room to weed out of our 
respective programmes both obsolescent and surplus items. This movement 
started about May ’43 and has been increasing in size and tempo ever since.42 
The problem of obsolete weapons and equipment was particularly acute in the 
RCAF. Almost from its outbreak, the war provoked rapid technological development in 
aircraft design and engines that resulted in constant changes to the arsenals of Allied 
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fighters and bombers. This wreaked havoc, not only on production lines plagued by 
frequent alterations in aircraft design, but also in pilot and flight training as newer models 
rendered the elementary training aircraft increasingly obsolete.
43
 With the establishment 
of the BCATP in December 1939, Canada faced a serious deficit in training aircraft and 
so the RCAF purchased Tiger Moth, Finch, and Anson airplanes while contracts were 
issued to manufacture additional numbers.
44
 By 1941, however, the Tiger Moths and 
Finches were, after some extensive negotiations, designated for replacement by the 
Cornell and newer models of the Anson.  
At the mid-point of 1943 the second generation of aircraft was becoming 
increasingly obsolete and required disposal. Two reports were circulated to Cabinet in 
April and May 1943 outlining what steps were being taken to “guillotine” aircraft (to 
scrap planes for their component parts). The process of “guillotining” the obsolete Tiger 
Moth and Finch models had commenced immediately when Cornells began replacing 
them, but now the RCAF was seeking approval from Cabinet for an expanded “second 
stage” that would take all Tiger Moths and Finches out of service over a two-year period, 
systematically “guillotining” each one.45 Clearly, officials in the DND were grappling 
with disposal problems, as the April report stated “it must be accepted that no aircraft 
type, nor indeed any type of warlike equipment, can persist forever. This is a condition 
that is forced upon us by enemy competition and which, with varying urgency, affects all 
types of equipment from front line combat to elementary training.”46  
The Canadian Army also had problems with obsolete kit. Issues involving disposal 
and salvage overseas were dealt with by the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps and the 
Salvage Collection Units of the Ordnance Corps, but at home special arrangements were 
made. For example, the issue of storage space in training camps and ordnance depots 
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(many hastily constructed or expanded after 1939) became a serious problem in late 
1942. By that time, the Army had recruited, trained, and deployed several infantry and 
armoured divisions’ worth of troops. To become effective soldiers, successive waves of 
recruits required extensive practice at shooting and therefore millions of rounds of 
ammunition were expended on firing ranges. However, every bullet or shell shot also 
expended a cartridge casing, in addition to the wooden packaging crates used for storing 
and transporting the ammunition in bulk. Standard procedure dictated that these empties 
were picked up and stored on site. By December 1942 a crisis was developing since many 
training camps and firing ranges were running out of storage space.
47
  
“No one knew what to do” wrote the anonymous author of a January 1945 
newspaper article in the Longue Pointer, the popular newspaper published at Longue 
Pointe Ordnance Depot in Montreal. But a solution was in the offing. On 12 January 
1943, the Ammunition Empties Group was formed at Longue Pointe under the command 
of Major O. Rabatich, the Inspecting Ordnance Officer for Military District 4. Its purpose 
and function was “to recondition and return to service all ammunition packages, boxes, 
containers, fired cartridge cases, and other ammunition components” used by infantry and 
artillery units in training operations in Eastern Canada.
48
 At the Depot’s Shed 47 (and in 
conjunction with the ASDB), the Empties Group built up a system in which they received 
shipments, inspected the serviceability of each item, and prepared them for future 
disposal. Non-serviceable casings were turned over to the Depot’s Salvage Group which 
sold them back to war contractors as scrap brass. Serviceable casings were stored until 
orders came from the ammunition-filling plants working for the DMS. It was at the 
ammunition filling plants that these serviceable casings were refurbished and refilled for 
eventual reuse.
49
 
In government circles, the summer of 1943 was a breaking point as the military’s 
issues with obsolete kit mixed with the public’s growing interest in disposal matters. The 
situation required action and thankfully there were several prescient officials in the 
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government’s bureaucracy who were independently considering the disposal problem. 
With all these issues swirling, suddenly superiors started listening and Carswell was one 
of the first to speak up. Carswell understood that disposal operations would not just 
involve the sale of obsolete junk since the armed forces and government would no longer 
require their large stocks of arsenals and assets. Victory would necessitate the liquidation 
of all inventories and many items would be state-of-the-art or in peak working condition, 
while others might retain value for civilians in different forms and functions. Therefore, 
the disposal of such assets needed special consideration well beyond the sale of war junk. 
On 14 June, Carswell wrote Howe to outline the potential dangers and risks that lay 
ahead. He stressed the applicability and usefulness of early and comprehensive disposal 
arrangements “as a war measure” (emphasis original) since the “weeding-out” of obsolete 
kit created surpluses that required immediate disposal. A month later, he submitted a 
briefing note that suggested a course of action for dealing with war surpluses.
50
 Shortly 
thereafter, Howe recalled Carswell from Washington and ordered him to implement his 
suggestions. According to Carswell, this was followed by “several conferences with other 
departments of the Government interested, culminating in a luncheon meeting in Ottawa 
in October” when he sketched out his proposed ideas about the creation of a Committee 
“to define surpluses” and a Corporation “to dispose of them.”51 
Initially Carswell’s appointment might have surprised some colleagues in the DMS. 
Stationed far away in Washington, he was an outsider to the Department’s Scrap Disposal 
Branch. But Howe had an impeccable ability for picking the right men for the right posts 
and Carswell’s appointment fits this pattern. Formally educated as an engineer, Carswell 
arrived in Canada in 1910 from Paisley, Scotland, and found work in Montreal with the 
company Ross & MacDonald. A few years later he was transferred to their Toronto office 
where he worked on several major construction projects including, Union Station, the 
Royal Bank Building, and the Central Technical School. During the First World War he 
worked for the Imperial Munitions Board’s aviation department as chief engineer 
overseeing the design and construction of all camps, airfields, and buildings in Canada. In 
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1918, he started his own construction business and sold it ten years later to become the 
managing director of Burlington Steel Company Ltd.
52
 When war broke out again in 
1939, Carswell was retired and living in New York but still volunteered his services to 
the Canadian government. After receiving a stellar reference from J. C. Armer of 
Dominion Forge & Stamping Co. Ltd., he was hired by Wallace Campbell, head of the 
War Supply Board, in early 1940 and sent to Washington.
53
 With his combination of 
business and engineering backgrounds, his experience during both world wars, and his 
reputation and connections with the international community, Carswell was the ideal man 
for the job of disposal. 
PC9108: Creating the Committee and Corporation 
Despite the wealth of experience with disposal, the Salvage Officer, the ASDB, and 
the Scrap Disposal Branch were not initially consulted. Instead, when officials in the 
DMS, DND, and Finance started seriously contemplating disposal issues they turned to 
others. Independent of Carswell and prompted by the situation with garments 
manufacturers, Gordon broached the subject with W. A. Bark, president of the crown 
company Wartime Salvage Ltd., sometime in April or May 1943. On 5 August, Bark 
submitted a two-page report in which he expressed some observations gained from 
consultations and correspondence with several businesses that summer, including Willard 
Storage Battery Company and Knowles Bailey Ltd.
54
 Bark made several suggestions, 
including selling assets by tender through “regular distribution channels” and creating a 
catalogue of all surplus items. He also explained that forming a new disposal agency 
might not be necessary if the existing controls and production branches were cleverly 
reorganized to handle disposal. The plan would obviously benefit from the experience 
and expertise gained throughout the war: 
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By putting the present machinery in reverse and using various Controllers and 
Administrators for the purpose of disposing of the particular supplies they, 
themselves, created would seem to be a natural set-up. e. g. –  
1- Aircraft Production Branch might become Aircraft Disposal Branch;  
2- Automotive and Tank Production might become Automotive and 
Tank Disposal; 
3- Administrator of Heating and Plumbing would direct the disposal of 
heating and plumbing fixtures; 
4- Administrator of Fabricated Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals might 
direct the disposal of all such materials.
55
 
Although such a suggestion made sense in theory, it was not very practical. At that 
time, war production was about to peak and each control and agency was wholly 
absorbed in ensuring that production continued at its rapid pace. Burdening officials with 
disposal – a problem as equally complex as procurement – was not ideal. Additionally, 
such reorganization was limited to department-specific arrangements and therefore would 
not be uniformly applied across the whole government. This would inevitably cause 
serious duplication and internal competition, while also overwhelming existing 
arrangements with more assets than their small staffs could handle. Moreover, in the case 
of the Salvage Officer, the ASDB, and the Scrap Disposal Branch, they remitted the 
profits from all sales back to the departments they serviced. Such arrangements 
subsidized departmental budgets in some small measure, but with the expected volume of 
surpluses in the future, this arrangement would profit only the departments bloated with 
significant inventories while also preventing the government from collecting the proceeds 
in a consolidated revenue fund to help pay off its substantial war debts. The need was 
clear: a new inter-departmental agency that tied disposal operations into wider postwar 
policy objectives had to supplant the disparate and existing arrangements. 
A few days after receiving Bark’s report, Gordon passed it on to Clark with his own 
opinions. Gordon stated that he had “from time to time” considered that “some definite 
part of our post-war planning” should be “devoted to the question of salvage.”56 The 
urgency of the issue had now crystalized in Gordon’s mind, not only because he was now 
aware of Carswell’s proposals, but also because he felt that a “glorious state of 
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confusion” would result if all departments did not coordinate their various Salvage 
Committees before the end of hostilities. In an addendum to his letter Gordon reiterated 
the importance of the issues at stake: 
Already tremendous inventories of supplies are becoming available for 
disposal. Various Crown Companies and Munitions companies whose 
contracts...have been cancelled are anxious to wind up surplus inventories. I 
should not be surprised if more than $50,000,000 of material is over-hanging 
the market right now. If these companies are allowed to dump this on the 
market, not only will there be a serious loss to the Treasury, but as well our 
domestic markets may be demoralized.
57
 
On 13 August, Clark sent Gordon’s memo to Bryce for consideration. Clark and Bryce 
both agreed with some of Bark’s suggestions, especially about the creation of a catalogue 
listing all supplies likely to become available at the cessation of hostilities. This would 
allow for a quick compilation of most objects and “form the basis for further detailed 
work.”58 Clark also felt that other Departments had to help compile the list, especially the 
DND and the DMS, since they were directly concerned and possessed most of the objects 
destined for disposal.  
Clark and Bryce pointed out three additional big-picture considerations facing any 
new disposal arrangements. The first related to gathering information on the potential 
postwar uses of the supplies in relationship to civilian needs, government purposes, 
postwar military requirements, commercial exports, and relief and rehabilitation purposes 
(from both the war or some future natural disaster). Bryce also suggested that “as a minor 
outlet for some of these supplies” they could be shipped up north or used “for new 
colonization projects in pioneer areas in Canada.”59 Another consideration was the 
channels and techniques of disposal in combination with determining what materials had 
to be junked. Finally, Clark saw the need for international coordination, particularly with 
the UK and US, so that property located in foreign countries and foreign property located 
in Canada could be dealt with accordingly. However, he felt it was better to “leave this 
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until we have explored our own problems to some degree, so that we will have certain 
specific questions in mind in approaching those abroad.”60 Overall, Clark’s memo 
highlighted the need for close inter-departmental collaboration between a variety of 
government agencies and in many respects the business community. As he concluded, 
“the collection of this information and the consideration of the potential demands and 
possible techniques of disposition should get the various departments and agencies 
concerned thinking along constructive lines themselves, in case the problem crystallizes 
before we have had a chance to conclude the various studies.”61 
A month later, the matter was brought to Cabinet and on the recommendation of the 
War Committee a special ad hoc committee was established to consider the disposal 
problem. At the 29 September meeting J. L. Ralston brought up the disposal problem 
facing the Canadian armed forces for the third time. Earlier in April and again in May, he 
had broached the subject on behalf of the RCAF, but nothing had resulted except deferred 
decisions. This time, however, he received support from both Howe and Ilsley. As a 
result, on 5 October, A. D. P. Heeney, Clerk of the Privy Council, wrote to Watson 
Sellar, the Auditor General of Canada, informing him that Cabinet had decided to form 
“an interdepartmental committee, composed of representatives of the Departments of 
Finance (who would act as convenor), Munitions and Supply, and National Defence” that 
would “consider and make recommendations regarding suitable machinery to deal with 
disposal.”62 The committee was comprised of Sellar (as chair), Colonel G. S. Currie from 
National Defence, E. J. Brunning from Munitions and Supply, and Terence Sheard (Air 
Member for Supply) was added later. Moreover, once the committee was in place, most 
of the resolutions and paperwork received by the government were forwarded to Sellar 
for consideration.   
Seller’s report, submitted to Cabinet on 10 November, made recommendations for 
the machinery of disposal. It started by outlining the scope of the problem. It estimated 
that three billion dollars of assets “might be held by or for the Canadian Government” at 
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the conclusion of hostilities and it identified several trouble spots in the form of “(a) lend-
lease materials of other allied governments, (b) developments and materials of the United 
States government, mainly in the Northwest, (c) jointly-owned assets of the 
Commonwealth Air Training Plan and of the Inspection Board of the United Kingdom 
and Canada, and (d) various properties, moveable and immovable, of the United 
Kingdom Government.”63 The report also found that cancelled “production 
commitments” and leases would release various types of supplies and goods requiring 
disposal and that significant “external war investments” existed, particularly in 
Newfoundland and Labrador.
64
  
The report repeatedly suggested that due to the international dimensions of surplus 
disposal, arrangements with Allied countries were necessary.  An agreement with the US 
was particularly urgent as the authors cited a pamphlet written Charles H. Lipsett and 
published in the Daily Metal Reporter on 28 September 1943 estimating that the US 
surplus inventories would be worth $75 billion.
65
 Given that future Canadian markets 
would be overwhelmed with their own postwar surpluses, it was imperative that the US 
be prevented from dumping surplus inventories in Canadian markets. The Sellar 
committee recommended that the Dominion “seek understandings with other Allied 
Governments” with the goal of establishing “an inter-governmental body analogous to 
the Combined Production and Resources Board” in order to handle the monumental task 
of disposal and to monitor the vaguely stated “principles to be followed in disposing of 
surpluses.”66 
The Sellar committee was most concerned about the form, function, and 
administration of Canada’s disposal bodies, as Sellar’s report stated:  
We foresee the probability of confusion delay and clashes of interests if 
departments individually attempt to formulate plans and negotiate 
liquidations of inventories and commitments. Further, we visualize 
administrative risks if Ministers and officials alike are harassed by the 
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importunities of speculators seeking a profit because the Government has 
surplus stocks.
67
 
Accordingly, it was crucial to establish legislation “to regulate the control, management, 
and disposal of Crown property” and to create a “Disposal Board” and “Corporation” 
under the Minister of Munitions and Supply, so that the full attention of the Board’s 
Chairman and the Corporation’s President could be devoted to disposal matters.68 The 
report then went on to outline some general terms of reference for the Board and 
Corporation. The “Board” would operate under the jurisdiction of the Minister of 
Munitions and Supplies and inform Cabinet directly on all matters pertaining to surplus 
disposal. It would make recommendations on what to dispose of and how, and it would 
be given the power “to co-opt technical assistance, to make inquiries and to demand 
reports from departments and to authorize inter-departmental transfers.”69 The 
“Corporation” had to have a name that distanced itself from the government, it had to be 
run by a board of directors with shares in the company, and it had to be supplied with 
enough funds to ensure it could store, manage, and administer the properties coming 
under its jurisdiction.
70
 After deferring a decision on the matter, Cabinet requested that 
Sellar’s committee submit a revised report on 19 November, since Deputy Minister of 
Defence (Air), Charles “Chubby” Power, had offered some recommendations. On 26 
November, Sellar’s report was finalized and Cabinet agreed on names for the two 
organizations. The “Board” would be known as the Crown Assets Allocation Committee 
and the “Corporation” would be called the War Assets Corporation. 
Sellar’s report formed the basis of PC9108, passed by Cabinet three days later. 
Emerging at a time when the government was preparing its enormous 1944 legislative 
agenda, PC9108 was a significant development in the creation of a disposal policy. 
PC9108 ordered each government department or agency to “survey and investigate all 
lands, buildings, structures, plant, machinery equipment, articles, and things (including 
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munitions of war and supplies defined in the Department of Munitions and Supply Act), 
and any interest therein or parts thereof” that it administered “with a view to the 
determination of the types and quantities of such assets” which were unneeded.71 Further, 
the CAAC was established to monitor and coordinate these departmental investigations, 
to receive all surplus declarations, to facilitate inter-governmental transfers, and to 
formulate and recommend general disposal policies. Guidelines for policy formation 
were also outlined in PC9108, as the CAAC was ordered to consider the needs of 
provincial governments, municipalities, and public organizations when creating policies 
as well as the potential benefits of deploying surpluses in “distressed areas.” For reasons 
of public safety and economic stability, the CAAC was also ordered to establish policies 
for things that “should not be offered for sale in Canada” or “should be converted back to 
basic materials or should be withheld from the market for the time being.”72  
PC9108 also created the WAC to act as the Crown’s agent in disposal operations. 
Its shares were vested in a Board of the Directors (who, like the CAAC, were separately 
appointed) and the Minister of Munitions and Supply. PC9108 instructed Howe to take 
“all necessary steps” for organizing and incorporating the Corporation and the working 
capital ($5 million) was provided by Parliament through the War Appropriation Acts. 
The WAC was “charged with the duty of disposing of or otherwise dealing with surplus 
assets” transferred and consigned to it by the Committee. In doing so it was empowered 
to “hold, manage, operate, dispose of or deal in and with surplus Crown assets…in such a 
manner as it may decide, subject only to the conditions and instructions stipulated” by the 
CAAC upon consignment. The Company was granted some flexibility with policymaking 
as well, as PC9108 stated the WAC could make “recommendations on matters of policy 
and courses of action with respect to such surplus assets or which in the opinion of the 
Company will promote the national well-being of Canada.”73  
PC9108 also outlined the structure of the Committee and Corporation. The CAAC 
was to have a full-time paid member acting as chairman and to consist of representatives 
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designated by several government departments, the President of the WAC, and three 
additional members representing the interests of labour, agriculture, and “the 
householders of Canada.”74  On 14 December, PC9526 appointed the first two people to 
the CAAC: its first secretary C. A. Geoffrion and its first chairman, J. P. Pettigrew. Three 
days later PC9640 filled out the rest of the CAAC with representatives (mainly deputy 
ministers) from the departments of National Defence, External Affairs, Public Works, 
Finance (later in 1944 the Departments of Transport, Trade and Commerce, and Pensions 
and National Health were added to the mix).
75
 Pettigrew was a key figure in the 
Committee’s early stages. During the war he became one of Howe’s most competent 
executive assistants and earned the CAAC appointment because of his familiarity with 
the DMS’s production branches. However, in March 1944, Pettigrew resigned as 
chairman so he could concentrate more fully on his role as an assistant deputy minister in 
the DMS. However, he remained peripherally involved in disposal operations by helping 
organize the termination of the Machine Tool War Service Committee in 1944-1945.
76
  
Pettigrew’s replacement was John Berry, a rising star in the DMS. Berry was born 
in Cheshire, England on 24 September 1898 and was educated in mathematics and 
applied mechanics. Like most men serving in the DMS, he was a veteran of the First 
World War, having served in the Royal Naval Air Service for several years. After the 
Great War, he apprenticed as an engineer in the Liverpool shipbuilding industry and later 
worked for Vauxhall Motors in Luton, England, and then General Motors’ Overseas 
Operations in Detroit as a production manager. In August 1940 he was loaned by GM to 
the DMS’s Automotive Production Branch as a technical advisor. Throughout his time in 
the DMS Berry displayed a strong work ethic and developed a well-respected reputation 
as an efficient manager. At the time of his appointment to the CAAC (as representative 
for the DMS) in December 1943, he was Director-General of the Automotive Production 
Branch, the WICB’s Motor Vehicles Controller, and the WPTB’s Administrator for 
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Photo 1 Board of Directors, WAC, January 1944. Sitting (L to 
R): Hugh Lawson, John Knox, A. C. Guthrie, J. B. Carswell 
(President), Jean Julien Perrault, J. B. Ward, and Wilfrid 
Gagnon. Standing (L to R): Goodwin Gibson, F. O. Peterson 
(Secretary-Treasurer), A. T. O’Leary, and R. D. Purdy. Source: 
LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-8, War Assets Corporation – 
Historical, Board of Directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Automobiles.
77
 However, Berry relinquished these other jobs shortly after replacing 
Pettigrew. When Carswell resigned as President of the WAC in May 1945, Berry was the 
natural choice to replace him. Thus, from 16 July 1945 onwards Berry occupied the two 
most important positions in Canada’s disposal administration until 31 July 1949, when he 
resigned to become President of Canadian Arsenals Limited (CAL).
78
   
 The Corporation’s Board of Directors was also selected around the same time as 
the CAAC’s membership. On 28 December 1943, eleven men were sold shares in the 
company and named to its Board of Directors, which first met in Montreal on 6 January 
1944. According to an 
unpublished history of the 
WAC written in 1950, “the 
directors were chosen as 
representatives of a cross-
section of business, labour, and 
agriculture and of the country 
geographically.”79 In reality, 
though, it was dominated by 
businessmen who became 
associated with the WAC by 
virtue of either their work as 
“dollar-a-year-men” or because 
of their professional 
backgrounds. The business 
experience of the WAC’s Directors encompassed mining and colliery agents, knitting and 
clothing, beds and bedding, architecture, motor vehicles, merchandising, and real estate. 
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Wilfred A. Gagnon, who became the WAC’s first Vice-President, is a typical example. In 
the 1930s, he was Quebec’s Minister of Commerce and Industry in Adelard Godbout’s 
government. His company, Aird & Son Ltd., specialized in footwear manufacturing and 
therefore had a vested interest in disposal operations as his industry was particularly 
susceptible to ruin, given the amount of footwear produced for the war effort. The 
Canadian Encyclopedia noted that Gagnon used his business experience and wartime 
connections to become one of the most successful industrialists in Canadian history.
80
  
As important as PC9108 was in the development of the government’s disposal 
policy, it was not perfect. Perhaps the biggest initial problem involved the ambiguities 
and overlap between the two organizations. Under PC9108 both the CAAC and WAC 
could formulate policies about specific surplus stores and make recommendations about 
disposal to the Minister and so, presumably, there was an opportunity for duplication or 
conflict. However, the authors of PC9108 dismissed this overlap and ambiguity. They did 
so because they were aware that the officials, representatives, and staff of the two 
organizations were being handpicked and therefore, despite the potential overlap on 
paper, they had “full confidence that both the Committee and the Corporation would be 
composed of, or headed up by, officers with sufficient common sense to ensure that no 
narrow interpretation would be given” to PC9108 and “that no grasping for power and 
authority at the expense of the other body concerned would take place.”81 In doing so, 
they envisioned both organizations working together as teammates, a fact best 
exemplified by the employees who occupied dual positions in both organizations. For 
example, in October 1945 when the WAC was reorganized to form a new Procurement 
Division, its manager, R. P. Saunders, was also named the CAAC’s executive secretary. 
This overlap was necessary because the Procurement Division dealt exclusively with the 
                                                 
80
 At the time of his death in 10 June 1963 Gagnon was “associated with more than 30 industrial concerns, 
banks or trusts companies, either as chairman of the board, president, or director.” “Former Cabinet 
Minister Wilfrid Gagnon Dies, 64,” The Montreal Gazette, 11 June 1963, 8. See also: “Wilfred Gagnon” by 
J. Lindsey, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca. 
81
 LAC, RG2, Vol. 12, File: W-45, “Crown Assets Allocation Committee, War Assets Corporation Limited, 
P.C. 9108, Nov. 29, 1943,” 5 January 1944, 1. 
  
66 
 
consignments and transfers from the CAAC and having the same person in charge at both 
ends helped streamline the process.
82
  
The authors of PC9108 were intent on avoiding a power struggle. The Committee 
and Corporation were envisioned as “two autonomous bodies operating on the same 
plane” both reporting to the Minister and neither reporting to the other as subordinate. 
The CAAC did not “instruct” the WAC nor did the Corporation “give orders” to the 
Committee. Instead they worked cooperatively on a common problem, one that the 
CAAC dealt with at an earlier stage.
83
 This cooperative and common-sense approach was 
on full display at the CAAC’s first meeting on 5 January 1944, when confusion over roles 
and responsibilities came up. However, Committee members felt that although “PC9108 
was somewhat ambiguous” they would “at least try to iron out this question and get 
underway” instead of requesting further clarification.84 The decision to establish a single 
administration composed of two organizations working in tandem and not in direct 
competition turned out to be a very sound idea, especially when compared to 
developments in the United States.  
In April 1945, Carswell was invited by the US Senate’s Special Committee to Study 
and Survey Problems of Small Business Enterprises to speak at a meeting of its 
subcommittee on Surplus War Property. After outlining a brief on Canada’s disposal 
agencies and the policies adopted for machine tools he answered several questions. Aside 
from how prices and preferential sales were established for machine tools, the American 
senators were interested in the centralization of authority and the division of 
responsibility between the CAAC and WAC. They were particularly focused on how they 
functioned together as Canada’s “sole disposal agency.” In clarifying the arrangements, 
Carswell stated “we compare with your team of eight horses, I think it is, in the United 
States. We only have one horse.” Having numerous agencies involved was causing 
problems in the US, as major duplication, rivalries, and administrative delays hindered 
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disposal operations. On this point one senator cynically remarked, in reference to the 
CAAC’s American counterpart, “Our Surplus Property Board here has, itself, almost 
been declared surplus.”85 Before thanking Carswell for his briefing, a Senator 
complemented Canada on its administration, “I just wanted to observe that you seem to 
me to have a very well worked out plan there, in your country. Ours should be as simple 
as yours.” Another senator added, “It was apparently given a lot of thought.”86 
Another limitation of PC9108 was not immediately apparent and only came to light 
in early 1944 when Pettigrew and Carswell got to work. Although PC9108 did not cancel 
any of the government’s other disposal arrangements it did supersede them, effectively 
rendering them redundant. By its terms and legalities, government departments were now 
required to vet their inventories and requirements, declare surplus the unneeded items and 
property, and relinquish custody of them to the WAC (via the CAAC). This new set up 
prevented any other salvage committee or organization from dealing with disposal since 
it vested the powers to sell, destroy, or otherwise dispose of surplus assets with Howe and 
through him, the WAC. Accordingly, PC9108 threatened the existence of the ASDB, the 
Chief Salvage Officer, and the Scrap Disposal Branch. However, after some 
investigation, Pettigrew and Carswell felt that eliminating these organizations would 
cause catastrophic problems.
87
 In fact, an early January meeting with Brigadier W. 
Mavor, the Master General of Ordnance (MGO), and Colonel Dailley had impressed 
upon Pettigrew the importance of these organizations. He later reported to the Committee 
that if these three operations were terminated or replaced by PC9108, “we would be 
unable to get anywhere fast.”88  
 The key issue was the experience and type of surpluses handled by the ASDB, 
Scrap Disposal Branch, and Chief Salvage Officer. These organizations primarily 
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handled sales of smaller lots and less valuable items on a regular basis, but PC9108 was 
drawn up mainly considering the bigger and newer items destined to be surplus at the end 
of hostilities. If Howe cancelled these existing arrangements (as was his prerogative) the 
CAAC “would be hopelessly bogged down as a committee through requiring everything, 
no limit, to come forward to [it].”89 Furthermore, in their fact-finding meetings, Pettigrew 
and Carswell found other problems with PC9108. All three disposal organizations used 
special arrangements that greatly streamlined the paperwork associated with weeding out 
obsolete assets. All three organizations required special approval for larger or out-of-the-
ordinary sales, but for all regular transactions they were given a free hand. The Chief 
Salvage Officer could sell anything below $10,000, but if the transaction surpassed that 
threshold it required approval from the Treasury Board. The ASDB could sell anything 
less than $5,000 without seeking approval, but anything over that and below $50,000 
required approval from a Deputy Minister, and Ministerial approval was needed for 
anything more expensive. The Scrap Disposal Branch operated under a blanket sales 
authorization from Howe’s office, but every effort was made to recycle the materials 
back into production.
90
 There were no such limitations built into PC9108: every sale, no 
matter how big or small, required approval from the Privy Council.  
Clearly some adjustments were necessary. In early 1944, the CAAC recommended 
to Howe that anything declared surplus and valued under $15,000 would not need 
approval from the Privy Council for disposal. The CAAC also suggested that the 
chairman’s powers be increased so he could determine what could be classified as scrap 
so he would not have to seek Council’s permission at every instance. A third 
recommendation suggested that the WAC assimilate the three existing disposal agencies 
into its operations.
91
 All three recommendations were approved by PC1342 and PC4013 
and shortly thereafter the WAC integrated them into its operations as agents. Fortunately, 
this happened right as the first waves of surplus stores (mainly from the RCAF) were 
declared in early 1944. Although the ASDB and Scrap Disposal Branch were assimilated 
rather seamlessly, the Chief Salvage Officer resisted. Kelley and his staff were not 
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thrilled with the new regulations and felt that the proceeds of all sales should be remitted 
back to the declaring department, not the Corporation or government’s consolidated 
revenue fund. However, Kelley lacked support from Council and by May 1944 these 
matters were settled and Kelley, his staff, and their experience were absorbed into the 
new disposal administration.
92
 
The Surplus Crown Assets Act 
After issuing PC9108 Prime Minister Mackenzie King wanted to publicize it 
widely, as Heeney told Howe in a letter requesting a press release: “Mr. King feels that 
the Order deals with a matter of such widespread interest and importance that it should be 
made public as from the Prime Minister by means of a press statement and possibly even 
a press conference.”93 On 1 December 1943, King made the press release himself, while 
Carswell hosted a major press conference in January. In his speech to reporters, King 
informed Canadians about the creation of “an interim method” for disposal in the form of 
the CAAC and the WAC and then outlined the various functions and responsibilities of 
each. He also promised that PC9108 would be followed, in the next session of 
Parliament, by new legislation “authorizing a permanent procedure” for disposal.94  
More information and details about the government’s plans were released by 
Carswell after the January Board of Directors meeting at the Dominion Square building 
in Montreal. In the first detailed statements about government policies, Carswell stressed 
a number of important points, particularly about the flow of goods and the overarching 
purpose of the new disposal arrangements. King and Carswell were clearly attempting to 
assuage growing anxiety about the future disposal of “inevitable surpluses.” Carswell 
promised that there would be no “fire sale” of assets and that disposal operations would 
be strictly controlled in order to stabilize the postwar economy and maintain high 
employment. As he stated, “I look upon the new corporation as a symbol of partnership 
between labor, industry and government in tackling one of our most serious post-war 
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problems, the problem of keeping our economy going despite the existence of heavy war 
surpluses.”95 Thus, creating the Corporation and Committee was a “constructive step by 
the Government” that “should allay these fears, in a great measure.” He continued:  
[WAC] has been designed and empowered to stand between these surpluses 
and the going economy of the country; to impound these surpluses in one 
great reservoir and to supply intelligent but firm control on the releasing gate-
valves. Essentially the job of the corporation will be one of compromise, 
recognizing that surpluses impounded too long cease to be assets and on the 
other hand, that surpluses released too quickly could have the most disastrous 
effect on industry and on employment.
96
 
The publicity and attention generated by King and Carswell was met with a wide 
and eager audience that, over the course of 1944, would grow to include more interest 
groups than just apprehensive industrialists and their professional associations. With the 
creation of a dedicated administration for handling all disposal matters, as well as the 
added publicity, several other interest groups, municipalities, city councils, and 
agricultural and educational associations started contacting the CAAC and WAC with 
their own resolutions and demands. Therefore, while disposal policies were formulated 
throughout 1944, both the CAAC and WAC faced mounting demands from private and 
public interests alike. Although this pressure tapered off towards the end of 1944 (only to 
revive after the war), it started peaking right as the first round of surpluses were declared 
and as the Liberals drafted the Surplus Crown Assets Act.  
When Howe stood in the House of Commons on 29 May to introduce the Surplus 
Crown Assets Act and schedule its first reading, a mountain of resolutions had already 
piled up. In late February Edward C. Fisher, President of the Alberta Pensioners’ Society, 
mailed a resolution to the Prime Minister demanding a “National Plan” for the disposal of 
military equipment and government property in order to relieve the housing situation and 
homelessness. As the resolution stated “if a National Plan is adopted for the utilization of 
this vast material, that tens of thousands of Canada’s needy and homeless would be 
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helped, and the serious housing situation and slum conditions would be relieved.”97 
Howe’s office received several other similar resolutions throughout the spring, 
particularly from agricultural associations.  
In one resolution, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture demanded that the 
Dominion government allow farmers and farm organizations access to “used or new 
equipment, plants and material either by direct sale by the Government or through the 
War Assets Corporation.”98 Another resolution demanded that any surplus training 
facilities constructed for the war effort and located “adjacent to agricultural colleges and 
experimental farms” should be “made available as educational and recreational centres 
for farm people.” Similarly, any hospitals or health centres associated with the training 
facilities be repurposed as rural health services in line with Federation’s “Principles for 
National Health Insurance.”99 Moreover, the Federation must have heard about the 
DMS’s plan for declaring the sulphuric acid plant at Clark Island (near Valleyfield, 
Quebec) surplus, as an additional resolution requested that the government “continue to 
operate the synthetic nitrogen, and other government-owned or Government financed 
fertilizer plants” or make them available to “farm organizations.”100 Finally, a resolution 
from the United Farmers of Alberta stated that because “a large percentage of our farm 
homes are without modern conveniences” and because “plumbing [and] suitable housing 
[was] deemed essential for the wellbeing of the forces as well as for the prisoners of 
war,” the government should adopt a needs-based method for distributing surplus 
materials in Canada.
101
  
Continuous public pressure was also levelled at the federal government from 
educational associations, provincial authorities, and school boards. On 16 June 1944, J. 
C. Dryden, Manitoba’s Minister of Education, wrote Howe indicating that his 
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Department was “receiving a considerable number of inquiries regarding the eventual 
disposal of surplus…machine tool equipment and technical apparatus” from school 
boards eager to expand their course curriculums and acquire assets “suitable for school 
instruction purposes at a very reduced figure.” Dryden felt that a plan could be easily 
crafted “that would make available for educational purposes” government surpluses and 
that it “would be heartily supported by departmental staffs in the provinces and also by 
the public.”102  
Other interests groups lobbied the government as well. On 28 July 1944, the 
Ontario Parks Association wrote to the CAAC indicating that public bodies, such as 
parks, deserved priority for purchasing surpluses “with particular reference to the 
equipment used in construction and maintenance of airports and army camp; army 
transportation, including jeeps, public address systems of the mobile type, or other 
vehicles which could be put to parks use.”103 The letter also asked “that without 
infringing on war production,” park and playground equipment receive a priority “since 
after five years of war such equipment is almost at the wornout stage.” The Ontario Parks 
Association justified the priority on the basis of future childhood development:  
And since the physical welfare of the coming generation which must replace 
that lost by war, must be based not alone on leadership...but upon equipment 
and recreation grounds being available so that leadership can be utilized. And 
such cannot much longer be maintained under present condition, with 
wornout machinery, playground equipment which should be discarded and a 
labor shortage which emphasizes the sad state of material equipment. All of 
which means a considerable and growing lessening of physical endeavours.
104
 
Municipal governments acted in a coordinated fashion. Over the course of a few 
weeks in May 1944 at least twenty-five municipalities and city councils from across the 
country mailed the government an identical resolution.
105
 The resolution stated that 
because municipal and provincial governments had offered “every assistance and co-
operation…to Dominion authorities” during the war and did so “frequently at 
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considerable inconvenience and cost to the municipal taxpayers” and because municipal 
employees, equipment, buildings, and property were used for the war effort “without any 
remuneration,” municipalities deserved favourable consideration when selling surpluses. 
The resolution also included a method for transferring assets between governments, one 
that was definitely inspired by the wartime experience as it called for the acquisition to be 
“on a lend-lease basis.” Most importantly, this resolution demanded that municipal and 
provincial governments receive priority for purchasing assets “before such supplies and 
equipment and buildings are sold to private individuals or corporations for resale to the 
public.”106 Given their support for the war effort, municipal governments felt entitled to 
preferential treatment for purchasing surplus war assets. Their lobbying efforts were not 
only directed at gaining some favourable consideration from the federal government, but 
were also clearly linked to growing concerns over how far the federal government would 
cater to businesses.
107
 
The intensity of interest in disposal matters was often tied to the regional disparities 
of wartime investments. To many observers, central Canada seemed poised to profit most 
from disposal since surpluses were most numerous there, leaving the Maritimes and the 
Prairies at a disadvantage. Saskatchewan’s Premier, Tommy Douglas, pointed this out in 
a letter to Prime Minister King on 12 October 1944, when he stated that a “serious 
situation” was liable to “get out of hand.” As Douglas continued, “a great many airports 
have been closed on the prairies. Most of these airports have excellent hospital 
equipment, road machinery and some very fine buildings, also quantities of training 
planes, army trucks and other mechanical equipment which are no longer required and 
are being stored in various places across Western Canada.”108 Although the federal 
government had established the CAAC and WAC, very little had been done to “acquaint 
[the provincial governments and] agencies with what material is available.” Consequently 
it was discovered that equipment was leaving the Prairies and being sold in Winnipeg and 
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Vancouver.
109
 Douglas’s letter hinted at some resistance to and confusion about the 
federal government’s disposal policies, but it mainly piggy-backed on wartime 
complaints from provincial authorities about the encroachment of federal powers and the 
realignment of Canadian business interests from a regional and provincial focus towards 
the federal government and Central Canada.
110
  
Regional interests in surpluses remained a real contentious issue. Gordon B. Isnor, 
MP for Halifax and Chairman of the SCWEE, echoed Douglas’s concerns. In a letter to 
Ilsley in January 1945, Isnor voiced concerns about the regional distribution of surpluses. 
Isnor worried that some corporations were profiting more because of favourable 
geography, as he stated the “large concerns, such as T. Eaton Company, Robert Simpson 
Limited, Zellers, Woolworthe and Metropolitan and similar large firms have access 
through their main office and thus make purchases at Toronto” while the merchants in 
Nova Scotia were excluded and could not buy anything direct from WAC either in 
Toronto or Halifax.
111
 After conferring with W. J. Bennett in the DMS, Ilsley reported 
back to Isnor that his concerns were greatly exaggerated. The arrangements for disposal 
were sound and worked out in consultation with business interests and according to 
Bennett few merchants reported any problems. The key here was the fact that Central 
Canada had profited dramatically from the war and that disposal operations would 
solidify those gains.  
In some respects, Douglas and Isnor were jumping the gun, as they raised their 
concerns during a time when few assets had been declared surplus. It was not until the 
fall of 1945 and winter of 1946 that surpluses started emerging across all parts of the 
government, so they were pressing the government for action when few surpluses 
actually existed. However, their letters reflected the widespread eagerness and 
anticipation for surplus government assets. Everyone wanted to acquire objects to 
improve their living standards and fulfill postwar ambitions, so ensuring that an equitable 
distribution and access existed preoccupied many people, especially political leaders 
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responding to their constituents. Although business interests wanted more restrictive 
disposal policies, municipalities and other interests groups demanded priority access and 
lower prices so they could make use of surpluses in their reconstruction and rehabilitation 
programs. The letters from Douglas and Isnor hinted at the key issues and public 
concerns involved in the disposal of surpluses. Divesting public property was certainly a 
polarizing endeavour. 
The Surplus Crown Assets Act encapsulated the polarizing nature of surplus 
disposal. In June 1944 when it was debated in Parliament, all sides of the political 
spectrum clashed over the purpose and responsibilities of the government for mobilizing 
the transition to peace. For the left-wing social democrats and the C.C.F., Stanley 
Knowles, MP for Winnipeg North Centre, voiced a common ideological starting point 
when he argued that public enterprise had generated mass employment, booming 
productivity, and victory during the war – so why not maintain it in peace? Knowles 
continued by stating his view of the basic postwar issue: “is it to be the first concern of 
the government to protect the kind of economic system we had before the war, one which 
gave us the sad story of the 30s; or is the government going to realize that the demands of 
peace are just as compelling as have been the needs of war.”112 Knowles feared that the 
liquidation of such large inventories of public assets and property would not benefit 
Canadians. Instead, he worried about handing the country’s economic fortunes back to 
corporations and private interests that had left the nation in such turmoil after the last 
war. Government was responsible for the social welfare of its citizens and the complete 
liquidation of factory floor space, tools and equipment, office space, airports, hospitals, 
and the vast array of other assets would greatly hinder its ability to provide the safety net 
of social security. 
Although conservatives conceded the necessity of public ownership in times of 
war, they were adamant that public enterprise was not the key to a stable and prosperous 
postwar system. In the House of Commons, J. H. Blackmore responded to Knowles by 
stating that in war “the government must have design, and it must have special quality; it 
must also have an exceedingly high degree of speed in the production of the items that 
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are being brought into existence, and at the same time there has to be a high degree of 
secrecy. All these things make it so that government ownership is probably the best 
producer in this field in time of war.”113 However, government ownership was not 
effective in the distribution of goods, was prone to wasteful spending, and had fostered 
unsustainable economic growth in many areas of the country. In other words, public 
ownership might produce a great deal, but that production had not taken into 
consideration the spending power of export and domestic markets, consumer tastes and 
preferences, and local conditions. To conservatives, private ownership would cater to 
these aspects of supply and demand so a return to free-market capitalism was the only 
viable option. Over-production was not the basis for continuing prosperity. Although 
favouring the Act and the CAAC and WAC, Blackmore wanted those institutions to work 
toward re-establishing private enterprise by reducing government assets, controls, and 
liabilities: “I think that the time has come when the whole country must study the means 
of the decentralization of industry, decentralization of credit control, and of responsibility 
with respect to everything that pertains to our public wellbeing.”114 
While arguments about Canada’s future were debated in Parliament, the Surplus 
Crown Assets Act came under some harsh criticism and questions. Several Conservative 
MPs took the Act as an opportunity to vent frustrations about how the King government 
operated. During the Act’s second reading, R. B. Hanson went as far as to question the 
necessity of the Act when PC9108 was already on the books. His questions were 
prompted by John Diefenbaker’s continuing criticism of Cabinet’s excessive use of PC 
Orders for running the war effort, but the question was probably an attempt to embarrass 
the Liberals by getting Howe to admit that PC9108 was insufficient.
115
 However, the 
point was moot. PC9108 was an adequate provision, but its permanency was in question. 
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Each of the 58,402 PC Orders passed by the Privy Council (from 1 September 1939 to 28 
September 1945) derived their binding authority from the sweeping powers gained under 
the War Measures Act. In effect, the War Measures Act allowed Cabinet to govern by 
decree and turned each PC Order into law just as though it was debated and passed by 
Parliament. Given how heavily the government had relied on PC Orders, the war’s end 
posed a legal problem: once the War Measures Act was repealed the PC Orders that were 
not accompanied by Legislation (duly debated and passed by Parliament and the Senate) 
would lose all legitimacy. In response to Hanson’s remarks, Howe explained to the 
House of Commons that not only was surplus disposal a serious issue that required public 
input and discussion, but it was “a continuing job” and “the powers of the government 
under the War Measures Act will expire shortly after the war ends, but the work of 
disposal will continue for a long period thereafter.”116  
Several provisions in the Act received a great deal of attention from the 
Conservative opposition. Hanson, J. R. MacNicol, and especially Diefenbaker were 
outspoken in their criticism, particularly in reference to the authority, control, and 
responsibilities of the Minister. In several sections of the Act the Minister’s powers were 
absolute. The members on the Corporation’s Board of Directors and the Committee’s 
representatives had to be approved by the Minister, their designated roles and 
responsibilities were subject to the Minister’s instructions, the Corporation’s annual 
reports had to be approved by the Minister, and all accounting records were to be 
maintained in a “system satisfactory to the Minister.”117 Summing up his objections to the 
Act, Hanson stated, “I find on reading the Bill that this Corporation and this Committee is 
merely an instrument of the Minister himself, that he is a dictator under this Bill. There is 
nothing that this Committee can do, or refrain from doing, there is nothing that this 
corporation can do or refrain from doing, unless it has the imprimatur of the Minister.”118 
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The big concern with such centralized authority was that Howe might cover up 
failures or stop the Corporation from selling assets to particular people. The Opposition 
wanted provisions written into the Act that guarded against the meddling influences of 
the Minister or whoever received his delegated authority. On this matter, Diefenbaker 
was relentless. Citing an American report written by Bernard Baruch that outlined several 
principles and considerations for surplus disposal in the US, Diefenbaker called for better 
transparency and oversight. As Baruch’s report stated, disposal had to happen in a “gold 
fish bowl” where records and activities were always open for public inspection. 
Accordingly, Diefenbaker felt that the Act had loopholes that could hide problems and 
information. Despite the criticism, few changes were made. However, Diefenbaker did 
manage to amend Section 18 of the Act to ensure that the Auditor General reviewed the 
Corporation’s annual report which would contain “in reasonable detail particulars of 
surplus Crown assets, sold or otherwise disposed of during the accounting period” before 
the Minister tabled it in Parliament.
119
 
After receiving assent in July 1944, the Surplus Crown Assets Act made some 
changes to the administration established under PC9108. Most substantially, the Act 
altered the relationship between the CAAC and the Minister. Under PC9109 the CAAC 
was granted substantial independent duties and responsibilities for prosecuting its 
functions and formulating policies, and in doing so, it advised the Privy Council directly. 
However, under the Act, the CAAC’s role was redefined so that its primary function was 
to advise the Minister on disposal policies. He would then advise the Privy Council as 
needed. In other words, the Act delegated some authority to the Minister for accepting or 
rejecting disposal policies before they were submitted to the Privy Council.
120
 Moreover, 
under PC9108 reports of surplus from each government department were made directly to 
the CAAC and if an item or property was worth over $15,000 then a PC Order was 
required for disposal. But, under the Act, surplus declarations were now addressed and 
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sent to the Minister of Reconstruction, who then referred them to the CAAC for 
appraisal. The Minister’s office became a middleman for all declarations.  
Even though Howe always intended to delegate significant responsibility to Berry 
and Carswell, disposal policies were firmly embedded under the purview of the 
Department of Reconstruction, and by extension its parent department, Munitions and 
Supply. That the Act was passed right after the creation of the Department of 
Reconstruction in June 1944, and given Howe’s initial reluctance to become Minister of 
Reconstruction, it appears that granting such wide authority for disposal was aimed at 
further enticing Howe to accept the new portfolio and also to solidify the mandate and 
responsibilities related to the new department. Thus, as much as these administrative 
changes bolstered the legal and administrative powers of the government’s disposal 
apparatus, the Act fits into the wider patterns of criticism and rivalry within the 
government’s bureaucracy and Howe’s own attempts at empire building.121  
Conclusion 
In order to enact the administrative changes Section 19 of the Surplus Crown Assets 
Act was drafted. In a confusing turn of events, Section 19 dissolved the CAAC and WAC 
as established by PC9108 and then re-established them under the Act. All property, 
assets, liabilities, and obligations in the custody or administration were transferred 
between the old and new organizations, and aside from some personnel turnover, both 
retained the same basic purposes, composition, and functions.
122
 On the same day that the 
Act was passed the Privy Council approved PC5300 and PC5301 which ensured an 
orderly transition by updating several PC Orders from earlier in 1944.
123
 Thus, as W. E. 
P. DeRoche, assistant counsel to the DMS, explained to the SCWEE, Howe had 
delegated all the same functions and responsibilities to the new organizations, and so 
despite the legal changes, “it is accordingly unnecessary in practice to distinguish 
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between recommendations or actions of the original committee established by order in 
council PC9108 and the new committee established by the Surplus Crown Assets Act.”124  
With PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act the government had established its 
response to the disposal problem. The government would rely on the CAAC and WAC to 
handle all aspects of disposal, from policymaking through to sales and destruction. Their 
creation emerged out of Canada’s immense wartime industrial productivity, the 
increasing government controls and regulations over the economy, and the lobbying 
efforts of private and public interests groups concerned about the challenges destined to 
arise when victory was won. Everyone saw the creation of a disposal administration as a 
necessary and logical step, which is certainly an achievement worthy of praise, even if 
there was little consensus on how the liquidation of government assets would take place 
moving forward. Perhaps the most important thing about the creation of the CAAC and 
WAC was the timing. Both organizations were formed nearly two full years before 
hostilities ended, ensuring that a significant amount of planning and preparations could 
occur before the flood of surpluses arrived. Anticipating the needs of peace was 
important because it gave the disposal administration a head start on its crucial task. The 
following chapter will discuss exactly what was done with this head start and explore 
how all the early plans and preparations both helped and hindered the disposal of 
munitions and supplies.   
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Chapter 2 
From Flow to Flood: Managing Disposal Operations 
In huge measure, the success with which we make the economic transition to peace will 
depend on the quality of government administration in the process of industrial 
demobilization. We shall need better organization for the transition to peace than we had 
in mobilization for war if we are to avoid needless unemployment, loss of production, and 
frustration of business enterprise.
1
 
James H. McGraw Jr., President of McGraw-Hill Publishing Company 
Introduction 
On 23 October 1944, the Minister of Munitions and Supply made an important 
announcement over the radio in which he explained the government’s plans for 
addressing the disposal problem. The speech constituted the first public comments on the 
issue since Carswell’s press conference in January and served to update an apprehensive 
population. In the speech, Howe used the flow of water in a pipeline as an analogy to 
explain the situation:   
The flow of war materials from source in Canada to the fighting fronts 
overseas may be likened to the flow of water through a pipe line. To maintain 
a sufficient head of pressure at the receiving end, the pipe line must be kept 
constantly filled. So it is with the flow of war materials. The valves 
controlling the flow of these war materials are in Italy, France, and the British 
Isles. Thus, when the flow is checked at any of these outlets, supplies back up 
along the whole of the pipe line and surpluses become available in Canada.
2
  
Not only had this “pipe line” of war materials resulted in some surpluses becoming 
available during the war, but when hostilities ended the whole pipeline itself would be 
surplus. Thus, the “valves” in Europe would be joined by many more in Canada, as the 
materials, productive capacity, and vast stores of government-owned assets were no 
longer needed. Victory would trigger a major commodity crisis since billions had been 
invested in procurement and these items would not simply dematerialize into peacetime 
without some effective disposal strategy.  
                                                 
1
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, Newspaper Clippings, James H. McGraw Jr., “Disposal of 
Government Inventories,” Electrical World, 4 March 1944, 53. 
2
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Howe’s analogy was incisive for another reason. The flow of water through a 
pipeline was self-contained and took place in a controlled environment. This analogy 
offered him a means to describe how the flow of munitions and supplies was regulated 
and delivered to the soldiers at “the fighting fronts overseas.” This was significant 
because Howe’s speech explained to the public how the government planned to maintain 
control of that pipeline in order to avert a postwar disaster. The public need not worry 
about disposal because the preparations of the CAAC and WAC ensured that the pipeline 
of war materials would be successfully redeployed and liquidated to support postwar 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. Howe was reassuring his audience: the government was 
taking steps to prevent the flow of goods from becoming a flood. As he concluded: 
War Assets Corporation with the consent and unqualified support of the 
government, will endeavour through constant vigilance to protect Canadian 
industry, Canadian labor, Canadian agriculture, Canadian merchants and the 
Canadian public from the greed of the speculator, the cupidity of the profiteer 
and to ensure that all our war surpluses shall be liquidated to the greatest 
benefit of the greatest number of the citizens of Canada.
3
 
Yet water rarely flows with controlled precision. Although Howe’s metaphor made 
strong rhetorical sense, in practice controlling the flow of war goods – like that of water – 
was very difficult.  
The task facing the CAAC and WAC was enormous and it came with few 
precedents and was replete with challenges that strained the capabilities of everyone 
involved. Managing disposal operations was a constant battle against diminishing returns. 
Every element of the disposal process – from defining and declaring surpluses to their 
consignment and final disposition – required a significant investment of attention, effort, 
ability, and money that did not always remain stable at every stage. Since it was up to 
each department to review its inventories, establish postwar requirements, and declare the 
remainder surplus, the work of the CAAC and WAC was contingent on the bureaucracy’s 
speed and efficiency. Despite all the early preparations, government departments could 
divert the flow of their surpluses on purpose or by accident. At times this left the WAC 
and CAAC vulnerable to political and economic variables, competing bureaucratic 
                                                 
3
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procedures, and varying levels of interest and enthusiasm for disposal matters. From 
narrowly defined departmental agendas, bureaucrats tended to view surpluses (and the 
paperwork associated with them) as time-consuming nuisances. The kneejerk reaction 
was to get rid of unwanted items quickly, but the new disposal administration cautiously 
followed its agenda. Disposal was now an instrument of public policy that would require 
more attention, effort, and cooperation to achieve. Therefore, the bureaucracy would have 
to adjust accordingly. 
To manage disposal operations efficiently, the CAAC and WAC had to overcome a 
confluence of obstacles. The politics of establishing postwar requirements was a serious 
issue within the federal bureaucracy, especially for the DND and DMS. Political and 
military leaders clashed over the permanency of the military-industrial complex 
developed during the war as well as the future size and shape of the armed forces. 
Venturing into these debates was tricky business, as the creation of comprehensive 
disposal arrangements was counter-intuitive to winning the war and legitimatizing the 
military’s sizable postwar plans. Although the future necessity of disposal was obvious, 
the exact details about the types, condition, and numbers of unneeded assets remained 
difficult to ascertain before the war ended. The size of the military’s budget and material 
requirements took time to settle, thus impeding the speed and willingness of the DND to 
declare assets surplus. In regards to the DMS, postwar economic stability and the fate of 
all the government-owned industrial floor space and machinery were central issues. This 
led to the creation of competing agencies and sometimes diverted the flow of assets and 
property away from the WAC.  
Much of the early preparations for disposal focussed on creating workable and 
comprehensive administrative procedures for the liquidation of all government surpluses. 
In general, the early plans were designed to bring order and coherence to a large and 
diverse problem that blurred departmental jurisdictions and involved many competing 
political, economic, and social interests. During the spring of 1944, as the first waves of 
surplus declarations arrived, the CAAC decided to institute a set of Standard Procedures 
that all departments and foreign governments would use when declaring surpluses. This 
administrative system sought to build consistency, coax out more information about the 
assets being declared surplus, and allow the CAAC to strategically allocate surpluses 
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according to political, economic, and social imperatives. The system for allocating 
surpluses was known as the “priorities.” Establishing priorities created a hierarchy of 
access to surpluses that accommodated inter-departmental transfers and privileged direct 
sales to “priority holders.” Although they provisioned a great deal of local reconstruction 
and rehabilitation programs, the priorities created significant administrative bottlenecks 
that could delay final disposition, especially once the postwar rush commenced. However 
other problems emerged almost immediately after the Standard Procedures took effect. 
Over the summer of 1944, the CAAC and WAC started encountering complaints from 
other departments and agencies. Since PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act carried 
broad provisions about selling government property, conflicts emerged with existing 
regulations. This prompted the CAAC to issue exemptions from the Act or make new 
cooperative agreements instead of assimilating the other organizations altogether.  
Although the early start on disposal preparations helped fix some of the pipeline’s 
kinks, the establishment of administrative arrangements that were both workable and 
comprehensive proved elusive. Each policy had diminishing returns since changing 
circumstances, budgetary forecasts, and experience in dealing with departments forced 
continuous modifications. It was fortunate that another early focus of the CAAC and 
WAC was on populating both organizations with experienced people capable of finding 
solutions through trial and error. However, keeping those individuals working for the 
government was another constant challenge, as many of these “dollar-a-year-men” were 
interested in returning to the private sector or worn out from their gruelling wartime 
service with the DMS. Yet despite the personnel turnover and the short tenures of some 
executives they still managed to achieve a great deal and deserve some credit for what the 
CAAC and WAC accomplished after their departures. 
By mid-1945, the plans and preparations for the disposal of surplus goods had been 
developed and tested with a limited amount of surplus declarations. However, once the 
war ended, officials discovered that despite their best efforts and early work, no plan – no 
matter how well conceived – survives first contact. From May 1945 to October 1946, 
roughly 35,000 separate surplus declarations were processed by the CAAC and WAC, 
along with over 50,000 requests for “priority” allocation. The sheer volume and scale of 
declarations and items consigned to the state’s disposal administration was overwhelming 
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and greatly strained the capabilities of the Committee and Corporation. Internally and 
externally, Canada’s disposal administration faced a new series of oversights and delays 
that were magnified by the vast array of objects and associated paperwork. Luckily the 
situation was not totally unforeseen, but the tidal wave that barrelled into the CAAC and 
WAC belied Howe’s pipeline metaphor. After victory, the flow of surplus assets became 
a flood.  
To meet the new challenges the CAAC and WAC restructured their operations 
from August to October 1945 by making two significant changes to their mandate and 
operations. First, the WAC’s operational procedures were decentralized into five regions. 
This alleviated the administrative burden and greatly facilitating the WAC’s increasingly 
proactive role in collection, storage, and sales. Second, the WAC (and to a lesser extent 
the CAAC) was restructured to reflect the new regional focus and also to eliminate as 
many administrative bottlenecks and selling obstacles as possible. These organizational 
and operational changes greatly reduced some of the problems and delays, but were 
accompanied by a steep growth in employees, facilities, and operational expenses which 
prompted another set of challenges and solutions. Managing disposal operations was an 
imperfect business. Yet in making these organizational changes the foundation was set 
for the WAC to become the largest merchandising company in Canadian history and, in 
doing so, the WAC was better poised to fulfill its intended function as a “shock absorber” 
during the country’s transition from war to peace 
Laying the Groundwork: Early Plans and Preparations  
After its creation, one of the CAAC’s first priorities was reconnaissance. In early 
January 1944, Pettigrew started making inquiries with key government departments about 
the state of their disposal preparations. This action not only drew attention to a future 
problem of some importance, but it also helped Committee members familiarize 
themselves with the scope of their new responsibilities. The logical starting point was the 
largest consumer of munitions and supplies: the DND. After a Committee meeting on 12 
January 1944, Pettigrew wrote to Howe requesting that the Minister inquire about the 
military’s expected postwar requirements. In the letter Pettigrew stated that the CAAC 
wanted the Cabinet War Committee to order the Defence Staff to start contemplating “the 
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numerical strength of each of the Armed Services at the close of hostilities” and “that 
such direction…would enable them to better declare...surplus[es] and would also enable 
them to visualize the magnitude of the operations ahead.”4 On Howe’s initiative the 
matter was referred to the War Committee and then to the Defence Council on 21 January 
where it was discussed by the country’s top generals.  
However, Pettigrew’s rather presumptuous request was dismissed three days later 
when Colonel H. A. Dyde, Secretary to the Defence Council, informed him that it was 
“impossible at the present time to furnish an accurate estimate of the numerical strength 
of the Armed Forces at the close of hostilities.”5 There were good reasons for the Defence 
Council’s reluctance to define postwar requirements. While the Defence Council was 
sympathetic to the inevitable need for disposal procedures, the war effort showed no 
signs of slacking. In January 1944, heavy fighting still raged in the air and at sea with 
heavy losses on both sides. In Italy, Canadian soldiers took heavy casualties capturing 
Ortona over Christmas, the landings at Anzio were just days away, and the Gustav Line 
still blocked entry into Rome. Operation Overlord and the campaigns in Normandy and 
Northwest Europe were six months away and just entering the final preparatory stages. 
Although it was easy to be optimistic considering the serious Allied defeats in 1940, 
1941, and 1942, victory was far from certain. At that point, nothing could be ruled out as 
surplus yet except for small amounts of derelict equipment.  
As the year progressed the Defence Council’s reluctance to define postwar 
requirements became enmeshed within larger wartime issues and political wrangling that 
surrounded the conscription crisis. Within a few months of Dyde’s response to Pettigrew, 
rumours about manpower shortages in the Canadian Army became a reality as the 
fighting in Normandy and Italy raged and casualties mounted at rates higher than 
expected. Compounding this unsustainable situation was the inadequate number of 
trained replacements for infantry units and the decreasing trends in voluntary enlistment 
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at home.
6
 The battle lines over conscription materialized in mid-1944, much to 
Mackenzie King’s alarm and dismay. Haunted by the riots and fallout from the 
conscription crisis in 1917, Mackenzie King and most of Cabinet opposed compulsory 
military service. However, J. L. Ralston and a small but powerful cadre of other ministers 
holding important wartime portfolios (Howe, Ilsley, Angus MacDonald, and T. A. 
Crerar) dissented. While recognizing Cabinet’s serious concerns about conscription, they 
believed it was necessary to continue the war effort.
7
  
Over the summer and fall of 1944, each side dug in and the manpower crisis 
became an increasingly politicized and contentious issue. Mackenzie King, furious at 
what he perceived to be the Army’s incompetent planning and use of manpower, grew 
ever more apophenic, paranoid of conspiracies, and emotionally drained.
8
 However, the 
“conscriptionists” (as he labelled them in his diary) would not relent. After Ralston 
toured the front in September and October, he returned to Ottawa more resolute than 
ever. While overseas he learned that few Allied generals expected victory in 1944 and 
speaking with wounded veterans in hospitals he discovered that many infantry battalions 
were fighting at half-strength.
9
 Canada could not break faith with those at the front; the 
nation’s Army needed more soldiers immediately. With the stress of long and divisive 
Cabinet meetings, media coverage, and mounting pressure from the military, things hit a 
breaking point in November. Although Mackenzie King tried everything possible to 
manoeuvre away from conscription, even torpedoing Ralston’s political career by 
accepting his letter of resignation written two years before, the beleaguered Prime 
Minister could not avoid the issue and by the end of the month conscription for overseas 
service was approved by cabinet.  
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Decisions about the shape and size of Canada’s postwar armed forces developed on 
the heels of the conscription crisis and were similarly contentious issues. As the war 
came to an end in 1945, all three services put forward proposals outlining their future 
shape, size, and budgets. Some of the proposals, like those from the Army, were 
outlandish and contrived, as Granatstein remarked, without “one iota of political sense.”10 
In June 1945, the Army proposed peacetime conscription in order to maintain a reserve 
force of roughly 180,000 part-time soldiers and a professional force of over 55,000. 
Cabinet, and especially Mackenzie King, balked at the idea and in August told the Army 
to expect funding for a postwar force of 55,000 (reserves and professional forces 
combined) and a total defence budget for the three services of roughly $172 million.
11
 
The RCN and RCAF developed more flexible plans that, especially in the case of the 
RCAF, accepted inevitable postwar budget cuts and attempted to make the most of 
decreasing resources. The Navy’s plan called for $45 million in continuing expenses, $30 
million in one-time payments, 18,000 reserves, and 10,000 professional sailors 
maintaining twelve major war ships. The RCAF’s postwar plans required several 
squadrons of fighter aircraft, bombers, and reconnaissance elements, 16,000 personnel, 
and cost just under $60 million. Although gaining Cabinet approval, these plans proved 
quite optimistic since all three armed services had trouble meeting even these reduced 
recruitment figures.
12
   
Given the postwar budget cuts and reductions in force establishments, the three 
Services were primed to liquidate considerable assets and property. Yet for historians this 
fact does not seem to loom as large as it did for contemporaries, as most histories of the 
early postwar and Cold War periods tend to focus overwhelmingly on procuring new 
weapon systems in an era of significant cutbacks and new alliance systems.
13
 However, 
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the downsizing caused by demobilization also made the disposal of existing arsenals a 
primary consideration. This fact was not lost on those in charge, even if it was 
accompanied by some foot-dragging. Even before the conscription crisis unfolded and 
postwar establishments were set the Defence Council recognized that peace would 
seriously change the composition and size of the armed forces. Back in January, when 
Dyde replied to Pettigrew, he indicated this while acknowledging the need to prepare for 
the eventuality of disposal. As a result, orders were issued by the Defence Council 
instructing the services to beginning vetting their stores of weapons and equipment for 
obsolete kit or items likely to become surplus in the future.
14
 Thus, while future 
requirements and force establishments remained uncertain and a source of contention 
between civilian and military leaders, there were no such illusions about disposal: 
surpluses would inevitability exist after victory. 
Although arrangements for the disposal of new and state-of-the-art weaponry 
would await the end of the war, records from the Army’s Provisions Directorates in the 
MGO Branch show that little time was wasted in revising disposal procedures for 
obsolete kit. Recognizing that the ASDB would be assimilated into the WAC and that 
new arrangements were required for handling surpluses, the Defence Council ordered the 
creation of the Army Ordnance Surplus Assets Committee (AOSAC) on the same day it 
discussed Pettigrew’s letter. The AOSAC convened just two days later and Colonel 
Dailley was named its first chairman. The AOSAC became the Army’s central hub for 
disposal connecting the MGO Branch, the Inter-Services Committee for Interchange of 
Surplus Assets, the Obsolete Stores Committee, the ASDB, and the CAAC.
15
 From 
January onwards, it investigated all assets and property handled by the MGO “with the 
view to the determination of the types and quantities of such assets which are surplus to 
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the needs of the Department of National Defence.”16 In practice, this meant that when 
surpluses or obsolete stores were found within the Army’s various branches and 
directorates, lists were sent to the AOSAC which would then distribute the paperwork to 
the other committees listed above for investigation. Recommendations were then sent 
back and if the goods could not be redistributed between the other services, were surplus 
to all known requirements, or obsolete then the AOSAC forwarded the amended lists to 
the Deputy Minister (Army) and through him they were declared to the CAAC.
17
  
The Army was not alone in devising procedures for declaring surpluses. In response 
to PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act varying methods – from large committees 
to a single bureaucrat – were developed within the RCN, RCAF, and practically every 
government department or agency. The creation of these arrangements highlights an 
important starting point for the flow of surplus goods, as well as the relationship that 
existed between the CAAC, WAC, and all the departments they serviced. The Committee 
and Corporation were not responsible for examining the inventories of every federal 
department, agency, or organization. Rather they depended on each one to inspect their 
own assets and evaluate their own needs before declaring surpluses. Only once assets 
were declared did the CAAC become involved and then, once the paperwork was 
processed, were the assets sent to the WAC for final disposal.
18
 This was a key dynamic 
to the flow of goods: the work of the CAAC and WAC was dependent upon other 
departments and the military evaluating postwar budgets, expected requirements, and the 
speed at which they declared surpluses.  
In having the largest inventories, the DND and DMS became the key valves 
controlling the flow of goods and disproportionately affected the character and tempo of 
disposal operations. Therefore, shortly after being formed, the CAAC sought to forge 
strong lines of communication and coordination with both. As part of its general 
reconnaissance efforts and fact-finding missions, Committee members started liaising 
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with particular individuals they could count on if problems or uncertainty arose. In 
regards to the armed forces, this was especially critical since they would be working so 
closely together. For declarations related to the Army, the CAAC relied on the two 
Deputy Ministers serving as the DND’s representative on the Committee, first H. 
Desrosier and then A. Ross. However, the practical experience of those lower down the 
hierarchy of command (and actually in charge of handling the assets in question) was 
needed, so the CAAC decided that Colonel Dailley was the best point of contact. For the 
Navy and its disposal matters the CAAC dealt with L. C. Thompson and later Captain G. 
L. Roome, who was appointed Director of the Navy’s Disposal Organization. For the 
RCAF, Terence Sheard was initially approached but it was finally agreed that his boss, 
Wing-Commander I. C. Cornblat, Director of Supply Administration, (and his successor 
E. H. Mahoney) was the better contact.
19
 In regards to the DMS, the CAAC relied not 
only on Berry’s connections but also on W. E. P. DeRoche, General Counsel and later the 
Surplus Property Officer for the DMS.  
Of course, the DMS and DND were not the only government departments that had 
assets to dispose of after the war, so new disposal arrangements started popping up across 
the entire bureaucracy. As a result, in early 1944 the first waves of surplus declarations 
started arriving at the CAAC from all over the government. At that point, Committee 
members were still familiarizing themselves with their new jobs and policies had only 
been discussed in the broadest sense. So when the first declarations arrived from the 
RCAF and the Department of Pensions and National Health, the CAAC received a 
hodgepodge of lists declaring surplus several hundred obsolete aircraft and equipment as 
well as unneeded firefighting and air raid precaution equipment. There was little 
consistency in format or information provided other than type and quantity.
20
 This lack of 
consistency and detail prompted Berry to establish the Standard Procedures and require 
every declaring agency to use them. This also helped solidify the administrative channels 
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within the rapidly growing network of new departmental arrangements and officers 
handling disposal matters. 
In total there were ten different Standard Procedures issued from 1944 to 1948 with 
several accompanying forms and receipts. Together they covered the basics of surplus 
declarations and explained what was required of declaring agencies and how declarations 
and assets were processed. The Standard Procedures were always referred to in short 
form (“CAAC 1” “CAAC 2” etc.) while the accompanying forms were usually denoted 
by a four digit number (“2231” “2232” “2241”). When revisions became necessary, the 
short form was updated as “CAAC 2A” and “CAAC 2B.” Moreover, two other separate 
sets of Standard Procedures were devised, one for declarations of surplus property owned 
by foreign countries in Canada and the other for surplus declarations of American 
property in Canada (see Appendix 2). CAAC 1 to 6 were drafted to explain how to report 
surpluses properly, what kinds of information to provide in addition to type and quantity 
(such as, original cost and location), the number of forms that were required (since 
multiple copies were needed for all parties to keep track of items), the definition of scrap 
and unusable goods, the types of codes and abbreviations to use when filling in forms, 
and how to make priority claims for the transfer or allocation of goods.
21
 However, 
experience in dealing with declaring departments prompted several changes. The 
chronology of the trial and error process is evident in the dates on which procedures were 
issued and subsequently revised, especially for CAAC 2 and 4 (the Standard Procedures 
covering how to report surpluses and how transfers and allocations functioned).  
Since PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act required that all surplus 
government property be sold through the CAAC and WAC, some duplication and 
conflict emerged with other departmental regulations when the Standard Procedures were 
implemented. Over the course of 1944 several departments and agencies sought 
clarifications for conflicting procedures. This proved to be an early challenge for the new 
disposal administration, but these bureaucratic issues were resolved by allowing several 
exemptions to the system. In most cases, exemptions were easily granted and added to a 
master list that Berry started keeping over the summer of 1944. Most exemptions 
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followed on the blanket one for perishable goods written into the Surplus Crown Assets 
Act.  Section 3 stated that no departments, except for the DND and DMS, were required 
to declare surpluses in accordance with the Act if they were “agricultural or dairy 
products or livestock or livestock products.”22 This spared the Committee and 
Corporation from substantially interfering with the agricultural economy, its crop 
surpluses, and its prices. Furthermore, in accordance with this provision the CAAC later 
decided to extend Section 3 to include kitchen waste.
23
  
Some exemptions were minor. In one case, the RCMP was provided one for selling 
old uniforms to Indian and Northern Affairs.  In other cases, the Department of External 
Affairs was given permission to sell “small items abroad” when relocating embassies and 
the Department of Mines and Resources received approval to “sell surplus in remote 
areas under $100.00.”24 Other exemptions were larger. For instance, the National 
Harbours Board and the Department of Transport were both permitted to sell surplus 
lands they owned before the war in consultation with the WAC.
25
 Similarly the Soldiers 
Settlement Board and the Veterans Land Act lobbied the CAAC over the summer and 
were granted exemptions to sell or lease land and farming equipment to veterans seeking 
a living in agriculture.
26
 Probably the largest and most important exemption granted to 
any single department was given to the DND for destroying surplus ammunition. In May 
and September 1944, the CAAC and WAC (which lacked the specialized storage 
facilities needed for maintaining ammunition safely) allowed the military to destroy 
unwanted ammunition and explosives without declaring them surplus.  In response to the 
growing tide of conflicts, the CAAC approved a blanket exemption in September 1944. It 
authorized “Government Agencies which were either responsible for their own financing 
or were an entity in themselves or having their own disposal Agency be excluded from 
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the provisions of the Act.”27 Although the meaning of “own disposal agency” remains 
unclear, it seems that this was a formal statement indicating that the CAAC and WAC 
were finished assimilating other disposal agencies.  
There are few – if any – indications that exemptions were abused. However, it was 
entirely possible for a department to avoid using the disposal channels of the CAAC and 
WAC. In theory, if the department maintained its own disposal agency, skirting the Act’s 
provisions was just a matter of not declaring something surplus. Without a surplus 
declaration the assets or property would never fall under the jurisdiction of the CAAC 
and WAC. However enticing, it appears that this practice was not used frequently, and if 
it was, it usually had the CAAC’s approval and was coordinated in some fashion with the 
WAC. Therefore it seems that government departments adhered to the spirit of the 
Surplus Crown Assets Act, although Howe and the DMS flirted with its boundaries and 
took advantage of its loopholes. As DeRoche explained to the SCWEE in November 
1945, “The Surplus Crown Assets Act gives power to sell to the Minister of 
Reconstruction” rather than explicitly vesting that power solely in the CAAC or WAC. 
So while these organizations became the primary and legal means for selling unneeded 
government property, Howe’s mandate as Minister of Reconstruction enabled him to 
delegate selling authority to other agencies and branches under his control.
28
 Indeed, 
Diefenbaker’s sharp criticism of the Act had some merit. 
Yet this particular loophole for delegating selling authority was necessary given 
Howe’s wider mandate as Minister of Reconstruction and he keenly exploited it despite 
some internal opposition. Towards the end of 1944, Howe formed the War Surplus 
Branch inside the DMS and named Berry its Director-General. Records relating to the 
War Surplus Branch are curiously missing from the DMS’s files and finding aids, but 
testimonies to the SCWEE reveal that the War Surplus Branch negotiated sales of 
complete factories and relied on the WAC to rubber stamp the transactions, thereby 
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tacitly fulfilling the provisions of the Act.
29
 Records and meeting minutes from the 
WAC’s Board of Directors show that it deeply opposed the creation of a competing 
agency even though Berry was in charge. In January 1945, the Board wrote Howe a letter 
that formally objected to the establishment of another selling agency. However, they also 
offered some recommendations should this new agency remain in operation. Among 
other things, it recommended that a clear definition of its mandate be publicized to avoid 
confusion and that its mandate be exclusively linked to the sale of factories and industrial 
machinery. A month later, Howe responded and while noting their objections he 
indicated that the War Surplus Branch would not be terminated, but that the division of 
responsibility would fall in line with their recommendations.
30
 
From surviving evidence it is difficult to piece together how the War Surplus 
Branch did its business, but it likely acted as a clearing house for the Industrial 
Reconversion Branch, the most important and influential branch in the Department of 
Reconstruction. Headed by H. J. Carmichael until December 1945, the Industrial 
Reconversion Branch was responsible for establishing the nation’s postwar industrial 
priorities and supporting the transition of industry from wartime to peacetime production. 
In other words, the Branch’s consultants, economists, analysts, and statisticians 
determined whether or not Canada could support a specific industry or if the expansion of 
an industry was in the nation’s best economic interests.31 Carmichael’s Branch handled 
the allocation of factory floor space and much of its associated machinery (especially the 
most valuable and high-tech equipment). Therefore it required further powers to negotiate 
their sale and disposition. In doing so, the Industrial Reconversion Branch administered 
the department’s disposal arrangements and surplus declarations. However, it is also 
quite evident that it could short-circuit the CAAC if it found a purchaser. In those 
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situations it went directly to the WAC to close the sale, but if the Reconversion Branch 
determined that a particular plant or parts thereof were surplus, it declared them through 
regular channels.  
Howe also delegated his selling authority to at least one other agency in his 
department: the WICB and its resource Controllers. In regulating the flow of materials 
and resources into the war economy, the WICB had to guard against shortages in supply. 
As a result, Controllers established strategic stockpiles of resources either through 
conservation and recycling campaigns or by purchasing materials in bulk with public 
funds. The question of how to dispose of surplus stockpiles was eventually addressed by 
Howe at a WICB meeting in September 1944. Both Berry and Carswell assumed that 
entire resource stockpiles would be turned over to the WAC immediately upon becoming 
surplus to the needs of Controllers and the war economy. Howe rejected that policy line, 
reasoning that since stockpiles were created by acquiring the materials from the 
marketplace they could be disposed of in a similar fashion and without an additional layer 
of a bureaucratic involvement.
32
   
Therefore, before the Control ceased operations, the Controller, employing his 
knowledge and expertise in the trade, was instructed to sell as much of the stockpiles as 
possible. If the Control did not liquidate everything before winding up its operations, the 
remainder was declared to the CAAC and turned over to the WAC for disposal. On this 
matter, Gordon concurred since the practice was already envisioned for the Canadian 
Wool Board, which would continue selling its stocks until they were depleted. Moreover, 
E. J. Brunning, the Coal Controller and formerly a member of the Sellar Committee, also 
favoured this policy. He felt that it was “better to leave the stockpile surpluses with the 
Controllers in the first place” since the WAC would inevitably depend on the expertise 
and connections of the Controllers when marketing and selling the stockpiles.
33
   
While exemptions certainly helped cut down on friction within the federal 
bureaucracy, they were largely useless if capable people were not around to devise them 
and help resolve problems. It was fortunate that an early emphasis was placed on hiring 
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the most experienced and capable people for senior positions in Canada’s disposal 
administration. Some mention has already been made of the company’s Board of 
Directors and their wide-ranging business experience, but several other key employees 
also demonstrate this pattern. In January 1944, F. O. Peterson, who was the Secretary-
Treasurer for Citadel Merchandising, accepted the same job with the WAC and served in 
numerous capacities until 31 December 1945 when he resigned.
34
  
Hew Scott became the Corporation’s first General Manager in January 1944. A 
Scottish-born engineer, Scott worked for the Allied War Supplies Corporation during the 
war as their Director of Ammunition Filling.
35
 Scott resigned as General Manager in 
February 1945 and, after completing a major tour and evaluation of markets in South 
America, he officially left the Corporation in June. Peterson filled Scott’s vacancy until 
October when A. E. McMaster took over. During the war, McMaster served as the 
Executive Assistant for the Japanese Fishing Vessels Dispersals Committee and therefore 
gained some dubious experience selling property and assets as the Dispersals Committee 
sold the fleet of fishing vessels confiscated by the government after their rightful owners 
were resettled.
36
 Several other employees were critical to the WAC’s operations. H. R. 
Malley, who served six years in the Ammunition Production Branch of the DMS (two as 
its Director-General), joined the WAC in August 1945 as VP in charge of the newly 
created Supply Department and eventually succeeded Berry as President in July 1949.
37
 
In November 1945, E. R. Birchard, who replaced Berry as Motor Vehicles Controller 
after serving as his Deputy for most of the war, joined the WAC as VP in charge of the 
Merchandising Department. 
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These names and resumes demonstrate a key dynamic to the WAC’s business 
model. As with its Board of Directors, the WAC’s employees represented a cross-section 
of Canada’s industrial war effort. Whenever possible, previous experience with war 
production was deliberately targeted so that it could be redeployed to demobilize the 
wartime economy and disperse its materiality. This was crucial considering how the 
Corporation was burdened by a large and diverse inventory of merchandise that it had not 
produced but was forced to deal in. In other words, the WAC needed a wide set of 
experienced employees because it did not specialize in any single niche market and was 
forced to operate a conglomerate of many different and unrelated big businesses. As 
Berry explained to the SCWEE: 
We have one business which sells ships. We have a business which sells 
automobiles. Another business sells aluminum, brass and copper. And then 
we have another business sitting over here that sells something totally 
different. And, off the record you are faced with the problem of having to 
have senior executives who will run any one of these types of businesses, and 
any one of these, again, is a big business in itself.
38
 
Although finding key men was not difficult, retaining them proved to be a constant 
challenge. Despite a small and capable nucleus that remained with the WAC throughout 
the transition period, the Corporation experienced a high rate of personnel turnover at all 
staffing levels.
39
 Among executives, the constant turnover was a product of several 
factors emanating from the WAC’s chief mandate: selling surpluses. Many people saw 
the Corporation’s existence as a “temporary” measure since it produced nothing and sold 
only government property that, while vast in scope, was finite in supply over time. How 
long the Corporation remained in operation depended completely on its performance. So 
while no timetable existed for its termination, the quicker it sold its inventories the 
quicker it became obsolete. As a result, the WAC did not offer much long-term job 
security. 
No stop-gap measures could remedy the turnover, even at the executive level. For 
businessmen-turned-bureaucrats the lure of returning to the private sector remained 
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powerful. In 1939-1940 the mobilization for war had attracted droves of “dollar-a-year-
men” and their private sector expertise into public service, but this brain gain evaporated 
once hostilities ended. Although the government tried double-dipping into this talent 
pool, few “dollar-a-year-men” obliged. After years of public service, many were eager to 
return to their civilian careers or retire. Thus, “brain drain” became widespread and hit 
the WAC repeatedly. The exodus of talent and experience (exemplified by the 
resignations of Carswell, Scott, and Peterson in 1945 and Gagnon, Guthrie, and J. W. 
Horsey in 1946) meant that a steep attrition rate developed right when a second wind of 
ingenuity and expertise was needed most. As Berry explained to the SCWEE, “you can 
say that quite specifically that Canada is short of key men, and that all of this type of man 
are actively engaged by their own companies at the moment, with the reconstruction of 
their own companies turning them back from war to peace.”40 In response to some 
questions regarding the private sector loaning “key men” to the government during the 
war, Berry clarified his point: “during the war period the government actually took over 
some of the functions of officials, and as a result of that certain men could be spared from 
those businesses and loaned to the government. Now, the situation is reversed.”41  
Fortunately, replacements were usually found to plug vacancies as they developed, 
but recruitment efforts were constantly handcuffed by the Corporation’s unique mandate 
and overreliance on nepotism. To guard against wide-spread influence peddling and 
abuse, proper character references from trusted sources were required. As Berry 
explained, increasing salaries to compete with the private sector was not an ideal 
solution: “I do not think we could attract people with money. The men whom we require 
to do this job and do it honestly and properly are not the men whom you can go out in the 
street and buy, not under the conditions under which we operate.”42 At all times, it was 
best to draw from the small cadre of trusted individuals who had already contributed to 
the war effort, were familiar with the bureaucracy and, ideally, had experience in the 
production branches of the DMS. But even then enticing this cadre to stay could be 
difficult. As Berry continued:  
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Most men of the calibre required are already employed by commercial 
enterprise or are snapped up by commercial companies when available. It 
does not appear possible to borrow these men as was done during the war 
period. I think I must say that the men remaining with the corporation and 
those having joined the corporation since my own appointment are mainly 
staying with the job from a sense of public duty and a desire to see the job 
through.
43
 
Coming on the heels of a grueling six-year war, few people were interested in another 
round of demanding public service. During his only appearance before the SCWEE, 
Howe explained that the job of disposal was a hard sell: “the difficulty is that we have a 
very small staff for a very big problem. It is difficult to attract staff to this type of work. It 
is not the type of work that commends itself to most people.” Right after Howe finished 
his statement, Berry added that disposal “has been referred to as a self-liquidating job” – 
meaning that it interested few people to begin with, those who started did not last long, 
and if the job was done efficiently eventually it would be expendable.
44
  
While cynical in nature, Berry’s remark was also quite incisive since it hinted at 
another layer to the manpower issue. Trusted reputations were forged by service during 
the war years, so the type of individuals desired most by the WAC were also the most 
liable to be exhausted and worn out. The industrial front was a stressful and dangerous 
place to work and by 1945 many “dollar-a-year-men” were burnt out or developing 
serious health conditions. In October and November, Berry was bed-ridden with 
pneumonia and relied on DeRoche or Peterson to present parts of his briefings to the 
SCWEE.
45
 Several others were suffering serious health conditions or in desperate need of 
a vacation. As Howe remarked, “I just got Mr. Berry out of a sick bed last week. I just 
received word this morning that the second in command [Gagnon] is in hospital with 
arthritis; and the man dealing with surplus plants [Malley] had a heart attack this morning 
and would be in the hospital for at least three months.”46 Thus, the decision to take on 
another daunting challenge immediately following the war meant that officials were often 
risking further “liquidation” of their health and abilities. 
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Despite the turnover, a remarkable amount was accomplished. In fact, brain drain 
had some positive results since it added particular emphasis on developing solid 
administrative procedures to ensure some form of institutional memory was maintained. 
Officials put special effort into making workable administrative arrangements, because 
they recognized that without them, the likelihood of problems and mistakes multiplied 
exponentially, especially once new employees replaced those leaving. They also 
recognized that imposing order on the disposal process gave them a foothold for dealing 
with its various problems. However, since there were few precedents on which to rely, 
trial and error was the only way to develop workable procedures. As a result, attempts at 
imposing order were always accompanied by new or unforeseen complications. Trial and 
error meant that administrative procedures remained in a constant state of flux and that 
the batch of 3,267 surplus declarations from before March 1945 helped test the 
established arrangements.  
The serial insufficiency of the administrative procedures designed for declaring 
surpluses stemmed from their purposes and goals. In general, the Standard Procedures 
had four underlying principles. First, they had to be designed for efficiency so they could 
handle the vast majority of all declarations and assets in an orderly and automatic 
fashion. However, this meant that the administration had to be detail-oriented so items 
could be tracked once consigned to the WAC. This multiplied the amount of paperwork 
and was completely contingent on the willingness of officials to fill in the forms correctly 
and with sufficient details. Second, the entire administration had to enforce strict 
regulations that minimized widespread influence-peddling and abuse, but that in turn 
eliminated pricing discounts and special treatment in the Standard Procedures – even if 
assets were sold to provincial governments or public organizations involved in 
reconstruction or rehabilitation.  
Third, since the procedures were all drafted before the war ended, officials 
understood that some flexibility was crucial to meet changing needs and assimilate new 
experiences.
47
 However, this realization also lent itself to developing vaguely worded 
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regulations and procedures that often resulted in new problems and delays, particularly at 
the fringes of departmental jurisdictions or when filling in the requisite forms. In most 
cases, when the Standard Procedures were revised it was usually to address the vagueness 
of various provisions so that more details were coaxed out of declaring departments. 
Finally, and most importantly, the administration had to have a set of special procedures 
that allowed for the strategic allocation of assets. Such a system would protect the 
economy from a glut of surplus second-hand property and also materially support the 
needs of reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, the incumbent checks and balances 
required to allocate goods and resources through a system of “priorities” were counter-
productive to quick disposal and, once the volume of surpluses increased, the mountains 
of paperwork bogged down the whole system as administrators had to match claims and 
inventory lists by hand.  
The system for strategically allocating surpluses, established through CAAC 4, was 
a persistent issue that continually exposed the imperfections built into the administrative 
preparations. Largely created because of the political and public pressure surrounding the 
disposal of surpluses, the “priorities” system was a four-tiered scheme designed to create 
a hierarchy of access and privilege in which other federal government departments 
ranked first, provincial governments second, municipal governments third, and public 
bodies (any school, hospital, relief organization, or publicly funded organization) fourth. 
In this hierarchy, each level could submit a priority claim or request for any type of 
surplus and if it became available in their region it could be purchased before it went out 
on the open market and if none of the other priorities above laid claim.
48
 In this way 
assets could be disposed of strategically and in the public’s best interests since the 
property acquired by priority claim was often urgently needed for local reconstruction 
and rehabilitation efforts.  
At the first priority level, the CAAC facilitated inter-departmental transfers. A great 
deal of assets changed hands this way and a significant amount originated from the 
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inventories of the DND and DMS. In general terms, the CAAC facilitated the transfer of 
numerous types of tools, clothing, bedding, medical supplies, buildings, real estate, 
factory space, and many other types of assets from those departments to other ones.  In 
many cases, the property transferred went to the Departments of Labour or Indian and 
Northern Affairs so each could continue supporting its various programs and policies, 
such as the Canadian Vocational Training Program and the expansion of social services 
in the North.
49
 After some discussion with the Treasury Board about the finances behind 
the transactions, it was determined that no free departmental exchanges could take place. 
So the CAAC became responsible for ensuring that transactions took place and that the 
prices involved were equivalent to the market values as defined by the WAC. However, 
once the CAAC matched surplus declarations with priority claims, the negotiations for 
the exact price, transfer, custody, and transportation became the responsibility of the 
departments involved.
50
 The CAAC played the role of matchmaker. 
Probably the largest and most substantial inter-departmental transfer managed by 
the CAAC was the airfields, facilities, and equipment of the British Commonwealth Air 
Training Program (BCATP). The BCATP was arguably Canada’s largest contribution to 
the Allied war effort. The program trained over a quarter of all Commonwealth aircrew 
and pilots and prompted the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to remark that 
the BCATP turned Canada into the “aerodrome of democracy.” The BCATP established 
107 flight schools and 184 ancillary units located at 231 different sites across the country. 
Many schools were located in rural or under-populated areas (such as Goderich, Ontario, 
Penhold, Alberta, and Yorkton, Saskatchewan), so the postwar necessity of an airport was 
questionable, but the interest of municipal and provincial governments remained high.
51
 
Others, located in more populated regions, retained some practical value as civilian 
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aerodromes and flying clubs or, inversely, as a source of building materials and housing 
if demolished or renovated.
52
 In March and May 1944, Cabinet decided that the 
Department of Transport would automatically receive “first opportunity of acquiring 
control of all airfields and all or any of the buildings thereon” when declared surplus by 
the RCAF and BCATP. However, if Transport did not require the property then it was 
sent back through the normal disposal channels to the WAC. The Corporation then took 
possession and determined the best course of action: either to sell the real estate, 
buildings, and moveable assets or dismantle them and sell the materials piecemeal.
53
  
By mid-1945, once several batches of surpluses had tested the channels of 
communication, the tracking system, and the priorities scheme, the CAAC and WAC felt 
they had developed a satisfactory system for managing disposal operations.
54
 However, 
despite all these early preparations, once hostilities concluded and the rate of declarations 
increased, some glaring problems and oversights quickly emerged. In fact, the small 
sample size of surplus declarations around which the administrative procedures were 
tested proved to be a critical weakness as the system was designed with too many checks 
and balances that slowed disposal after the floodgates opened. However, despite their 
shortcomings, the combination of early preparations and the assimilation of qualified 
expertise did help mitigate a total disaster. Yet this did not happen without incident or 
new rounds of mistakes, changes, and effort – especially on the part of the WAC.   
The Best Laid Plans 
On the eve of VE-Day, the typical path travelled by a surplus asset and its 
associated paperwork went something like the following. Once a department or agency 
defined its postwar plans and budgets, it knew what was surplus to its requirements. 
Unneeded assets were reported to the CAAC using Standard Procedures CAAC 2 and 3 
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and by correctly filling in the associated forms and receipts. The paperwork, having been 
received by the CAAC at its offices in Ottawa, would then be added to a general tracking 
schedule and staff processed the paperwork by comparing the declared surpluses to the 
roughly 50,000-plus requests for priority allocation (as defined by CAAC 4) received 
separately by the Committee.
55
 Copies of all paperwork were then sent to the WAC’s 
Sales (later Supply) Department with the most recent tracking schedules. At every 
Committee meeting these tracking schedules were approved for transfer and each entry 
contained a specific recommendation that almost always related to a priority claim so the 
WAC was apprised that it had to negotiate with a specific interest group. If no priority 
requests were on file then specific recommendations were not generally provided.
56
  
At no point in the process did the CAAC ever take physical possession of any 
assets; it only handled paperwork. Everything declared surplus would be physically 
handled by the WAC. Thus, the wisdom of forming both organizations on the same 
plane, with neither subordinate to the other, was clearly evident. A division of 
responsibilities existed, but there was a fundamental inter-dependency that a hierarchical 
organization could never accommodate: duties shifted laterally, not from above or below. 
All tracking schedules were received by the WAC’s Head Office in Montreal, which then 
passed them on to its main operating department, the Sales Department. Until the WAC 
was reorganized between August and October 1945, the Sales Department handled all 
aspects of disposal.
57
 Although the arrangements were logical and straightforward they 
would also prove to be quite cumbersome and prone to delays once hostilities ended.  
From April 1944 to August 1945, the WAC centralized all its operations around 
only sales. At its offices in Montreal, the Sales Department coordinated the 
categorization, pricing, marketing, and selling of all surpluses consigned to it. However, 
the centralization of all declarations, paperwork, and sales approval for the entire country 
at one location and within one department created an administrative bottleneck. The 
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Corporation’s various branches, located across the country, had very little autonomy and 
were arranged mainly as places to pick up goods or make inquiries about purchases. This 
resulted in “a decided time lag” since the WAC’s regional headquarters were reduced to 
“distribution outlets only for that surplus referred to them” from the Head Office.58 The 
postwar rush only exacerbated this bottleneck and compounded the inherent delays. 
Further complicating this situation was the fact that during the early stages of planning 
and preparations there were hardly any considerations made for warehousing needs.
59
 
Instead, the WAC expected to rely heavily on declaring agencies to maintain custody of 
their surpluses and also make deliveries to the purchaser according to instructions 
received by the Head Office. The custodial arrangements may have saved the WAC the 
cost of warehousing and shipping, but it did not expedite disposal.
60
  
Before the WAC’s major reorganization, delays and problems started appearing as 
the volume of declarations steadily increased. By April 1945 the AOSAC noticed that a 
significant delay between the declaration of surpluses and their actual sale was 
developing. On 18 April, the new MGO, Major-General James V. Young, submitted a 
report to the Deputy Minister (Army) that he had commissioned “because of complaints 
from several of my Directors” that surpluses declared to the CAAC were not being 
disposed of by the WAC “within a reasonable length of time.” The report, written by 
Dailley, was not very flattering to Canada’s disposal administration. Up until April the 
four Directorates of the MGO Branch had made 218 surplus declarations but only 52 
could be classified as completed. Moreover, the elapse time of the remaining declarations 
was troubling: thirteen were older than nine months, 58 were between three and nine 
months old, 33 were less than three months old, and the remaining 62 declarations were 
unaccounted for in the report.
61
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The report also uncovered that, of the sales completed, many were made piecemeal. 
For instance, the AOSAC found that of the 2,500 butchers’ cleavers declared surplus and 
“in the hands of W.A.C. for 5 months…only 34 have been sold to date” while $17,908.68 
worth of “surplus tools and equipment” were “in the hands of W.A.C. for 7 months and 
only $100.00” was sold.62 Although some sales were taking place, they were not in 
significant quantities. Moreover, given the severe material shortages across the country 
and that some of the surpluses declared by the MGO had useful civilian purposes the 
delays were doubly concerning: how could the WAC not find any customers? Even 
though many of the problems exposed by the AOSAC’s report were attributable to the 
centralized operational practices of the Corporation, the report demonstrated that some 
“legitimate criticism of the service being rendered by War Assets Corporation” existed.63  
For the armed forces these delays in disposal were particularly troublesome because 
of the custodial arrangements with the WAC. Downsizing force requirements and 
declaring surpluses not only involved the disposal of unneeded kit, it also meant that each 
armed service started consolidating the munitions, supplies, and real estate they planned 
on keeping. This made any existing storage space and warehouses a premium resource 
that could not be spared indefinitely for unneeded things. However, without storage 
facilities of its own, the WAC was completely dependent on the armed services to 
maintain custody of surpluses until it found a buyer. This took time and had serious 
implications for the armed forces since assets declared surplus months before were still 
occupying “badly needed storage space” on a seemingly indefinite basis.64 Once 
demobilization hit full swing, the WAC started hampering the efforts of the armed forces 
to both consolidate and liquidate their wartime inventories.  
The custodial arrangements caused problems for the WAC. Because the 
Corporation wanted declaring agencies to maintain custody of their surpluses, it 
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effectively relinquished control over their treatment and fate before final disposal. This 
was a major problem given the pressing storage concerns facing the military and most 
federal departments. As a result, declaring agencies started viewing surpluses as a 
nuisance – especially if they remained in their possession indefinitely – and were anxious 
to dispose of them as quickly as possible. Viewing surpluses as expendable and worthless 
could result in their premature destruction, particularly if the declaring agency only 
considered the asset’s value within the narrow confines of departmental requirements. In 
such cases, the declaring agency did not consider the object’s residual value in civilian 
markets or in fulfilling other purposes. For the declaring agencies, the Corporation was 
simply not getting rid of unwanted things quickly enough. 
Perhaps, the most notorious example of the pitfalls of custodial arrangements was 
the situation involving the WAC and RCAF at Penhold, Alberta. The incident started in 
February 1945 when the WAC allowed the RCAF to destroy a laundry list of surplus 
equipment, with a few noted exceptions clearly identified in the correspondence.
65
 RCAF 
personnel, acting as the WAC’s custodians and technical advisors, began identifying and 
destroying unneeded equipment and obsolete aircraft by scrapping or incineration. 
However, RCAF personnel misunderstood the meaning of “surplus” and “obsolete” as 
defined by the WAC. They assumed that since the aircraft and equipment in their custody 
was obsolete by Air Force standards, they did not possess any residual value for other 
purposes. In fact, the opposite was true, especially since weapon systems are the sum of 
several thousand components, some of which – such as engine batteries or Plexiglas – 
retain value in civilian markets. But the WAC, lacking direct supervision at Penhold, 
could not intervene and the destruction continued until questions were raised by the 
media and in Parliament. To many observers it was clear: waste and wanton destruction 
had taken place and the WAC was held accountable, even though its custodial agent was 
responsible for destroying the items in question.
66
 The long shadow of the Penhold fiasco 
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caused significant changes to the WAC’s operational policies and also prompted it to 
forbid the military from destroying anything except ammunition.  
The other major problem that the WAC encountered was the propensity for the 
declaring agencies to consolidate their surpluses in a single location before declaring 
them to the CAAC. This was problematic for two reasons. First, it meant that additional 
shipping costs had to be added to the purchase price and it further complicated the 
logistics of sales for the Corporation. Second, it resulted in quite a bit of negative 
publicity for the WAC. As Peterson explained to the SCWEE, “people see the surpluses; 
they know they are there; they see them moved away; they don’t like it, and they assume 
the War Assets moved them.”67 Inversely, the bad publicity and public dissatisfaction 
could be aggravated if the surpluses, concentrated in a particular location by the declaring 
agency, remained trapped by the WAC’s centralized practices and the CAAC’s 
administrative bottleneck. This meant that the public could see large stocks of unused 
supplies and materials sitting on seemingly abandoned property or behind barbed wire 
fences, exposed to the elements, and further deteriorating in condition. The complaints of 
the Calgary General Contractors Association in August 1945 provide a typical example: 
We are informed that there is a quantity of building materials of all kinds in 
storage at Currie Barracks and at No. 11 Equipment and Supply Depot here in 
Calgary that is not being used in any way. As you are no doubt aware, we are 
suffering from a serious shortage of supplies and we are at a loss to 
understand why this material is not being released to the trade.
68
  
Regardless of circumstances, the WAC was blamed even if the armed forces had yet to 
declare the items surplus as was the case at Currie Barracks.
69
  
On 23 October 1945, a follow-up report was submitted to the MGO and the Deputy 
Minister by Colonel R. McColm, Dailley’s successor as Chairman of the AOSAC. In it 
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he indicated that the April report resulted in some improvements but that “a regular 
procedure for hastening War Assets Corporation” should be adopted. McColm suggested 
that each week the AOSAC prepare a list of overdue declarations and have the Deputy 
Minister transmit it to the WAC’s newly formed Supply Department. The gentle 
reminder would serve to “press the various Divisions of the Corporation for action.”70 
That McColm noted improvements in the WAC’s performance in October was significant 
given the increasing volume of materials declared surplus during that time and the fact 
that the WAC was only selling a fraction of what it took in from the MGO per month. 
According to the MGO’s monthly tabulations of declarations and sales (calculated in 
dollar figures) the WAC disposed of $15,156,994.37 up to October 1945 out of a total of 
$47,265,593.95 worth of surpluses. As an aggregate, the WAC sold about a third of all 
the MGOs surpluses, an accomplishment worthy of some merit, particularly given the 
discrepancy between the original value (calculated by the MGO based on what it paid to 
acquire the assets) and the WAC’s depreciated selling price (based on the going market 
rate and WPTB price ceilings).
71
  
However, these figures do not indicate much about the rising volume of assets 
entering the WAC’s inventory at war’s end. Subtracting the totals for September from 
October, the WAC took in $6,169,081.00 worth of new surpluses from the MGO Branch 
in October while disposing of $1,127,294.95. Subtracting the totals for August from 
September revealed a similar disparity between input and output: $5,204,069.53 worth of 
goods declared in September versus $1,551,158.71 worth of goods sold.
72
 A few 
conclusions can be drawn from these statistics. First, by the fall of 1945, for every dollar 
the WAC made in sales it was taking in between five and six dollars’ worth of goods 
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from the MGO – a pattern that was surely replicated across all branches of the military.73 
Second, the increasing amount of items consigned to the WAC caused a natural lag in 
sales, so it is obvious that McColm adjusted the AOSAC’s expectations for immediate 
disposal action. A backlog in sales was impossible to avoid given the increasing volume 
of goods declared surplus, the administrative and operational procedures, the collection 
and inspection of goods, marketing requirements, and sales negotiations. Although it is 
conceivable that the WAC succeeded in selling $6 million worth of goods (originally 
priced) for $1 million (selling price) in the same month, there are no indications that any 
assets declared in September or October were actually sold in the same month.  
The situation with the MGO Branch was just the tip of the iceberg. When hostilities 
ended, the floodgates opened. Despite the early preparations and planning, the flood of 
surpluses was overwhelming and appears to have caught officials somewhat off guard. 
Before May 1945, few surpluses (except mainly obsolete kit) existed since bureaucrats 
were unsure about their future departmental needs and consequently they were loath to 
declare too much surplus too quickly. This was especially the case with the Army as 
relinquishing control and ownership of a significant quantity of assets was 
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Table 1: Declarations of Surplus Received by Month, 1944-48 
 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 
January 1 430 2,472 805 256 
February 9 416 2,483 723 266 
March 46 559 2,862 749 365 
April 45 984 2,737 615 - 
May 59 1,216 2,486 652 - 
June 165 1,692 2,001 502 - 
July 194 1,330 1,784 719 - 
August 175 1,593 1,325 529 - 
September 180 1,767 1,016 370 - 
October 242 1,064 1,014 443 - 
November 469 1,520 996 352 - 
December 277 1,487 668 293 - 
Total 1,862 14,058 21,844 6,752 887 
Source: War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual Report (April 1st, 1947 to March 31st, 1948), 7. 
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counterproductive, not only to winning the war, but also to legitimizing its sizeable and 
demanding postwar requirements. This reluctance to declare anything surplus no doubt 
played a major role in forming the massive waves of declarations towards the end of the 
1945-1946 fiscal year.
74
 Once hostilities ended and postwar budgets were settled in basic 
terms, most government departments and agencies (especially the Army) suddenly 
switched gears, from cautiously guarding inventories to rapidly defining and declaring 
surpluses to the CAAC.
75
 Table 1 shows the acute and swift growth in surplus 
declarations from all departments (not just DND) from 1944 to 1948 – note the peak 
period from May 1945 to October 1946 and the fact that the two biggest months (March 
and April 1946) coincide with the end and start of the fiscal year. 
A common refrain among CAAC and WAC officials, both in their records and their 
testimonies before the SCWEE, was the unprecedented nature of the task now facing 
them.
76
 Of course there were vague notions of past failures and sweeping indictments of 
speculators following the First World War, but the liquidation of such a vast amount of 
government property had never been attempted before. Over a two-year period, from 
April 1945 to April 1947, more than 35,000 separate declarations were processed by the 
CAAC and consigned to the WAC. Keeping in mind that each declaration could contain 
as little as one item or, more likely, lists of hundreds if not thousands of items, the 
magnitude of disposal operations becomes more apparent. As the WAC’s Third Annual 
Report stated, “one report of surplus may well cover a complete plant involving 
buildings, land, machine tools, etc., having an original cost of $10,000 while another will 
cover one horse valued at $25.”77 Unfortunately, the exact dollar values of all 
declarations are difficult to ascertain (given the discrepancy between the original and 
actual values), but since these declarations constituted the bulk of everything tagged for 
disposal, the total original cost was worth billions. Indeed, the flood of goods might be 
described as a tidal wave. 
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Since federal departments controlled the floodgates and opened them when they 
pleased, some friction between the disposal administration and declaring agencies 
resulted at the fringes of mandates and responsibilities. As a result, new problems started 
popping up everywhere. Some were well beyond the control of the WAC and CAAC. 
This was because departments were liable to renege on their surplus declarations if 
circumstances and forecasted budgets changed. Although it remains unknown how 
frequently this occurred, by January 1947 the CAAC had to address the issue at its 
monthly meeting since “government Departments were, in many instances, requesting the 
return of materials previously reported surplus” and doing so after the WAC had prepared 
its inventory reports. Since the inventory reports were “accountable documents” and 
subject to audit, the Committee determined that reporting Departments had to repurchase 
the assets in question (if they were not already sold).
78
 In other instances where inventory 
reports were not prepared then it was possible to transfer the objects back to the 
Department but this entailed further correspondence and investigation. 
One well-documented case involved the RCAF and its facilities at Debert, Nova 
Scotia. In April 1947, the RCAF declared surplus over a dozen airfields and facilities, but 
in doing so it also secured a special dispensation that froze final disposal indefinitely. 
Two years later, in February 1949, the RCAF had clarified its postwar requirements and 
released most of the property. However, it wanted to re-acquire some of the assets and 
real estate at five locations: Bowden, Alberta, Debert, Nova Scotia, Edenvale, Ontario, 
Jarvis, Ontario, and Souris, Manitoba.
79
 In the case of the sprawling military facilities at 
Debert some serious postwar changes had occurred in the interim. Almost all of the 
Army’s buildings at Debert (about 443 in total) were dismantled but the RCAF’s 
buildings were spared and renovated by the WAC for use as a warehouse facility.
80
 After 
the inventories dwindled in Debert, the buildings and surrounding property were 
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transferred to the Department of Transport in accordance with Cabinet’s directives for 
BCATP airfields. Thus, in the spring and summer of 1949, the WAC had to reacquire the 
property from Transport so it could transfer it back to the RCAF.
81
 This type of situation 
illustrates the complexities and uncertainties of declaring surpluses. The postwar rush to 
downsize caused a logjam of paperwork, and if circumstances or budgets changed then 
sometimes departments wanted their stuff back. This meant forestalling final disposal so 
that assets and paperwork could reverse course against the prevailing flow of bureaucratic 
procedures.
82
  
In other cases, the WAC and CAAC shared the blame for delays and problems with 
the declaring departments. Perhaps, the biggest issue facing Canada’s disposal 
administration resulted from insufficient details on surplus declarations and priority 
claims. This was a product of both inadequate instructions in the Standard Procedures and 
lackadaisical bureaucrats improperly filling out the paperwork. Quite often in the haste to 
complete the maze of forms for ridding themselves of unneeded assets or making as 
many priority claims as possible, officials did not fill in the paperwork correctly. It did 
not take long for Berry and his staff to discover this problem and make changes to CAAC 
2 and 4 in several futile attempts at curbing this behaviour by eliminating vagueness in 
the instructions. However, because clarifications to the Standard Procedures only helped 
as long as other agencies played ball, the problem persisted. In doing so, further delays 
were caused when the CAAC was forced to track down and investigate the declaring 
agency or priority holder to determine exactly what was being declared or requested. 
After the tidal wave washed in this task became a real time-consuming impediment for 
processing declarations. 
To illustrate this problem consider a hypothetical example: say the DMS declared a 
drill press surplus at the John Inglis Plant in Toronto and valued it at $1,000. At first 
glance this “declaration” might seem sufficient, but how could the WAC market or sell 
the drill press without more information describing it and its features? And how could it 
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be differentiated from all the others, if one had to physically remove the drill without 
knowing its serial number? The plague of vague descriptions crippled disposal 
procedures at their very core. Without any information detailing the exact type of drill 
press (whether it was a bench, pillar, or radial) or its condition of use (worn out or new) 
or the exact size and capacity (whether it was hand-held, stationary, its features or 
limitations) or its component parts (such as power sources or drill bits) the declaration 
was virtually useless. Inversely, the vagueness of priority claims was equally 
troublesome. To simply request “a drill” without any further detail provoked similar 
questions: what type was required? How big and powerful? What parts were needed and 
for what purposes would it be used?
83
 This type of information was critical because it 
enabled the CAAC to match items from the WAC’s inventory with a priority request. 
Keeping in mind this was long before computers and keyword searches, so each priority 
claim was matched by hand against the mountains of declarations. Even if the forms were 
filled in correctly, processing paperwork through the priorities took time and each vague 
declaration or request only added further delays. 
Other issues and delays resulted entirely from the CAAC’s and WAC’s operational 
procedures since the tidal wave of declarations and priority claims turned the priorities 
scheme into a dam rather than a filter for the flow of goods. As the previous section 
explained, the priorities scheme called for negotiating sales directly with specific interests 
groups but this slowed sales and the problem quickly snowballed when the postwar rush 
brought in over 20,000 surplus declarations and 50,000 requests for priority allocation 
from April 1945 to March 1946 alone. This compounded the WAC’s centralized 
operational procedures and the “sieves” of the CAAC’s priority system. The sheer 
volume stalled disposal to the detriment of priority holders. One example, brought up by 
Peterson during his testimony before the SCWEE explained the situation quite succinctly. 
A few months after VE-Day, 174 pieces of construction equipment were declared surplus 
by the DND and brought back to Montreal from Goose Bay, Newfoundland. The WAC 
received 1,500 inquiries about them from both priority and non-priority holders. The 
equipment was second-hand and some of it was in “bad repair” but there was clearly an 
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interested market as many potential customers and construction companies inspected the 
gear. Yet in order to give priority claimants time to exercise their priority rights, sales to 
the public were “held up for three weeks” but priority claims were exercised on only 
twenty-two machines.
84
 Clearly, the priorities were preventing the WAC from 
capitalizing quickly on sales of assets in high demand and left many customers frustrated.     
The complaints that “you can’t buy from War Assets” started emerging out of a 
confluence of factors and events loosely connected by the media. On the heels of the 
Great Depression and war, severe material shortages continued throughout the transition 
period, fueling an increased demand and eagerness for goods of all types. With new 
goods especially scarce, the public expected second-hand government surpluses to be 
profuse and available. Perhaps conditioned by extensive wartime propaganda that 
glorified industrial productivity, there was a perception that somehow the WAC’s 
inventory was vast, infinite, and available immediately for public consumption.
85
 
However, this was at odds with reality. Moving assets through the CAAC priorities and 
the selling branches of the WAC took time. Moreover, the WAC could only sell what 
was consigned to it – a fact the public always seemed to misunderstand despite the 
continuous publication of pamphlets and newspaper advertisements.
86
 Before the war 
ended, few surpluses existed anywhere, so there was actually little to buy from the WAC. 
It was only after VE- and VJ-Day that the WAC’s inventory grew substantially, but 
selling restrictions limited who could make purchases. Moreover, there were also no 
guarantees that the avalanche of declarations at war’s end contained things the public 
wanted or in quantities that could satisfy demand.  Indeed, the WAC may have taken in a 
large amount of assets, but the most desired commodities represented only a small 
fraction of the total.  
The priorities also caused frustration. For example, over the summer of 1945 the 
WAC and the Ontario Federation of Agriculture came to an agreement that allowed the 
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Federation to facilitate the sale of military-patterned trucks and field artillery tractors 
through a series of lottery-style auctions to bonafide farmers. Auctions took place across 
Southwestern Ontario in the late summer and early fall and the one in Markham received 
some media coverage. In late September, about 300 farmers gathered at the Markham 
Fair grounds for the lottery draw. Names were thrown into a hat and the lucky winners 
received the chance to purchase one of the available 125 military-patterned trucks and 
twenty-five artillery tractors (each valued at $330 and $280 respectively).
87
 Sensing an 
opportunity mechanics ventured to the Markham Fairgrounds but they were turned away 
at the door by Federation officials who were stringently verifying the credentials of all 
attendees. Only farmers were allowed to purchase the machinery, and since the WAC did 
not waive the resale condition attached to all priority sales (this prevented the purchaser 
from legally reselling what had been purchased for 90-days) mechanics were completely 
cut out. “I can’t possibly see what use a tractor could be to a farmer” an exasperated 
“garage man” told the Globe and Mail, “the machines run only about four miles to the 
gallon. But they would be ideal for us for towing purposes.”88 Out of luck, the mechanics 
could not buy directly from the WAC and instead had to wait to purchase vehicles and 
equipment through established dealers and at prices closer to the WPTB’s price ceilings.  
The hierarchy of access and privilege created by the priorities also resulted in 
competition between and within each priority level. Those lower down the priority list 
were at an inherent disadvantage and were often unable to purchase assets even if they 
became available. For example, as Peterson explained to the SCWEE, by November 
1945, “only seven buses in usable condition have been declared surplus” and since these 
were sold to the federal and provincial governments on priority claims, “the school 
boards throughout Canada who want buses must be given the unpopular and the 
unexpected answer.”89 The school boards, being public bodies, were fourth in the priority 
scheme and could only get access to goods not purchased by the priorities above, to say 
little about the intense competition between school boards that would have resulted had 
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the small number of busses become available. Managing the competition for goods 
between organizations at all levels of the priority system became an additional burden of 
some complexity. In one instance, the CAAC got out in front of a potential fiasco when it 
negotiated an agreement between two international relief agencies that were requesting 
the same types of materials. In April 1945, the CAAC, the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund 
(CUARF) agreed to distribute supplies on a percentage basis: UNRRA received 7/10 and 
CUARF 3/10.
90
 Thus, the CAAC was able to accommodate both the large and small 
relief organizations and avoid additional public embarrassment. 
The priorities scheme required more vigilance than originally expected. This was 
because the scheme was open to abuse and exploitation.  Abuse of the priority system 
stemmed from the fact that some claimants made dozens of blanket requests at once or 
claimed more than they actually needed so they could resell for a profit after the 90-day 
resale restriction expired. In other instances, the abuses were less about volume and more 
about particular individuals trying to beat the system for their own selfish gains. Over the 
summer of 1945, staff in the WAC and the DMS started discovering large-scale abuses of 
the priorities system. According to Howe, veterans who received a priority certificate 
from the Motor Vehicle Controller were purchasing vehicles they did not require and 
reselling the cars for a tidy profit. The cheating was “on a colossal scale” as the number 
of priority certificates handed out by the DMS “exceeded available cars by some 60,000” 
and further solidified the WAC’s refusal to create a veterans’ priority since the cheating 
would inevitably spread to its inventory of vehicles and other commodities.
91
 
 In another incident the WAC discovered that members of the public could abuse 
the priorities system through misrepresentation. In August 1945, Louis Richard, an Audit 
Supervisor with the Auditor General of Canada (who later joined the WAC in 1947 as 
Treasurer and became President in 1954), was informed of one such instance by the 
Corporation’s then Comptroller, G. A. Cruickshank. According to Cruickshank, Montreal 
Sales Order 0087 dated 23 May 1945 was issued to approve a sale to the Unemployment 
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Insurance Commission in Moncton for a “Ford car” valued at $365.42. However, the car 
was paid for by a personal cheque from Mr. McBeath, an employee of the 
Unemployment Insurance Commission. On the surface everything looked normal, but the 
odd discrepancy between the priority claim and the actual purchaser raised a red flag. 
After looking into the matter, the WAC’s Priorities Division determined that Mr. 
McBeath had “used the name of the Unemployment Insurance Commission in order to 
obtain a priority which he could not obtain otherwise.”92 Upon discovering the scam, the 
Priorities Division cancelled the sale and refunded Mr. McBeath his money while the 
Moncton Branch repossessed the car. 
Suffice to say, when the tidal wave of surpluses arrived, the priorities scheme 
turned into a major headache that fuelled increasing delays, bad publicity, and 
paperwork. Although officials were not overly concerned by the negative publicity, they 
did start debating the merits of abolishing the priorities scheme altogether in November 
1945.
93
 Clearly, things had hit a breaking point. A product of political pressure and a 
desire for strategically managing disposal, the priority system was well intentioned and 
worked best when there were fewer declarations and limited available surpluses. 
However, the flood of paperwork and assets was overwhelming and prevented any 
orderly liquidation. At a meeting with Howe several members of the Board of Directors 
called for the elimination of the priorities system “because first, they lead to abuse of the 
privileges, and second, they tend to bog down operations.”94 
On the matter of abolishing priorities, Berry disagreed with his colleagues. Given 
that the WAC sold surplus materials through established trade networks and not usually 
by direct transactions with end users, he recognized the importance of ensuring that 
public institutions and governments received some consideration in a system mainly 
conceived with business interests and economic stability in mind. To Berry, the priorities 
system had to continue, not only because their cancellation would cause unfavourable 
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political fallout, but also because they reserved goods and assets for interest groups and 
public programs assisting with postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation.
95
 Priorities 
served an important function, but Berry also recognized that they were slowing sales to 
the detriment of postwar prosperity. The solution, however, was not to eliminate the key 
cog in the disposal administration but to streamline the whole system around it and 
remove as many of the other bottlenecks as possible. 
Overall, Berry felt that revisions to the priority system would become necessary in 
the future, but that the timing was not ideal. Without his support the priorities scheme 
was not abolished in 1945. However, over the following few years, Berry authorized 
several modifications that streamlined processing and selling efficiency. One particularly 
important change was the establishment of time limits for holding a priority request on 
file. At first they were set at thirty days and then lowered to ten days in mid-1946.
96
 In 
January 1947 the time limit was abolished completely when the CAAC “relieved” the 
WAC “of the necessity of carrying requests on its records.”97 This almost entirely 
eliminated the administrative bottleneck that had plagued the system from its inception. 
From January onwards, the WAC still continued making direct sales to priority holders 
but only if the materials requested were available in the Corporation’s inventories “at the 
time the request [was] received.”98 There was now no responsibility for administering an 
institutional memory for the priorities system. Over the spring and summer of 1947, it 
was abolished completely in line with decreasing inventories and decreasing sales. 
The Reorganization and Expansion of the WAC 
The reason why Berry was reluctant to significantly change the priorities in 
November 1945 had a lot to do with the WAC’s restructuring and reorganization over the 
summer and early autumn. The changes were largely aimed at eliminating administrative 
bottlenecks and improving the Corporation’s selling efficiency, so he wanted to give 
them an opportunity to sort out the issues affecting disposal. At the time, making more 
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modifications that would eliminate part of the disposal process, especially one that 
fulfilled an important function, was not prudent. Besides, Berry shared some cautious 
optimism that a by-product of the reorganization would attenuate the priorities quagmire:  
The reorganization deemed necessary had barely commenced when V-J Day 
brought an enormously increased volume of surpluses which had to be 
handled concurrently with the loss of existing personnel and the introduction 
of additional newly appointed personnel and substantial changes in 
procedure. This reorganization has made good progress, but I would ask the 
committee to keep in mind that while every effort will continue to be made to 
complete it as quickly as possible, there is necessarily much still to be done.
99
 
The first steps in the WAC’s restructuring took place back in February 1945 when 
J. W. Horsey was hired as Executive-Vice President and added to the Board of Directors. 
Horsey was only on the WAC’s payroll for less than twelve months, but his influence 
over the future shape, structure, and mandate of the Company was profound. As President 
of Dominion Stores, a very prominent supermarket chain founded in 1919, he had 
extensive experience in merchandising and sales and the Board of Directors gave him a 
free hand to review the Company’s operations. Horsey’s report was tabled in June and 
some of his ideas on selling strategies were published in the Quarterly Review of 
Commerce in January 1947.
100
 Above all, his recommendations were designed to increase 
the selling efficiency, as he told Board members in March, “anything in the nature of a 
barrier to sales must be broken down.”101  
One of Horsey’s biggest organizational changes was the implementation of a new 
regional focus. Over the summer and early autumn, the WAC (and CAAC) decentralized 
operations by dividing the country into five selling regions: Western, Prairies, Ontario, 
Quebec, and the Maritimes. Each region was controlled by a Branch Manager who 
oversaw all merchandising and supply operations in their respective jurisdictions. The 
five Branch Managers reported directly to the General Manager who remained 
headquartered in Montreal at the Head Offices, now located at 4095 Catherine Street 
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West in a building formerly used by Westmount Tool Works. The WAC’s centralized 
organizational structure was similarly dispersed. Surplus declarations were still sent to 
the CAAC in Ottawa and tracking schedules were still passed on to the WAC’s Head 
Offices, but in Montreal the schedules were now sorted by region and mailed out to 
Branch Managers. The priorities scheme was similarly decentralized and no longer totally 
contingent on the Head Offices and CAAC in Montreal and Ottawa. Instead, priority 
requests were mailed directly to the Regional Branches where they were assessed against 
and accommodated by the region’s available inventories.102 If regional inventories could 
not accommodate a request, it was forwarded to Montreal and matched against the  
national inventory. The big advantage of this change was in dividing the size of 
inventories and the 
number of priority 
requests across each 
region thereby cutting the 
administrative bottleneck 
into five manageable 
portions. 
Because specific 
areas within regions were 
liable to have high 
concentrations of assets, 
special branches were organized within the company’s five regions. For example, Sub-
Branches were opened in the Pacific Northwest in Edmonton and Whitehorse that 
handled and appraised all the American surpluses that accumulated along the Alaskan 
Highway, Northwest Staging Route, and the Canol pipeline. Given the significant amount 
of American surpluses located in Prince Rupert another Sub-Branch was opened there as 
well. To deal with specific disposal challenges in Ontario and Quebec, District Supply 
Managers were appointed to oversee the WAC’s activities in Ajax, Ontario and 
Bouchard, Quebec. In Ajax, the Supply Manager handled the disposal of assets by 
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Photo 2 The WAC’s Head Offices (circa. late-1945) located at 4095 
Catherine Street West, Montreal. The building was formerly used by a 
DIL subsidiary, Westmount Tool Works. Source: LAC, RG101, R-1-
1-9, History of War Assets Corporation Lt. and War Assets 
Corporation. 
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coordinating the sale of property, tools, and other assets to the University of Toronto and 
the CMHC. In Bouchard, the Supply Manager coordinated disposal operations between 
the Canadian Army and the WAC. In February 1946, a special Supply Department 
representative was also sent to Newfoundland as the Army, RCN, and RCAF were 
liquidating large amounts of equipment and facilities in this strategic location.
103
 Thus, 
the WAC’s new regionalization made the Corporation more proactive in the cleanup of 
wartime developments wherever they had occurred. 
The regional decentralization required a corresponding change to the WAC’s 
organizational structure. Therefore, Horsey rationalized the Corporation’s various 
departments and divisions. Almost immediately after joining the WAC, he created a 
temporary “Services Division” and tasked it with various responsibilities crucial to a 
selling organization but virtually non-existent in the WAC: warehousing, shipping, and 
security. To improve the efficiency of the Head Office, Dominion Stores lent their 
secretary, A. A. Beevor, to help improve clerical practices.
104
 Furthermore, to oversee the 
Corporation’s accounts, internal audits, and handle its finances, Horsey formed a new 
Comptroller Department and appointed an accountant, L. A. Brooks, to manage it. An 
Educational Director (Harry Low) and a Personnel Director (Clarence Fraser, loaned 
from Bell Telephone Company of Canada) were hired for training new employees and 
also to ensure that the Corporation continued to recruit the most qualified and 
experienced personnel as possible. Harry Low was later given the additional task of 
coordinating sales with the needs of educational associations. Horsey also took issue with 
the Corporation’s lack of publicity and public engagement. He did not like “the 
Corporation’s past policy of ‘Keeping Quiet’” and felt that “a series of constructive, 
positive statements should be made regularly to the population at large, to Industry and to 
employees…through news columns…and through convincing attractive advertising” in 
order to fight back against any bad publicity. As a result, he gave Herbert Lash, the 
                                                 
103
 War Assets Corporation Second Annual Report, 10-11. 
104
 Horsey hired: J. P. Gledhill as “manager of sales,” A. H. Evans as “manager of warehouses,” J. T. 
Mackenzie as “traffic manager” and R. B. Early as “office manager.” LAC, RG101, Vol. 7, WAC – Board 
of Directors, Meeting Minutes, 8 March 1945. 
  
124 
 
WAC’s Publicity Director, a more proactive mandate to monitor the press and publish 
positive news stories relating to the WAC’s activities.105 
The Sales Department, with which Horsey constantly tinkered, was eventually 
disbanded and replaced by two separate Departments: Supply and Merchandising. H. R. 
Malley was put in charge of Supply, which took over all procurement, categorization, and 
warehousing responsibilities. The Supply Department was also subdivided into several 
Divisions: Procurement, Clearance, Warehousing, Traffic, Security, Reclamation, and 
Surplus Property. The Merchandising Department, headed by E. R. Birchard, took over 
all duties relating to marketing, pricing, and sales. It was also subdivided into several 
Divisions: Pricing and Distribution, Sales, Priority, Export, and Direct Sales.
106
 Several 
other Departments were created by the end of the summer. The Organization and 
Personnel Department (formed by merging the Educational and Personnel portfolios) was 
responsible for human resources, payroll, administration, records management, and 
investigations. The Lands and Buildings Department, headed by G. H. S. Dinsmore, 
handled the immense task of real estate sales across the whole country.
107
 Tying in with 
the emphasis on regional decentralization, each Department and Division was divided by 
region so representatives were stationed at every Branch.  
The organizational changes coincided with the growth of the WAC’s operations in 
the fall of 1945 and with the rapid expansion of the Corporation’s workforce. As the 
Tables below demonstrate, the number of employees grew sharply immediately following 
the war and as the mountains of surplus declarations and assets began overwhelming the 
CAAC and WAC. However, it must be noted that the expanding labour force was never 
conceived of as a permanent development. Everyone understood that the decentralization 
and expansion was a short-term contingency, and that when the Corporation’s inventories 
dwindled so too would its workforce. The WAC was redesigned to expand and contract 
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with the flow of goods. The decentralization accommodated the steep postwar expansion 
but as inventories depleted over time, the Corporation could close down its regional 
operations and revert to its centralized practices. This is exactly what happened and it is 
certainly evident in the precipitous drop in employment numbers as the WAC wound up 
operations from 1948 to 1950.
108
  
Reliable employment statistics are not available prior to June 1945, but the WAC’s 
First Annual Report indicated that in March 1945 there were 571 employees working for 
the Corporation, mostly in Montreal. This number is at odds with the Second Annual 
Report as it appears to have only counted “administrative” employees and not those 
working in the “field” (the Second Annual Report put the total figure at 1,557 in June 
1945 and an unpublished history put the total at 931 
in March 1945).
109
 Aside from discrepancies in 
tabulation and classification, there is one other major 
limitation to the statistics. Unless otherwise noted, 
the numbers are aggregate figures based on the last 
month of the fiscal year and do not provide much 
indication on the substantial monthly fluctuations 
experienced by the Corporation. As the Second 
Annual Report stated after noting the number of new 
hires (4,790) and the number of “separations” (1,156) 
between June 1945 and March 1946, any review of 
the employment statistics should bear in mind “that they represent net increase and do not 
give any indication of the large number of appointments necessary to offset the heavy 
rate of staff turnover.”110 
                                                 
108
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “Statement prepared for the House of Commons Special Committee 
on War Expenditures and Economies,” 2 April 1946; Ibid, “History of War Assets Corporation,” 15 July 
1950, 5-6; CWM, Democracy at War, Warren Baldwin, “How’s Big Department Preparing for Fadeout 
Around Mid-Summer,” Globe and Mail, 5 April 1947. 
109
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “History of War Assets Corporation,” 15 July 1950, 20; War Assets 
Corporation First Annual Report, 6; War Assets Corporation Second Annual Report, 18;  
110
 War Assets Corporation Second Annual Report, 18. 
Table 2: Number of 
Employees in the WAC in 
March, 1945-1950 
Year Employees 
1945 931 
1946 6,074 
1947 9,919 
1948 3,527 
1949 284 
1950 120 
Source: LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: 
R-1-2-4, Organization of the 
Crown Assets Disposal 
Corporation; Ibid, File: R-1-1-9, 
“History of War Assets 
Corporation” 15 July 1950, 20. 
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 Regardless of these discrepancies, the employment statistics indicate that from 
June 1945 to June 1947 the WAC’s workforce expanded substantially from 1,557 to 
8,501 – an increase of 545 percent. During that period the Corporation hired more than 
15,000 new employees while about 8,000 were terminated. In January 1947, the 
expansion peaked when 10,371 employees were on the payroll, an increase of 666 
percent over June 1945.
111
 Moreover, the WAC was meticulous about employing 
veterans. Not only was a veteran’s hiring preference the law, but it also helped offset the 
fact that the WAC had not provided veterans with a special priority. When the SCWEE 
grilled Berry and other officials about the lack of a veterans’ priority, they relied on 
employment statistics to partially defend their policies while also demonstrating how the 
Corporation supported veterans in other ways. As Table 3 illustrates, at the peak of the 
WAC’s growth, and even 
as its workforce declined, 
veterans accounted for 70 
percent of all male 
employees and most were 
hired on short-term 
contracts to work in the 
Supply Department. 
Although the vast 
majority of the WAC’s employees were temporary workers who were paid lower salaries, 
had limited benefits, and no pensions, most employees accepted these provisos as they 
saw the job as a temporary paycheque while they searched for permanent employment 
elsewhere.
112
 To accommodate the substantial turnover of personnel the Corporation’s 
Organization and Personnel Department “worked closely with the various employment 
offices and agencies” and became “instrumental in placing an appreciable number in 
positions of more permanency.”113 
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Year 
Total Number of 
Employees 
Percent of 
Males to 
Total Staff 
Percent of 
Veterans to 
Total Male 
Staff 
Lowest Highest 
1945-46 944 6,074 73 53 
1946-47 6,074 10,371 71 71 
1947-48 3,527 9,919 68 70 
1948-49 294 3,527 57 70 
Source: War Assets Corporation Fifth Annual Report (April 1, 1948 
to 31 March, 1949), 11. 
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While it is uncertain how many employees were former war workers or female 
veterans, the hiring of veterans definitely allowed the Corporation to double up on the 
experience and training of the country’s ex-soldiers, thereby improving the overall 
quality of its workforce and, perhaps, lowering training costs in some cases. In other 
words, hiring veterans (and war workers) meant that the WAC was gaining employees 
who had some practical experience in the use, manufacture, components, and capabilities 
of the objects entering its custody. Moreover, veterans also made excellent security 
guards. In February 1945, the WAC entered into an agreement with the Canadian Corps 
of Commissionaires to provide security, fire detection, and supervision of visitors at all 
its facilities. Throughout the fiscal year of 1946-1947, the number of Commissionaires 
working for the Supply Department nearly doubled from 661 to a peak of 1,116.
114
 Since 
the Commissionaires were overwhelmingly composed of veterans, the WAC further 
boosted its employment statistics and helped counter the backlash against its 
unfavourable policies towards veterans.
115
   
Decentralizing the organizational structure also helped increase sales. To 
accommodate the new regional focus, Horsey had the regulations governing signing 
authority on sales below $25,000 loosened. This allowed greater autonomy to the 
Corporation’s salesmen and Branch Managers across the country, as it eliminated some 
of the incumbent processing delays by removing the need to communicate with the Head 
Offices. Before this change every sale – no matter how big or small – had to be approved 
by the Board of Directors in Montreal. Furthermore, a new selling mantra was adopted: 
“as is, where is” meaning that surpluses declared in a particular area were sold there so 
that the Corporation could save on the cost of shipping and handling the surpluses. This 
policy was ideal for making quick sales because it privileged local interests and it became 
increasingly important as inventories expanded.  
One of the biggest barriers to sales and a source of many bureaucratic problems had 
been the WAC’s lack of storage space and custodial arrangements. In order to overcome 
                                                 
114
 War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, 22.  
115
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 7, WAC – Board of Directors, Meeting Minutes, 8 February 1945. See also: John 
Gardam, ed. The Commissionaires: An Organization with a Proud History, 1925-1988, (Burnstown, ON: 
General Store Publishing House, 1998). 
  
128 
 
these issues, Horsey enacted a significant change to the WAC’s mandate and purpose by 
instituting a new supply and logistical apparatus. This was an essential element of all 
merchandising businesses and it was clearly lacking in the early part of the WAC’s 
history. In creating the Supply and Merchandising Departments, Horsey split the 
logistical tasks from the selling, thereby instituting a significant operational shift by 
adding the collection and storage of surpluses to the WAC’s mandate. The following 
chapter will discuss this important change in more detail, but it is important to realize that 
from October 1945 onwards the WAC largely abolished its custodial arrangements and 
only used them when absolutely necessary, such as with ammunition storage. Until 
inventories were depleted, the Supply Department’s two most important divisions, 
Clearance and Warehousing, handled the tasks of collection and storage.  
These organizational changes paved the way for a period of rapid expansion. Up to 
October 1945, $40,133,166 worth of goods were sold by the WAC in 42,161 separate 
transactions from its establishment in late 1943.
116
 With each passing month those 
numbers increased significantly. In November 1945 the WAC hit the $10 million mark in 
monthly sales and in January 1946 monthly sales topped $14 million. In March 1946, the 
WAC hit its high water mark as monthly sales reached the astounding total of 
$42,830,725.34, doubling the totals from January 1944 to October 1945 in just 31 days. 
In April, the slow decline in sales began as the total dropped to just over $21 million and 
by September 1946 sales dipped back below the $20 million mark.
117
 By the end of 1948, 
the WAC had made over 306,014 separate transactions and recouped $427,246,250.81.
118
  
During this postwar selling frenzy, the volume of sales was not the only thing 
overwhelming Canada’s disposal administration. Word got out quickly that the WAC was 
open for business and that the items and materials in short supply might be available in its 
inventories. As a result, the Corporation was blindsided by a huge influx of inquiries 
from the public that grew to such astounding proportions that the Corporation’s Central 
Registry struggled to keep up. In October 1945, 28,113 letters reached the WAC, a 
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staggering monthly total to say the least, yet it was dwarfed by the 96,481 letters received 
in March 1946. That amounted to an average of 3,112 letters arriving at the WAC every 
day that month.
119
 Clearly, the public was interested in acquiring surplus assets! Yet it 
was also equally clear that the WAC’s organizational changes were working. Even under 
the immense strain, the Corporation’s operations bent but they did not break. The delays, 
administrative bottlenecks, and various other problems facing the WAC in 1945 might 
have prompted critical media reports and questions from politicians, but the 
reorganization and expansion had a positive effect. When confronted by the SCWEE 
about delays and complaints, Berry used the sales data to defend his organizations. 
Although he recognized that some delays and problems still plagued the system, he 
usually attributed them to the priorities scheme.
120
  
Berry may have downplayed some of these problems, as many new ones started 
emerging as the flood of surpluses came in and the reorganization took effect. The two 
most pressing problems facing the WAC after October 1945 were the increased 
operational costs and decreasing sales revenue. The increasing size of the WAC’s 
workforce and the number of warehouses in operation steadily increased expenses 
beyond forecasted budgets. However, getting extra money from the DMS (and later the 
DRS) was not a guarantee, so the WAC was constantly looking to save money and cut 
costs. This fact overshadowed its expanding logistical operations and added an additional 
limitation to how effectively it could adapt to its new custodial responsibilities. PC9108 
granted the Corporation a $5 million start-up investment and Section 15 of the Surplus 
Crown Assets Act allowed the WAC to keep a percentage of profits to cover operating 
expenses. This percentage was originally set at three percent by Howe in December 1944 
and required a Privy Council order to change. In April 1945, an increase to five percent 
was authorized and this proved adequate once the postwar rush commenced since the 
frequency and size of sales increased the actual dollar value of that five percent.  
However, as the sale of big ticket items dwindled and the frequency of smaller and 
less valuable sales picked up throughout 1947, the WAC’s operational costs ate away at 
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profits. The problem was that the administrative and supply costs inherent to every sale 
did not fluctuate dramatically, but the profits recouped per sale did. So as the big ticket 
items were sold off, the WAC was left with less valuable assets and as a result the cost of 
each sale increased as a percentage of the total profits earned. Furthermore, the higher 
costs of sale on less valuable goods was compounded by other expenditures that the 
WAC was required to pay out of its operational budget. In 1946-1947, the WAC funded 
the completion of several war contracts for ships and other materials for the British and 
placed with Wartime Shipbuilding Ltd. through Mutual Aid.
121
 Apparently, the 
Corporation had little say in this arrangement but it cost the WAC an additional $3 
million. As a result, a last-minute 2.5 percent increase was made in March 1947 and 
approved by PC1115 and in April the percentage was adjusted to ten percent. However, 
administrative expenses in 1947-1948 eclipsed the ten percent margin and additional 
money had to be withdrawn from sales revenue.
122
 
Keeping sales revenue high and operational costs low was a constant preoccupation 
because every dollar earned was remitted on a yearly basis to the Receiver-General of 
Canada to help pay down the country’s war debts. Quoting Carswell at his first press 
conference in January 1944, the Toronto Star reported that, “every dollar will be turned 
over to the receiver-general and every dollar turned in will mean a decrease in the war 
debt of Canada and a lessening of the amount of taxes the government will have to 
levy.”123 Utilizing the money in this manner was a policy choice that was widely 
supported. However, in practice, Carswell’s promise was somewhat empty. Remitting 
“every dollar” back to the government was not possible since the WAC had to cover 
some of its operational costs with the proceeds of sales. Overall, operational expenses 
accounted for an average of about 17½ cents of every dollar sold. In other words, that 
meant 82½ cents on every dollar sold “was returned to the Canadian tax payer.”124  
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Another problem developed out of the new selling mantra. Although the “as is 
where is” policy generally cut overall operational costs, it could also have the opposite 
effect. This was because the policy required greater measures for monitoring the amount 
and distribution of surpluses in every region and resulted in the creation of the WAC’s 
Pricing and Distribution Division inside the Merchandising Department. Monitoring the 
distribution and price of goods was necessary given the regional disparities of wartime 
investments and the fact that surpluses tended to be concentrated in Central Canada. 
Therefore, “as is where is” put some regions at a disadvantage, either because other areas 
had more materials available or, inversely, there were too many assets available so local 
markets became saturated. As Berry stated rhetorically to the SCWEE in response to 
some skepticism from an Alberta politician about the WAC’s redistribution efforts, “if 
200,000 spark plugs were reported surplus in Ontario and that was the total surplus that 
had been reported across the dominion, you would not suggest that all those spark plugs 
should be sold in Ontario?” The answer was, of course, a resounding no. So Berry’s point 
was clear: in order to mitigate some of the regional disparities a redistribution program 
had to occur and did. Furthermore, redistribution also ensured that “as is where is” did 
not result in a flood of similar goods overwhelming a local or regional economy and if 
that danger existed then national distribution was required.
125
 To follow Berry’s 
hypothetical spark plug example, if the 200,000 plugs declared in Ontario saturated the 
spark plug market and lowered prices in the province, than it was necessary to 
redistribute them to prevent a collapse in Ontario’s spark plug economy. 
Material shortages and limited declarations of items in high demand added further 
complications to this new selling strategy, but the WAC made the effort to redistribute 
goods from region to region as equitably as possible. Although its efforts never seemed to 
impress political leaders from the Maritimes and Prairies, they did help ensure that some 
of the items in high demand were available at practically every Branch.
126
 Thus, the real 
emphasis of the new selling policy was the “where is” rather than the “as is” since the 
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policy could create artificial 
shortages in one area to lessen 
an actual shortage elsewhere. 
Take the sale of motor 
vehicles as an example. 
Although the postwar demand 
for vehicles of all types far 
outstripped the supply 
reaching the WAC, the “as is 
where is” policy was adapted 
to meet the public’s 
expectations that at least some 
vehicles would be available in 
their region. Table 4 indicates 
that the WAC redistributed 
and sold vehicles throughout the country according to the percentage of vehicle 
registrations in each province and it appears that these efforts continued in later years. In 
regards to other assets requiring redistribution, the WAC relied heavily on the 1941 
census records.
127
 
Conclusion 
The early plans and preparations for the inevitable consequences of victory had 
given the CAAC and WAC a head start on the disposal problem. By the time the war 
ended, they had established and tested administrative systems for managing the flow of 
goods and paperwork. They had also formed a priority system for strategically allocating 
materials, made contact with particular individuals inside the whole bureaucracy, and 
were able to find capable people for important positions in the CAAC and WAC despite 
the heavy turnover in staffing. These arrangements certainly helped mitigate a postwar 
disaster but they were devised well in advance of the war’s end. Thus, when the “valves” 
                                                 
127
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 7, WAC – Board of Directors, Meeting Minutes, 28 November 1946; War Assets 
Corporation Third Annual Report, 13. 
Table 4: Distribution of Motor Vehicle Sales (all 
types) by Province and Vehicle Registration 1944-
1945 
Province Vehicles 
WAC 
Sales (%) 
National 
Registration 
(%) 
British 
Columbia 
435 8.95 8.37 
Alberta 356 7.33 7.91 
Saskatchewan 360 7.41 8.52 
Manitoba 298 6.13 6.27 
Ontario 2,133 43.90 47.26 
Quebec 767 15.79 14.74 
Nova Scotia 307 6.32 3.82 
New 
Brunswick 
144 2.96 2.57 
Prince Edward 
Island 
59 1.21 0.54 
Source: SCWEE, 27 November 1945 (No. 3, Book 2), 67. 
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opened to release the flood of objects and paperwork, officials discovered just how 
unprepared they actually were. With the tidal wave of 35,000 Surplus Declarations, 
50,000-plus priority requests, and billions worth of assets descending on Canada’s 
disposal administration from 1945 to 1947, just staying afloat during the flood was no 
small achievement. 
In light of past experience, the variety of problems and inefficiencies that surfaced, 
and the need for adjusting procedures to deal with such tremendous inventories, the 
CAAC and WAC (especially) revised and reformed their operational procedures, 
mandate, and structure. To divide the workload and better accommodate the collection, 
storage, and sale of surpluses, both organizations regionalized and decentralized 
operations. The Corporation was redesigned to expand and contract with the flood of 
assets and in doing so it took on a larger and more proactive role in the collection and 
storage of surpluses. In order to cope with increasing responsibilities, the WAC also 
underwent a period of significant expansion within its newly restructured organization. 
The two areas that accounted for the majority of this expansion included the Supply 
Department’s Clearance and Warehousing Divisions. This study now turns to the 
operations and impact of these two important divisions. 
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Chapter 3 
Bursting at the Seams: Clearance and Warehousing 
Operations 
The job will be the biggest piece of merchandising ever attempted in Canada. How big, 
may be illustrated by the fact that in one ordnance depot alone there are, at this moment, 
military stores having an investment value larger than was our entire National debt in 
1914.
1
 
C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply and Reconstruction, 23 October 1944 
Introduction 
Under the crushing pressures of a surging inventory, expanding workforce, and 
continuing public criticism, Canada’s disposal administration bent but did not break. 
Instead, the CAAC and WAC adapted their operations to supply Canada’s political, 
economic, and social reconstruction with the required materials. This adaptation was all 
the more remarkable considering how the WAC implemented changes on the fly from 
August to October 1945. In reorganizing operational practices the Corporation better 
positioned itself to assist with the country’s postwar transition and effectuate the cleanup. 
Two of the most significant changes were the formation and operation of the Clearance 
and Warehousing Divisions inside the Supply Department. These divisions allowed the 
WAC to physically control the flood of surpluses through onsite collection, shipping, 
handling, storage, and maintenance. Although operations were far from perfect, 
Clearance and Warehousing provided a critical bridge between war and peace since they 
removed and relocated the assets and materials that were physically obstructing the return 
of peacetime operations on factory floors, military bases, or anywhere else that surpluses 
existed. This chapter examines the scope and scale of clearance and warehousing 
operations, their contribution to reconversion and demobilization, the challenges 
encountered, and the things that were abandoned.  
Through the collection and storage of assets, the WAC positioned itself to absorb 
the “shocks of transition” by gathering, managing, and facilitating an object’s transition 
                                                 
1 
LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, Radio Speech on CBC by C. D. Howe, 23 October 1944, 1. 
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into new and sometimes different peacetime applications.
2
 Therefore the WAC facilitated 
a process of removal and renewal that was closely associated with the demobilization and 
reconversion of Canada’s wartime political economy. In doing so, the Corporation 
influenced how objects and resources were redeployed and reused in postwar Canada. In 
fact, without the WAC’s collection and storage operations, the war’s materiel might 
never have been reused or redistributed to the civilian economy on such a large scale or 
without a coherent strategy in mind. As a result, the WAC’s clearance and storage 
capacities helped preserve the residual value and utility of assets by maintaining custody 
and regulating the supply. This process was the stewardship of objects and it boosted 
marketability, stabilized prices, increased sales, and turned the WAC into the largest 
merchandising company in Canadian history.  
Yet the removal and renewal of assets did not always yield positive and useful 
outcomes. Instead, the war’s materiel legacies also created less productive, dangerous, 
and problematic situations that lingered long after hostilities ended. For every valuable 
asset there were piles of obsolete and derelict items that required disposal. Therefore, 
Clearance and Warehousing personnel were often occupied sifting through and sorting 
out the gems from the junk. Moreover, since Canada’s vast tracts of under-populated 
space were ideal for creating large training and testing grounds for Allied military 
personnel and weapons systems, significant amounts of unexploded ordnance and surplus 
kit littered areas across the country. Chemical residues from munitions factories polluted 
surrounding landscapes and impregnated all the production equipment and buildings. 
Large scale cleanup operations involving decontamination, garbage collection, and 
environmental remediation were required but these efforts were severely limited by the 
incumbent financial costs, the permanency and composition of military facilities, and 
their remoteness and geographic dispersion. Faulty clearance operations and the 
abandonment of assets created a materiel legacy that influenced the surrounding social 
and spatial environments in uneven patterns of utility and danger.  
                                                 
2
 Quote from: Ibid, Newspaper Clippings, “Move to Cushion the Shocks,” Montreal Gazette, 3 December 
1943. 
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Clearance operations could never have existed without the expansion of storage 
capacities. After all, the war’s materiel did not simply disappear once its primary utility 
was usurped. Objects continued occupying a physical reality: when Clearance teams 
removed something from one place, it required storage somewhere else before final 
disposal was arranged. This is why the WAC’s Warehousing Division was so critical. 
During a time of severe accommodation shortages and expensive rental costs, the WAC 
rapidly expanded its warehousing operations to include fifty-one warehouses, totalling 
over six million sq. ft. of indoor storage space at its peak. This significant amount of 
stowage space allowed the WAC to build up its inventories that were later sold to support 
economic and social reconstruction. In effect, the Corporation’s warehouses allowed it to 
absorb the war’s materiel legacies and guard against any major economic dislocation 
caused by government surpluses. However, just as with clearance operations, 
warehousing came with some serious challenges. The huge volume of assets entering the 
WAC’s custody caused major problems that related to cataloguing, screening, tracking, 
processing, and sales. This resulted in an attrition rate through clerical errors, breakage, 
and theft. Most troubling of all, assets could fall through the cracks by either entering or 
exiting warehouses without any receipts or proper inspections.   
The Cleanup Crew: Clearance and Materiel Legacies   
The creation of the Clearance and Warehousing Divisions signalled a significant 
organizational change designed to cope with the flood of surpluses after the war. 
Predictably, the Supply Department’s workforce grew in proportion to its surging 
workload. Over the fiscal year of 1946-1947, Malley’s Supply Department accounted for 
the vast majority of the WAC’s payroll: roughly 74 percent of all employees worked in 
Supply. In March 1947, the Department employed 7,314 of the 9,919 workers on the 
WAC’s entire payroll, while the Clearance Division alone employed 1,899, down from 
its peak of 1,970 in December 1946. By contrast, the entire Merchandising Department 
employed 1,544 (or about 16 percent of the total workforce) and all other Departments 
accounted for the remaining 1,061 workers (or 10 percent).
3
 These employment statistics 
indicate much about the changing nature of the WAC’s operational practices, the 
                                                 
3
 War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, 22. 
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quantities entering its possession, and the urgency of clearance and warehousing duties in 
supporting the transition from war to peace.  
Clearance was one of the WAC’s most important contributions to Canada’s postwar 
reconstruction. On the government’s dime and time, almost every single facility or 
factory that had produced or housed munitions and supplies was cleared by the WAC. 
The Clearance teams (or private contractors hired in some cases) were also responsible 
for collecting surplus assets from military installations, airfields, shipyards, or bases. By 
March 1947, the WAC had received a total of 40,428 requests for clearance operations 
across the company’s five regions and Newfoundland. This was an astounding figure that 
could have easily crippled operations, yet the teams moved quickly. Of the 40,428 
requests about 27,800 or 69 percent were completed by March 1947. A year later, the 
total number of clearance requests reached 44,399 while 41,285 or 93 percent was 
completed, leaving only 3,114 outstanding in March 1948.
4
 Indeed, operations progressed 
so rapidly that by August 1947, Malley started pressing his deputy, C. E. Elliot, to get 
Regional Supply Managers to cut staff as quickly as possible. Malley was concerned 
about reining in salary and wages which accounted for “approximately 75% of our total 
expenses” and this had to be “vigorously attacked in order that our overall expenses are 
commensurate with the Corporation’s earnings” (which were decreasing from the 
previous year due to the shrinking number of big-ticket items in the WAC’s inventories).5 
The efficiency of Clearance teams depended on carefully controlling operations and 
closely cooperating with other organizations and stakeholders. The Clearance teams 
operated on strict “controlled lines” that allowed inspectors to triage assets quickly 
according to several categories: capital assets (anything in saleable condition), tools and 
gauges (production equipment and precision instruments), and aircraft. Everything that 
did not fall into these categories, was worn out, or considered dangerous was categorized 
                                                 
4
 War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, 10; War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual Report, (April 
1, 1947 to March 31, 1948), 7. 
5
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-7, “Re: Plant Clearance,” H. R. Malley to C. E. Elliot, 18 August 1947. 
See other correspondence in this file on the organizational consolidation and reduction of staff. 
  
138 
 
as scrap.
6
 Triaging assets depended on close collaboration between the Clearance teams 
and declaring agencies.  In regards to the armed forces, special sections were established 
to process stores originating from each Service The formation of specific army, navy, and 
air force sections greatly streamlined a large portion of the Clearance Division’s work, as 
each section processed only clearance requests from the corresponding Service. This also 
ensured that close liaison and familiarity developed between the WAC’s inspectors, the 
various disposal officers from each Service, and those personnel stationed at the locations 
where surpluses were declared.  
Largely a product of necessity and experience, the close coordination between 
clearance teams and declaring agencies was essential for the proper handling of all 
surpluses and ensuring that only dangerous items without peacetime applications were 
singled out for destruction. Clearance inspectors and service personnel relied on each 
other to inspect and categorize items. For instance, Clearance teams and RCAF 
maintenance personnel jointly inspected surplus aircraft and their component parts in 
order to consider their “airworthiness” so that no dangerous or jerry-rigged items were 
sold on civilian markets.
7
 Furthermore, the disposal of secret technologies and equipment 
required special care, not only to ensure that the objects were mutilated to preserve their 
secret nature, but also to limit the amount of personnel gaining familiarity with designs, 
features, and purposes. In the case of ASDIC, the codename for the first generation of 
SONAR, the Navy took the precaution of removing the equipment before declaring 
vessels surplus.
8
  
Clearance teams also cooperated closely with the DMS and war contractors when 
entering their facilities and factories. In all cases, the Clearance teams were preceded by 
                                                 
6
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 1-9; War 
Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, 8-9. 
7
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 6, File: 9-5-2, “Aircraft Material to be Sold as Pedigreed Stock for Air Use,” 
Merchandising Department Procedure No. 7.01, 4 March 1946; Ibid, “Aircraft, Aero Engines, and 
Aeronautical Equipment For Air Use,” Merchandising Department Procedure No. 4.01, 23 May 1946; Ibid, 
“Obsolete, Non-Flyable Aircraft,” Merchandising Department Procedure No. 7.04, 20 December 1946. 
8
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “History of War Assets Corporation,” 15 July 1950, 14; Ibid, 
“Statement Prepared for the House of Commons Special Committee on War Expenditures and Economies,” 
14 May 1946; Ibid, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 5-6; LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, 
File: 70-2-5B Vol. 1, “Disposal of Surplus Vessels – ASDIC Equipment,” Secretary of Naval Board, 24 
May 1945. 
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three different groups of inspectors and technicians. Employees from Canadian Arsenals 
Ltd. (CAL), a new crown company established in September 1945 to maintain a postwar 
government-run munitions industry, and personnel from the Plant Decontamination 
Committee (PDC) inspected all facilities and factories in conjunction with the 
contractor’s employees. Together they decided what was surplus to their needs, what 
needed decontamination, and what was required for postwar munitions production. CAL 
inspectors used a colour-coded tagging system to easily sort and separate the assets. 
Green tags indicated that the item was surplus and in saleable or good condition. Yellow 
or blue tags indicated that the equipment was government property required by CAL and 
it would handle removal. Red tags meant that CAL inspectors considered the assets 
surplus and scrap materials.
9
 However, to guard against the needless scrapping of items 
with residual value, clearance inspectors did not simply rely on the declaring agency’s 
classifications and tagging. Instead, they made their own judgments through onsite 
inspections. To determine an item’s reusability, they appraised its salvageable materials 
and component parts. Therefore, Clearance inspectors became the primary filters for 
disposal, as they evaluated the condition of assets and whether they were suitable for sale, 
storage, or destruction.
10
 
Once the tagging process was finished, the PDC moved in to decontaminate the 
facilities and equipment. The PDC was established by the DMS over the summer of 1945 
to undertake extensive cleanup operations at munitions factories and proof ranges. At 
many of these factories the volume of production, especially of explosive compounds, 
had been so great that particles and residues had impregnated everything (the walls, roof, 
floors, uniforms, machinery etc.) at facilities and even polluted the surrounding 
landscapes.
11
 These sites required remediation because the public’s general safety was at 
                                                 
9
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 3-4; LAC, 
RG101, Vol. 4, File: 5-6-1, “Canadian Arsenals Limited – Terms of Reference,” Berry to Malley, 8 
September 1945, 1-3; Ibid, “Supply Department Procedure, Canadian Arsenals Limited,” 14 August 1946, 
1-2. 
10
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 1-9; War 
Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, 8-9. 
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 LAC, RG28-A, Vol. 156, File: 3-P-13, Plant Decontamination Committee, various meeting minutes and 
correspondence, August-October 1945; Archives of Ontario (AO), F 2082 General Engineering Company 
(Canada), Box 3, F 2082-1-1-7 “Decontamination and Desensitizing,” 1945-1946; Ibid, Box 3, F 2082-1-1-
  
140 
 
risk. As Howe stated in a 9 October 1945 radio speech announcing the creation of the 
PDC (which had been active since July), “following the First Great War a number of 
accidents, some of which were fatal resulted from careless disposal of plants and 
equipment used for making explosives and filling shells.”12 Under the supervision of a 
variety of experts from the DMS’s ammunition, weapons, and explosives branches, the 
PDC was assigned “the duty and responsibility” to investigate and decontaminate all 
munitions plants “which have become dangerous by reason of impregnation with 
explosives” and, in the cooperation with the contractor, render the facilities as safe as 
possible so they could be dismantled or reconverted or sold. Eventually the PDC was 
transferred into the WAC in August 1946.
13
  
While the WAC’s Clearance teams had little to do with the actual desensitization or 
decontamination work, its employees entered problem areas relatively quickly after the 
PDC finished or even as the work was progressing. Dangers lurked everywhere, 
especially at the larger chemical and explosive factories like the DIL plant in Nobel or 
the various surplus proof ranges utilized by the DMS and DND to test weapons and 
ammunition or train soldiers in their use. Despite proper safety precautions and 
experienced workers, decontamination and clearance could be dangerous, not only 
because explosive compounds and poisonous chemicals permeated everything in 
munitions factories, but the job also required the movement of heavy machinery or the 
dismantling of entire facilities. In late November 1945, one fatality occurred at the DIL 
plant in de Salaberry when a worker fell off a ladder while dismantling part of the plant 
for the PDC.
14
  
Once the PDC finished its work, the WAC was informed and a Clearance team was 
dispatched. At the facilities Clearance teams re-inspected and categorized everything in 
conjunction with the declaring agency. However, they did not immediately remove assets 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 “Desensitizing Scarboro Plants,” ca. 1945; Ibid, Box 3,  2082-1-1-9 “Disposition of Records – Drawings 
& Specifications,” 1945; Ibid, Box 3, F 2082-1-1-10, “Disposition of Records,” 1946.  
12
 LAC, RG28-A, Vol. 156, File: 3-P-13, Radio Speech by C. D. Howe, 9 October 1945. 
13
 Ibid, “Re: Plant Decontamination Committee,” G. K. Sheils, 20 July 1945; Ibid, Radio Speech by C. D. 
Howe, 9 October 1945; Ibid, H. R. Malley to Lt.-Col. G Ogilvie, 12 August 1946. See also: Ibid, Plant 
Decontamination Committee – Meeting Minutes, various minutes 1945-1946. 
14
 LAC, RG28, Vol. 156, File: 3-P-13, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee Dealing with the 
Decontamination of Buildings and Equipment,” 4 December 1945, 4. 
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from the factories. After making their initial assessments, inspectors had to file their 
reports with the Warehousing Division in order to confirm if storage space was available 
nearby. In the interim, the equipment was usually tucked away in an empty portion of the 
contractor’s facility, unless a special request was made for immediate removal because 
the facility was too small. When surpluses were removed inspectors issued receipts to 
contractors. Quite often contractors, who had assisted with the surveys and 
decontamination, wanted to purchase green-tagged items or other materials for use in 
their factories. In these cases, the WAC’s Clearance teams noted the contractor’s requests 
on the proper forms and representatives from the Merchandising Department followed up 
to negotiate the sale.
15
  
This practice was common and the WAC’s preferred “Plan A” method for clearing 
plants. The “Plan A” scheme was configured specifically for either the objects already 
considered surplus crown property or items not yet declared surplus but the government 
was willing to sell them anyway. Under the procedures of “Plan A” contractors made an 
inventory of all tools, products, and materials left over in their factories. This inventory 
was then reviewed with the CAL, PDC, and WAC during their onsite inspections. After 
determining ownership and what was surplus, a time-line for the physical removal of 
assets was established based on the contractor’s requirements. At that point contractors 
identified which assets they wanted to purchase from the government through the 
WAC.
16
 Provided that there were no priority requirements, the WAC was happy to oblige 
contractors with onsite sales since it saved the additional logistical and marketing costs 
while also ensuring the most direct route for reuse.
17
  
The “Plan B” method for plant clearance was slightly different. It was reserved for 
situations in which the contractor wanted reimbursement for work (completed or 
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 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 9-17.  
16
 Ibid, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 9-17. See also: LAC, RG28, Vol. 213, File: 
196-2-54, Manual of Procedure on Termination of Contracts, (Ottawa: Department of Munitions and 
Supply, February 1944). 
17
 LAC, RG2, Vol. 79, File: C-85, Disposal and Peacetime Use of Crown Plant Buildings, 23; LAC, 
RG101, Vol. 7, WAC – Board of Directors, Meeting Minutes, 9 November 1944. See also: LAC, RG28, 
Vol. 21, File 70, “War Contracts Depreciation Board Confidential Narrative of its War Activities,” 32; 
LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 11; War Assets 
Corporation Third Annual Report, 8. 
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incomplete) or if the assets and materials tagged as surplus were not already crown 
property. “Plan B” took more time to resolve as the Contract Settlement Board became 
involved and the inventory lists were heavily scrutinized since they were now entwined 
with the formal settlement of cancelled war contracts.
18
 “Plan B” scenarios developed out 
of situations where companies had taken advantage of accelerated depreciation (or the 
other fiscal measures enacted for industrial mobilization) to make private purchases of, 
for instance, single-purpose machine tools for ammunition production. These assets were 
not required by private firms after the war but they were not crown property, so an 
exchange of title and financial settlement had to take place before they were removed by 
Clearance teams.
19
  
The disposal of machine tools and equipment exemplifies the clearance process. 
When Canada went to war in 1939, the previous decade of economic turmoil and idle 
industry had left the country with a desperate shortage of machine tools. In 1939 
Canadian industries possessed about $58 million worth of machines tools or roughly 
30,000 individual units, two-thirds of which were estimated to be at least thirteen years 
old.
20
 This shortage of machine tools was rectified by the DMS when it created a crown 
company, Citadel Merchandising, in June 1940 to control, purchase, and distribute 
machine tools for the war effort. In just four years, Citadel spent $160 million purchasing 
tools in the United States and it authorized roughly $92 million in additional purchases by 
war contractors through the War Industrial Expansion Program ($60 million) or from the 
contractor’s own accounts ($32 million). This brought the total wartime expenditures on 
machine tools to about $250 million for the purchase of approximately 45,000 new units. 
Adding those figures to the existing totals and accounting for the scrapping of some 
derelict machinery, by 1944 there were about 70,000 machine tools in the country worth 
around $300 million.
21
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 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 9-17. 
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 Ibid, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 11-12. 
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 LAC, RG101, Vol. 4, File: 1-1-13, CAAC Meeting Minutes, 23 February 1944, Schedule G. 
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 Canada, the UK, and the US all doubled the number of machine tools in their respective countries. 
Citadel Merchandising gave birth to the machine tool industry in Canada. In 1942, it banned the 
importation of machine tools from the US in order to help foster the growth of Canadian firms producing 
this precious machinery on contracts with the federal government. As a result, employment boomed in the 
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The increasing involvement of the state in acquiring machine tools meant that by 
1945 most of the most advanced and newest machinery was owned by the government. 
Moreover, the DMS had also kept machine tools as mobile as possible during the war 
since shortages of production machinery often followed the distribution of war contracts. 
As a result, the DMS resorted to moving them from factory to factory so companies could 
meet their contractual obligations. Naturally, businesses were apprehensive about the 
government’s disposal plans and eager to acquire the tools for peacetime production 
before it removed them. Even before the Allies had landed in Normandy on D-Day, 
businessmen were anticipating peace and “thinking of their post-war situation and their 
desire to get into peacetime production at the earliest.”22 As early as February 1944, 
officials in the DMS and CAAC began forming a plan, but they discovered that – much 
like with other commodities – the disposal of machine tools was fraught with difficulties. 
Since the armed forces needed an industrial base for future defence procurement, it was 
difficult to forecast how many tools would be surplus. Moreover, a third of all types 
(about 82$ million worth) were single-purpose machines that “were chiefly for turning 
out special war work such as shells and ammunition.”23 Aside from defence procurement 
this machinery was worthless to the peacetime economy, while a large portion of multi-
purpose machines would be worn out from continuous operation. 
Out of these developments and considerations emerged the disposal and clearance 
strategy for machine tools. The CAAC and WAC worked with CAL, Citadel 
Merchandising, and the Machine Tool War Service Committee to set prices, inspect 
machines, and maintain custody of those tools needed for future munitions production. 
The CAAC and WAC used “Plan A” and “Plan B” methods to meet their obligations for 
disposal and clearance. In general, the two plans were very flexible and worked well in 
almost all situations. In regards to machine tools specifically, both plans contained 
special provisions that balanced the pressing need for strategically allocating surpluses to 
educational institutions with the expediency of kick-starting postwar production at the 
                                                                                                                                                 
machine tool industry from virtually zero to 2,500 workers in 1942, but it settled around 750 in 1944. LAC, 
RG101, Vol. 4, File: 1-1-13, CAAC Meeting Minutes, 23 February 1944, Schedule G. 
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 Ibid, 23 February 1944, Schedule G. 
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contractor’s factory. Although priority holders were technically entitled to the machinery 
before contractors, Canada’s disposal administration understood how important machine 
tools were for all types of businesses, large or small. In particular, the CAAC recognized 
that the “small machine shop operators” needed special assistance in acquiring modern 
models to replace their old or worn out machines because “without new equipment they 
would have difficulty in surviving financially in peace time.”24 Largely based on the 
recommendations and input of individual businesses, the flexible approaches of “Plan A” 
and “Plan B” helped cater clearance operations to the needs of industry and onsite sales 
of machine tools were conveniently exempted from priority claims.
25
  
As the graph below indicates, the bulk of machine tools declared surplus were sold 
in the three fiscal years immediately following the war. According to the WAC’s annual 
reports, sales were primarily concentrated in 1945 and 1946, and few were sold before 
April 1945 or after March 1948. It is possible that sales took place before and after this 
period since the annual reports only listed sales over $5,000 (so any sale under that 
threshold was not recorded), but in these cases sales would have been for small quantities 
of useable machines in good condition or for worn out machines at seriously depreciated 
values and with limited remaining life spans.
26
 The postwar market for machine tools was 
competitive. From April 1945 to March 1946, the total value of machine tool sales by the 
WAC ($18,835,041.07) ranked third behind only ships ($31,970,437.42) and trucks 
($21,453,787.64), but by the fall of 1946, the Merchandising Department’s Machine 
Tools Direct Sales Section was discontinued while the volume of sales dropped off as the 
number of available and useful machines shrank.
27
 For the following fiscal year the total 
value of all machine tool sales dropped to $12,500,586.35, ranking as the sixth-highest 
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commodity behind ships, vehicles, textiles and boots, complete plants with equipment, 
and vehicle parts and equipment.
28
 
 
The war’s materiel (in this case, machine tools) could be a very useful starting point 
for peace, so it is no coincidence that the bulk of machine tool purchases were made by 
private companies immediately following the war. Public organizations, schools, and 
government departments purchased machine tools for educational purposes, but the 
volume of sales was dwarfed by private firms especially during the peak selling phase.
29
 
Machine tools were crucial to any postwar production and business interests eagerly 
sought to acquire the most useful tools before they were relocated by Clearance teams. It 
is worth noting that a similar pattern was also found in the sale of industrial floor space as 
roughly 43 percent of war contractors that operated facilities owned by the government 
purchased them after the war.
30
  
The glut of machine tool sales, tightly focused around the timeline of plant 
clearance operations, is not all that surprising. Given the substantial wartime investments, 
subsidies, and contracts from the federal government, war contractors were facing a 
unique situation when the war ended: they did not own much of the machinery (or even 
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some of new plant extensions and production lines) they were operating. Moreover, 
contractors had also faced heavy wartime taxes and regulations and as a result many 
businesses lacked the necessary capital to reinvest in reconversion, plant clearance, and 
product innovation. Thus, with the government funding clearance through the WAC, it 
provided a valuable service to contractors by saving them the cost of clearing out 
unneeded materials, machines, and unfinished or finished products cluttering the factory 
floors and physically impeding the return of peacetime operations.
31
  
Thus, the WAC’s Clearance teams played an important role in facilitating the 
transfer of publicly-owned goods to private interests. Immediately following the war, 
Clearance teams fanned out across the country and tabulated inventories, inspected items, 
filled out paperwork, helped settle war contracts, and removed any remaining 
government property to warehouses. In doing so, they protected government interests and 
investments, while also accommodating private corporations as glorified repo men. 
Fielding the clearance teams was a vital element of the state’s reconversion program. In 
taking on the responsibility for clearing plants of the unneeded materials, the government 
ensured that it maintained ownership of assets that were purchased or fabricated with 
public money. While some contractors tried to swindle the government, it appears that 
most assisted WAC inspectors and clearance teams in good faith.
32
 When coupled with 
the WAC’s expanding warehousing capacity, this meant that the government was 
reimbursed for all its property and ensured it maintained greater control over the 
redeployment and reuse of the war’s materiel legacies.  
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Cutting Losses: Abandoned Materiel Legacies 
Given the volume of sites requiring clean up after the war many problems surfaced. 
As much as clearance helped with reconversion, a variety of factors – geography, budget 
cuts, public criticism, the volume of goods, and the extent of environmental damage – 
affected cleanup operations. Despite Canada’s distance from the fighting fronts, the 
Second World War left behind materiel legacies that were not always positive, 
sustainable, or useful. Although the PDC and WAC did their best to remediate 
problematic materiel legacies, the scope was beyond their resources. In order to keep up 
with the workload they adopted some pragmatic and crude tactics often borrowed from 
the DND. Upon entering former munitions plants or surveying proof ranges, inspectors 
quickly realized that certain sites or buildings were beyond saving. In these cases, 
explosive compounds were too deeply saturated in the building’s constituent materials 
and production equipment, so they would never be safe for reuse. Moreover, at proof 
ranges the amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO) was plentiful and complicated by the 
various depths at which shells were buried in the ground. This rendered many explosives 
invisible or inaccessible to the technicians clearing ordnance. To keep pace with the 
immense workload, sites were often quickly decontaminated or demolished by setting 
fires, thereby completely destroying the dangerous substances and the materials they 
permeated. At proof ranges, fires were set in the hope that the heat would ignite any 
ordnance buried near the surface. It also appears that the PDC took other crude shortcuts 
that usually involved dumping the contaminated equipment or materials into the nearest 
body of water. This strategy was adopted by the military during the cleanup after the 
Bedford Magazine Explosion in July 1945 and, in all likelihood, at the north end of Parry 
Sound and Simmes Lake when the PDC dismantled the DIL plant in Nobel.
33
  
Ironically, despite the fact that decontamination was designed to protect public 
safety, the destruction of contaminated sites faced public opposition. To the media and 
the public, who were not aware of the contamination’s extent, the demolition process 
looked like a deliberate waste of public money. To outsiders it appeared as though 
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valuable building materials – from door and window frames, to nails and lumber – were 
literally going up in smoke, while the marketplace was clearly starved of those and other 
desperately needed materials.
34
 In late September 1945, the Deputy Minister of the DMS, 
G. K. Sheils, was informed by Lud Hawkins, a member of the Department’s Publicity 
Branch, that “unless proper publicity steps” were taken, “misinformation concerning the 
necessary destruction of buildings formerly used in the manufacture and handling of high 
explosives will result in unsatisfactory reflection on the government’s action in this 
regard.”35 Hawkins relayed a suggestion from Gordon Garbutt, DIL’s Publicity Director, 
that would allow them to “invite local newspapermen to visit these plants and see for 
themselves why it is necessary that these buildings should be destroyed.”36 The reporters 
would then be able to explain the necessity of the PDC’s demolition activities, since 
“highly inflammable and explosive materials have permeated the wood and timber of 
these buildings, with the result that they are of no further use, and in fact would be highly 
dangerous if they were released to the general public.”37  
Sheils liked the idea but believed that this publicity was better handled by the PDC. 
As a result, the PDC’s chairman, Lt-Col. G. Ogilvie, was ordered to prepare publicity 
materials that would fight off “any suspicion that we were unnecessarily destroying 
valuable property” and a tour for reporters and interested government officials was 
organized.
38
 On 10 October 1945, a bus was chartered from the DMS’s Montreal offices 
to tour the Bouchard plant in Ste. Therese, Quebec. Reporters observed all the 
decontamination and salvage efforts in action. Coming on the heels of Penhold and the 
continuing public criticism about the willful destruction of government property, Howe 
explained to Parliament that this tour was designed to “forestall charges that more war 
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equipment was being destroyed instead of sold.”39 Unfortunately, these publicity efforts 
did not provide a long-term solution to “forestall” the public’s criticism which continued 
throughout the transition period.  
Other problems surfaced when the financial costs of clearance operations were 
excessive. This was especially the case if private contractors and permanent structures 
were involved. After facilities were inspected and all government property removed, 
sometimes the buildings required demolition not only because of contamination but also 
because of wartime lease agreements. To meet the needs of mobilization, the federal 
government and military had acquired considerable amounts of land during the war, 
either through expropriation or leasing. For the land it leased, the government and 
military were contractually obligated to return the property to its original state if there 
was no interest in purchasing it. When the land was declared surplus, fulfilling these lease 
conditions became the responsibility of the WAC. To keep its own costs down, the 
Corporation contracted this job out to private firms that wanted to purchase and relocate 
whatever was constructed on the land. In most cases, contractors purchased buildings for 
component parts or raw materials. In other cases, the structures were kept intact and 
moved to new places. If no contractor was found for this job, the WAC’s Clearance 
teams did the demolition work.
40
  
One relatively well-documented example involved Joseph Sasseville, a Montreal-
based firm that purchased many buildings and installations at several former Canadian 
military bases in Newfoundland. Having purchased well-over 100 different structures 
from the WAC at Botwood, Philip’s Head, Wiseman’s Head, Cape Spear, and several 
other places, the firm took over clearance and cleanup operations at those locations in 
1946 and 1947. Given that the buildings were all constructed on land leased to the 
Canadian government by Newfoundland, Sasseville was contractually obligated to 
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demolish the buildings or remove them and restore the properties to their original states 
as reasonably as possible.
41
 By 24 November 1947, Sasseville had finished its work and 
the Newfoundland government released the WAC and the Canadian government “from 
any further responsibility for the restoration of these areas.”42  
At the time, however, there were some unresolved questions about the concrete gun 
emplacements that remained at Cape Spear and Wiseman’s Head. Sasseville considered 
the cost of removing the guns and their mountings prohibitive and the WAC (which was 
also unwilling to spend the money) “granted permission to leave the guns and mounting” 
in place.
43
 However, Newfoundland’s Department of Natural Resources could not 
“ascertain definitively” if the WAC had the right to do this since the original leases were 
not available, so it added a caveat to its communiqué and reserved the right to request 
their removal at a later date.
44
 In the context of the postwar rush to clean up several 
thousand sites and an inability to track down the terms of the original leases, all the 
stakeholders involved were able to evade an expensive cleanup operation. As a result, the 
concrete emplacements and 10-inch guns were simply abandoned and left to decay. 
The situation remained unchanged for two years until inquiries began arriving at 
DND in March 1949 about purchasing the guns as scrap. It was then that Ottawa took 
action to address the oversight, as officials became aware that some of the guns were not 
mutilated properly while others had simply disappeared. Moreover, the sites and 
installations were deteriorating rapidly.
45
 At Cape Spear “the underground magazines, 
control room and tunnels connecting the two positions were not filled and [were] now in 
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a very dangerous condition” as the tunnels were collapsing and “constitute[d] a public 
hazard.”46 Fortunately, only the lighthouse-keeper’s family lived in the immediate 
vicinity and they were aware of the dangers but still allowed their livestock to graze in 
the area. After making a reconnaissance tour of several installations in the summer, the 
Army declared eight guns surplus: two each at Chain Rock, Cape Spear, Bell Island, and 
Fort Amherst.
47
 Most were later disposed of as scrap by the WAC and the sites were 
cleaned up by the end of 1950 thus resolving a lingering problem caused by financial 
constraints. Today, a tourist can visit these and other locations and view the abandoned 
materiel legacies firsthand as the concrete emplacements at Cape Spear were never 
demolished and some of the mutilated guns are still there.
48
 
The geographic dispersion of surpluses also complicated disposal and cleanup 
operations. Because strategic imperatives dictated the when and where of wartime 
expenditures and the movement of military resources, the war effort sometimes spawned 
large-scale development in areas of Canada that would become uneconomical and 
unsustainable after victory. In some places, new patterns of development resulted where 
virtually none had existed before.
49
 Prince Rupert, a town on the northern British 
Columbia coast, exemplifies this boom-bust nature of defence spending, since its short-
term importance to the war effort meant unparalleled expansion, funding, and 
infrastructure development all out of proportion to the population size and local pre- and 
postwar economy.
50
 A local newspaper, the Prince Rupert Daily, noted some of these 
changes in the wake of VJ-Day celebrations: 
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Carried along by the impetus of wars emergent requirements, Prince Rupert 
during the past two or three years has had an era of activity that almost 
overwhelmed the city and its facilities and capacity, bringing about what 
some considered an unhealthy, artificial prosperity. We might as well admit 
that things are going to be difficult soon. After having been carried along, we 
are going to be on our own now.
51
 
For much of the war, Prince Rupert was an important supply facility for the Pacific 
Theatre. It was the closest port to the Aleutian Islands, a key stop on the supply run to 
Alaska, and eventually a terminus for the Alaskan Highway. As a result, it became a 
focus of American and Canadian funding and wartime development. According to a 
Valuation Report of U.S. Army Facility, Prince Rupert and Port Edward, British 
Columbia co-authored by American and Canadian appraisers in December 1945, Prince 
Rupert had not enjoyed much prosperity until the Second World War when its population 
nearly quadrupled in size. The town was incorporated in 1910, had a population of 6,555 
in 1939, peaked in 1943 at 21,500 residents, and was expected to drop to 7,500-8,000 by 
1947.
52
 During the war, there were so many people in Prince Rupert that all amenities 
were strained under the immense demands for water, electricity, fuel, and alcohol. If 
someone wanted a shower they had to go to the Exhibition Building, wait in line, and 
pray for warm water and good pressure.
53
 This situation, however, would not persist. The 
experienced appraisers writing the Valuation Report figured that the town’s isolation, the 
lack of industrial or agricultural economies in the region, and the projected decreases in 
population and defence spending after 1945 would doom the area. They also concluded 
that Prince Rupert could not absorb all the facilities, equipment, and other materials built 
on war contracts and destined to be declared surplus and sold.
54
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After VJ-Day there were too many buildings left over and not enough people 
remaining in Prince Rupert. During the war, the Canadian government had invested $1.8 
million dollars in the city, while Wartime Housing Ltd. built at least 151 temporary 
dwellings. A major hospital was also constructed but never used and it was eventually 
turned over to the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs for use as a tuberculosis 
sanatorium. On the other hand, the Americans invested $17 million dollars to construct 
new roads, a mess hall, several barracks, a hospital, four entertainment clubs, a theatre, 
gym, library, chapel, and barber shop. They also built a 53,776 sq. ft. administration 
facility for the Prince Rupert dockyards, which were also expanded. Down the road in 
Port Edward, 180 temporary buildings were erected, the port facilities were improved, a 
400,000 sq. ft. ammunition magazine was constructed, and in 1944 they completed work 
on an underground storage tank that could hold over 93,000 barrels of fuel.
55
  
However, without the threat of Japanese invasion there was simply no need for a 
continuing military presence or such large-scale infrastructure in the postwar period. 
Although some of the larger buildings with communal and social significance were 
purchased by local interests, the conclusions of the Valuation Report proved accurate. 
The sales of the military hospital wing at the Prince Rupert General Hospital, the U.S. 
gymnasium building, and the YMCA war services building were straightforward, since 
the Prince Rupert General Hospital Association, the City of Prince Rupert, and the Civic 
Centre Association (respectively) purchased these properties.
56
 But finding other local 
purchasers was difficult. As a result, assets were removed either by the withdrawing 
Americans or by the WAC which redistributed them to more populated regions of the 
country. Furthermore, many surplus facilities sold by the WAC as “buildings without 
land” were purchased by southern interests from Vancouver, Victoria, Ottawa, Seattle, 
Portland, and Tacoma.
57
 These types of purchases (especially to private companies) often 
signified that the structures were valued for their materials and immediately demolished 
or relocated elsewhere. Considering that most of the facilities in Prince Rupert had been 
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hastily constructed without meeting the town’s building codes, demolition or complete 
abandonment was a fate bestowed upon these wartime investments.
58
 
The abandonment of assets and property was quite common across Canada 
particularly if the structures were permanent or if moveable assets were located in remote 
places (like the sub-arctic). So while the government took in a great deal of property after 
the war, lots of items and objects were intentionally left behind. The abandonment of 
assets was not just confined to Prince Rupert either. It happened frequently in the Pacific 
Northwest along the Alaskan Highway and Canol Pipeline routes as the Americans left 
behind a great deal of assets that remained too expensive to return home or too worn out 
to keep. This practice had tacit approval from Washington, as one report to Congress 
explained: “every effort has been and is being made by responsible officials on the spot 
to segregate and return to the United States material worth returning, abandoning only 
that not worth the cost of evacuation.”59 It was also a practice the Americans adopted in 
other parts of the world, especially the Pacific where munitions and supplies were 
stretched out across numerous tiny islands. In an effort to encourage local purchases of 
American surpluses, the American Senate added an amendment to the Surplus Property 
Act that provided “intangible benefits” for unsalable surpluses, such as funding an 
educational exchange program named for the senator who wrote the amendment, J. 
William Fulbright.
60
 
Although the Canadian government avoided paying for much of this northern 
wartime development, after the war it took possession of the Northwest Staging Route 
and the other American construction initiatives as part of its obligations under the 33rd 
Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD). The 33rd 
Recommendation was the product of months of negotiations throughout 1943 and 1944 
and formed the basis of the disposal agreements between Canada and the US. In practice 
though, the 33rd Recommendation was preceded by a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that 
Carswell and his American counterpart, Will Clayton, negotiated in early 1944. This type 
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of informal accord was common to most international arrangements and helped build a 
practical framework for the formal agreements that followed in March 1946. The 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” was a reciprocal promise made by both governments to “not 
offer Government-owned surpluses” for sale in the other country.61 This meant that the 
WAC could not sell Canadian surpluses in the US, but more importantly, the agreement 
prevented the US from dumping their vast amounts of surpluses in Canada. Although 
some exceptions were made for agents acting on behalf of either government and there 
were limited controls on the cross-border resale by third parties, the agreement worked 
well until it was replaced by the 33rd Recommendation, approved by Canada and the US 
in September and November 1944 
respectively.
62
 
The 33rd Recommendation 
was a very practical document. 
Under its terms each country was 
allowed to withdraw from the other 
whatever moveable property it 
owned and wished to keep within 
one year of the termination of the 
war. After that point, anything 
remaining automatically exchanged 
hands free of charge. Immovable 
property was dealt with by a 
separate provision that allowed the US to submit a list of all surplus property in Canada 
for which it wanted financial reimbursement. The list was delivered in February 1945 and 
joint valuation reports (such as the Valuation Report for Prince Rupert) were arranged so 
the Americans received the going market rate according to the appraisers’ findings. The 
WAC, acting as the Canadian government’s disposal agent, was heavily involved in 
                                                 
61
 United States Senate,  Hearings before the Surplus War Property Subcommittee of the Special Committee 
to Study and Survey Problems of Small Business Enterprises, 79th Congress, First Session, Part 63: 
Machine Tools Industry, “Statement of J. B. Carswell President, War Assets Corporation, Ltd. Montreal, 
Canada,” 27 April 1945, 7590. 
62
 SCWEE, 2 April 1946 (No. 1, Book 2), 13-14. 
 
Photo 3 Abandoned Trucks on the Canol Heritage Trail, 
near Mile 222. Source: Anthony DeLorenzo, 31 July 2012 
Available at: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abandoned_truc
ks_on_the_Canol_Heritage_Trail.jpg  
 
 
  
156 
 
almost every aspect of this disposal operation. This was not only because it hired the 
Canadian appraiser for each valuation report, but also because the Recommendation 
contained provisions requiring both countries to abide by the other’s laws governing 
surplus disposal. The Canadian government had insisted upon this clause because of the 
large volume of American surpluses in Canada. All American property not returned to the 
US and not required by the Canadian government had to be sold through the CAAC and 
WAC, while the proceeds of sales were turned over to American accounts.
63
  
However, after hostilities ended, the Canadian government wanted to expedite the 
financial settlement with a comprehensive agreement before the end of the fiscal year. On 
30 March 1946, the two governments agreed on a set price for all remaining American 
property in Canada and the Canadian government paid the United States $12 million for 
the defence facilities, leftover equipment, and infrastructure that had originally cost about 
$59 million USD (there were separate agreements for the Alaskan Highway and Canol 
Pipeline). According to Stanley Dziuban, the deal was mutually beneficial to both sides 
as Canada received airports and infrastructure while the US received cash in return.
64
 
However, the usefulness and practicality of the remaining facilities and infrastructure was 
questionable as a large portion of the leftover equipment was war junk not worth the cost 
of repatriating back to the US and technological advances in aircraft designed rendered 
the series of air bases obsolete. Indeed, a cynic might conclude that the Canadian 
government paid the Americans to leave their garbage behind. 
Such a situation was compounded by the attitude of Canadian political leaders 
toward northern developments. In general, Ottawa was indifferent toward the Alaskan 
Highway, Northwest Staging Route, and the Canol Pipeline from the beginning – 
officials even called the highway “a most dubious egg” at one point.65 The government 
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was even less enthused about having to maintain the new infrastructure coming under 
federal jurisdiction and clean up all the war junk that remained in the surrounding areas. 
Therefore, the remoteness of the area, the amount of territory requiring clean up, and the 
continuing costs of maintenance were prohibitive. It was simply easier and more cost 
effective to follow the American example and abandon what could not be salvaged, 
relocated, or sold locally.  
As a result, the Pacific Northwest became littered with abandoned relics from the 
Second World War that were not worth the cost of disposal. These relics and materials 
became entwined into the social and spatial identities of the region and have had a 
residual impact on the local inhabitants and the tourist industry more generally.
66
 The 
Canol pipeline is an example. It was crash-built by the Americans in the wake of the 
Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands so that oil from Norman Wells in the Northwest 
Territories could be transported to refineries in Whitehorse. Over the winter of 1943-
1944 approximately 2,650 km of four and six inch piping was laid across the rugged 
landscape, in addition to 1,600 km of telephone lines and a service road. Amazingly, the 
first oil reached Whitehorse in April 1944 but the project was abandoned a year later 
since it was incredibly expensive and impractical as oil production in Whitehorse was 
four times the world price and the threat of further Japanese advances had passed.
67
  
In 1944, the Americans arranged for the pipeline’s sale to Imperial Oil and the 
company demolished large portions and removed whatever else it considered valuable. 
However, there was little oversight and Imperial Oil left behind considerable amounts of 
materials and worthless equipment. Whatever remained came under the WAC’s 
jurisdiction in 1946 and some sales did occur in 1947, but everything else was abandoned 
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once again.
68
 In the 1950s and 1960s renewed federal investment in the north improved 
the road networks and spurred a mild increase in adventure tourism, but little was done to 
clean up the Canol pipeline and the large amounts of remaining materials. In October 
1996, the Canol Heritage Trail was officially opened at a plaque ceremony in Tulita and 
according to a 2012 article by Maclean’s the 355km hiking trail ranks as the most 
challenging in Canada.
69
 
Aside from the rugged Canadian wilderness and breathtaking scenery, the other 
tourist draw is the leftover materiel dotting the area. Against the backdrop of a northern 
landscape, the derelict remains of 
pumping stations, road camps, bridges, 
trucks, and other rusting equipment are 
strewn along the Canol trail. For 
tourists these are some of the 
highlights of the hiking experience. As 
Wendy Cecil, Chancellor of Victoria 
University, described in a commercial 
for Northwest Territories Tourism, the 
Canol Trail was just like “a living 
museum” because visitors can “see 
remnants of when it was 
constructed…you can see where 
bridges got swept away; you can see 
some of the old buildings; there’s still lots of the old trucks, all stripped of their rubber 
tires and motors and everything but the shells…it’s a bit like walking through a ghost 
town.”70 However, for the locals, the material legacies of abandoned military equipment 
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Photo 4 Group of Inuit with housing made from 
American military supplies, Fort Chimo, QU. 1948. 
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were more than just parts of the landscape. In some cases, the leftover objects were 
integrated into their lives to bring some meagre improvements to living conditions in the 
north. As Photo 4 demonstrates, local populations often appropriated leftover military 
supplies to improve their housing needs, as these Inuit did in Fort Chimo (present day 
Kuujjuaq) along the northern tip of Quebec on the coast of the Ungava Bay.  
Yet the leftover materiel is not always welcomed. Even today it poses some 
challenges and dangers for both humans and wildlife. In July 2014, during the ninth 
annual Canol Youth Hike, Norman Yakeleya, the now former MLA for the Northwest 
Territories’ Sahtu region, discovered around mile 170 of the hike that the old 
communication wires installed by the Americans were hanging dangerously low. The 
group found moose antlers 
tangled up in the telephone wire 
and as Yakeleya told the CBC, 
“it really breaks your heart 
when you see those antlers all 
tangled up in those wires. The 
poor animals suffocated in that 
state.”71 While the scars of the 
Second World War are most 
often associated with far off 
battlefields, destroyed 
landscapes, and the immaculate cemeteries of the Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission, other forms of materiel legacies and pollution still remain and require 
continuing expenses and maintenance decades after its conclusion. In 2009, the federal 
government paid to clean up the wire along the first 80km of the Canol trail and added 
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the pipeline to its list of contaminated sites since roughly 20 percent of the oil it 
transported never arrived in Whitehorse.
72
 
The issue of UXO located around the country also continues to cost Canadians. 
Since Canada’s vast expanse of land was perhaps its greatest contribution to the Allied 
cause, the country was used extensively for training soldiers and testing weaponry during 
the war. As a result, large numbers of sites became so contaminated with unexploded 
ordnance, that an overworked and underfunded PDC and WAC could not possibly 
remediate everything. Moreover, jurisdictional limitations also plagued their operations 
since they were only responsible for clearing proof ranges operated by the DMS or those 
declared surplus by the DND. Facing drastic budget cuts in 1945, the DND had little 
incentive to clean up the testing and training ranges it planned on maintaining, while 
postwar exercises only added more UXOs to these properties. Over time, however, 
geological processes push shells closer to the surface, while Canada’s population growth 
has put more land into development. This has resulted in more frequent encounters with 
UXO. For instance, in 2005 the DND started collecting data on UXO locations and in 
2013 officials speculated that there are more than 860 “legacy sites” across Canada and at 
least another 1,100 sites off the Atlantic coast.
73
 Since 1927 unexploded ordnance has 
killed 15 people and injured another 20 across the whole country. In Vernon, British 
Columbia alone, between 1944 and 1973 at least nine people were killed in accidents, 
including two Boy Scouts named Grant Morgan and Don Hope who died when a buried 
mortar exploded in 1963. As of 2013, the last known injury was in Lethbridge, Alberta 
when a farmer ran over a buried pyrotechnic device in 2007.
74
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“A Solid Big Gob”: The Challenge of Managing Large Inventories 
Despite lingering problems, cleaning up contaminated sites and clearing out surplus 
property from military and industrial sites was a crucial element of the state’s disposal 
efforts. This act made way for the return of peacetime operations and materially aided 
postwar reconstruction and reconversion programs. However, it was only half of the 
story. Without a place to store all the items, objects, and materials collected by the WAC, 
clearance operations were impossible to sustain. Therefore, the Supply Department’s 
Warehousing Division was an essential element of clearance operations. Once Clearance 
teams did their work, the assets not purchased by the contractor on site and not required 
by CAL or the armed forces were collected and transported to one of the WAC’s 
warehouses to await final disposition.  
The Warehousing Division allowed the WAC to control the flood of surpluses 
entering the economy and testimony before the SCWEE explained this important 
function, “Canada cannot absorb in a short period the huge stocks made surplus and 
means must be found to properly warehouse them” so they would not flood markets and 
depreciate prices for new goods.
75
 These comments were echoed by an unpublished 
history of the WAC. Since private industry, the armed forces, and federal departments 
relied on the Corporation to remove and dispose of surpluses as quickly as possible, it 
was not feasible or advisable to “sell the surplus in time to meet the removal demands 
without flooding the market.”76 The best option was “to remove such surplus to 
warehouses” where they would be stored until sold or, if no sale could be arranged, 
destroyed.
77
 However, the storage and maintenance of all merchandise reclaimed by the 
government was no easy feat. The Warehousing Division faced some significant 
challenges related to the volume of goods entering its custody and this section will 
examine these problems in relation to the expansion of storage capacities and the 
stewardship of objects. 
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The toughest initial task was finding space for everything. In December 1945, just a 
few months after being created, the Warehousing Division boasted eighteen warehouses 
spread across the country: eight in Ontario, seven in Quebec, and one each in the 
Maritimes, Prairies, and BC. The eighteen warehouses amounted to roughly 1.735 
million sq. ft. (or 39.8 acres) of indoor storage space. To put this early amount of storage 
space into perspective: it was almost twice the size of Parliament Hill which occupies 
952,390 sq. ft. in downtown Ottawa. Yet this space was not nearly enough. In January 
1946, the first month that Surplus Declarations topped 2,000, the fifteen warehouses in 
Ontario and Quebec (totalling 1.435 million sq. ft. combined) were reaching full capacity, 
as 65 percent of Ontario’s and 75 percent of Quebec’s warehouses were filled. Similar 
issue occurred in other regions as well. In the Maritimes, 60 percent of the available 
140,000 sq. ft. was occupied, while 35 percent of the 125,000 sq. ft. serving Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan and 80 percent of 35,000 sq. ft. serving British Columbia and Alberta 
was occupied.
78
 With the flood of surplus declarations and clearance requests increasing 
each month, it was obvious that more warehouses were required, especially in the west 
and east. As a result, the Warehousing Division expanded rapidly to operate a peak of 51 
warehouses, totalling more than 6 million sq. ft. of indoor storage space by March 1947.  
The expansion of the WAC’s storage capacity was a remarkable achievement 
considering how expensive real estate and rental charges were in a country plagued by 
severe accommodation shortages during and after the war. Acquiring new buildings or 
facilities was very expensive and yet the WAC managed to find more than six million sq. 
ft. of indoor space without going bankrupt. How did that happen? Malley’s Supply 
Department came up with an ingenious and cost effective solution: the WAC would 
repurpose the facilities already owned by the Crown and declared surplus through the 
DMS or DND. Berry’s testimony before the SCWEE confirmed this policy which was 
implemented wherever possible. However, he also indicated that as of December 1945, 
the armed forces were still closely guarding their storage capacities, so the repurposing of 
existing spaces was not a straightforward process: “I believe we possibly use [vacant 
airport buildings or army buildings for storage], but in certain cases we have not been 
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able to organize to the point where we can take over existing buildings which have 
surpluses in them from the present custodians; namely, the air force, the army, and the 
navy.”79 
Since the WAC usually did not construct any warehouses, its storage facilities came 
from two general sources. First, a portion of the warehouses taken over by the WAC were 
formerly Crown-owned plants (or sections thereof) that were already closed down and 
declared surplus. After some renovations, the Corporation gained plenty of space that was 
often in the general vicinity of where assets were declared and already located near good 
transportation networks since factories were constructed along rail lines wherever 
possible.
80
 Rather than rushing to sell the real estate, the WAC reused it temporarily and 
once the warehouse’s inventory was depleted, the building(s) were put on the market and 
sold as the WAC reverted to its centralized operational procedures.
81
 According to the 
pamphlet Disposal and Peacetime Use of Crown-Owned Plant Buildings, at its peak the 
WAC warehouses occupied roughly 4-5 million sq. ft. of floor space at thirteen former 
crown plants. But by 1948 the Corporation occupied only 1.1 million sq. ft. and there 
were few indications that storage space would be required much longer.
82
   
The second source of warehousing was the space commandeered at military bases 
across the country. This cut down on expenses especially if the materiel was located on 
the same base, as it only required transportation to the WAC’s buildings or the assets 
could be left in place to avoid double handling. This policy was not always welcomed by 
the military because it took up valuable space on bases at a time when the postwar 
storage problem was most acute, but over time the WAC and military found ways to 
cooperate. To supervise the storage, handling, and maintenance of assets on military 
bases, the Supply Department assigned personnel and hired security guards. This 
particular arrangement worked extremely well in several places, especially in Montreal at 
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the Longue Pointe Ordnance Depot. The 210-acre depot was Canada’s “Valcartier” of the 
Second World War. Crash-built on the outskirts of Montreal very early in the war, by 
1944 it was the central logistical hub of Canada’s entire war effort. Practically all 
munitions and supplies produced by Canadian industries were shipped overseas or 
returned home through its sprawling facilities, railways, and dock yards. After the war, 
the WAC used Longue Pointe as its central shipping hub for many international sales and 
some local ones as well.
83
 
The amount of outdoor storage space used by the Corporation was probably larger 
than the indoor space, but it is harder to 
quantify because the square footage was not 
recorded and because it is more difficult to 
define. For instance, assets could be stored 
directly outside the doors of warehouses 
permanently or temporarily. They could be 
put in sheds without walls adjacent to 
military bases or left in open-air depots 
behind barbed wire fences. Additionally, the 
remote areas where surpluses were 
abandoned could be labelled as a form of 
outdoor storage space. Assembled aircraft 
posed a special storage challenge due to 
their size and numbers. As a result, they 
were often left at RCAF bases or aircraft 
factories until a sale or destruction could be arranged.
84
 If the planes were in saleable 
condition but the logistics of storage proved too problematic or the space did not exist, 
than the planes were “cocooned” (wrapped in plastic) and left outdoors. Cocooning 
became a very common practice during the war. Just before its outbreak Dow Chemical 
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Photo 6: A rare picture of decommissioned 
ships at the graveyard near Sorel. Source: LAC, 
RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9 History of War 
Assets Corporation Ltd. and War Assets 
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Standard, 15 September 1945, 3. 
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invented a thin plastic wrap (it was green and smelled bad) that it called “Saran.” 
Originally, Dow Chemical was unsure about its potential applications until munitions 
shipments had to be packaged and protected from dust, moisture, salt water, air, and 
damage.
85
 
The largest outdoor storage space utilized by the WAC was a part of the St. 
Lawrence River on the “leeward side of Isle de Grace” north of Sorel, Quebec. It was 
here that the WAC established its largest ship graveyard for Canada’s surplus naval and 
cargo vessels. The WAC paid about $100,000 to set up the site and under the joint 
command of the WAC’s Fred Hamilton and the Navy’s disposal officer at Sorel, Lt-
Cmdr. J. Hodgkinson, a veteran of the Battle of the Atlantic and former commander of 
the corvette HMCS Morden. Morden was one of roughly 100 corvettes sold from the 
Sorel graveyard, which could hold up to 150 vessels at any given moment.
86
 Flower and 
Castle-class corvettes were joined by several other types of vessels common to Canada’s 
wartime navy, as fairmiles, frigates, destroyers, and the Fort and Park cargo vessels were 
also moored at Sorel.
87
 The WAC also maintained two other ship graveyards in 
cooperation with the Navy, one on either coast. The graveyard at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, 
handled surplus ships on the Atlantic coast, storing primarily minesweepers, harbour 
craft, and any overflow from Sorel. Surplus vessels on the Pacific coast were moored at 
Bedwell Bay before final disposal.
88
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As sales peaked over the 1946-1947 fiscal year, the number of items entering and 
exiting the WAC’s warehouses grew to staggering proportions. As Table 5 indicates, the 
WAC’s 51 warehouses shipped 99,902 and received 107,257 tons of materials that year. 
The roughly even split between shipping and receiving occurred because the WAC 
reached the peak of its clearance, warehousing, and selling operations: the volume it took 
in started equaling what it shipped out. This allows us to interpret the WAC’s disposal 
operations in three phases chronologically defined by the annual reports. The first period, 
1945-1946, was dominated by the intake of surpluses into warehouses during which some 
sales occurred (particularly onsite to contractors) but the tonnage entering warehouses 
was much larger than what was leaving. Unfortunately, statistics for 1945-1946 are not 
available, but they should mirror (in reverse) the trends in Table 6. The second or middle 
period, 1946-1947, was characterized by roughly equal levels of shipping and receiving, 
whereas the first and third phases were characterized by an imbalance in intake and 
output. During the last phase, 1947-1948, the number of warehouses was drastically 
reduced in line with the liquidation of inventories and this is reflected in the major 
imbalance between the shipping and receiving and the higher rate of sales orders handled 
over the previous years.
89
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Table 5: Warehousing Operations of the War Assets Corporation, 1946-47 
Region 
Warehouses 
Operating 
March 1947 
Total 
Occupied 
Area 
(Sq. Ft.) 
Total 
Personnel 
Approx. 
Tonnage 
Received 
1946-47 
Approx. 
Tonnage 
Shipped 
1946-47 
Sales 
Orders 
Handled 
Maritimes 6 614,381 304 10,852 8,192 8,657 
Quebec 11 1,555,913 761 30,583 28,151 20,202 
Ontario 12 2,338,964 873 27,625 32,026 19,649 
Prairies 8 578,608 156 12,237 12,147 14,285 
Western 14 1,163,699 417 25,960 19,386 14,167 
Total 51 6,251,565 2,511 107,257 99,902 76,960 
Source: War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, (April 1, 1946 to March 31, 1947), 11 
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The volume of assets entering and exiting warehouses brought a whole host of new 
problems. Perhaps the biggest challenge was keeping track of the ballooning inventory.  
As Berry explained to the SCWEE, some of his divisions had seen significant increases 
in their business after V-J Day. Referencing the sale of machine tools as an example of 
the problems caused by the sudden surge, Berry stated that over the six-month period 
following Germany’s surrender, sales of machine tools tripled from an average of 
$300,000 per month to $1 million a month:  
Up to that time we had a flow of X machines coming in per week or per 
month. On V-J Day it was not a flow of machines of X per month, it was a 
solid big gob of machines which descended on us. I cannot possibly have the 
administrative machinery to catalogue all these machines; as to what they are, 
where they are – we have to sell them openly. It may take me 12 months to 
get all these machines sold properly. It may take me two years.
90
 
That the WAC sold the “solid big gob” of machine tools roughly in accordance with 
Berry’s two-year estimate was remarkable given the diversity and sheer volume of 
everything else descending on the Corporation. After the war, the WAC received solid 
big gobs of every imaginable category of goods!  
Cataloguing such a large inventory was not easy or, as it turned out, even desirable. 
As Ken Johnstone explained in the September issue of The Standard, “the country’s 
largest department stores may stock up to ten thousand different items. War Assets 
Corporation lists something like two hundred and fifty thousand items in its 
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Table 6: Warehousing Operations of the War Assets Corporation, 1947-48 
Region 
Warehouses 
Operating 
March 1948 
Total 
Occupied 
Area 
(Sq. Ft.) 
Total 
Personnel 
Approx. 
Tonnage 
Received 
1947-48 
Approx. 
Tonnage 
Shipped 
1947-48 
Sales 
Orders 
Handled 
Maritimes 2 456,505 82 9,097.81 12,524.01 11,860 
Quebec 3 427,639 117 8,349.66 33,973.26 26,559 
Ontario 2 993,262 217 8,688.19 59,577.88 26,278 
Prairies 2 109,808 26 4,146.28 18,834.67 9,288 
Western 3 391,714 106 14,587.28 26,353.26 18,740 
Total 12 2,378,928 548 44,869.36 151,263.08 92,725 
Source: War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual Report, (April 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948), 8 
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inventories.”91 Given the volume of declarations and the number of objects entering and 
exiting the WAC’s warehouses every day, compiling a comprehensive inventory of 
250,000 different categories was impractical since it would be immediately out-of-date 
and too large for quick reference. As Berry explained in another description of the 
inventory problem, “to catalogue the variety of goods and material disposed through the 
sales forces of the Corporation would require a large [book]. For example, a breakdown 
of material and components cleared through the Aircraft Section alone entails the 
enumeration of approximately 20,000 items. The section devoted to Radar and Radio lists 
5,000 separate classifications of items dealt with.”92 Moreover, the stock of items in each 
category was constantly fluctuating, and since every change had to be done by hand and 
without the help of microprocessors, inventory management software, or the internet, it 
was administratively impossible to keep a running tab.
93
 
In addition to the diversity and volume of items, creating a comprehensive 
catalogue was further complicated by the wide geographic dispersion of surpluses, the 
difficulty of combining into one master list all the various regional inventories, and the 
freight charges for mailing what was a heavy stack of paper to all interested customers. 
For these reasons the WAC was never able to circulate lists or catalogues of its entire 
inventory, much to the dissatisfaction of its customers and inquiring politicians. As 
DeRoche stated to the SCWEE in response to a question about why air raid precaution 
equipment was not included on the catalogue submitted as evidence, “this inventory is 
just one month. The total thing stands about that high (indicating) off the floor.”94 In this 
case, the air raid equipment had not been declared surplus that month and as a result was 
still in the Director of Civilian Defence’s possession and therefore not included in 
DeRoche’s briefing.  
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The procedures and practices for tracking inventories within the WAC were 
imperfect and overwhelmed by goods and paperwork. This made the Auditor General’s 
job more difficult. Because of Diefenbaker’s vocal criticism and questions in the House 
of Commons when the Surplus Crown Assets Act was debated, an amendment was added 
that required the Auditor General of Canada to investigate the WAC’s operations and 
accounts. As a result, dozens of auditors and supervisors fanned out across the country 
each year in order to inspect the WAC’s Head Office, Regional Branches, and all its 
warehouses. What they found raised eyebrows. Overall, most of the surviving auditor 
reports indicate that the records management at warehouses were adequately organized 
and maintained given the circumstances, although there were some systemic 
discrepancies between the paperwork and actual stocks available in the inventory.
95
  
As a result, the Auditor General continuously appended a caveat to its yearly 
reviews. While sympathetic to “the tremendous amount of paper work required in this 
company by the nature of its operations” as well as “the very great amount of clearance 
work” that “took place in a relatively short time,” the Auditor General qualified its report 
by stating that “the procedures and practices of the Corporation were not of such a nature 
as to permit establishing by examination of records maintained that all assets received for 
disposal had been fully accounted for.”96 The Auditor General’s remarks were a serious 
charge against the WAC, especially considering all the organizational and administrative 
preparations. Apparently, it had all been insufficient. Yet, remarkably, the comments did 
not yield any significant changes for two reasons. First, it appears as though auditors 
understood that clerical issues were impossible to avoid given the amount of assets and 
paperwork at hand. They were therefore willing to work with the existing system by 
limiting the discrepancies as much as possible. Second, Berry and his fellow executives 
believed it was impossible to alter the WAC’s practices and procedures to better serve the 
needs of auditors or create a detailed inventory. If this were to happen then operations 
“both as regard to taking over surplus and the sale of surplus” had to be “stopped for a 
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considerable period (estimated to be two months).”97 As the Second Annual Report stated 
after the Auditor General’s critical remarks: 
The Corporation feels that a stoppage of operations by the Corporation would 
be entirely unjustified as the safeguards that have been instituted to protect 
the Crown-owned property in its custody are of such a nature that only minor 
losses of property are likely, and the necessity for accepting surplus so that 
the original custodian departments may demobilize their personnel or, 
alternatively, contractors may clear their plants and return to civilian 
production are of paramount importance.
98
 
The difficulty in tracking such large inventories with even more paperwork was a 
product of many issues incumbent to the WAC’s operations and identified by auditors. It 
all started with the fact that the CAAC and WAC used different procedures and forms. 
The two separate administrative practices resulted in the provision of different file 
numbers for each declaration. This resulted in misfiled paperwork, much to the dismay of 
officials in the MGO Branch who discovered that some files were lost at the WAC’s 
Head Office in April 1945.
99
 Operating two administrative systems simultaneously was 
necessary given the different responsibilities of each organization. As Chapter 2 
explained, the CAAC’s Standard Procedures were issued to ensure consistency in filling 
out Surplus Declarations and also to ensure that a clear link was maintained between the 
items, their condition, the declaring agency, and location. These details allowed the 
CAAC to screen assets through the priorities and, when necessary, facilitate an inter-
departmental transfer or recommend a direct sale on the tracking schedules.  
However, once the assets entered the custody of the WAC a new set of 
administrative procedures existed, designed specifically for the physical task of inventory 
management. When Clearance teams acquired assets on site they were less concerned 
about where the objects originated, what they had been used for, or their original cost. 
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Instead, they were most interested in the object’s condition, dimensions, component 
parts, weight, features, availability, quantities, location, and warehousing requirements. 
The WAC therefore relied on a separate set of procedures and forms denoted by the 
prefix “S.D.” to track assets and sales through the provision of receipts and forms for 
contractors, declaring agencies, transfers between Departments or Divisions, and 
eventually, customer sales.
100
  
Internally, the Clearance and Warehousing Divisions used several imperfect 
methods to help keep track of items and paperwork. The Clearance division maintained 
an inventory of codes and abbreviations that helped them fill out forms for the 
Warehousing Division and Merchandising Department. However, this catalogue was over 
300 pages long, constantly changing as stocks were accrued or diminished, and largely 
generic since little information about the quality and quantity of each item could not be 
maintained.
101
 Inside warehouses, bin tags were used so personnel could easily navigate 
aisles and locate objects. Staff kept tags up-to-date by editing them with markers as items 
were removed. Warehouse supervisors kept track of stocks by inspecting availability 
reports (issued when items entered warehouses), sales forms (issued when items left 
warehouses), and discrepancy reports (issued when items went missing). However, as 
auditors discovered, this could be a cumbersome system to navigate since there was no 
general index for the forms, only stacks of paper that had to be cross-referenced by hand 
at each warehouse office.
 102
  
As a result of these practices, the identity of assets in relationship to the declaring 
agency and the CAAC’s Standard Procedures was “naturally lost” once in the WAC’s 
                                                 
100
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, “Clearance Division Procedures,” 19 November 1945, 1-22. 
101
 Ibid, “History of War Assets Corporation,” 15 July 1950, 5. 
102
 LAC, RG58, Vol. 17, File: War Assets Corp. Working Papers Quebec Region 1947-1948, “War Assets 
Corporation – Report on Warehouse 55,” no author, no date, 1-2; Ibid, “War Assets Corporation – #14 
Warehouse,” no author, 22 September 1947, 1-2; LAC, RG58, Vol. 40, File: War Assets Corporation Ltd. 
Head office Year-end Test Audits 31 March 1948, “Audit of Warehouse No. 41, Debert N. S. for the period 
July 8, 1946 to June 23, 1947,” L. E. L. Harvey, 7 August 1947, 1-2, 5; Ibid, “Audit of Warehouse No. 41 
Debert, N. S. Period 18th July 1947 to 16th August 1948,” Mr. G. C. Sircom, 26 April 1948, 1-5; Ibid, File: 
War Assets Corporation Ltd. Head Office Working Papers 1947-1948 File AII, “Plant and Warehousing 
Operations No. 1 Reclamation Depot – Valleyfield,” H. R. Stephenson, 23 July 1948, 1-3. 
  
172 
 
custody.
103
 This was an inevitable consequence of the Corporation’s storage and handling 
procedures, but frustrated auditors attempting to track the flow of specific goods from 
intake to output. Due to the sheer volume of assets entering the WAC’s possession, it was 
necessary to adopt storage and sorting practices that were as pragmatic as possible. 
Maintaining the identity of an object in relationship to the original surplus declaration 
was an impractical basis for arranging warehouses and processing sales. In other words, it 
made no sense to store all radios declared surplus by the DND or the DMS in separate 
places. Rather it was more convenient to store all radios in the same bins regardless of 
origin and divided by condition, type, or 
manufacturer.
104
  
 The identity problem is best 
illustrated by the WAC’s No. 1 
Reclamation Depot located in 
Valleyfield, Quebec. The Reclamation 
Depot handled the storage, processing, 
and sale of all surplus clothing, textiles, 
bedding, blankets, boots, and shoes. 
Valleyfield became a very important 
feature of the WAC’s support for 
postwar relief and rehabilitation across 
the world. Yet the flow of clothing and 
textiles posed a problem for auditors 
because it was impossible to track an 
incoming shipment through its delivery, inspection, storage, processing, and sale. When a 
shipment first arrived at Valleyfield it was measured by total weight (not by the quantities 
of each item) and then transferred to another room (with all the other new shipments) for 
inspection. Inspectors sifted through each shipment and removed insignias, sorted 
contents by type, and folded articles for storage in the Depot’s 50-plus huts and buildings. 
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Photo 7 John Brocklehurst checking a pile of khaki 
uniforms at No. 1 Reclamation Depot, Valleyfield, 
Quebec. This rare photo from inside a WAC 
warehouse was taken from a badly deteriorating 
issue of The Standard, 15 September 1945, 4. 
Source: LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, 
“History of War Assets Corporation Ltd. and War 
Assets Corporation,” Newspaper Clippings. 
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Eventually, once a sale was made, the purchased items were all washed and dyed (to 
meet military policies governing the sale of old uniforms) before leaving the Depot.
105
 
Not only would the items look physically different, but it was impractical to sort and 
store each type by their original shipments or owners. Rather, it was more feasible to 
store all the pants, all the tunics, and all the blankets separately, regardless of where they 
originated, and subdivide them by condition.
106
 As a result, it was impossible for an 
auditor to determine if the 100 lbs. of pants sold on a Friday were all or part of Monday’s 
100 lbs. clothing shipment from, say, the Department of Labour. 
Given the intake of such large quantities, it was not uncommon for Clearance 
inspectors to simply leave assets in warehouses with the intention of screening them later 
but never getting the chance. This occurred often and was documented at Warehouse 55 
by an auditor who discovered that a large amount of material and equipment had not been 
screened by Clearance or Warehousing staff and simply left in open boxes on the 
warehouse’s floor “for as long as ten months.”107 Moreover, warehouse staff also had to 
deal with a steady stream of returned materials, either because the customer was unhappy 
with the shipment or because the Corporation had over-shipped. This happened with 
some regularity and increased workloads since goods had to be rescreened, new forms 
had to be filled out, and the assets had to be physically returned to bins or, more often, 
sent to the scrap heap because the items were unacceptable to the buyer. In one case, 
Garsons Scrap Yard in Nova Scotia actually refused to purchase the scrap consigned to it 
by the WAC as it was “useless scrap.”108 
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Compounding this problem was the eagerness of Clearance inspectors to close files 
quickly. During the peak of clearance operations, overworked inspectors hastily filled in 
forms with insufficient information or, more problematically, they would close files 
before warehousing receipts were included. This loop-hole was discovered first by the 
WAC’s Comptroller Branch and confirmed later by reports to the Auditor General in 
November 1947. As a result, by February 1948, steps were taken by “the internal audit 
staff at Ottawa” to review “some 50,000 plant clearance files with the objective of 
ascertaining whether or not materials intended to be taken over by War Assets 
Corporation have actually been received and that materials received and no longer on 
hand have been disposed of legitimately.”109 Although the Discrepancy Investigation 
Committee never appears to have reviewed all 50,000 files (this would have entailed 
reviewing every clearance request handled by the WAC) they did investigate some of the 
larger discrepancies at several meetings in March and April. They concluded that in most 
cases the Crown was partly or totally responsible for the discrepancies. This was either 
because of “clerical errors on the part of the corporation” or long delays in the inspection 
and repossession of inventories when contracts were terminated and the “desire of 
contractors to obtain full use of their premises with minimum delay” which could result 
in the materials being used illegitimately in peacetime production, resold by the 
contractor, or scrapped before the government could collect them.
110
 
Improper or delayed screening by clearance and warehousing staff was a fairly 
serious problem since assets could fall through the cracks. Judging from surviving 
evidence, this occurred with some regularity and, in the end, made for some 
uncomfortable and even dangerous situations. In one case, a “serious accident” occurred 
at Sorel when a hand grenade, left onboard HMCS Sherbrooke, exploded after the ship’s 
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commanding officer signed the ship’s “explosive free certificate.”111 As a result, orders 
were reissued to officers instructing them to make a “thorough search of the ship” after 
de-ammunitioning took place and before the ships were transferred to the WAC.
112
 
However, as George E. Irving later discovered, these inspections could be somewhat 
porous. In November 1945, Irving, a retired captain from the Royal Canadian Naval 
Volunteer Reserve, purchased Hodgkinson’s old ship HMCS Morden from the WAC and 
had it transported from Sorel to Port Dalhousie, Ontario. Sales records indicate that 
Irving may have misrepresented his intentions for purchasing the ship since the sale was 
listed as a “corvette for scrap” and therefore came with a slightly cheaper price tag. But 
Irving had other plans for the decommissioned vessel and started rebuilding it as a lake 
freighter over the spring of 1946.
113
  
On 29 April Irving made an unexpected discovery while removing ammunition 
racks from inside the ship’s aft magazines. To his surprise, he found “a 4-inch Corvette 
Shell Mk VIII No. 497, without nose cap” wedged behind the racks that the WAC’s staff 
had missed when they were preparing the ship for sale.
114
 In what must have been a 
nervous few moments, the retired sailor telephoned the RCMP’s Niagara Falls 
Detachment around 1pm and Constable J. Brucker arrived shortly thereafter. Brucker 
removed the shell to Queenston Quarries “pending further instructions as to the 
disposal.”115 Final disposal took a few months to coordinate with officials from the 
Department of Mines and Resources and the RCN, but the shell was eventually dumped 
in Lake Ontario in June.
116
 Although the shell’s detonator (nose cap) was removed, 
making it safe for handling, such a situation was an obvious symptom of how 
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overwhelmed the WAC’s clearance and warehousing operations were after the war. The 
explosive, hidden from plain sight, was missed when the boat was inspected by both its 
former crew and WAC personnel. That Irving decided to retrofit the vessel proved 
fortunate since scrapping ships requires ferociously hot liquid-oxygen torches and heavy 
machinery for dismemberment. His decision probably prevented an oversight in Sorel 
from turning into a devastating accident in Port Dalhousie.   
Improper screening and inspections also resulted in defective tabulations. This 
meant that, at any given moment, the WAC’s actual stocks could be much larger or 
smaller than officially recorded. This resulted in over-shipments or under-shipments to 
customers or in sales occurring for assets that had not officially entered the WAC’s 
custody or in assets taking up storage space without anyone knowing they were there. A 
field audit of Warehouse 48 in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, from 11 February until its 
closure in July 1947 revealed several discrepancies in shipments from the warehouse. In 
one instance, involving the shipment of canned food to the British Food Mission, “it was 
found that a shortage occurred between the Warehouse and the purchaser’s 
destination.”117 While theft at any point in the logistical arrangements was a distinct 
possibility, it was also likely that warehousing records were inaccurate. The records may 
have either over-estimated the amount of canned food actually available for sale or 
packages containing a portion of the cans purchased were not located in the warehouse at 
the time the order was filled. 
The issuing of Discrepancy Reports to account for the difference between the 
tabulations on paper and actual stocks of materials in the warehouse became a common 
practice that varied in severity from warehouse to warehouse. At Warehouse 14, adjacent 
to the Crown Industrial Building in Villeray, over 4,000 discrepancy reports were on file 
when auditors reviewed the facilities in 1947. By contrast, Warehouse 48 and Warehouse 
41 at Debert had very few discrepancy reports on file, allowing auditors to conclude these 
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warehouses were well managed.
118
 Discrepancies between the paperwork and actual 
stocks available in warehouses originated mainly from three sources. The improper or 
delayed screening of incoming materials has already been mentioned, but this and 
inaccuracies on the original Surplus Declarations to the CAAC or clearance receipts 
accounted for a large portion of the problem. The other two sources involved breakage 
and theft. Just like personnel from the Clearance Division were liable to abandon objects 
and materials onsite by purpose or accident, a natural attrition rate developed inside the 
warehousing facilities – either on purpose or by accident – that affected the availability of 
assets. Many of the objects entering the WAC’s custody were already worn out, obsolete, 
or otherwise unwanted, so breakage happened constantly in warehouses as assets were 
damaged or destroyed when handling them. As a result, warehouse supervisors wrote off 
assets in what amounted to a wastage rate.  
The tight third-party security provided by the Commissionaires at warehouses made 
it difficult to steal large quantities of assets without a sizable number of co-conspirators. 
Although surviving evidence is silent on this issue, it does not appear that any large or 
organized rackets developed inside the WAC. Yet small-scale thefts were a systemic 
problem that occupied the Investigations Division of the Organization and Personnel 
Department with several dozen cases each year. For instance, during the fiscal year of 
1946-1947, the Investigations Division kept busy with 161 cases of which sixteen 
resulted in prosecutions and convictions “involving 20 persons, mostly Corporation 
employees, and 20 other cases which were completed by the dismissal of 31 
employees.”119 In comparison to the Corporation’s total employment statistics over the 
same period, these numbers are miniscule. However, this does not mean that thefts were 
uncommon. In fact, it seems that only the most serious incidents were passed on to the 
Investigations Division since warehouse supervisors were more likely to write off the 
losses after conducting their own investigations. As an auditor noted in his review of 
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Warehouse 14, there were thirty-seven Discrepancy Reports issued throughout the year 
because of “pilfering” and only “about one half” were sent to the Investigations Division 
while no records of the warehouse supervisor’s investigations were available and no 
staffing changes happened because of the shortages.
120
  
At Warehouse 14 thefts included the disappearance of some flashlights from a 
storage bin and “three aircraft type, eight day clocks removed from the manufacturer’s 
case and the cases refilled with pieces of scrap.”121 In another instance, a security guard 
thwarted the theft of an electric motor found “behind the driver’s seat in the warehouse 
truck outside the warehouse.”122 At Valleyfield, auditors discovered when checking the 
discrepancy reports that the warehouse supervisor had simply written off a number of 
thefts. Given the nature of Valleyfield’s inventory and the fact that it was during the dead 
of winter (January and February) 1948, the missing items were understandable, as they 
included: five pairs of leather women’s shoes, 61 satin brassieres, 58 small and medium 
waistcoats, 10 pairs of woollen gloves, and five pairs of leather mitts.
123
  
Although most were small in nature, some serious thefts were committed. For 
instance, on 14 October 1946, the RCMP was notified by the WAC that a large 
centrifugal water pump powered by a General Electric motor was stolen from its 
warehouse at Watson Lake in the Yukon. The water pump was heavy and big (4m x 1.5m 
x 1m) so a group of people and a vehicle were involved. Upon making their inspection, 
constables found the locks on the warehouse doors were broken and tire tracks from a 
truck equipped with “mud grip” tires in the immediate vicinity.124 WAC maintenance 
personnel were interviewed but no one knew anything about the robbery so the unsolved 
case remained opened until 25 February 1947 when it was cancelled. Since nothing was 
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ever found in the region by police, it seems likely that the water pump was stolen by 
someone heading south, perhaps enterprising American soldiers or civilian contractors 
returning home with equipment that their government had declared surplus.
125
  
Fraud was another type of crime associated with the WAC, especially given the 
severe material shortages across Canada. As Warren Baldwin reported in the Globe and 
Mail on 3 March 1946, WAC officials in Ottawa were confronted by “three very 
indignant young men” who demanded the immediate delivery of the trucks they had 
supposedly purchased from the Corporation.
126
 After calming down, they explained that 
four months earlier an acquaintance had put them in touch with a man who had pull with 
the WAC and could get them the trucks despite the priority restrictions. The men were 
directed to “a business address, where business-like negotiations regarding type, size and 
price were carried out, and where the men finally parted with their cash deposits.”127 Of 
course, this was not legitimate and the three men were swindled out of about $1,200. 
When the case was turned over to the WAC’s Investigations Division, eighty-nine similar 
scams involving “gullible purchasers” and motor vehicles were found and the RCMP was 
brought in to conduct further criminal investigations.
128
    
In another incident, a young man explained to his landlady that he was an official 
with the WAC and could get her furniture “at bargain prices” and when she invested 
$250 with him, he disappeared. “It was left to War Assets officials to explain to the 
landlady that the young man wasn’t and never had been an employee of War Assets.”129 
Taking advantage of a materially-starved marketplace and a backlog of consumer 
spending power, scammers and fraudsters capitalized on the public’s knowledge of the 
WAC to misrepresent themselves and swindle money. As the newspaper article 
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concluded, making special reference to the very popular and coveted Jeep, “one other 
warning. If anyone tries to sell you a War Assets jeep, don’t bite. War Assets Corporation 
hasn’t yet seen a jeep, and doesn’t expect to for a long time, if ever.”130 Fraud would 
remain a constant companion of the WAC’s operations, well into the postwar period. In 
1973, a group of men misrepresenting themselves as salesmen for the WAC’s successor 
agency, the Crown Assets Disposal Corporation (CADC), travelled around Kingston, 
Napanee, and Brockville “offering jeeps at $100.00 cash, brand new, in crates” and when 
they collected the money they advised the purchasers that the CADC would make the 
delivery later. Of course this was not the case and, amazingly, “when apprehended they 
had collected in excess of $28,000.00”131  
Conclusion 
While the WAC held little influence over how objects were used once in the hands 
of new owners, its clearance and warehousing operations played an important role in 
controlling the fate of an object’s transition into peacetime. For the most part, the WAC 
controlled access to government surpluses as well as the types of objects made available 
for redistribution in the civilian economy. This is why the clearance of both military and 
industrial facilities was so important, not only to public safety, but to economic renewal 
and reconversion. In clearing the 40,000-plus sites and collecting the surpluses located at 
each, the government ensured that it would be reimbursed for its property and create a 
large inventory of assets for redistribution. Moreover, in clearing unwanted objects from 
factories, the government helped private industry make room for new machinery and 
different peacetime operations. This was a prerequisite for any postwar development and 
expansion since the assets cluttering factory floors, military bases, or office buildings 
would no longer impede reconversion or postwar production. Clearance and warehousing 
constituted an important mechanism for absorbing the shock of peace through a process 
of stewardship. 
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However, the shock absorbers did not always accomplish their objectives. Financial 
and geographical obstacles, as well as the profuse quantities of objects involved, 
frequently scuttled clearance and warehousing operations. If the clearance and 
remediation of sites was too expensive or if the assets were located in remote areas, then 
they were often abandoned or only partially cleaned up, thereby leaving a materiel legacy 
for future generations. Furthermore, the sheer volume of assets entering and exiting 
warehouses left personnel in a constant uphill battle to keep up and ensured that the 
storage system broke down periodically. This resulted in assets slipping through the 
cracks by either entering or exiting a warehouse without an associated paper trail or 
without being properly inspected. These discrepancies resulted from numerous sources 
and illuminate the operational conditions inside warehouses, the nature of the Auditor 
General’s criticism, and the wider challenges faced by the Corporation while ushering 
objects through the transition from war to peace.  
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Chapter 4 
“The Wonderland of War Assets”: Selling, Scrapping, and 
Salvaging Value  
In the operations of War Assets Corporation there arises the responsibility of protecting 
the public against its own enthusiasms. No matter how much people may covet military 
equipment, it may not always be suitable for civilian use. Therefore, much military 
equipment may not be offered for sale at all.
1
 
C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply and Reconstruction, 23 October 1944 
First we must give away all the assets of the war: 
Stores, trucks, equipment, goods of every kind, 
And all the factories built with public money. 
These must be channelled toward monopolies, 
Who will most surely exploit them.  
This we shall call restoring free enterprise.
2
 
F. R. Scott, “Orderly Decontrol 1947” 
Introduction 
Although clearance and warehousing were very challenging aspects of disposal 
operations, they were also effectively redundant if nothing left the WAC’s possession. 
After all, the chief purpose of the WAC was not to hoard surpluses but to dispose of them 
in the best interests of the national economy, employment, and the taxpayer. There were 
only two avenues for accomplishing this divestment: selling or destroying. In general 
terms, the selling option was preferred over destruction since it allowed the WAC to 
recoup some of the asset’s original value. However, this did not mean that the 
Corporation charged head-on into the postwar period by selling everything it could all at 
once. Rather, it had to liquidate assets in a rational and stable fashion so that surpluses 
would not precipitate an economic crisis by lowering prices for new goods and harming 
employment. Therefore, in many cases – especially those involving lethal assets or items 
without civilian applications – destruction was the preferable option. To help guide the 
Corporation’s work, sometime in early 1944 the WAC’s Board of Directors, in 
consultation with the CAAC and Howe, devised a selling strategy based on “nine cardinal 
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points” that were outlined in the Corporation’s first few annual reports and 
communicated to the public in Howe’s October 1944 speech on the CBC.3 The cardinal 
points served as the basis of all the WAC’s operations (see page 189 for list). 
One theme that connected all nine cardinal points related to the fears of reliving 
another postwar depression. In the 1940s many people feared that another Great 
Depression was unavoidable and would be worse than the economic collapse of 1929 and 
its decade-long fallout. As Cyril James, a respected economist and President of McGill 
University, stated to the House of Commons Committee on Reconstruction in August 
1942 “there will inevitably be a post war depression, either immediately after the war or 
after a brief period of prosperity.”4 James was not alone in raising the alarm, as his 
comments reflected a broad sense of apprehension about a future postwar experience that 
might replicate the prolonged turmoil following the Great War. Those planning disposal 
operations shared some of James’s doom and gloom, though it also served as motivation 
to get things right the second time around. The cardinal points were designed to regulate 
the circumstances in which surpluses were sold and restrict the WAC’s clientele so they 
would not upend the normal economy. In doing so, the points helped contain any 
disruptive conditions arising from the influx of such large quantities of government assets  
Above all else the nine cardinal points formed a disposal strategy that blatantly 
favoured corporate interests. However, this strategy was rationally conceived and largely 
based off the First World War experience when speculators – someone who purchases 
goods for resale below market value but possessed no capacity for producing those goods 
or any connection to the industries concerned – had been the government’s primary 
customers. Instead of facilitating another deflationary economic cycle by flooding 
markets with inexpensive goods, the government decided to bring business interests into 
disposal operations. The WAC hired agents to help broker sales, commissioned 
prominent businessmen to help direct policies and practices, and most importantly, it set 
up its organization to sell surpluses only through established businesses and trade 
networks. In other words, the WAC did not sell direct to the public. Instead, it only sold 
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surpluses through manufacturers, wholesalers, and dealers who then resold to end users. 
Thus, the WAC devised a selling strategy that expressly included a middleman, but 
instead of some reckless speculator who cared little about long-term stability, that 
middleman was established business.  
Although the WAC devised a rational selling strategy, its policies and procedures 
were criticized by the public, journalists, and politicians. By controlling prices and the 
flow of goods through established businesses, the WAC was forcing end users to pay 
more for surplus goods, as the costs of reconditioning, transportation, and commissions 
were built into the final price. In the immediate postwar period Canadians faced severe 
material shortages but expected to use second-hand government property to offset the 
dearth of goods and materials in order to fulfill their postwar plans. Unfortunately, the 
WAC’s policies did not always cooperate, leaving many frustrated. As one vocal critic 
wrote in a scathing review of the WAC’s operations, “for the last year of my two and a 
half years of exploration through the gloomy Wonderland of War Assets, I admit I had no 
real hope of doing business with the Corporation. But I kept trying, partly from a sense of 
frustrated amusement, partly because the more I saw of War Assets, the more bizarre its 
business techniques seemed to be, and the more they seemed to call for enquiry.”5 
The public’s frustration grew most acute whenever reports surfaced about the 
WAC’s destruction programs. Contrary to the public’s assumptions, the WAC operated 
an efficient destruction program that progressively reduced items to components or basic 
materials before permanent elimination. Although it was not a flawless process, at each 
stage the WAC repeatedly tried marketing the items or selling them piecemeal before 
starting a new round of reductions and salesmanship. However, the public only saw 
waste, negligence, and profligacy. The assets being destroyed had cost taxpayers billions 
when they were acquired or manufactured during the war, but now the agency tasked 
with recouping that investment was destroying perfectly useable items at a time of severe 
shortages. To add insult to injury, the surpluses were only available through established 
businesses and sold at the WPTB’s price ceilings. It did not seem to matter to anyone 
outside the WAC that it possessed substantial stocks of things that required destruction, 
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such as war junk that no one wanted or tactical assets without civilian utility. Instead, 
people expected surpluses to be cheap, available in vast quantities, and be exactly what 
they wanted. Of course, this was not always the case. War was incredibly wasteful. 
Although the WAC did its best to sell everything it could, what was not sold had to 
be destroyed to save on storage and labour costs. Unfortunately, this meant that the 
arsenals, so revered by the glories of war and victory, would not survive in peacetime. 
Instead, they became victims of financial and storage constraints, dubious civilian 
applications, political and economic considerations, a lack of commercial interest, 
depreciated values, and 
obsolescence. The scrapheap 
was an inglorious end for the 
implements of war. Perhaps the 
painting by a former navy 
officer, Tony Law, encapsulated 
the public’s mood about the 
depressing fate bestowed upon 
the war’s materiel. The 
nostalgic veneration of 
corvettes, moored together in 
gallant rows stretching far into 
the horizon as if they were 
marching into battle once again, 
sharply contrasts the cold reality of their impending doom. The corvettes were stored at 
Sorel where they awaited scrapping or conversion into other purposes. Ron Marsh, a 
reporter for The Montreal Gazette, felt the same way. In July 1945, Marsh called Sorel “a 
grim place” for “fighting ships.” “Not so long ago,” he wrote, Hollywood “produced an 
exciting moving picture” about these “gallant little” vessels, but now they were “dead 
ships” forgotten and tossed aside.6 Indeed, the dark colours and long shadows reflecting 
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off the water in Law’s painting visualize Marsh’s remarks by communicating a deep 
sadness and frustration at the ships’ unceremonious end.  
Corporate Dividend: Established Businesses and Selling Restrictions  
 When the Second World War ended in May and September 1945 it capped off a 
decade and a half of depression and war. The prevailing economic conditions – first 
rampant unemployment and economic dislocation, followed by wartime restrictions on 
the production of civilian goods – forced most Canadians to put off purchasing new 
homes and durable goods. Although booming wartime production ushered in an era of 
full employment and increased income, from 1941 onwards civilian goods were not 
considered a priority for resources or manufacturing. Instead, Canadians continued 
sacrificing and made do with the materials and household goods left over from the 1930s. 
However, as Graham Broad has shown, Canadians found other ways to spend their new 
earnings (on entertainment and movies, for instance) during the war, while they also 
paradoxically accrued savings that they hoped to expend once the war was over.
7
  
Most Canadians looked forward to the opportunities of peace, a time when they 
could pursue their own postwar plans and increase their living standards. In 1945, 
Canadians had more money to spend and a backlog of needs built up over the previous 
fifteen years of scarcity. This fostered, as Doug Owram described, “a more unabashed 
pride of ownership” amongst the generation that lived through the depression and war.8 
However, as Joy Parr explained, the expectations for immediate relief and gratification 
were thwarted by postwar developments, labour strife, delays in production, economic 
policies, material and housing shortages, and wide-spread unemployment.
9
 As a result, 
frustration and anger brewed in many quarters, particularly among returning veterans and 
labour unions, since the government appeared indifferent and unresponsive to a serious 
crisis threatening everyone’s postwar ambitions. In October 1945, one of the Army’s 
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Rehabilitation Officers recounted the dissatisfaction in a report on a meeting with one of 
Calgary’s local Rehabilitation Committees: 
While the matter of violence is to be strongly deplored, experience shows 
unfortunately that this is about the only method of obtaining quick and 
decisive Government action even in a democratic country. Surely it is too 
much to expect that the men who did not fail in their job are going to stand 
placidly by when they find that the people have failed in their promises of 
employment for all, houses for everyone, in fact a regular Garden of Eden... 
These men are on the whole deep thinkers, they know what can be done under 
emergency; there is an emergency right now. They are used to action and they 
want some kind of definite action right now.
10
 
However, government officials – many of them businessmen-turned-bureaucrats – 
were not aloof or unsympathetic to the situation. In fact, many were keenly aware of the 
dangers caused by the accumulation of consumer spending power mixing with a sudden 
ferocity in demand for new products. Therefore, instead of working to facilitate the 
surging demand and meet the public’s expectations for new goods, policymakers and 
their corporate allies preached caution and restraint.
11
 As inconvenient and infuriating as 
the postwar shortages were, perhaps they were serving a useful purpose in a broader 
sense? After all, something had to be done to protect the public from its own 
enthusiasms, lest that eager demand and increased spending power be wasted on the 
promise of immediate gratification, impulse buying, and short-term prosperity instead of 
long-term growth. In regards to the disposal of government surpluses, this was a 
particularly pressing issue since everyone expected them to be available for purchase at 
cheaper prices and in large quantities. To policymakers it was as if a perfect storm 
brewed on the postwar horizon, where cheaper goods would mix with a ferocious demand 
to usher in some long overdue prosperity but at the expense of sustainable growth. 
This was a potent mix because the disposal of superfluous military and government 
property was a double-edged sword. On one hand, used and second-hand goods were a 
cheaper alternative to new ones and generated considerable interest from consumers, 
businesses, and entrepreneurs. For consumers and the general public, cheaper prices 
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meant saving money while purchasing items that would increase living standards after 
years of shortages. For businesses, cheaper goods and raw materials meant lower 
production costs and potentially higher profits from increased productivity, factory 
expansion, and the resale of assets that had already been paid for during the war. For 
entrepreneurs, cheaper goods and materials meant low-risk start-up costs and the 
potential for cornering a market if one could purchase the entire stock of an item or 
resource. On the surface, the influx of cheaper goods appeared to provide some tangible 
opportunities that, at least over the short term, stood to benefit everyone. 
On the other hand, a glut of cheap goods and resources was not that advantageous 
or profitable. In fact, over the long term, the disposal of government surpluses was more 
of a curse than a gift. For consumers, cheaper goods meant sacrificing quality since used 
items usually have shorter shelf lives. Depending on how worn out they were by wartime 
usage, surplus assets were more liable to break down frequently and increase repair costs 
over time. Although policymakers did not ignore the shelf-life issue, their main concerns 
were focused on the threat that surplus goods posed to employment and corporate profits 
because the liquidation of surpluses had potentially catastrophic deflationary 
consequences. Second-hand goods are usually less expensive than new ones and therefore 
they threaten prices for new goods of similar types. This is particularly the case if the 
costs of production (having already been paid during the war) are not reflected by the 
selling price and if a flood of second-hand goods enters the marketplace all at once. 
Moreover, some industrious customers were liable to buy surpluses from the government 
on a speculative basis, meaning that their purchases were motivated by the opportunity 
for resale at slightly higher prices but still well below market value. Therefore, 
liquidating the vast stocks of government-owned property without any restrictions or 
controls created informal economies that further undercut the prices of new products and 
threatened employment, all while creating illegitimate sources of supply that 
manufacturers might increasing rely upon to cut costs and increase profits. Over time this 
situation would hit the primary and secondary industries especially hard. When 
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speculators stepped into regular supply channels to sell their materials, they did so at 
unsustainably low prices that in no way reflected the costs of extraction or manufacture.
12
 
Experience after the First World War and the subsequent economic turmoil of the 
Great Depression enlightened concerns in the 1940s. This experience strongly indicated 
that the government had to enact a proper disposal strategy so that it would not sponsor 
the creation of an economic bubble that could sabotage the principles of the White Paper 
and the promises for high and stable employment.
13
 A proper disposal strategy was 
embodied in the WAC’s nine cardinal points: 
1. To sell all saleable surpluses at going market prices but within ceilings set 
by the Wartime Prices and Trade Board; 
2. To control the flow of surpluses so as to create the least possible 
disturbance to the normal economy of the nation; 
3. At all times to make every effort to control the price to the user and to 
reach the user by the shortest feasible route; 
4. To keep out of unfair competition with established business; 
5. To see expert advice from industry on price levels and marketing methods 
but not to act on such advice to the expense of public interest; 
6. To distribute sales uniformly across Canada; 
7. To sell abroad in harmony with other governments everything that 
becomes available abroad and that can be sold there; 
8. To keep out the speculator; 
9. To recover for the taxpayers, the original investors in these goods, the 
largest possible cash return.
14
 
Thus, a proper disposal strategy controlled the flow of goods entering markets and 
stabilized prices in line with market values. It sought input from established businesses 
on policies and practices, while also adequately investigating potential clients. Above all, 
the disposal strategy was intended to limit the deflationary conditions that occur when 
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supplies and speculators are plentiful. In doing so, a proper disposal strategy guarded 
against the economic conditions that might undermine future prosperity. 
In regards to disposal, the chief concern was always the meddling speculator. 
Following the First World War, Allied governments paid very little attention to their 
customers and, in the case of the United States which waited six months after November 
1918 to start selling surpluses, delays and ad hoc plans characterized most disposal 
efforts.
15
 As one journalist wrote in the Financial Post in December 1943, after the First 
World War surplus materials were “forced onto markets that were already full of these 
materials” despite vigorous protests from American industry and labour.16 Instead, 
military and government officials chose not to listen. Devoid of much experience in 
business matters or appreciation for the postwar value of surplus assets, these mandarins 
never thought to implement restrictions or controls, nor did they perform any 
“investigations and background checks” on their clientele to see if they were “responsible 
and acceptable buyers.”17 The article continued: 
As a result, many fly-by-night firms sprang up [in the US] for the sole 
purpose of operating in government surplus merchandise. Many of these 
individuals and firms had unsavory business records and were undesirable 
speculators...since many such transactions were surrounded with suspicion, 
legitimate businessmen were reluctant to compete with such irresponsible 
individuals.
18
 
During the Second World War, a consensus emerged among Canadian bureaucrats 
and politicians that blamed the pesky speculator and their fly-by-night companies for 
contributing to, if not causing, the economic collapse in 1929. As they saw it, speculators 
had purchased surpluses from governments dominated by non-business types interested 
in a return to laissez-faire policies and then resold those inventories throughout the 
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1920s. This created a booming supply of materials that fuelled mass production. 
However, the speculator’s “unsavoury” practices lowered prices, which in turn killed 
profits and employment, thereby initiating a deflationary cycle that eventually led to the 
Great Depression. In Parliament, J. R. MacNicol spoke about this prevalent practice:  
I remember clearly what happened after the last war, when the business with 
which I was associated bought many steel boilers which were used in this 
plant...and afterwards sold them at prices below those for which boilers of a 
similar capacity could be purchased from the home manufacturers. That must 
have had an effect on boiler production and naturally on employment in our 
boiler plants.
19
 
Whether or not this causal assumption was an accurate explanation of the Great 
Depression’s origins is less relevant here than what policymakers believed to be true in 
the 1940s. When looking back at 1918-1919 for lessons on how to dispose of surplus war 
assets in 1945-1946, the lens of the 1930s shrouded everything in failure. The mistakes – 
real or imagined – served as lessons for the future and provided justification for making 
changes in the present. Indeed, on the issue of surplus disposal, both sides of the political 
spectrum recognized the dangers, vilified the speculator, and agreed that government had 
to do something, though they disagreed on what that “something” meant.  
In Parliament, concerns about surplus sales and speculators were voiced by the 
Conservative Opposition. In a speech debating the Surplus Crown Assets Act in June 
1944, R. B. Hanson stated: 
Above everything else I warn the minister [Howe]…against sales to 
promoters or speculators. The minister will find the thrifty, the wide-awake 
man who will care more about making money than winning the war, ready to 
purchase these goods, and having in mind the scavengers in this country who 
are always looking for this sort of thing, he will find the man who will be out 
to buy these stocks on a speculative or promotion schemes.
20
 
In private correspondence similar issues were raised by the left-wing social democrats. A 
concerned Tommy Douglas, the newly elected Premier of Saskatchewan and leader of the 
CCF, wrote Mackenzie King on 12 October 1944:  
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I think you can understand that after the experience following the last war 
most people are apprehensive lest these stocks of equipment and supplies for 
which the Canadian people paid, should fall into the hands of speculators who 
would sell them at a handsome profit...I am therefore, writing to you in the 
hope that the whole situation can be clarified because I greatly fear that it 
holds the possibility of dangerous repercussions unless attended to 
immediately. I know that you are very busy, but I would urge that some 
action be taken in this regard lest the situation get out of hand.
21
 
If the interwar experience was to be avoided, preventing sales of government surpluses to 
the pesky speculator became the rallying cry. As Berry told the SCWEE in November 
1945, no doubt with the Great Depression in mind, “as regards to this slowing up [of 
sales], I personally think that if we are to dispose of our domestic surplus to the best 
advantage of the public, we must sell now while the market is starved, so that when 
normal manufacturing gets under way, the sale of surplus will not compete with new 
goods and so with employment.” The merits of this strategy were plainly obvious to 
Berry, who concluded that it “will help to fill the vacuum in the supply situation and so 
assist in preventing a false boom and its subsequent evils.”22  
Avoiding sales to speculators – the WAC’s eighth cardinal point – was a sacrosanct 
policy, but it could not exist on its own. The cardinal points were designed to work 
together to prevent that “false boom and subsequent evils.” In order to limit the influence 
of speculators on the normal economy, controls over the flow of goods and prices had to 
be maintained (cardinal points 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7). Moreover, these controls also had to be 
supported by business interests, so as to ensure that they were practical, helpful, and 
fulfilled their intended purposes. As a result, the WAC immediately seized upon the 
utility of pre-existing trade and distribution networks commonly maintained by 
manufacturers and private companies (cardinal points 4 and 5). Therefore, in order to 
ensure that the national economy was not heavily disrupted by a flood of surpluses or 
meddling speculators, and also to “keep out of unfair competition with established 
businesses” the WAC operated only through established business and trade networks. 23 
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As the WAC’s Second Annual Report clearly stated: “wherever possible, the Corporation 
places itself in the position of the manufacturer of goods which it has to dispose of and 
routes them to the retail purchaser through the channels the manufacturer usually 
employs in his commercial operations.”24 
This policy had a sweeping impact on how the WAC sold its surpluses. Rather than 
turning into a retail chain where the public could purchase government surpluses, the 
WAC never sold directly to end users. Instead, the Corporation grafted it operations into 
the pre-existing channels used by established manufacturers, dealers, and retailers for 
marketing and distribution. This was done usually at the wholesale level, unless the item 
needed reconditioning. Although there were a few exceptions to this rule, mainly in the 
sale of ships or aircraft and when priority claims were exercised on goods that required 
no repair or modifications, the WAC never deviated from this policy. Moreover, using 
only reputable businesses and trade networks was further justified because WAC officials 
considered it the safest and most efficient method for getting surplus assets onto the 
market while shortages existed. Thus, the Corporation’s selling and marketing strategy 
was expressly designed to include a middleman but that middleman had to be an 
established stakeholder in the trade and not some speculator with fleeting interest in long-
term stability.
25
 
Buttressing established businesses by using them as middlemen was a natural 
outgrowth of the Corporation’s mandate. Above all, this policy truncated the speculator’s 
access to surpluses and controlled the flow of goods and prices so that legitimate 
manufacturers and dealers did not have to compete against their own wartime production. 
In fact, using the businesses that had established reputations in the field as a sanctioned 
middleman for disposal operations was an ingenious method for reversing the supply 
chain to create a “removal chain.”26 This quickly eliminated surplus assets from 
government inventories while also redistributing them back to taxpayers through the 
manufacturers that had originally produced them. In effect, the WAC’s disposal strategy 
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“closed the loop” on wartime production and co-opted established businesses into 
forming one of the first modern systems of “reverse logistics,” a term coined later in the 
twentieth century to describe “the process of planning, implementing, and controlling the 
efficient, cost effective flow of raw materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and 
related information from the point of consumption to the point of origin for the purpose 
of recapturing value or proper disposal.”27 Using established businesses as middlemen to 
help reverse the flow of supplies was the safest and most convenient option available. Yet 
it was also a deliberately conservative initiative that was geared towards economic 
stability and corporate profits, not end users. Clearly, in devising this disposal strategy 
officials with the WAC were unwilling to liberalize the sale of surpluses out of fears of 
upending the capitalist system and ushering in another Great Depression.  
Although policymakers felt most comfortable hitching their economic fortunes onto 
established businesses, they were also picky: the middlemen they used needed proven 
track records of survival, reliability, profitability, and patronage. When contemporaries 
used the term “established business” they envisioned major companies – such as Ford, 
GM, and CIL – that had proven their worth on the industrial front during the war and, 
perhaps most importantly, by surviving through the economic wasteland of the 1930s. 
Those big businesses that possessed large research and development branches, staffed 
with engineers, scientists, and marketers were particularly valued. There were many 
precedents that directed officials towards this strategy. For instance, consider the origins 
of Kotex, the first cheap and disposable sanitary pad for menstruation. During the First 
World War the American military and its allies required bandages at alarming rates and 
the paper company Kimberly-Clark won the contract to provide highly absorbent 
bandages made from a new material, cellucotton (a highly absorbent cotton made from 
wood cellulose). However, when the war ended abruptly in 1918, Kimberly-Clark lost its 
major clients but it still possessed a massive inventory of cellucotton.
28
 The company 
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needed to find a market for its materials quickly. Having heard rumours that nurses in 
France had used the bandages as improvised pads for their menstrual needs, Kimberly-
Clark’s scientists and marketers figured this was the outlet they desperately needed.  
Disposable pads were not a new invention. They had been around since the late 
nineteenth century, but the cost of production and materials made the selling price too 
prohibitive for women accustomed to reusing old rags.
29
 However, for Kimberly-Clark, 
the cost of the cellucotton had already been paid out during the war, so its disposable 
sanitary pad could sell cheaply. In 1921, Kotex hit store shelves accompanied by an 
immense advertising campaign that told readers about its origins.
30
 A few years after 
launching Kotex, with its stockpiles of surplus cellucotton still ample and new production 
underway, Kimberly-Clark targeted the reusable handkerchief. In 1924 it débuted a new 
“disposable kerchiefs” called Kleenex.31 Thus, two products that are so commonplace in 
today’s society owe their origins to material demobilization following the First World 
War. More specifically, though, they owed their existence to the marketing, research, and 
development branches of a large and successful business. The development of new 
products made from surplus materials had secured new markets for Kimberly-Clark, 
allowing it to thrive throughout the Depression. It was this type of entrepreneurial spirit 
that policymakers wanted to nurture and sustain with their disposal operations. 
The use of established trade networks provided many other advantages, both to the 
WAC and business interests. In getting the first chance to purchase back their products 
(or even a competitor’s if they outbid them), manufacturers were given an opportunity to 
control the quality of their goods that eventually re-entered the marketplace. This was 
important since it helped maintain brand-name recognition and reputations with 
customers, while it also ensured that assets built to military specifications would be 
properly reformed to meet civilian laws and safety standards. Moreover, established 
businesses were also better set up to handle any post-sale customer services as they 
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operated repair facilities, offered warranties, and possessed a dependable supply of spare 
parts. Relying on these pre-existing services saved the Corporation from provisioning 
them. This was important given that the WAC manufactured nothing it sold, so its 
inventories were constantly depleting over time. Despite the plethora of items it 
possessed after the war, once the Corporation sold an entire category of goods there 
would be no replacements forthcoming, so it was best to make customers use regular 
channels, lest one day the source of spare parts dried up.
32
 
In funnelling surpluses back through established trade networks rather than making 
direct sales to end users, the WAC refrained from competing with manufacturers and 
dealers across the 200,000-plus merchandising fields that made up its inventory. 
Moreover, this policy also kept the WAC out of competing with established retail 
businesses, which saved a tremendous amount on operational costs. If the Corporation 
opened up its inventories to the public and allowed direct sales, then it had to open retail 
outlets in every city and build up an extensive logistical infrastructure to ensure a fair 
distribution. As Berry explained to the Veterans Affairs Committee on 29 March 1946:  
Creating a chain of stores would be a further expense and require further 
planning outside the scope of what [the WAC has] done already… In order to 
do this [the Corporation] would have to hire 100,000 more employees – not to 
mention that stores selling surplus would undermine other stores selling new 
goods. This would also take jobs away from the retail sector in the short 
term…Retail stores under the WAC would require buildings, this would mean 
taking them from other stores and businesses – given the shortages of space, 
this was not ideal. It would also be a temporary situation, so it was better to 
give the space to some business that would be permanent.
33
 
Selling directly to end users required the WAC to create its own network of government-
operated retail stores across the country, pay more rental charges and worker salaries, and 
then once surpluses were completely liquidated, tear down the whole enterprise and 
relinquish any lasting responsibility for customer service. Such efforts seemed more futile 
than the expediency of supporting established businesses and getting goods to the market 
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as quickly as possible. After all, why double up on the pre-existing trade and distribution 
networks? Or risk upending the flow of normal economic activity in order to solve a 
temporary crisis? What was the point of competing with companies that “will continue 
long after the WAC disposal job is complete” if that lowered prices, profits, and 
employment?
34
 Clearly, the WAC’s Directors erred on the side of caution and 
consciously colluded with business interests. 
Another means of controlling the flow of goods into the marketplace was by 
controlling prices. To do this meant eliminating all discounts to the end user and only 
selling assets at or close to the going market rates. The WAC’s mandate contained 
provisions that required it to abide by the WPTB’s price ceilings. Since second-hand 
items were sold to end users at the highest levels possible, prices for new goods were 
largely stabilized or trended upwards – rather than downwards – because of shortages. 
This greatly limited any large-scale disruption to the national economy because it helped 
control deflationary pressures, while also preventing speculators from pervasively 
exploiting any wild fluctuation in prices (if or when they appeared). Prices were 
determined through consultations with the WPTB and established businesses and by 
calculating the asset’s depreciated value. Meetings with established businesses were 
extremely important because they informed the WAC about all the added costs that 
accumulated on every sale. Since surpluses were sold back through established trade and 
distribution networks, the additional costs for repairing, refurbishing, and shipping items 
had to be factored into the final price tag, while a modest sales commission for the 
manufacturer and dealer was also added.
35
  
Because of price ceilings the WAC had to calculate its selling price to established 
businesses in light of these additional costs. It did this by calculating the asset’s 
depreciated value in terms of its age, wartime usage, and market value (based on a 
selected median year). The price was then adjusted to the WPTB’s ceilings and divided 
up so manufacturers and dealers could cover all their costs. In the end, the final purchase 
price paid by customers was a non-negotiable price-point that was fixed by the WAC’s 
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Merchandising Department. The end user was never supposed to get a discount. Instead, 
established businesses and corporate interests received the discounted price – or what 
might be better explained as a dealer price or factory invoice determined by the 
depreciation calculations – from the WAC. This was then added to the commission and 
the costs of refurbishing, repairing, and shipping the asset.
36
 
Unsurprisingly, the pricing of surplus assets and the lack of discounts for end users 
was a very contentious issue. This tension about pricing stemmed from an ongoing 
wartime debate over government largesse, wartime expansion, and the DMS’s massive 
budget. The billions of dollars that had funded the production programs was in actuality 
the public’s money raised through taxes, loans, and victory bonds. Therefore, recouping 
as much of the original cost was essential, not only for political optics, but also in light of 
the rising national debt and criticism from the Opposition in Parliament about 
overproduction, excess, and wastage.
37
 Insiders in the DMS and DRS understood that 
such enlarged expansion and investment had been the unavoidable cost of total war, but 
tabulating where every dollar was spent in order to establish a price-point for surpluses 
was nearly impossible and quite impractical for the WAC’s purposes.38 Simply put, 
calculating the original cost was not going to be easy or have much bearing on postwar 
appraisals and prices.  
During the war emergency of 1940-1941, the financial costs of the war became 
irrelevant as far as Howe was concerned. As he boldly told his staff in June 1940 while 
instructing them to take whatever steps were necessary to increase production, “we have 
no idea of the cost but before this war is over everything will be needed so let’s go ahead 
anyway. If we lose the war nothing will matter...if we win the war the cost will still have 
been of no consequence and will have been forgotten.”39 At the time, the production of 
war materials mattered more than keeping detailed and centralized production records 
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and receipts.
40
 Furthermore, as A. F. W. Plumptre explained, the DMS was “largely 
staffed by persons unfamiliar with government regulations and government routine, most 
of them business men and engineers” and as a result “there was a good deal of 
misdirected effort.” 41 Overworked and compartmentalized, few people knew the whole 
picture of where all the money was spent. Recouping the original cost of each article 
would be difficult to calculate because the starting figures were unavailable or required 
extensive research to tabulate or because the “dollar-a-year-men” who did know had 
already left government service. 
Moreover, the mandarins in the DMS and DRS were also well aware that the 
original cost was drastically inflated. From its inception the DMS opted to use a form of 
contract known as “cost-plus” over other contracting methods. The logic was simple 
given Canada’s limited manufacturing capacity at the outbreak of hostilities: in order to 
incentivize war production for private businesses, the DMS agreed to pay for or 
guarantee bank loans to cover the cost of production plus a profit that came in the form of 
a fixed fee, an award per item produced, or (more popularly) a percentage of the total.
42
 
However, the cost-plus system was open to abuse as contractors were liable to 
dramatically inflate their start-up and production costs to turn a larger profit and double 
up on other conversion incentives. In 1941, officials in the DMS came under fire when an 
investigative report by the SCWEE concluded that cost-plus contracts were the worst and 
most expensive form of contract. Despite this fact the DMS continued to use them as 
Howe and his advisors saw little alternative but to sacrifice cost efficiency for the rapid 
expansion required for increased production.
43
 Furthermore, in addition to the 
construction and other capital costs associated with industrial expansion, the scarcity of 
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sophisticated production equipment and the purchase and importation of machine tools 
from the US substantially increased production costs beyond normal market values.
44
  
The postwar market rates for assets acquired between 1940 and 1945 were 
therefore drastically smaller than what was paid out during the war years. As a result, the 
government could never expect to recoup the entirety of the original investment, 
especially since these items naturally depreciated over time. In fact, it would only get 
back a tiny fraction of the original price, though critics constantly assumed the 
government could do better. However, these critical opinions often failed to differentiate 
the total wartime expenditure by sub-dividing the costs recoverable in selling surpluses 
from the sunk costs that had funded the expansion of industrial production early in the 
war.
45
 Of course, the optics looked terrible, especially when aircraft or ships that had cost 
millions to procure were sold for a fraction of the original investment. But there was little 
that could be done. According to an unpublished history, the WAC’s gross sales total 
from 12 July 1944 to 31 March 1948 amounted to $427,246,250.81 while a minimum of 
$23,776,582.60 was recovered from sales in 1948-1949.
46
 These numbers represented 
only a portion of the billions spent during the war, but the WAC considered this a solid 
return for depreciating assets. 
Dividend Denied  
The WAC’s selling strategy was criticized by a disgruntled public that expected to 
purchase goods at dealer prices. The public did not appreciate having to pay for an item 
twice – first for its manufacture during the war and then at price ceilings after the war – 
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all so that businesses could turn a profit. Yet the WAC’s selling strategy was precisely 
designed to avoid the uncontrolled erosion of prices and limit the public’s ability to buy 
direct. In fact, because the system was set up in opposition to the public’s expectations, 
the frustration was actually a sign that the WAC was doing its job. However, with 
corporations winning out, average consumers lost out and several groups contested this 
disadvantaged position. Their efforts brought some relief, but the WAC refused to 
overhaul the basic premise of its operations and preside over a fire-sale of crown assets. 
Veterans pressured the government hardest as their associations mobilized quickly 
to combat the WAC’s corporate favouritism. In the spring of 1945, the Second World 
War Veterans organization wrote a resolution that the United Council of Veterans 
approved and sent to several ministers including Howe. The resolution demanded 
preferential treatment in buying surpluses, stating: “we urge that surplus war materials be 
sold at a preferential price to returned ex-service personnel by Crown Assets Corporation 
or by wholesalers on a cost-plus fee so that veterans could use such supplies to re-
establish themselves.”47 These types of resolutions were common and a sign of things to 
come, especially as more veterans returned home and encountered obstacles prohibiting 
them from acquiring surplus things. In many cases, the items veterans wanted most were 
the ones they had been using just days before their discharge. It seemed outrageous that 
they could not buy them for their own re-establishment. 
Throughout 1945 many veterans voiced their displeasure with the situation and the 
Royal Canadian Legion started accumulating evidence. Since many veterans were 
interested in acquiring trucks, their complaints tended to focus on the inability to buy 
vehicles direct from the WAC and the sales commissions attached to the final price at car 
dealerships. As one frustrated veteran told Captain E. M. Greaves, a Senior Army 
Councillor stationed in Ottawa, “I understand these dealers get these cars for $125 and 
sell at a ceiling of $375. Why can’t we buy direct? Surely after 5 years’ service I don’t 
have to pay a dealer $250 for the privilege of buying a $375 truck.”48 In Calgary where 
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shortages of building materials, employment, and accommodation were especially acute 
and disproportionately affecting veterans, the Army’s Rehabilitation Officer, Major E. A. 
W. Miles, remarked that “feelings [were] beginning to run high” since “every troop train 
adds more to the crowd, and it would take very little to start considerable 
unpleasantness.”49 In the same report, Miles also summarized the general mood and 
hostility brewing in Calgary. People believed that the government and big business were 
colluding for profits, while willfully ignoring the scarcity of goods, accommodation 
shortages, and rising unemployment levels:  
Too soon it appears to have been forgotten that had it not been for the service 
men there would have been no Canada, too often have these same servicemen 
been told that ‘nothing is too good for them’, and now we find that very little 
is being done that is ‘too good for them’ and actually it appears that most 
consideration is given to manufacturers and dealers.
50
 
During late 1945, the Legion made several attempts at pressuring the WAC into 
providing veterans with favourable pricing and priority access to surplus goods. In 
August and September several meetings between representatives of the Legion, WPTB, 
DND, Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), and the WAC were convened to discuss 
the issues and establish possible arrangements for a “veterans’ priority.” At meetings on 6 
and 11 September, a potential set of arrangements were drawn up that included, among 
other things, the creation of a list of items veterans needed most and the requirement that 
the WAC keep those items on hand for thirty days so veterans could submit a claim, 
inspect the goods, and then make a purchase at dealer prices (or so the Legion could buy 
them on behalf of veterans). Summing up the meeting and the recommendations, J. W. 
Johnson, a Veterans Welfare Office with the DVA stated, “I think the draft is excellent. 
The suggestions we have put forward there in, I think are practical and if accepted should 
go a long way towards solving a vexatious problem.”51  
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Unfortunately, the key words in that sentence were “if accepted” and not “vexatious 
problem.” On 6 December A. E. McMaster, the WAC’s General Manager, wrote to 
Johnson with some bad news. Upon conferring with Berry and his staff, the WAC could 
not accept a veterans’ priority because it was “administratively impossible” to 
implement.
52
 While sympathetic to veterans’ issues, the WAC was having such a difficult 
time with the priorities scheme they were considering abolishing them completely right 
as the Legion was asking for an additional one.
53
 Other reasons for the refusal had to do 
with holding the inventory for thirty days as this would slow sales and further stall an 
already overburdened system. Additionally, the WAC could not guarantee a steady 
stream of spare parts or customer services, so it was best to sell everything through 
established dealers who could offer those things. Perhaps the most important reason why 
the veteran priority was rejected was not even mentioned in McMaster’s letter. Instead, it 
was hand-written in the margins by Berry on Johnson’s original memo: “this envisages 
‘blind buying’ of course, which was what we are trying to avoid. Suppose the vet is 
dissatisfied with the article when he sees it at the dealers? I fear I have no solution.”54 In 
other words, holding items on the speculation that veterans would want them not only 
delayed final disposal, but turned the veteran into an authorized speculator.  
Thus, veterans were shut out of receiving any privileged access to the surplus assets 
that many had used and gained great experience with during the war years. Instead, they 
had to purchase them, like every other customer, through established businesses and at 
the highest prices allowed under the WPTB’s ceilings. For veterans, hoping to acquire 
items for their rehabilitation during a period of severe material shortages, this often meant 
expending their entire gratuity payments or re-establishment credits on second-hand 
materials that were sometimes inferior in quality or worn out. Moreover, an eager veteran 
desperate to re-establish himself with home furnishings or tools was often susceptible to 
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being victimized by fraudsters promising those things for cash but never delivering.
55
 
Ultimately, by refusing to grant a veterans priority, the WAC placed veterans in direct 
competition with civilians. This situation favoured the civilian who had earned higher 
wages in Canada’s bustling wartime economy and had more savings to spend. Although 
the situation was less than ideal, the WAC saw no advantages to altering its practices 
though it did try pressuring dealers with patriotic and compassionate appeals.
56
 
Despite their efforts, veterans could not unhinge the corporate favouritism. The 
overriding concerns of WAC officials and businessmen were too entwined, as fears of 
recreating another postwar depression clouded policymaking. Businessmen had the inside 
track and the WAC depended on them regularly. For practically every major type of 
commodity or industrial sector the WAC hired experts or associations closely affiliated 
with the trade to act as agents for the Corporation. In regards to aircraft the WAC at first 
relied on the Toronto-based engineering firm Armstrong, Wood, and Company but it later 
settled on Federal Aircraft Limited, a crown company that helped the WAC on aircraft 
sales and destruction policies.
57
 In September 1944 an agreement was struck with H. 
Muehlstein & Company of Canada Limited (a subsidiary of the American conglomerate 
H. Muehlstein Inc.) which made it the primary consultant and distributor for rubber 
surpluses in Canada.
58
 The Canadian Electrical Manufacturers Association served as an 
advisor for the disposal of electrical items and E. J. Longfellow was hired specifically as 
a consultant.
59
 For ships and naval vessels, the WAC turned to David Reid, Chairman of 
John Kilgour & Company, who acted as a broker for the sale of ships in the UK. 
However, in January 1946, the WAC hired Park Steamship Company, the crown 
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company that had managed Canada’s merchant marine during the war, to broker sales for 
merchant and cargo vessels.
60
  
Hiring agents was an effective strategy for the WAC since its large and diverse 
inventory meant it had to engage in multiple merchandising fields simultaneously. Rather 
than building new relationships with so many different businesses at once, it was easier 
and more direct to hire someone that was already well-known and respected in the trade. 
Thus, employing an “insider” to represent the WAC was the simplest and most direct 
method for navigating the marketplace. Moreover, the WAC’s agents also took on some 
other important tasks; they advised on disposal policies and procedures, informed their 
networks of impending liquidations, facilitated introductions with potential clients, and 
coordinated extensively with the industrial committees established by the WICB’s 
Resource Controllers during the war.
61
  
There is little doubt that agents helped the WAC, but they also profited 
handsomely. Employing agents created an inner circle of clients who gained a significant 
competitive advantage over “outsider” companies and the general public. After all, agents 
were businessmen first and since profits mattered most, they used their positions 
accordingly. The competitive advantage gained by agents can be demonstrated through 
an analysis of those involved in the WAC’s destruction programs. In February 1944, the 
WAC’s Board of Directors hired the President of the Canadian Secondary Materials 
Association, Mr. Egmont Frankel, as its agent for scrap materials. Later in October an 
agreement was reached with Atlas Steel Ltd. which acted as the WAC’s agent for steel 
and metals disposal (or everything metallic but not labelled as scrap).
62
 In the following 
years, both Atlas Steel and Frankel’s company, Frankel Brothers Ltd., benefitted 
substantially from their transactions and association with the WAC because their 
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companies gained the inside track on policy formulation and reconnaissance on available 
inventories. 
A clear pattern of corporate patronage emerges when all types of metal sales from 
1944-1949 were plotted on Google Fusion tables. Although some large sales were made 
to Anaconda American Brass Company, West Coast Shipbuilders Ltd., and Hayes Steel 
Products Ltd., it was Atlas Steel that topped the network analysis charts in terms of 
purchasing frequency, dollars spent, and total weight acquired. Although not every sale in 
the WAC’s annual reports provided total weight, Atlas Steel surely made the single 
heaviest purchase when it bought 1,708,745 net tons (or about 3,417,490,000 lbs.) of 
shell steel billets from the WAC for the sum of $34,174.
63
 Although certainly not on par 
with Atlas Steel, Frankel Brothers also made a variety of purchases from the WAC. From 
1944 to 1949, it bought well over two million pounds of scrap metals (mainly brass, 
nickel, and steel), in addition to 126,887 lbs. of copper wiring, $10,068 worth of Army 
vehicle parts, thirteen naval vessels (five destroyers and eight corvettes) for $119,000, 
and many other items listed as scrap.
64
 Clearly, as agents of the WAC, Atlas Steel and 
Frankel Brothers benefitted from insider information about available inventories. 
Agents also may have received some preferential treatment when bidding on 
merchandise and real estate. In one instance, J. W. Horsey’s company, Dominion Stores 
Ltd., got into a bidding war with Addison Ltd. for the York Arsenals building in Toronto. 
From late 1945 through to early 1946 when the sale was finalized, the two companies bid 
for the prized property. Originally, Addison offered $400,000 but quickly matched the 
$475,000 counterbid from Dominion Stores. With both offers equal, the matter was 
passed on to the Industrial Reconversion Branch (IRB) which determined that the sale to 
Addison (a radio manufacturer) was the best choice since the Branch’s experts believed it 
would generate more employment. However, before the WAC could act, Dominion 
Stores submitted a $600,000 bid and the Corporation jumped at the offer. Although 
Addison eventually settled on its second choice and purchased floor space at the John 
Inglis plant extensions, it would appear that officials in the WAC favoured Horsey’s 
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company by rejecting the IRB’s recommendations and completing the sale without giving 
Addison much time to counterbid.
65
 
However, despite enjoying a privileged position within the WAC’s disposal 
strategy, agents and established businesses had some of their peace dividend denied as 
well. Certainly businessmen gained competitive advantages, but their advice and opinions 
were never binding. The fifth cardinal point mandated the WAC “to seek expert advice 
from industry on price levels and marketing methods but not to act on such advice to the 
expense of public interest.”66 This meant that the WAC reserved the right to refuse or 
modify whatever information, opinions, or proposals it received from the business sector. 
In effect, the WAC collaborated with business interests to create a disposal system that 
benefited mutual economic imperatives. Yet the WAC also departed from the advice or 
needs of businesses whenever they did not suit the political or social imperatives 
structured into the WAC’s full mandate or the priorities system that allowed direct sales 
to governments and public bodies before anything was sold to private interests.  
One issue on which the WAC departed from the advice it received from business 
interests was on the destruction of surpluses. Businesses were deathly afraid of their own 
wartime productivity – particularly of assets easily reusable in the peacetime economy – 
and openly advocated for complete destruction of surplus stocks. For instance, the Allied 
Drug Council, an association representing the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, 
medicines, and medical supplies, echoed a common refrain when they pressured the 
government to destroy all surpluses instead of redistributing or reusing them. While V. E. 
Hessell, the Chairman of the Drug Council, acknowledged the wastefulness of such a 
policy and the desperate need overseas, he explained in a letter to Ilsley, that “from a 
purely selfish point of view, it would be best to destroy absolutely all surplus goods, as 
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their appearance on the market is certain to lessen the demand for new manufactured 
goods and consequently decrease employment.”67  
The pressure that business interests brought to bear on the government worked on 
some occasions, but the destruction of perfectly useable assets was not something that 
interested the WAC. For the Corporation destroying surplus assets because they 
threatened to flood markets and destroy prices was not sufficient grounds for initiating a 
destruction program to eliminate the asset’s residual value, particularly given the postwar 
shortages in supply. Instead, the destruction of a surplus asset was only considered as a 
last resort or if no civilian uses were discovered. In other words, while businesses feared 
the asset’s residual value and wanted it terminated to further stimulate demand for new 
goods, the WAC considered it a quality worth preserving in some capacity. Moreover, 
because its mission was to recoup as much money as possible, funding the costs of 
destruction was not always advisable. While the WAC would do what it could to sustain 
the normal economy and limit the disruptive influence of surpluses, it would not offer 
business interests a blanket destruction policy or special treatment beyond using 
established trade and distribution networks. All surplus assets that maintained residual 
value in civilian life would be sold as quickly as possible so the WAC would recoup 
more money while liquidating surpluses during a time of severe shortages. As Peterson 
explained to the SCWEE, “now is the time, not only to get the best return for surpluses, 
but also to relieve consumer needs. Every effort is being bent to accomplish this purpose. 
No industry is receiving protection through the holding or export of surpluses, or the 
suppression of offerings.”68 
Munitions and Public Safety 
There was one consideration that trumped selling an asset: public safety. Despite an 
eager marketplace, if an item was designed purely to military specifications or possessed 
no civilian applications or remained a danger to life, it was never offered for sale 
domestically. If no international client could be found, than the WAC had no choice but 
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to fund destruction. However, it is important to note the complexity in determining the 
level of danger posed by an asset. At first glance blanket policies for destroying and 
restricting the sale of dangerous materials are a very logical and vigilant course of action. 
Hypothetically, if the government allowed a veteran to return home from Northwest 
Europe and purchase a tank to drive on city streets, the rule of law and public safety 
would be severely threatened. The unrestricted sale of tanks would not only upend the 
basic tenets of all traffic laws (who stops at traffic signals when driving a tank?) but it 
would also create a precedent for the availability of armoured vehicles to all segments of 
the population that would be difficult to rescind, to say little about the lasting financial 
burdens on customers (for tank maintenance) and municipalities (for road repair). 
Clearly, establishing procedures that prevented the sale of “war-like material” that have 
“no known peace-time uses” and destroying whatever remained a “danger to life” was a 
prudent and reasonable course of action.
69
 Yet as the WAC discovered, blanket policies 
designed to protect public safety were not always practical. Although they looked good 
on paper, they created inflexible approaches to disposal that could hinder possible sales. 
When an item was labelled dangerous by the CAAC or armed forces it fell to the 
WAC to determine exactly what that meant and devise a strategy for selling or destroying 
that category of item. As a result, in May 1944, when the issue of war-like materials was 
first addressed by the CAAC, the WAC’s Board of Directors resolved to retain as much 
technical expertise as necessary in order to “discover sound economic uses” for a variety 
of military-patterned aircraft, vehicles, and even some types of ammunition, explosives, 
and weaponry.
70
 The WAC’s Directors further resolved that war-like materials would 
only be destroyed if no suitable peacetime applications were ever discovered. This was 
one of the most important sets of policies ever developed by Canada’s disposal 
administration since they were aimed at defining the practicality of military-patterned 
objects in a non-military marketplace. The key dividing line between selling and 
destroying assets was in determining their value to civilians. If the asset could not be 
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easily converted to peaceful purposes or remained a danger to life, it was destroyed by 
Clearance teams or contractors hired by the WAC or the armed forces in consultation 
with the WAC. If some residual commercial value was found or if some potential market 
existed (domestic or international) then the objects were not immediately consigned to 
scrap heaps or thrown in the ocean.  
However, simply identifying something as dangerous was not a straightforward 
delineation between civilian and military practicality. In fact, the WAC discovered that 
the line dividing civilian from military applications was so exceedingly thin that it was 
difficult to justify the expense of complete destruction. Some lethal objects maintained 
residual value to civilians without any adaptations or disassembly. Obviously, there were 
many weapon systems that were never sold because they lacked any real civilian 
applications that no amount of modifications could change. However, for every tank, 
tactical aircraft, grenade, machine gun, or artillery piece there were other types of 
weapons systems that retained some value and utility in peacetime. These latter types of 
munitions straddled the line between civilian and military practicality so closely because 
they were easily convertible for use in either context. In many instances, the armed forces 
recognized the cross-over potential and, despite their exemptions for destroying surplus 
ammunition and explosives, they declared lethal assets surplus to the CAAC and WAC 
for disposal to civilian markets. For example, TNT and other types of explosives were 
integral to the mining industry and infrastructure development, such as in highway and 
railroad construction. Moreover, the logging industry had interest in acquiring Bren gun 
carriers to pull logs in remote woodlands, while police forces were interested in machine 
guns and tear gas.
71
 Some other niche markets included rifle clubs, educational 
institutions, and flying schools. Of course, the supply far exceeded the demand, but these 
customers provided the WAC with legitimate outlets for selling weaponry, ammunition, 
and explosives so it could not ignore them for the sake of blanket destruction policies. 
The policies and procedures involving the disposal of firearms exemplify how the 
WAC navigated this thin line separating civilian and military practicality. To any 
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reasonable person firearms are considered dangerous, so if public safety is paramount 
then firearms should never be sold. However, since certain types of firearms maintain 
residual value in peacetime, blanket sales restriction and destruction policies were not 
always useful. For instance, in the hands of police forces or allied governments firearms 
are an asset that can further the state’s interests, authority, and monopoly on violence. 
Depending on the customer, selling arms might be worthwhile or even protect the 
public’s safety. Furthermore, if a potential customer was a legitimate business or 
association operating in Canada and specializing in hunting, sporting, youth education, or 
something similar, then it made sense to sell certain types of weapons (like shot guns or 
sporting rifles) to these reputable organizations. In these cases, restricting sales was not 
ideal because the WAC and the Services would have to underwrite the expense of storing 
and destroying the items, while forgoing any profits and the benefits of provisioning 
material support to the civilian organizations involved.
72
  
As a result, the WAC developed some flexible policies that allowed sales of lethal 
assets on a case-by-case basis and policy bulletins about selling restrictions on firearms 
were continuously redrafted between 1945 and 1947.
73
 In implementing these selling 
restrictions, the WAC depended heavily on the RCMP for guidance, both in terms of 
policy formation and also for conducting background checks on potential customers. 
Throughout the immediate postwar period, WAC officials consulted frequently with the 
RCMP and, depending on the assets involved, with other government agencies, such as 
the Department of Transport when disposing of aircraft or the Department of External 
Affairs when selling something internationally.
74
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The incumbent issues involving firearms were so important that both Malley and 
Berry corresponded directly with the long-time RCMP Commissioner, S. T. Wood. Their 
correspondence in the late summer and early fall of 1947 reveals how dependent the 
WAC was on the RCMP for guidance. In August 1947, Malley wrote Wood because he 
saw an opportunity to unload the Corporation’s stock of surplus service rifles (mostly, 
though not exclusively, the Lee Enfield Rifle No. 4 Mk. 1) because the American War 
Assets Administration (WAA) was about to liquidate American service rifles. He 
believed that since American weapons would “find their way into Canada to Sporting 
Goods or Hardware Dealers,” it made sense to sell surplus Canadian rifles.75 Malley’s 
primary concerns at the time were liquidating inventories, closing warehouses, and 
slashing payroll, so he was desperate to unload the stocks of weaponry piled up at WAC 
warehouses. On 13 September, Wood replied to Malley with an attached “Consolidated 
Departmental Regulations Governing the Importation of Firearms and Dangerous and 
Offensive Weapons” issued by the Department of National Revenue on 6 June 1946. He 
informed Malley that firearms could only be imported under permits issued by National 
Revenue and it was doubtful that any sporting or hardware store would receive approval 
because it was not issuing “such permits and all requests therefor are presently being 
refused.”76 There was no need to modify any procedures because of American actions. 
On 27 September, Wood further clarified his reluctance for liberalizing sales of 
firearms and lifting restrictions. Above all, he was preoccupied by the fallout from Igor 
Gouzenko’s revelations about a Soviet spy-ring in Canada, the Red Scare, and the fears 
of escalating gun violence. Although Wood acknowledged the “excellent background” 
and “religious, educational or semi-military nature” of clientele referred to the RCMP for 
investigation, he was concerned with other clubs and associations that “do not enjoy the 
same reputation and which might well be interested in securing a stock of weapons for 
improper purposes.”77 Wood then vaguely indicated that some of the organizations were 
declared illegal during the war and “a few tend to be of a semi-military character and 
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even favour the wearing of a type of uniform.”78 The Commissioner was concerned about 
creating a precedent that might cause “a real problem for refusing similar demands from 
other organizations which are not, at the present time, illegal but which are certainly not 
dependable from a standpoint of loyalty to this country.”79 Wood saw no undue hardship 
on the general public if weapons were not sold as he could not “visualize any actual need 
for arming organizations which do not have the sanction and support of the Department 
of National Defence.”80 A few days later Berry assured the Commissioner that “this 
Corporation is in entire agreement with the policy which you suggest.”81 He also told 
Wood that the WAC would continue following existing policies so that the organizations 
that Wood described as “questionable or disloyal” in character would not gain access to 
surplus firearms through the WAC. 
Since Malley’s attempt at liberalizing selling restrictions for service rifles failed 
and no legitimate international clients were found, the WAC had no other choice except 
to underwrite the cost of destruction. Whenever firearms were destroyed detailed 
procedures were employed to ensure that the weapons were confined to specific 
localities, sufficiently mutilated, and that the destruction process actually took place (so 
no weapons mysteriously vanished). Surplus weapons in the hands of the WAC were all 
destroyed in a similar fashion as the stock of 8,000 machine guns “of various types in 
storage at Lauzon and St. Johns, Quebec” that Malley mentioned in his 30 August letter 
to Wood.
82
 When Malley informed the RCMP Commissioner that the WAC still 
possessed 8,000 machine guns, he asked if any police forces in Canada might want them. 
Wood told Malley that he thought the Thompson sub-machine gun would be the only one 
valuable to police forces, but that he saw no other potential clientele for which these 
automatic weapons “might be disposed of legally.”83 Although Malley understood that 
they could not be sold to the public under any circumstances, he needed to confirm that 
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the WAC had no alternative except to “scrap these machine guns after they have been 
sufficiently mutilated”84 
All small arms declared surplus were mutilated under the supervision of a WAC 
representative. If the armaments were located on a military base or port, service 
personnel performed the job under the supervision of the WAC’s representative and an 
officer or senior NCO who certified that mutilation took place. At WAC warehouses or 
other locations, the WAC contracted out the job through “arrangements” with a local 
“mechanic with portable acetylene cutter.”85 In these circumstances the destruction 
process included a constable from the local RCMP Detachment who signed off on the 
Certificate of Mutilation. 
All mutilation was done 
with an acetylene torch. 
Usually one diagonal cut 
near the magazine and 
across the breech block, 
firing pin, and piston post 
was enough to mutilate 
most small arms. 
However, in some cases 
additional cuts were 
necessary as seen in Photo 
9 where a second cut 
across the barrel at the gas port was necessary to completely wreck the venerable Bren 
gun. Any components or spare parts were cut with the acetylene torch “in the most simple 
and effective manner.”86 Once the cutting took place and the Certificate of Mutilation 
was filled out and mailed to the WAC’s offices in Montreal, the small arms were usually 
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Photo 9 Photo of a mutilated Bren gun, circa 1949. Source: LAC, 
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sold as scrap to a local junk dealer who salvaged the metals after using a hydraulic press 
to flatten the weapons. 
Firearms were just one type of weaponry that the WAC dealt with, and even though 
they closely straddled the line between civilian and military practicality, they may have 
been one of the more clear-cut and easier delineations to manage. In effect, the line 
dividing civilian and military applications got even murkier once larger weapon systems 
were scrapped or broken down to basic materials. For example, if a bomber or fighter 
(such as a Lancaster or Hurricane) was considered as a single object designed to military 
specifications, few civilian uses were readily apparent and, in line with established 
policies, these valiant fighting machines were scrapped. However, aircraft are really the 
sum of several thousand component parts, some of which retain commercial value 
individually but not collectively. Depending on the creativity of customers or the WAC’s 
technical advisers and staff, many other potential improvisations or applications were 
possible. Aside from providing spare parts for maintenance purposes, airplane parts could 
double for many things. In one case, the WAC’s Consumer Goods Division found that 
the “tough yet pliable” Plexiglas used for windows in cockpits and gun turrets could be 
transformed into costume jewelry when diced and dyed different colours.
87
 In another 
case, the WAC was alerted to one manufacturer’s discovery of the usefulness of surplus 
airplane wheels and so the WAC sold the smaller tail wheels as replacements for 
wheelbarrow wheels and the larger ones were marketed as something to improve the 
mobility of trailers and machinery on farms or in factories.
88
 Thus, depending on one’s 
creativity and imagination, when weapon systems were taken apart and broken down, 
their components could be recycled into other productive civilian purposes.  
Therefore, destruction was really a process of reduction that facilitated renewal, 
reuse, recycling, and upcycling. A good disposal strategy had to accommodate and 
nurture this process of material rehabilitation in light of the risks to public safety and 
apprehensive businessmen. As a result, officials realized that they had to carefully 
scrutinize and test every type of item and its components before, during, and after the 
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asset entered their custody. The purpose was always to discover “sound economic uses” 
for the tactical equipment built to military specifications.
89
 To illustrate this process 
consider the Jeep and other motor transports, such at the 3-ton and 15-cwt Canadian 
Military Pattern trucks. Throughout the war, the four-wheel drive ¼-ton truck, commonly 
known as the Jeep, became an iconic symbol of the Allied war effort. As Howe remarked 
in his radio speech in October 1944, the Jeep “has fired public imagination” and that 
“everybody seems to want one.”90 Although the public was eager to buy jeeps, the reality 
was that few were available. Quoting a WAC press release about the Jeep’s limited 
availability, the Globe and Mail reported that the number “will fall far short of the 
popular demand, judging by the thousands of inquiries that have poured in ever since 
War Assets Corporation started operations.”91   
Curiously, the public’s enthusiasm for the Jeep remained strong despite warnings 
about the vehicle’s dubious suitability for “day to day civilian use.”92 Although the Jeep 
enjoyed incredible versatility on the frontlines as an all-purpose transport vehicle, its 
postwar utility was questionable. In an article on the Jeep’s postwar rehabilitation, 
Andrew Iarrocci explained that as early as August 1943 C. J. Mackenzie, the acting-
President of the National Research Council, sought advice about the Jeep’s postwar 
utility to farmers. He contacted a professor at the University of Saskatchewan who was 
involved in some extensive testing on the Jeep with the engineering department at 
Massey-Harris Company in Toronto. The results of the tests, which found their way to 
the members of the CAAC’s Sub-Committee on Automotive Equipment in mid-1944, 
revealed that an unmodified Jeep built to military specifications would not enjoy a 
productive civilian life. Among the Jeep’s chief failings was its lack of fuel efficiency, 
tendency to roll over, insufficient loading capacity compared to larger farm trucks, and a 
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transmission unsuitable for farm work.
93
 Those citizens looking to purchase a Jeep would 
be sorely disappointed, at least until the new Jeep Station Wagon models started 
appearing at car dealerships. These new Jeep models from Willy-Overland were 
specifically built for civilian markets, though advertisements were quick to connect them 
to their wartime brethren. One ad in Canadian Automotive Trade stated that “[the Jeep 
Station Wagon] is a people’s car and a lineal descendent of the wartime and later the 
Universal Jeep.”94 
Furthermore, the Sub-Committee discovered that the limitations of the Jeep were 
common to almost every military-patterned vehicle. As Brigadier Mavor explained in a 
letter to the CAAC in February 1944, “the safety factor” was the biggest concern.95 
Almost every type of military vehicle was right-hand drive, while civilian vehicles in 
North America were left-hand drive. Moreover, military vehicles were designed to meet 
military purposes and they lacked civilian-style comforts and features. They also needed 
special parts that were not easily available in commercial markets, most models were 
4X4 (thus they consumed more fuel) and the diameter of tires was larger than any civilian 
model. Mavor believed that most military vehicles would require scrapping, despite the 
fact that this “would perhaps arouse some adverse comments” from the public who were 
not aware of the “peculiar” types or the long-term drag they would put on the market.96 
Given the Sub-Committee’s composition, Mavor’s views found a receptive audience. Of 
the ten men who populated the Sub-Committee, six were executives representing Ford, 
GM, and Chrysler as well as the automotive parts industry, wholesale distributors, and 
dealers. The other four came from the government or military: the WAC, the CAAC, the 
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Automotive and Tank Production Branch in the DMS, and the Directorate of 
Mechanization in the DND.
97
 
It is fair to say that the final report submitted to Berry in late May 1945 reflected 
both the interests of big business and the reality that few military vehicles would become 
useful civilian assets without extensive modifications and refurbishing. The automotive 
industry was vitally concerned by the disposal of vehicles and its representatives were 
adamant that the disposal of surplus vehicles occur through regular distribution networks 
so as not to create illegitimate supply channels dominated by speculators. For those 
trucks, cars, and motorcycles deemed to have civilian potential, the Sub-Committee 
recommended that manufacturers purchase all vehicles back from the government and 
cover the financial and labour costs of reconversion, refurbishment and redistribution to 
dealers for sale to the general public.
98
  
Accordingly, the Sub-Committee also recommended that everything that could not 
be salvaged in peacetime be disposed of as scrap and mutilated in such a way as to 
prevent it from being used as a truck again. The only exception to this destruction policy 
was for “new military types” that were still in their crates or already overseas. These 
vehicles were to be disposed of outside the country wherever possible.
99
 This was a 
cunning decision that benefited both the government and big business as it avoided 
paying additional repatriation and reconversion costs while also providing a convenient 
outlet to unload vehicles that would have further glutted the domestic market. Moreover, 
finding overseas customers for those new vehicles still in crates had another, unspoken 
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benefit for the car industry. Since every military-patterned vehicle manufactured during 
the war came with one or two years of spare parts, car companies were anxious to limit 
the domestic supply of spare parts, lest they allow a customer to repair and maintain their 
military-patterned vehicle and further delay purchasing new civilian models.
100
  
The key point in this vehicle example is that Canada’s disposal administration 
actively sought the input of business interests and government expertise in order to amass 
information about implementing sales policies and restrictions. Of course, the WAC 
reserved the right to refuse the advice it received, and while this occurred in some 
instances, the WAC largely accepted the automotive sector’s recommendations as 
summarized in the Sub-Committee’s final report written by its chair, E. R. Birchard. 
Surplus military vehicles that could be converted to civilian purposes were disposed of in 
vast quantities through established dealers and manufacturers, while the remainder were 
destroyed or sold overseas.
101
 The due diligence of policymakers was paramount. When 
establishing and implementing policies and restrictions they sought to establish workable 
arrangements that defined the contours of civilian and military in pragmatic ways,  
protecting the public’s safety but still allowing the WAC to sell its inventories. These 
decisions were not popular with the public, who perceived them as the indiscriminate 
destruction of public property. However, war was extremely wasteful and, while there 
was no shortage of items available to sell, there was also a tremendous amount of things 
that could never be sold to civilians. Consequently, these items had to be destroyed. 
Reduction to Destruction: Salvaging Value from Weapon Systems 
Sometime in mid-1946 officials in the WAC came to grips with the reality that 
more than just ammunition would require destruction. Aside from ocean dumping, there 
were three other destruction methods available: incineration, scrapping, and mutilation. 
According to the WAC’s own definitions, the destruction of surpluses implied their 
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permanent elimination. This was only considered an option if the goods in question were 
lethal or without any peacetime applications or items of a secret nature that could not be 
sold because of national security concerns. The things that fell into these categories – the 
bulk of which were most calibers of ammunition and artillery shells – were destroyed 
using the safest and most efficient method possible: ocean dumping and to a lesser extent 
incineration and burial.
102
 Although some ammunition and explosives were scrapped, the 
incineration or dumping of stocks of dangerous goods permanently eliminated the threat 
and saved the financial, storage, and security liabilities. 
Scrapping and mutilation were commonly employed when dealing with weapon 
systems, secret materials, or any other items whose only value to “the peacetime 
economy [was] by melting [them] down, or by changing [their] form.”103 Scrapping or 
the “reduction of surplus to produce” was defined by the process of breaking apart a 
system of objects that formed a larger “apparatus” in order to salvage the components and 
materials. This was the fate most often bestowed upon weapon systems from aircraft and 
ships, to tanks and guns, and their “parts...which are not used in commercial life” but 
could be further reduced until some civilian value was derived.
104
 Although it was closely 
associated with scrapping and often done in tandem, mutilation had a separate meaning. 
Mutilation implied “the marking or removal of material, or otherwise defacing any 
particular surplus article so that it cannot be used for its original purpose.”105 In other 
words, the intent of mutilation was not to change the object’s form, but merely modify its 
intended function or identify a change in ownership. Mutilation could be done by 
acetylene torch cuts or the use of official cancellation dye for government markings. It is 
worth noting that objects were mutilated without being destroyed or scrapped. In fact, 
most objects that entered the WAC’s custody were mutilated in some capacity so that 
ownership could be established. Wherever possible – on the object or its components or 
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its container – Clearance and Warehousing personnel branded surpluses with the WAC’s 
logo or the words “War Assets Corporation.”106  
The necessity of an expanded destruction program dawned on policymakers as they 
faced two competing pressures. The first had to do with the quantity of surplus munitions, 
the limited storage space, and the selling delays caused by restrictions, priorities, and the 
testing for potential civilian applications. The other pressure was tied to the quality of 
items in the WAC’s possession. When evaluating their inventories, the armed forces 
adopted a stringent policy of keeping the best and most advanced equipment. Considering 
that the Services returned large portions of their kit to the British and only repatriated 
from Europe what they wanted to keep, this meant that the assets they declared surplus 
were often the bottom-rung, obsolete equipment in deteriorating condition. In other 
words, when the armed forces assessed their peacetime requirements they continued the 
well-entrenched policy of cannibalizing kit for spare parts and declaring the remainder 
surplus to the CAAC. This policy greatly affected the type and utility of munitions 
entering the WAC’s custody since the Corporation received either the components of 
weapon systems that the Services had already dismembered or the whole munition in its 
obsolete and worn out state. Thus, in addition to the flood of items valuable to civilians or 
in good condition, the WAC had to dispose of a wide selection of disparate things that 
originated from a variety of munitions (and some supplies) that were chopped up, 
disassembled, or technologically obsolescent.
107
  
A robust destruction program became unavoidable as the inventories of worthless 
kit and lethal objects without any civilian applications grew. Contrary to the public outcry 
and reports of wanton destruction in the wake of incidents like those involving the RCAF 
at Penhold, the WAC approached the destruction of surpluses in a methodical and 
sensible way. Throughout the entire process attempts were made to sell assets before they 
were further reduced. If sales were not possible, then the items were further scrapped so a 
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new round of marketing and sales could take place. This process of reduction took place 
until it was determined that no further value could be salvaged or if the storage and 
labour costs exceeded potential profits. Moreover, as experience was gained with 
particular categories of goods, the destruction process was streamlined so that these 
objects were reduced to a particular configuration as quickly as possible or, if experience 
indicated that nothing was salvageable, the entire thing might be destroyed right away 
without any recovery efforts or testing.  
 It is worth noting that Canada’s destruction program mirrored those initiated in the 
UK and US. However, a direct comparison is not wise since Canada’s program was less 
extensive, especially by comparison to the US. Given the immense productivity of 
America’s armaments industries, the US developed the largest and most comprehensive 
disposal program of all the Allies. For example, when the United States Army Air Force 
(USAAF) started declaring tactical aircraft surplus, a bewildering amount of planes 
required disposal in practically every part of the world. When air bases closed down or 
technological advances rendered older planes obsolete, fleets of tactical aircraft were 
destroyed onsite or relocated to the US where they were stored at 60 special depots 
administrated by America’s disposal agencies (first the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation and then the WAA). It was at these “boneyards” where tactical aircraft were 
concentrated for destruction or piecemeal sales.
108
  
The largest boneyard was the sprawling desert facility at Kingman, Arizona, though 
several permanent facilities were established across the US, such as at Davis-Monthan 
Air Force Base in Tuscon, Arizona. In the war’s aftermath, aircraft boneyards gained 
increasing notoriety and mystique in postwar American popular culture. In fact, the 
Kingman boneyard was featured in an Academy Award-winning film The Best Years of 
Our Lives (1946), in which actor Dana Andrews played a maladjusted Air Force veteran 
named Fred Derry who found solace in smashing war planes in the fictionalized town of 
Boone City.
109
 Today, surviving boneyards have become tourist attractions where the 
public can view decades worth of obsolete planes in permanent storage. In some respects, 
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aircraft boneyards represent a nexus point where the concepts of the “technological 
sublime” and “deindustrial sublime” co-exist. At these sites, the general fascination with 
and celebration of technological achievements (the technological sublime) and the 
nostalgia for derelict things and abandonment (the deindustrial sublime) mix together as 
the visitor walks through the open air museum observing both technological advancement 
and obsolescence simultaneously.
110
  
By contrast, Canada’s disposal administration never organized boneyards on such 
an elaborate and permanent scale, so they never gained much popularity in postwar 
Canadian society. In May 1944, the WAC’s Board of Directors determined that no 
extensive network of government-run scrapyards was advisable since they expected to 
utilize the armed forces’ storage facilities and vacant property wherever possible. 
However, they also understood that when hostilities ended, a number of temporary yards 
might be required to augment the existing infrastructure. The Board felt that if scrapyards 
had to be set up they should be located in close proximity to major “centres of 
production” and near RCAF bases where significant quantities of aluminum (used 
extensively for constructing fuselages) would pile up.
111
 As a result, several temporary 
yards were established, in Quebec (in Montreal and St. Johns), Ontario (Toronto and 
Trenton), New Brunswick (Scoudouc), and in British Columbia (Vancouver). These 
yards augmented whatever onsite scrapping operations were commenced by the military 
and by private companies contracted by the WAC.
112
 After the reorganization, all scrap 
was handled through the Supply Department’s Scrap Disposal Branch which worked 
closely with the Corporation’s other Branches and Departments to collect, reduce, and 
sell everything tagged as scrap. Since Clearance teams spearheaded all cleanup 
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operations, its personnel were closely affiliated with the Scrap Disposal Branch and 
carried out the bulk of scrapping requirements.
113
 
 If an article could not be sold in its primary form or to fulfill its intended function, 
than it was reduced to its basic materials and components. Therefore, scrapping objects 
was not the final stop in the transition from war to peace; rather it was just a means to 
another end because the decision to progressively reduce weapon systems created new 
potential uses and additional disposal requirements. The by-product of taking weapon 
systems apart was the production of 
numerous other components and 
materials that formed them. These 
newly separated assets could then 
be sold to create another system or 
fulfill another use. However, with 
every reduction assets were broken 
down into more constituent 
elements, so each scrapping 
operation yielded more items that 
required storage, marketing, and 
sales negotiations. This multiplied 
the workload of the WAC’s 
Warehousing and Merchandising 
staff who had to store and sell more 
(but smaller) objects and was 
compounded by the amount of 
obsolescent munitions declared to the CAAC.  
To illustrate the various stages of the destruction process consider surplus aircraft. 
When the RCAF started declaring them surplus, the WAC quickly came into possession 
of approximately 5,388 aircraft by the end of November 1945 and another 1,402 by May 
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Photo 10 Some of the parts and equipment stripped from 
planes at St. Johns, Quebec. Source: LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, 
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1946. Officials immediately realized that “some [aircraft] were of a strictly military type, 
unlicensable for commercial or for pleasure use in Canada, economically impractical for 
export, or in a condition beyond economical repair.”114 In other words, most of these 
aircraft could never be sold as aircraft and therefore had to be “reduced to produce” in 
order to derive value from them.
115
 This was especially the case considering the selling 
restrictions in place that forbid the sale of any tactical types and the certification 
procedures administered by the Department of Transport that determined the 
“airworthiness” of planes and the “pedigree” of the materials or parts. Stringent controls 
were instituted over the sale of aircraft and their parts so as to protect the public from 
mechanical errors, accidents, and unorthodox military modifications or designs.
116
 These 
restrictions not only determined who could purchase the planes and which ones were 
flyable, but also monitored the sale of parts and components. After all, the WAC could 
not scrap an obsolete plane and then resell the equally obsolete parts as replacements in 
airworthy aircraft. 
According to testimony before the SCWEE, of the 5,388 aircraft declared to the 
WAC, 906 were sold as aircraft (or otherwise not in the custody of the WAC in 
November 1945) and a further 1,430 planes (mostly obsolete trainer types such as, Anson 
I and II, Oxford I and II, and Fairey Battle) were demolished. Of the remaining 3,052 
aircraft “still in the Corporation’s hands” only 642 were “considered saleable as 
aircraft.”117 This meant that a further 2,410 would require disposal in piecemeal fashion, 
in addition to whatever else was declared later. Since scrapping aircraft meant taking 
them apart to sell their components and materials these supplies accumulated 
exponentially in warehouses before being sold or further reduced. This meant that the 
WAC had to be methodical in what it recovered, lest its storage facilities be overwhelmed 
with rivets or bolts instead of something more substantial. As a result, the WAC targeted 
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its scrapping operations on the key parts deemed to have residual value in civilian 
markets: engines, propellers, wheels, wireless equipment, instruments, Plexiglas, and 
scrap metals.
118
 Removing anything else was not advisable or financially prudent because 
the cost of removing and storing any other components far exceeded the potential profits 
from their sale. Even if other items recovered from the planes were in good and saleable 
condition, the WAC had no incentive to accommodate the marketplace if, for example, its 
labour and storage costs totalled $1 but sales only remitted 75 cents.
119
 Simply put, it did 
not matter if customers were lining up to purchase the recovered items if the salvaged 
value was not worth the expense 
of recovery. 
Moreover, any assumption 
about salvaging significant value 
from surplus aircraft grossly 
underestimates the rate of 
technological change and usage 
during the war years. In fact, the 
WAC quickly discovered that 
many items targeted for recovery 
were worthless or in low demand. 
Thus, the unhappy by-product of 
scrapping obsolete planes was the 
accumulation of more obsolete 
parts that no one wanted, even in 
a materially-starved marketplace. As Berry explained to the SCWEE in reference to the 
1,430 surplus aircraft demolished by the Corporation up to November 1945:  
Practically all of the engines saved in demolition are still in our hands, along 
with a large quantity of spare engines separately declared. These are either 
obsolete for aircraft use or not eligible for Department of Transport 
certificates. We have over 6,000. After National advertising we have 
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Photo 11 Workers at St. Johns, Quebec scrap old damaged 
aircraft that cannot be sold any other way. Source: LAC, 
RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9 History of War Assets 
Corporation Ltd. and War Assets Corporation, Newspaper 
Clippings, The Standard, 15 September 1945, 8. 
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succeeded in selling only 63. Further aircraft demolitions and possible further 
declarations of engines will increase the supply to around 7,500…What shall 
we do with the balance?
120
 
Thus, in regards to surplus aircraft, scrapping constituted more of a control on quality 
than a treasure hunt. Instead of finding hidden value, scrapping ensured that obsolete 
aircraft or those without proper licensing would never fly again. Yet this was little 
consolation to officials in the WAC’s Supply and Merchandising Departments tasked 
with storing and selling a bewildering supply of objects that were rapidly deteriorating in 
value and condition. Auctions sales, bulk transactions, indefinite loans to educational 
institutions, and increased advertising helped liquidate a small fraction of the ballooning 
inventory, but the fact still remained that parts and materials derived from scrapping were 
not always that valuable and often remained the items of last resort for customers who 
then complained that the items they wanted most were not available.  
Although attempts were constantly made to sell items as they traversed every stage 
of the destruction process, the WAC never panicked when unsaleable assets piled up or 
commercial interest faded. Instead, the Corporation’s management adhered diligently to 
its disposal procedures and only made modifications when necessary. The by-product of 
this diligence was additional delays in final disposal. Before deciding on a course of 
action the WAC had to collect information about the object’s condition and quantities, 
collect and store it, test for civilian applications, process paperwork, and if no sales were 
arranged proceed with the first wave of scrapping. This took time to complete and 
accounts for some of the continuing delays in processing Surplus Declarations. By April 
1946, the RCAF had submitted 6,018 Surplus Declarations to the CAAC, worth an 
estimated original value of about $628,721,675 and consisting of thousands of different 
items and property. However, only 2,181 of those declarations (a third of the total 
number and worth about $133,893,000 originally) were collected, processed, and 
disposed of by the WAC.
121
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Adhering to its mandate with stubborn persistence demonstrates much about the 
WAC’s raison d’être. The Corporation was methodical and calculating in protecting the 
national economy and employment. It was not out to make a sale for the sake of selling, 
but only if the sale was worth it. In fact, sometimes its mandate actually meant refusing a 
sale and destroying the items instead. For example, consider the fleet of 203 Anson 
training aircraft located in Brantford, Ontario. These obsolete aircraft were declared 
surplus by the RCAF in mid-1945, but by March 1946 they were becoming an expensive 
nuisance. Unable to sell the Ansons as airworthy planes, the WAC’s Clearance teams 
scrapped them to recover their 
major components and a new 
advertising campaign got 
underway to sell the parts and 
airframes separately. The 
campaign yielded just a single 
$300 bid for the whole lot, but the 
WAC rejected it on the basis that 
it was too small and the scrap 
dealer was unlikely to pay for the 
removal of everything.
122
 
Consequently, the materials went 
back on the market and another 
advertising campaign offered the 
airframes for $10 per unit. This 
brought in 37 purchases and $370, but only 19 frames were actually removed by 
customers. Given the limited commercial interest in these derelict aircraft there were few 
options left for the fleet of Anson airframes, so the WAC resorted to completing the 
destruction process in order to save the labour and storage costs. The Ansons (or 
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Photo 12 An advertisement in the Winnipeg Free Press for 
the sale of an Anson training aircraft. Source: Winnipeg 
Free Press, 1 April 1946, 6.   
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basically their leftover pieces) were destroyed by incineration in a “huge bonfire” 
sometime in the spring of 1946.
123
 
The Brantford bonfire was far from a unique occurrence, as the war’s end doomed 
whole generations of aircraft models, including the famed Mosquito fighter-bomber. 
Despite its best efforts, the WAC had trouble selling Mosquitos and their components. 
Although some were eventually sold to Nationalist China, the market for the plane was 
terribly small. According to an official with the WAC, who was interviewed by the Globe 
and Mail’s Jack Hambleton, the Mosquito was “hardly a week-end plane” since it was 
difficult to handle and required great skill to fly.
124
 They were also designed and built 
under wartime conditions so there was little space inside the cockpit, their fuel efficiency 
was terrible, and they were primarily constructed from plywood. Moreover, the pace of 
technological change was also a factor in rendering the Mosquito obsolete and limiting 
potential markets, as the anonymous official explained: 
We have just been talking about wheeling the machines out onto the field and 
leaving them there. It seems a terrible waste to see $30 million on wheels 
sitting idle but what use are they now the war is over? The RCAF is going 
into jet fighters and is not doing much flying other than transport work now. 
They are getting Vampires – jet machines – and the Mosquito is an old 
machine as a fighter now.
 125
 
In early 1946, the WAC cannibalized fleets of Mosquitos. One group of 128 
concentrated in Weston, Ontario was originally offered for sale but no scrap dealer or 
educational institution was interested in acquiring these decaying relics. The Corporation 
estimated that any further attempts to salvage materials from the aircraft were not 
advisable since the recovery of $1 worth of saleable scrap metal would cost $30 per wing. 
Therefore, sometime in the early spring the hulking wings (and probably many other 
components) were piled together and burned in what had to be a “monster bonfire” since 
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each wing was 52 feet long and weighed 2,300 lbs!
126
 A year later the sad saga of the 
doomed Mosquitos continued. This time, as Hambleton reported, the WAC had a fleet of 
100 Mosquitos that no one wanted. When the war ended they were cocooned and put into 
storage at the DeHavilland Aircraft plant in Toronto. However, the storage contract with 
DeHavilland expired in April 1947. Coupled with the prohibitive scrapping costs this 
fleet of 100 Mosquitos was condemned to a similar fate as those in Weston.
127
 The 
wartime investment literally went up in smoke! 
As the destruction of the Ansons and Mosquitos demonstrates, where no 
commercial interest existed or if the salvaged value was not worth the cost of recovery or 
storage, the only responsible recourse was complete destruction. Much to the public’s 
dissatisfaction, this happened frequently with obsolete aircraft. However, such actions 
were necessary because they saved the Corporation from the cost of storing and handling 
war junk. This in turn lowered operational costs and meant that the WAC remitted more 
of its profits back to the government to help pay down the war debt. Therefore, contrary 
to media reports about the wasteful and wanton destruction of public property, the 
destruction process actually saved the taxpayer more money than if the WAC continued 
to hold onto assets without any markets on which to sell them.
128
  
As much as the WAC controlled and funded the destruction of surpluses through 
the Scrap Disposal Branch, it also relied on businesses and commercial interests to assist 
in destruction programs. In this regard the WAC did not have much choice. As surplus 
items were restricted from sale or reduced to basic materials, commercial interests also 
narrowed. Therefore, almost by default, the junk dealers and steel manufacturers (in 
Ontario and Quebec especially) gained increasingly larger interest as surpluses moved 
through the WAC’s reduction process. Not only did they already possess the expertise, 
labour force, and equipment, but they maintained a vested interest in how the products 
and materials were disposed of in the marketplace. As a result, junk dealers and metal 
manufacturers were in a much better position to perform the destruction process and 
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would step in to purchase items from the WAC before scrapping had even commenced. 
This suited the WAC’s finances perfectly, since it did not have to fund the entire 
destruction process. In fact, depending on the type of asset involved, the WAC would sell 
whole items as scrap so that junk dealers or metal companies would cover the entire cost 
of reduction instead of the taxpayer.  
Scrap dealers had much to gain from these types of transactions since they received 
a whole asset with potentially valuable components at scrap prices and often in bulk 
purchases. Although a fair amount of the kit bought by dealers was derelict and unusable, 
some real gems found their way into scrapyards. Despite explicit rules to the contrary, 
upon discovering that something sold as scrap by the WAC was still valuable for a 
primary or secondary use, junk dealers often refurbished the goods for use in their yards 
or, more likely, for resale to interested customers. In one instance involving aircraft 
components, the WAC was alerted to a scrap dealer’s scheme for reselling a small 
inventory of obsolete engines procured from the WAC. Although the contractual 
obligations forbade the engines from being resold for “air use” in Canada because of Air 
Transport Regulations, the scrap dealer planned to sell the engines as replacements for 
snowmobiles. The WAC “having already studied the possibility of their use in that way” 
concluded they could not be adapted for snowmobiles and warned that “the final 
purchaser would be gypped.”129 It is unclear if the WAC succeeded in stopping this sale, 
but it is doubtful given how widespread the practice became. 
Clearly there were loopholes that needed closing. Since items were usually sold as 
scrap for a reason – because they were unsafe for civilians, unlicenseable, obsolete, or 
threatening to the national economy, employment, or public safety – the WAC started 
taking some additional precautions so that they did not reappear in the marketplace. To 
help guard against the unlawful resale of items sold as scrap (but still in workable or 
reusable condition) the Corporation started funding the cost of mutilation before the 
dealer took possession or sent supervisors to the junk yard to observe the physical 
destruction. Thus, from early 1946 onwards when, for example, obsolete engines, 
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batteries, or their components were still in workable condition but sold as scrap, 
Clearance or Warehousing staff (or Service Personnel where necessary) were obliged to 
render the articles “useless” by “the simple expedient” of bashing “cylinder heads” (or 
other vital components) with a sledge hammer.
130
  
Combatting third-party resales with such countermeasures was not particularly 
popular with customers, the media, or politicians, since perfectly usable goods were 
destroyed rather than salvaged to fulfill other functions.
131
 Yet the WAC had its reasons 
and if the junkman was not playing by the rules, then something had to be done to protect 
the public regardless of the optics. Every step in the reduction process was accompanied 
by attempts to sell the goods or their components, but if the Corporation could not find an 
interested customer, than the goods had to be destroyed to save public money. That 
perfectly useable goods were destroyed or sent to scrapyards during a time of severe 
shortages and when demand was ferociously high appeared utterly wasteful and 
incompetent. However, there were few available alternatives. It looked as if the WAC 
was acting irresponsibly and unethically by destroying government assets, but in reality it 
had already done what it could to sell them. The problem was in the eye of the beholder: 
the public’s own expectations were not meshing with reality.132  
The reselling of items sold as scrap was a problematic and persistent issue for the 
Corporation, not only because mutilation by sledgehammer might be ineffective, but also 
because it fashioned a public perception of the WAC as a neglectful and wasteful 
enterprise. One vocal critic, Dr. J. J. Brown, an engineer who worked at Research 
Enterprises during the war, believed that the WAC was badly run because it destroyed 
perfectly good items or sold them to scrapyards for pennies on the dollar, rather than to a 
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marketplace full of eager customers. In several articles condemning the WAC’s policies 
and practices, Brown claimed to have purchased roughly $45,000 worth of items in good 
condition from junk dealers for just $900.
133
 He was adamant that everything he collected 
originated from the WAC and that scrap dealers were not always playing by the WAC’s 
rules against reselling. As he stated in an article titled “Assets into Junk” published by 
Maclean’s in August 1946, “some junk dealers, adhering strictly to their contracts with 
the Corporation, have refused to sell me anything, but dozens of others have said, in 
effect: ‘Make me an offer. If a machine is worth more to you as a machine than it’s worth 
to me as scrap, we’ve got a right to do business.’”134  
Although not completely impossible, attempts at tracking and enforcing the resale 
restrictions on scrap were exceedingly hard once the objects left the WAC’s possession. 
Brown’s critical reports in the Winnipeg Free Press, Maclean’s, and eventually his 
testimony before the SCWEE targeted this situation with precision, as he divulged 
numerous examples of blatant waste and bargain-hunting. In one telling example, Brown 
claimed to have purchased two perfectly workable Jacobs-64 engines in good condition 
and worth an estimated $8,000 for only $40 from Frankel Brothers Ltd.
135
 However, 
Brown’s accusations should be taken with a grain of salt, as there were indications from 
military officials testifying before the SCWEE that he inflated his estimates of the 
original value and exaggerated the quantities available in scrapyards. For instance, Wing 
Commander E. G. Mahoney stated that Brown’s estimates of how many aircraft batteries 
(2,000) were scrapped at Solway & Sons were grossly exaggerated over what the RCAF 
had actually declared (371) by the time of his visit to the junkyard in October 1945.
136
 
Yet Brown’s accusations were not unfounded either. Good and workable surpluses 
were being thrown onto scrapheaps instead of into a materially-starved marketplace and 
public opinion was not favourable to such practices. However, there was method to the 
WAC’s madness, although admittedly it was difficult for outsiders to support. At the 
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heart of the issue were the WAC’s operational practices that favoured established 
manufacturers and trade networks. The by-product of this preference was an extensive 
reliance on business interests and the persecution of the second-hand market. By adhering 
to its disposal philosophy, the WAC was condemning perfectly useable surpluses to the 
scrapheap. If no middleman purchased the items in question than the WAC had no other 
recourse but to either peddle the salvaged components or sell the items as scrap to 
junkyards. Without a retail network, the WAC had no means to engage in retail sales to 
interested customers like Brown. Instead, to the bafflement of potential clients, the WAC 
redirected them to local dealers that had already made purchases from its inventories, 
while it deliberately reduced any unsold remainder. 
The blatant corporate favouritism in the WAC’s operational practices looked bad 
and got even worse when surplus goods sold to established businesses started appearing 
in stores. Corporations and dealers bought surplus goods at cheaper prices, while their 
customers were not so lucky. Instead of getting cheap goods directly from the WAC, 
customers had to pay the dealer’s commission and any logistical or refurbishing costs that 
were always attached to the final price tag. As long as items were sold at price ceilings 
the WAC was not concerned. Anything that established businesses did not buy was 
labelled as scrap and reduced until destroyed. However, the system was not foolproof, as 
the opportunity for reselling goods at prices above the WPTB’s ceilings or reselling items 
labelled as scrap was often seized by businesses and junk dealers. Such actions could 
undermine the whole system and the WAC had little control over these infractions. As a 
result, a price variance resulted despite all attempts to control them. The variance affected 
all types of surplus assets sold by the WAC – from scrap metals to aircraft, or vehicles to 
radios – and it occurred right under the WAC’s nose.  
The price variance resulted from several factors. In some cases, dealers and 
companies reselling surplus assets were liable to gouge their customers with hidden fees 
that were in excess of price ceilings and had to be paid up front in cash. In its quest to 
create a veterans’ priority the Legion collected several examples of how this price 
gouging was affecting veterans who wanted to purchase motor vehicles. One soldier told 
Captain Greaves, “I have been to several dealers. They will not talk to me unless alone 
and then persist in stating the necessity of extensive repairs on all vehicles taken over 
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from the government. They refuse to consider a sale until I agree to pay the repair bill in 
cash.”137 Another veteran, who encountered similar deviousness from a used-car 
salesman but agreed to pay the bill, stated: “I bought [the taxi] at $690, the ceiling price 
but had to pay a $210 repair bill on the quiet in order to get the car. I paid it to get in on 
the taxi business while things are going well.”138  
While used-car salesmen lived up to their somewhat slimy and nefarious 
reputations, the WAC’s agents also gouged clients. Take the case of Charles Babb, a 
well-connected American with extensive ties to the aviation industry. In early 1944, he 
was hired by the WAC to be its agent for aircraft sales in the US and his company 
Charles Babb Aviation Co. utilized this position to purchase aircraft and export them for 
resale to third parties, particularly in Latin America. In one case, fifty-three Cornell 
aircraft belonging to Canada’s Mutual Aid Program but located in Pennsylvania were 
declared surplus. It appears that Babb’s company used his connections with the WAC and 
“closed the deal before Canadians who had been trying to buy Cornells knew of those 
particular planes’ existence.”139 Apparently Babb made a pretty penny on their resale, as 
he purchased the Cornells for roughly $2,700 each, paid the export licences and taxes, 
and pocketed the rest of the $4,500 purchase price.  
In other cases, the price variance occurred because junk dealers would resell the 
same objects as legitimate manufacturers. For example, if a manufacturer purchased back 
most of its goods from the government, such as the Jacobs L4MB engine, and then 
refurbished them for resale, they had to add their costs to the final price tag which, 
depending on the scope of repairs, could vary from $750 to $1,500 per engine.
140
 
However, companies did not always buy back all their products, so some inevitably 
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wound up in scrapyards where an industrious customer might entice a junk dealer to sell 
the engine for practically nothing and refurbished it on their own, as Brown had done 
with his Jacobs engines as well as several other items, including an air compressor 
contraption he used “for paint spraying, spraying vegetables, blowing up tires, [and] 
cleaning off my work bench.”141 Clearly, some customers were getting shafted. As 
Brown stated, “I believe that when the same basic article sells for nothing on one price 
list, $250 on another, $750 to $1,000 on another and $1,500 on another, it’s not being 
very intelligently merchandised.”142 To the WAC’s critics the problem was only 
compounded by its corporate ties to manufacturing. Instead of bending to customer 
satisfaction by keeping all prices stable, low, and selling direct, the WAC was trying to 
eliminate – through resale restrictions, price controls, and destruction programs – the 
second-hand market at the source. To frustrated customers, it was as if the WAC wanted 
them to pay more for used goods. 
Conclusion 
In concluding his “Assets to Ashes” article in Maclean’s, Brown wrote a pointed 
criticism of the WAC’s disposal strategy. While acknowledging the magnitude of the 
task, he believed that the WAC’s “policies [were] based on a false and negative 
philosophy, the philosophy of let’s get rid of it.”143 According to Brown, the strategy of 
selling only to established businesses, destroying the unsold remainder, and refusing to 
sell directly to the public were catastrophic mistakes. As Brown stated, “I simply claim 
that War Assets has an insufficient respect for both commodities and clients and that on 
those terms no merchant can succeed.”144 His claims certainly had merit. No disposal 
strategy was perfect and there were clear winners and losers built into the system. 
However, it is doubtful that any of the WAC’s senior directors or managers agreed with 
him. From their perspective, the Corporation’s business philosophy was based on sound, 
though unorthodox, principles that had been studied extensively. Succeeding as a 
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merchant was not the goal. In fact, the difficulties that Brown faced in acquiring surplus 
assets from the WAC were actually positive signs and evidence that operations were 
functioning in accordance with how they were designed.  
The WAC’s operational practices intentionally favoured established businesses and 
did not prioritize the average customer. The countermeasures and selling restrictions were 
aimed at limiting the development and expansion of an illegitimate second-hand market 
that would threaten the normal flow of economic activity, the price of new goods, and 
employment. In other words, the type of open-access retail network that Brown and many 
others expected was precisely the type of system that the WAC wanted to avoid. The 
Corporation tried limiting the market in which a speculator could purchase a whole 
inventory and resell it without any concerns for long-term economic stability. The WAC 
was not interested in making “fly-by-night” sales so it buttressed established businesses 
across every merchandizing field its inventories flooded and destroyed whatever it could 
not sell through legitimate trade networks. The end result was a system designed to meet 
aggregate demand – and that it did. From 1945 to 1947, the WAC sold millions of 
dollars’ worth of government property at a time of severe shortages. Thus, the WAC’s 
inventories provisioned postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation with the assets and 
materials needed during the transition from war to peace. 
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Chapter 5 
Tactical to Practical: Supporting Postwar Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation with Surplus Assets 
Victorious day you’ve arrived at last! 
Store away the guns they’re a thing of the past 
Pray never again they’ll have to be used 
But into tools of peace they will be fused.
1
 
Anonymous, “Victory” 
Introduction 
When wars end the objects accumulated to fight are often the only things available 
for reconstruction and rehabilitation. In the case of a total war this axiom is doubly 
appropriate. Victory in the Second World War demanded substantial production feats in 
every sector of the Canadian economy and monumental expenditures of public money 
that far surpassed the precedent of 1914-1918. All out production for the war effort 
subsumed practically every part of the Canadian economy and society by forcing civilian 
goods and the free market economy to the sidelines. This resulted in a future commodity 
crisis of epic proportions. With Canada’s shrinking military, postwar requirements for 
munitions and supplies only constituted a fraction of wartime totals. The unneeded 
materiel was plentiful and an overwhelmed WAC did its best to handle the situation. But 
where did all the leftovers end up? What did the WAC sell? How useful were surplus 
assets? This chapter addresses these questions by examining the types of things the WAC 
sold, who purchased them, and where possible, what peacetime uses were derived from 
surplus munitions and supplies. 
As Magda Fahrni explained in her study, Household Politics, the transition from 
war to peace was not completely centred on the federal government and its policies and 
projects. While Mackenzie King’s government greatly shaped the debates and parameters 
of postwar developments, preparations for peace happened across all social classes and 
regions of the country. Individuals, families, and organizations all made their own plans 
for their expected postwar activities, subsistence, and ambitions. In studying Montreal 
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families and their responses to postwar reconstruction, Fahrni proved that the pursuit of a 
stable home life and improved living standards were “scaffolded” onto the pillars of 
“social and economic security” embedded into wider political agendas.2 In effect, 
everyone had their own personal postwar plans and preconceived notions about the social 
and spatial landscapes of their future lives, communities, and occupations. This “vision of 
victory” constituted the sum of one’s personal hopes, dreams, fears, and goals – however 
realistic – but was not always in line with government priorities or consensus opinions.3 
However, the fulfillment of personal aspirations was conditioned by the hard reality 
of competing interests groups and the limited availability of commodities and materials. 
In many respects the attainment of higher living standards, employment, social security, 
and rehabilitation were enabled by a materiality that supported all aspects of 
reconstruction. Therefore, a material world underpinned everyone’s postwar plans. For 
instance, building or buying a home for one’s family brought stability, but it could not 
occur without supplies of wood, brick, wires, nails, and plumbing, to say little about 
furnishing the abode with sinks, stoves, and other modern appliances. Employment, 
education, and leisure pursuits were similarly affected by a material reality in which the 
supply of objects greatly influenced the quality, scale, and degree of satisfaction with 
each endeavour. Yet the acquisition of assets was never certain. Material shortages and 
competing interests changed or thwarted the fulfillment of postwar ambitions and added 
to wider political, economic, and social dislocation. Navigating the transition from war to 
peace was no easy feat. As the White Paper stated, “our transition from peace to war was 
not accomplished without dislocations, and the transition from war to peace cannot avoid 
them entirely.”4  
The key to mitigating “dislocations” was by facilitating the material conversion of 
war assets and maintaining a steady supply of goods and resources throughout the 
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economy. The quick and diligent liquidation of surplus munitions and supplies helped 
stabilize the postwar economy in several key areas, mainly through the supply of metals 
and building materials as well as the redistribution of industrial floor space. In many 
ways surpluses greased the wheels of transition by buffering gaps in production and 
shortages in supplies. This benefitted both end users making purchases from middlemen 
and companies – large and small – preparing to produce future generations of new 
products and designs.
5
 Although not always the perfect stop gap, surplus assets were vital 
for meeting aggregate demand during a period of severe shortages by provisioning the 
postwar economy with a steady stream of goods and resources. In doing so, this ensured 
that second-hand goods and other government surpluses were consumed quickly and did 
not compete with new merchandise slowly trickling into store shelves. Therefore, the 
transition period offered the best opportunity to unload surpluses at a point in time where 
they would do the most good and least harm.  
The objects accumulated for war became the starting points of peace. Profuse in 
quantity and diverse in quality, surplus munitions and supplies not only transferred to 
new owners, but they also transitioned between old and new uses. This transition process 
is sometimes referred to as material demobilization. Material demobilization took place 
in two general ways roughly divided by the ease with which objects were converted from 
wartime to peacetime purposes. In the first case, the convertibility of objects required 
little effort or modifications since their utility and value remained relatively equal in war 
or peace. Therefore, material demobilization involved the reuse and redeployment of 
objects in order to fulfill their original functions, forms, and intentions. Items falling 
under the label of “supplies” (such as typewriters, radios, desks, bedframes, and raw 
resources) generally populated this category of material demobilization because their 
convertibility from wartime usage remained high. However, in other cases such as those 
involving military-patterned vehicles or aircraft, reuse was not as straightforward since 
modifications and refurbishing were required in order to improve versatility, lifespans, 
and meet civilian safety standards. Overall, the reuse of surplus assets provided many 
advantages in peacetime. Corporations gained a valuable peace dividend since they 
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stocked shelves with items purchased directly from the WAC or acquired the resources to 
fuel future production. End users benefitted indirectly if they could purchase the assets 
they needed through established businesses and trade networks. However, the peace 
dividend was not always economic, since educational institutions, hospitals, and a whole 
host of other organizations purchased surpluses for reuse in providing critical social 
welfare services to communities and, especially, veterans.      
The other half of material demobilization involved assets that were significantly 
altered and adapted to fulfill completely new functions, forms, and intentions. Because 
material shortages were rampant, people were lucky if they could obtain something new 
or readily reusable. Inevitably some had to compromise on what they acquired and settle 
for second-choice things that were designed for other purposes. Therefore, material 
demobilization also entailed a process of recycling and upcycling in which purpose-built 
items were reduced, refabricated, or reconfigured for new uses by new owners. In some 
cases, recycling and upcycling operated in tandem with the reuse of surpluses, but this 
did not always happen. There are subtle but not insignificant differences between all 
these concepts. Upcycling is the act of repurposing objects by valuing the material from 
which they are made and the form that they maintain. The recycling of something occurs 
only when the asset is valued only for its components or materials.
6
 The objects that were 
not easily reusable in peacetime had to be upcycled and recycled to create new utility.  
Susan Strasser explained in her study, Waste and Want, recycling and upcycling are 
fundamentally inventive processes that steer objects through many different forms, 
functions, and intentions. Recycling and upcycling were common activities to nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century societies as they privileged thrift and limited the amount of a trash 
generated by social and economic developments.
7
 The recycling and upcycling of war 
junk was an economic necessity. It took a certain level of ingenuity and originality to 
imagine a possible adaptation for something that others might consider inert or worthless. 
This was especially the case if the item was purpose-built for the military. After all, not 
everyone could envision using steel helmets as chicken nests or the fuselages of derelict 
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bombers as tourist cabins. Yet the repurposing of the war’s materiality was incredibly 
important, not only did it make the most of depreciating assets, it also promoted an 
entrepreneurial initiative that had been confined by years of wartime regulations and the 
prewar economic malaise. By recycling and upcycling munitions and supplies, Canadians 
fused new and old technologies, reformed and converted assets into new purposes, and 
adapted their visions of victory to the availability and suitability of objects. In effect, 
material demobilization was the peace dividend in practice. 
The WAC and Economic Stability 
The severe material shortages facing Canadian businesses and consumers after the 
war were a product of many factors. As Joy Parr explained in her book Domestic Goods, 
economic policies in the 1940s favoured export markets and what she termed the 
“producer emphasis.”8 At the time, policymakers in the DRS and the authors of the White 
Paper were most concerned with aggregate demand or the total demand for final goods 
and services across the whole economy at a given time. In the “triage” of economic 
priorities they considered consumer demand more pliable and better restrained than 
unleashed with the support of fiscal policies. Instead of expanding aggregate demand and 
better accommodating its regional disparities, public expenditure was better used as a 
means of encouraging industrial expansion. In other words, the replacement of capital 
goods and production machinery ranked higher than replacing household goods and the 
“consumer emphasis.”9 Aggregate demand was kept to a basic minimum, while public 
investment in accelerated depreciation favoured firms manufacturing industrial 
equipment or processing raw materials. Policymakers relied on these industries to form a 
stable base for postwar economic growth, particularly since the government was also 
trying to secure more export markets for Canadian products and resources.
10
 
Companies specializing in the “consumer emphasis” faced an uphill struggle to 
retool and reconvert after years of wartime production and with limited access to special 
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depreciation funds.
11
 Given the virtual elimination of civilian production from 1942 
onwards and the heavy tax burdens on all corporate earnings, few durable goods were 
available while companies lacked the necessary capital to reinvest in retooling, 
expansion, and product innovation. The end result of this production shortage meant an 
increased reliance on more expensive imports from the US and a persistent dearth of 
durable and household goods in department stores, like washing machines, ranges, and 
refrigerators.
12
 Furthermore, the return of another foreign exchange crisis in 1947 
contributed to the shortages and undercut some of the government’s economic priorities. 
The imbalance between American dollars and British sterling limited Canada’s capacity 
for exporting and importing thereby forcing companies to manufacture import substitutes 
to make up domestic shortages. As Parr explained, this situation “departed from the plan 
for a strong postwar Canadian economy selling into international markets” and ensured 
that aggregate demand fluctuated as companies retooled.
13
 
Yet the fact that the manufacturing and resource extraction sectors were given more 
favourable reconversion packages did not necessarily mean they had a smooth postwar 
transition. Strikes throughout 1946 caused major disturbances across North America, 
particularly in the steel, meatpacking, and automotive industries. As Peter McInnis 
demonstrated, the postwar layoffs came swiftly and sharply. In October 1943, roughly 1.1 
million Canadians were gainfully employed in war industries but by VE-Day that number 
had dropped to 888,000 and by VJ-Day the total was 600,000 and it fell precipitously 
thereafter.
14
 Starkly contrasting official proclamations promising high and stable 
employment and income, job loss and unemployment spiked immediately following the 
war. Net payments for unemployment insurance in Ontario and Quebec jumped by leaps 
and bounds between 1945 and 1946. In Ontario payments went from $3.5 million to 
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$16.3 million and in Quebec they went from $6.6 million to $18.9 million.
15
 Indeed, any 
history of the industrial front that only focuses on how the war created jobs and full 
employment completely obscures the fact that by 1945, job loss, labour disputes, and 
decreasing production totals were the dominant economic trends.    
Although the spike in unemployment was expected, workers and unions fought 
back. On the heels of victory came waves of strikes that hit the resource and 
manufacturing sectors especially hard. In 1946 and 1947, the number of strikes (225 and 
236 respectively) never reached the wartime high of 401 in 1943, but the average 
duration of each strike was three to four weeks, compared to five days in 1943. As 
McInnis explained, postwar strikes translated to over 6.9 million lost worker days over 
the course of those two calendar years combined.
16
 Thus, the combination of economic 
policies, production shortfalls, currency exchanges, and labour disputes conspired to limit 
Canada’s economic prosperity. Indeed, the Canadian economy stuttered into the postwar 
period as the GDP, which soared over the Depression-era lows, remained stable between 
1945 and 1946. The severe material shortages were therefore symptoms of wider social, 
economic, and political dislocation caused by the transition from war to peace.  
The WAC was well-positioned to help fill the vacuum in supply as it possessed 
large caches of goods and resources leftover from the wartime production boom. From 
cafeteria equipment and bedframes, to radios, furniture and large stocks of raw materials 
(both new and recycled), the WAC took advantage of the situation and provided an 
alternative source of supply to businesses and manufacturers, who reaped some 
immediate rewards. As an article in the Globe and Mail stated “the fact that a number of 
Canadian plants have not yet been forced to close their doors as a result of shortages 
occasioned by the strike in steel and other basic industries is attributed largely to reserves 
stockpiled during the war which are now surplus.”17 In combination with the winding 
down of the WICB and its Resource Controls, the WAC aggressively liquidated stores of 
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raw materials and finished goods to manufacturers and dealers whose regular suppliers 
were unable to fill orders.
18
 This demonstrated how the WAC helped soften the burden of 
reconversion on the manufacturing sector. On one hand it cleared plants of unneeded 
things, and on the other it supplied the tools, machinery, and resources when they were 
needed and at cheaper prices than the imported equivalents.  
In doing so, however, the Corporation was working against organized labour since 
its actions were aimed at minimizing the impact of the strikes and shortages. In being a 
corporate life-preserver during the transition period, the WAC prevented a full-scale 
shutdown in important industries. In one instance, at Mackinnon Industries, a parts 
manufacturer for General Motors, a bitter dispute with employees was circumvented 
when the company bought an “emergency shipment of scrap” that allowed replacement 
workers to continue manufacturing. The shipment was directly responsible for “averting a 
complete shutdown” of the factory in Oshawa and such shipments were probably not 
isolated cases.
19
 However, while the substitute raw materials and second-hand goods 
procured from the WAC acted as important stop gaps, they did not end the shortages and 
an inevitable “slowdown in production” occurred because of the general supply situation, 
inexperienced workers, and because the substitute materials were not always the perfect 
fit and “often resulted in new processing problems.”20 
The WAC did everything it could to maintain a flow of supplies to industries and 
manufacturers. The sale of ferrous and non-ferrous metals can serve as a case study, 
particularly given the widespread economic significance of steel. Notwithstanding 
increased purchases from US steel mills (to offset wartime shortages), there was 
significant wartime expansion at the seven largest steel foundries in Canada. The 
country’s total steel production more than doubled during the war from 1,230,120 tons in 
1939 to 2,860,000 tons in 1945, while the amount of steel consumed during the peak year 
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of 1942 was 4,297,120 tons.
21
 Almost all of those totals were absorbed by munitions 
production and a large (though unrecorded) measure was recycled into the postwar 
economy, mainly through the WAC’s scrapping programs. This trend is shown in the 
graph below which charts the number of transactions involving all types of metals 
(ferrous, non-ferrous, scrap) from 1944-1949. According to the WAC’s annual reports, 
the bulk of metal sales over $5,000 took place from April 1945 to March 1947, a timeline 
that parallels the rapid expansion of all postwar destruction programs and clearance 
operations. However, it must be noted that this chart only records metal sales as listed in 
the annual reports. It does not include the sale of newly manufactured metals, nor does it 
consistently include the sale of weapon systems for scrapping purposes. Therefore, some 
tanks, ships and aircraft sold as scrap are not represented because they were listed under 
different categories in the annual reports. No doubt their inclusion would significantly 
increase both the total number of transactions as well as the total weight of metals sold to 
private interests after the war, particularly in 1946 and 1947.
22
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Tabulating the total weight of all surplus metals sold back to private interests by the 
WAC is difficult. This is not only because metal could be recycled from many different 
sources, but also because the annual reports did not always list the total weight for every 
purchase. This discrepancy makes any sweeping conclusions about metals sales difficult, 
but what numbers are available provide some indication about the general pattern of 
metal supplies in postwar Canada. The graph below shows metal sales by weight, rather 
than transaction frequency. According to available data, the WAC sold a total of roughly 
4.1 billion pounds of metals (or about 1.83 million long tons) between 1944 and 1949. 
However, over 3.7 billion pounds of that total (or about 1.65 million long tons) was sold 
during the fiscal year of 1946-1947. The Atlas Steel mega-purchase of 3.4 billion pounds 
of shell steel billets accounts for the bulk of metal sales that year and skews the graph 
substantially. The key line to observe is the green one as it subtracts the largest-single 
purchase from all years to show a more uniform pattern that peaks toward the end of 
1945 and throughout 1946. Keep in mind that this chart does not account for all metals 
available from the WAC so the actual totals and trends were much larger. A conservative 
estimate might double the figures and place the peak over the same period though it 
likely stretched into late 1947.
23
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To maintain the supply of metals, the WAC also took some drastic actions. In one 
notable case, the Corporation managed to recycle some batches of ammunition in order to 
redistribute the metal components. The move followed the wartime practice of reselling 
spent shell casings, but this time the WAC paid for the scrapping of live shells. Given 
that there were few peacetime uses for volatile ordnance, ammunition was usually 
dumped in the oceans if it could not be sold internationally. However, acting on advice 
from the Steel Controller in early 1946, the WAC instructed the Navy not to dump a 
batch of 74,799 7.2-inch shells. Instead the Corporation had the projectiles redirected to 
CAL where the ammunition was decontaminated by boiling out the explosives and then 
melting them down to recover the metals. This process, though more time consuming 
than dumping, salvaged roughly 5,600 tons of scrap steel during a period of severe 
shortages and according to the WAC’s Second Annual Report the whole procedure cost 
only $72,315 or about half the “estimated dumping cost of $145,000” and with dumping 
there was “no recovery of valuable scrap.”24  
The recycling of surplus weapon systems and buildings without land greatly 
augmented the amount of metals flowing into private hands. In fact, the quantities grew 
so significant that the WAC started allowing companies to break resale restrictions on 
surplus naval vessels sold as scrap. For example, consider the purchase of naval vessels 
by the Frankel Brothers. Originally, it purchased five destroyers and eight corvettes in 
order to reduce them to basic components and materials for resale in the peacetime 
economy. The WAC gladly unloaded these ships onto a company willing to underwrite 
the costs of scrapping and allowed Frankel Brothers to collect any profits from whatever 
was salvaged. These profits could be substantial, as corvettes alone were said to have “a 
thousand-odd” tons of salvageable steel (especially steel plates), excluding the engines, 
wiring, and other fittings which were sold separately (if not removed by the WAC prior 
to the sale). Indeed, the value of the steel and other salvageable components was certainly 
in excess of the $10,000 purchase price.
25
 The only condition attached to the sale of ships 
for scrap was that they could never be resold as a ship. In other words, any warship sold 
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25
 CWM, Democracy at War, “Gallant Corvette Reaches Hamilton on Final Journey,” Hamilton Spectator, 
17 October 1945. 
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as scrap could not be resold to a third party in its primary form or to fulfill its intended 
function without the WAC’s approval. On paper this policy made good sense and 
prompted special procedures for the WAC’s Clearance teams (in coordination with the 
Navy) to “demilitarize” (or remove all armaments and ammunition) every vessel before 
being sent to one of the WAC’s ship graveyards.26  
However, like with so many other things, this resale condition was incredibly 
difficult to enforce. Inevitably some reckless companies resold surplus vessels despite the 
restrictions, especially if the third party was willing to pay a premium, had the necessary 
export permits, and the original purchaser was willing to risk being blacklisted by the 
WAC for breaking its resale restrictions.
27
 In the case of the Frankel Brothers and their 
corvettes, just a few months after finalizing their transactions with the WAC, a joint 
opportunity arose with two other businesses (the International Iron and Metal Company 
and Dominion Foundries) that had also purchased large numbers of corvettes for 
scrapping purposes. The three companies were approached by a fourth, Victory Transport 
and Metal, which had lost out on the original bidding process but still wanted to purchase 
twenty corvettes to operate as cargo vessels. No doubt wishing to maintain his insider 
privileges with the WAC, Egmont Frankel brought the opportunity to the attention of the 
Corporation’s General Manager.  
In yet another example of the type of corporate favouritism ingrained into the 
WAC’s operations, the Board of Directors easily approved a renegotiated sales agreement 
with all three companies that allowed them to pool the assets together for resale to 
Victory Transport, while the WAC received a 30-percent commission on the total return 
(or about $6,000).
28
 That three companies engaged in the scrap business and metal 
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 DHH, 81/5200/8000-8000, Box 242, File: 10, “Statement on War Assets Corporation Operations in the 
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industry parted with some valuable 
sources of metallic scrap (a key ingredient 
in steel manufacturing) is not an 
insignificant event. It demonstrates that, 
not only was there a strong postwar 
demand for naval and cargo ships, but also 
that a flood of recycled metals was 
entering the postwar domestic economy. 
In other words, these three companies 
already had sufficient stocks that they 
could spare several ships’ worth of metals.  
The sale of ships for scrap was a 
common method of disposal and very 
profitable for shipyards and foundries. 
While several classifications of 
decommissioned ships were better suited 
for peacetime work – such as the Fort- and 
Victory-class cargo ships – the RCN’s 
surplus war ships often suffered a different 
fate. In many instances, destroyers, 
frigates, and corvettes were either sold to 
foreign interests in a demilitarized state or 
they were taken apart for their materials, as was the case with the destroyer and seven 
frigates purchased by Halifax Shipyards Ltd. By late 1947, Halifax Shipyards had 
purchased HMCS Chaudiere, Capilano, Springhill, Fort Wentworth, St. John, Kirkland 
Lake, Port Colborne, and Montreal for scrapping purposes and an arrangement with the 
Dominion Steel Corporation in Sydney gave that metal manufacturer a monopoly on all 
the salvaged metals derived from the scrapping operations. Following a similar pattern as 
 
Photo 13: An advertisement in the Globe and 
Mail for the sale of surplus naval vessels for 
scrapping purposes. These types of 
advertisements were a common method for 
attracting potential customers. Source: CWM, 
Democracy at War, “For Sale” Globe and Mail, 
12 October 1945. 
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the Frankel Brothers, sometime in 1948-1949 Halifax Shipyards paid the WAC a $5,000 
“increase in selling price” so it could resell the HMCS Capilano “as a going ship.”29 
The diligent disposal of materials and resources was a boon for businesses that used 
them for manufacturing new things. In the case of metals, the WAC was able to provision 
the economy with a solid supply that helped attenuate the severity of shortages in this 
critical sector. However, the Corporation took action to alleviate the supply shortages in 
other areas as well. Through an extensive and systematic demolition program of surplus 
factories and military facilities, the WAC successfully recovered large caches of building 
materials required in home and commercial construction. While it is important to 
recognize that the Corporation never sought to remedy the whole supply situation on its 
own, its actions did produce many beneficial results for corporations and, to a lesser 
extent, their customers. In effect, the WAC’s actions took some of the edge off the supply 
crisis because the shortages in building materials (like that of metals) would have been 
worse had surpluses not been available. Therefore, the destruction of buildings was not 
undertaken as a means of cutting storage or maintenance costs (like with aircraft); rather 
demolition could be expensive and was done out of a desperate need for redistributing 
parts and materials to new construction projects. 
In January 1946, the WAC’s Supply Department established a Surplus Property 
Branch to take “direct charge of the physical demolition” of surplus buildings or arrange 
for contracts with private demolition firms.
30
 By March 1947, thirty-three sites had been 
demolished and another twenty-five were completed a year later. At each location, a wide 
assortment of barracks, guard towers, fences, bunkers, hangars, factory buildings, 
warehouses, and administrative buildings were torn down for their components. In some 
cases, the demolition could be extensive and expensive, especially if the WAC was 
required to return the land back to its original state. For instance, one unnamed 
demolition project required the Surplus Property Branch to demolish reinforced concrete 
bunkers and turn the area into a baseball diamond. Although the costs of demolition were 
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 LAC, RG24, Vol. 3547, File: 8000-30 Vol. 4, Halifax Shipyards Ltd. to Naval Secretary, 17 November 
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high and far exceeded potential profits, the value derived from them was “dynamic” 
according to Berry, who had to justify continuing the expenses to his fellow Board 
members in April 1947.
31
  
The “dynamic” value to which Berry referred was tied to the purposes for which 
the salvaged components were reused: the construction of homes. During the war, a 
significant amount of internal and inter-provincial migration occurred when Canada’s 
stagnant economy burst to life. Full employment meant that jobs were plentiful, but 
usually located in urban centres or industrial areas, while wartime investments also 
spurred growth in small towns or strategic areas all out of proportion to local 
demographic and economic conditions. This resulted in a major accommodation crisis 
whenever and wherever workers relocated for their new jobs. The influx of soldiers and 
defence spending compounded the crisis in cities and places that were not prepared to 
handle the population boom. As the war ended, veterans only accentuated the crisis.
32
  
Although widespread complaints and frustration surfaced in every part of the 
country, there was some cautious optimism in government circles near the end of 1945. 
As Howe told Carmichael and J. G. Godsoe, the chairman of the WICB, in a memo about 
improving the supply of building materials “I am satisfied that building will expand 
rapidly,” but foreshadowing the future problem, he added that “it would be a pity if this 
expansion were to be held back by a lack of certain lines of material. I do not think that 
lumber will continue to be the bottleneck. It will probably be items such as roofing, 
plumbing, wall board, etc.”33 A few months later, a survey of manufacturers in the 
building materials trade found that companies producing materials for housing 
construction were expecting to maintain 1945 levels or increase production in 1946, if 
they could get sufficient labour. This would help alleviate some of the shortages running 
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rampant in the last quarter of the year.
34
 The report, while not overly scientific, did 
provide policymakers with some continuing assurances about their economic policies and 
expenditures, but that optimism was soon exposed as complacency when labour strife 
mixed with soaring demand and production delays. In effect, all estimates for 1946 were 
thrown off and officials in the DRS were caught somewhat unprepared.  
Shortages in building materials were so severe that they torpedoed construction 
projects and a large portion of the CMHC’s plans. Both private enterprise and the two 
crown companies established to build homes, Wartime Housing Ltd. and Housing 
Enterprises Ltd., struggled to match their wartime achievements. The pressure to meet 
demands for accommodation for veterans was overwhelming as the velocity of 
demobilization picked up. In May 1945, the Services discharged 5,919 veterans and in 
July they released another 15,393. By January 1946 they were expecting to discharge 
30,000 veterans per month.
35
 According to Peter Neary a total of 395,013 veterans were 
discharged in 1945 and another 381,031 in 1946. This amounted to more than 1,000 
veterans returning to civilian life every day, each of whom had been clothed, fed, and 
sheltered by the military during the war, but now ex-soldiers were searching for adequate 
accommodations for themselves and their families.
36
 In some parts of the country, a 
system of emergency shelters was used by the DND so that veterans had somewhere to 
sleep. The DND often repurposed empty barracks or vacant buildings that were in the 
process of being declared surplus, while local Rehabilitation Committees struggled to 
find space for the surging influx of humans in their communities. However, these 
arrangements were not very satisfactory for veterans in search of postwar stability, while 
the continuing use of military facilities slowed the DND’s surplus declarations and 
demobilization plans.
37
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Emergency controls on materials and construction equipment were reinstituted by 
the WICB so that Wartime Housing and Housing Enterprises received priority access to 
the supplies they needed for building homes for veterans.
38
 However, the government’s 
actions were not well received by the construction industry. Many complaints about 
access and shortages reached the Building Materials Sub-Committee of the WICB 
through its correspondence with construction companies and business associations.
39
 
Perhaps Claude C. Chappell, President of the Nova Scotian construction company 
Chappells Ltd., voiced the concerns of industry most succinctly when he wrote 
government officials that “the policy of Wartime Housing Limited to bypass regular 
dealers and commandeer the products of manufacturers of building supplies will 
seriously cripple private enterprise and if carried out make it impossible for us to meet 
the demands of our customers…or to meet our obligations to postwar rehabilitation.”40 
Mayors, city clerks, and local rehabilitation committees joined business interests by 
mailing dozens of letters to the government, most of which ended up at Godsoe’s office, 
demanding action to relieve the shortages or remove controls.
41
 Reassuring responses 
acknowledged the problem, but there was little that the WICB could do. Production had 
dried up and new goods were in very short supply. 
To do its part in offsetting the shortages and ameliorating the housing crisis, the 
WAC did two dynamic things. First, its Surplus Property Branch and real estate 
appraisers surveyed all buildings and real estate under its care. If the property or 
buildings were deemed suitable for housing they were sold to municipalities and cities for 
10 percent of the original value, and in August 1945 the Board of Directors approved this 
momentous policy.
42
 Judging from surviving evidence this was the only occasion at 
which the WAC formally departed from its well-entrenched “no discount” policy and 
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offered surplus property at artificially depreciated values. For the WAC the peace 
dividend was not always financial, as the housing crisis and material shortages were 
forcing its hand. Almost immediately municipalities took advantage and a whole array of 
buildings, huts, drill halls, armouries, camps, and hangers deemed suitable for housing 
purposes were liquidated for pennies on the dollar. 
There is no shortage of examples. The WAC’s annual reports note a minimum of 
114 different sales of “real estate” or “buildings without land” to municipalities, cities, or 
townships from 1945 to 1948. Many other sales took place but they went unrecorded in 
the annual reports because the discounted selling price dropped the total below the $5,000 
threshold needed for inclusion in the reports’ sales lists. For instance, in Calgary, the City 
Commissioner, V. A. Newhall, negotiated with Berry to purchase several “hutments at #2 
Wireless School for ex-service men’s accommodation.”43 The city agreed to purchase 
two one-storey huts (#8 and #9) for $1,440 each and a single two-storey hut (#25) for 
$3,520. The city then paid for the huts to be converted into eighty apartments. When the 
renovations were finished, the city purchased two other two-storey huts (#26 and #30) 
and renovated them into ninety-six “smaller suites.”44  
Given the number of excess military bases and federal properties at war’s end, the 
WAC became a preferred source of real estate for provincial and municipal governments, 
especially if the army camps, barracks, hangers, and other facilities were cheap and easily 
converted to apartment-style accommodations. Some of the larger sales recorded in the 
annual reports included one for 264.52 acres of lands and buildings that formerly 
comprised an “army brigade camp” at Port Alberni to the municipal government. The 
City of Sherbrooke bought 60.5 acres and fifty buildings of the local army camp.
45
 
Dozens of buildings were also sold at former BCATP aerodromes or other unneeded 
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RCAF bases, including Oshawa, North Bay, Jarvis, Gananoque, Port Albert, and St. 
Eugene – to name only those in Ontario.46 
The WAC was being overly generous and recouped only a fraction of the original 
value on these sales. For instance, the Port Alberni encampment returned only $70,000 to 
the government, while the profits from the Sherbrooke sale amounted to $34,500. In 
Saskatoon, the WAC sold to the provincial government “for housing purposes” a group 
of army buildings originally valued at $405,129 for $32,500 or 8 percent of the original 
value. In Calgary, some RCAF buildings were sold to the city “for housing purposes” for 
$15,594, but the buildings had originally cost $195,558. In Vancouver, a group of army 
huts were sold to the University of British Columbia “for housing purposes” at 10 percent 
of the original value or $8,275.
47
 Of course the sale of buildings and real estate did not 
provide an immediate relief to the crisis, as it usually took about eight weeks for cities to 
find the necessary materials and a contractor to complete the renovations. Yet the WAC’s 
discounted prices and sheer number of surplus facilities spread across the country 
provided a frugal starting point to address postwar housing issues, particularly for 
veterans.
48
 Thus, instead of recouping money, the WAC assisted in deriving other forms 
of value from surplus facilities.
49
  
The second dynamic thing the WAC did to address the housing crisis was to target 
surplus buildings for salvage and demolition. According to the official policies of the 
Lands and Buildings Department, surplus property was always disposed of to the “best 
financial advantage consistent with the use to which they are put” and in the best interests 
of supporting “employment, housing, education, vocational training, institutional 
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purposes, and the reconstruction effort generally.”50 However, sometimes the “best 
advantage” lay in the value of the parts and not the whole. In consultation with the 
CMHC, the Lands and Buildings Department appraised every structure and then decided 
whether or not to demolish it. If the site was tagged for demolition then all materials 
(including, among other things, timber, electrical wiring, piping, plumbing fixtures, 
window and door frames, and nails) recovered were sold first to Wartime Housing and 
Housing Enterprises, and then to private contractors. Therefore, most salvaged materials 
assisted in building houses.  
Despite the fact that the totals returned to the economy were not substantial by 
comparison to wartime production statistics, the recovery of nails was arguably one of the 
most extensive, tedious, and necessary salvage efforts initiated by the Corporation. After 
all, the construction of houses and buildings cannot occur without nails and strikes in the 
steel industry greatly curtailed the production of all types, especially the 2½-, 3-, and 4-
inch types that were used in home construction. Canadian nail production in 1945 
averaged about 117,000 kegs per month (or about 11.7 million lbs.) and there were 
expectations of increasing this total in 1946 in order to supply the building program. 
However, the “strike-vexed nail supply” imploded those projections and severely 
truncated the 1946 building season.
51
 E. A. Taylor, the Field Executive Assistant to the 
Steel Controller, wrote to Godsoe’s office to explain the situation “owing to a lack of 
man-power in the steel mills and particularly at the nail machines, production of nails in 
Canada, at present, is at the level of about 75% of the peak production attained in 1941.” 
The difference, according to Taylor, amounted to “about 20,000 tons, or 400,000 kegs.”52 
It would only decrease further. 
Although the export of nails was severely truncated by the WICB, the strikes 
exacerbated the situation throughout 1946. With hardware stores running out, desperate 
builders and construction companies turned to the black market where nails sold for an 
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outrageous $15, $18, or $20 a keg (the WPTB price ceiling was $4.37 per keg).
53
 In order 
to salvage nails and alleviate the situation as best it could, the WAC resorted to some 
extra-ordinary measures. In the fall of 1946, as the WAC demolished buildings at the 
RCAF’s No. 1 Equipment Depot in Toronto and the DIL cordite plant at Transcona in 
Winnipeg, Clearance teams used mine detectors to discover nails and “a huge electro-
magnet” drawn by a tractor to collect them.54 Afterwards some unlucky employee was 
tasked with working out the “kinks” in each used nail. In effect, the WAC employed an 
“official nail-straightener” on all its reclamation projects. As one Globe and Mail reporter 
jokingly explained to readers, “if you’ve banged your fingers recently trying to straighten 
old nails you may be somewhat consoled to learn the Government is in the same 
predicament.”55  
 Certainly the WAC could never 
hope to reclaim enough nails to fill the 
skyrocketing demand. In fact, the total 
number of nails recouped was a drop 
in the bucket compared to wartime 
production statistics.
56
 According to 
tabulations in the WAC’s annual 
reports (as shown in Tables 7 and 8) 
the WAC’s demolition programs 
yielded thirty tons in 1946-1947 and 
422,655 lbs in 1947-1948, or about 672 and 4,226 kegs of nails respectively.
57
 However, 
in a materially-starved marketplace every little bit helped, particularly since a substantial 
amount of building supplies recovered were sold on priority claims to Wartime Housing 
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Table 7: Materials Salvaged from the 
Demolition of Surplus Buildings, 1946-
1947 
Kinds of Material 
Total Amount 
Salvaged 
Lumber 17,019,824 fbm 
Wall Board 4,188,203 sq. ft. 
Electric cable (all kinds) 1,170,512 L. F. 
Piping (all sizes) 203,669 L. F. 
Conduit 40,713 L. F. 
Windows - complete 7,269 units 
Doors – complete 4,704 units 
Nails 30 tons 
Source: War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, 
(April 1, 1946 to March 31, 1947), 12. 
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and Housing Enterprises. Additionally, from 1944 to 1949 the WAC sold at least 384 
complete buildings, houses, and hangars to these two crown companies thereby ensuring 
that an even larger (though unrecorded) amount of materials and accommodations were 
redistributed.
58
 In supplying what it could to the marketplace, the WAC was doing its part 
in bridging the country between war and peace.  
Nails were not the only things salvaged from dismantled buildings. Door and 
window frames, plumbing supplies, and lumber were also recouped and, while the totals 
barely matched wartime production, their timely redistribution when shortages reigned 
helped prevent the supply situation from deteriorating further. The largest single 
demolition project was at Debert, where 443 surplus buildings at the army base were 
dismantled by the private contractor Brookfield Construction. The Debert demolition 
project cost the WAC $451,019 in total, or a little less than the combined costs of the 
second and third largest projects, Camp Borden ($287,060) and the DIL factory in Nobel 
($216,977).
59
 It is estimated that the Debert camp alone provided 6 million feet of lumber 
cut in various sizes and an unrecorded number of window and door frames, plumbing 
fixtures, heating equipment, and electrical stores.
60
 In total, all the WAC’s demolition 
programs from 1946-1948 recouped almost 44,000 windows and frames, over 17,400 
doors and frames, over 630,000 feet of piping (all types), and thousands of other items in 
short supply. 
 Although the demolition of military bases yielded significant supplies, the majority 
of recycled building materials were derived from dismantling munitions factories. Since 
private industry was not willing to invest heavily in the production of items without many 
peacetime applications, the majority of Canada’s shell filling and explosives operations 
were funded through the DMS and run by the crown company Allied War Supplies 
Corporation (AWSC). Moreover, since the government knew it would not fund 
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production indefinitely, the majority of these factories were built as temporary structures. 
Once the PDC finished decontamination, some were dismantled. Some factories were 
simply gigantic; the DIL factory in St. Paul l’Hermite (the Cherrier plant) outside 
Montreal contained about 450 buildings and covered fifteen square kilometres, while the 
DIL Bouchard plant in Ste. Therese had 466 buildings on 2,130 acres.
61
 In total, the 
WAC demolished 3.767 million sq. ft. or about 13-percent of the total industrial floor 
space constructed by the DMS (the largest sites were Ste. Therese, Villeray, Nobel, and 
Transcona). Lumber was reclaimed 
in large amounts from these 
demolition projects, as Ste. Therese 
yielded three million feet of wood 
and Transcona another ten million 
feet. Therefore, a significant portion 
of the forty million feet of lumber 
recouped by the WAC in 1946-1948 
came from dismantling munitions 
factories. The pamphlet Disposal 
and Peacetime Use of Crown Plant 
Buildings estimated that the lumber 
alone was enough to construct 9,000 
homes during a time of severe 
housing and accommodation 
shortages.
62
 
While alleviating the housing 
crisis was an important goal, demolition was not ideal. Instead, renovation was 
sometimes the best course of action for the 33.5 million sq. ft. of industrial space 
constructed by the government during the war. As Appendix 1 shows, a majority or 51 
percent of all floor space was sold to private industries, while the government retained 37 
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Table 8: Materials Salvaged from the 
Demolition of Surplus Buildings, 1947-1948 
Kinds of Material 
Total Amount 
Salvaged 
Doors and frames  12,764 units 
Windows and frames  36,530 units 
Lumber 25,621,753 fbm 
Composition wallboard 6,176,055 sq. ft. 
Pipes (all types) 430,457 L. F. 
Fittings (all types) 191,955 units  
Plumbing fixtures 10,752 units 
Tanks – H. W. – storage  298 units  
Heater – jacket 145 units 
Radiators  4,311 units  
Wire – electrical 671,969 L. F. 
Conduit – electrical 23,580 L. F. 
Switches – panel circuit 
transformers 
12,168 units 
Iron – corrugated sheets 42,796 sq. ft. 
Nails - assorted 422,655 lbs. 
Source: War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual Report, 
(April 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948), 9. 
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percent. Although across individual categories the amount sold to private interests was 
considerably higher, some of the floor space retained by the crown ended up being used 
by businesses anyway. Most of the floor space was purchased outright by big businesses 
– usually the tenants that had occupied it during the war – so officials in the DRS 
recognized that support for small and medium businesses had to be provided through 
special arrangements. The WAC operated one set of these arrangements through its 
multiple tenancy initiative that redeployed industrial floor space and equipment at several 
former munitions plants in Toronto and Montreal. These sites were decontaminated, 
cleared of unneeded tools and materials, sub-divided into smaller units, and favourably 
leased to businesses. Overall, approximately ninety tenants benefitted from renting floor 
space in former weapons factories and a host of new goods were produced.
63
  
The multiple tenancy initiative owed its origins to the political pressure from 
politicians, medium- and small-business owners, and “a number of ex-servicemen going 
into business for the first time.”64  Over the summer of 1945 and in consultation with the 
Industrial Reconversion Branch, G. H. S. Dinsmore, the WAC’s Director of Lands and 
Buildings, became a de facto landlord who oversaw the clearance of facilities, the 
division of floor space into smaller parcels, the provision of favourable six-year lease 
agreements, and rent collection.
65
 In other words, the WAC converted industrial facilities 
that had been some of the most productive munitions factories during the war into smaller 
parcels so that small and medium businesses could afford the floor space to manufacture 
their products in a period dominated by steep prices for industrial real estate. In fact, the 
WAC bent over backwards to help these smaller companies; since the leases were so 
favourable the WAC ran a deficit keeping the buildings in operation, as the revenue 
barely covered operational expenses.
66
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 Three locations were chosen for conversion into multiple tenancies, two in 
Montreal and one in Toronto. The Toronto facility, located at 37 Hanna Avenue and 
renamed the Liberty Buildings, was used by the John Inglis Company during the war to 
manufacture Bren guns. A portion of this large complex, totalling about 287,000 sq. ft., 
was cordoned off from the rest of the Inglis plant, which was converting its 
manufacturing operations from Bren guns to fishing tackle, house trailers, home 
appliances, domestic heaters, and many other items.
67
 The space was advertised by a 
rental agency over the fall of 1945 and eventually it was split between eighteen clients 
that employed about 1,700 workers that manufactured a wide range of goods including, 
oil burners, decorative glassware, 
electrical instruments, pens and 
pencils, and valves and fittings. 
According to the pamphlet Disposal 
and Peacetime Use of Crown Plant 
Buildings, three clients were 
manufacturing products new to 
Canadian industry.
68
    
The two multiple tenancy 
projects in Montreal were established 
in former DIL factories that produced 
vast quantities of small arms 
ammunition for Brens and Lee Enfield 
rifles: Montreal Works (renamed the Crown Industrial Building) located at 9600 St. 
Lawrence Blvd. in the city’s north central Villeray district; and Verdun Works (renamed 
the Verdun Industrial Building) located at 435 River St. on the southwestern coast of the 
Island of Montreal. Just as in Toronto, the buildings were decontaminated, cleared, 
converted, divided, and rented out to small- and medium-sized businesses. The Crown 
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Photo 14: Advertisement seeking tenants for the 
Liberty Buildings, Toronto, Ontario. Source: Toronto 
Star, 17 September 1945, 12. 
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Industrial Building had thirty tenants, a cafeteria, a bank branch, and a WAC warehouse 
located on site. It employed 2,200 people and manufactured a range of products, from 
men’s and women’s clothing to electronic equipment. In Verdun there were thirty-five 
tenants and 2,500 employees producing more than thirty kinds of goods, from 
pharmaceuticals and processed foods, to clothing and electric razors. Apparently, sixteen 
of these items were products new to Canadian manufacturing.
69
  
Moreover, the WAC was not the only crown company to create multiple tenancy 
projects. CAL occupied roughly five million sq. ft. of government-owned floor space 
after the war, but most of it was left in “stand by” condition while its storage 
requirements and future production needs were sorted out. In the intervening time, CAL 
leased a number of buildings to private firms in Montreal and Toronto. One of the old 
Small Arms Ltd. buildings, totalling 318,000 sq. ft., was sub-divided to accommodate 
seventeen tenants producing many things, from men’s hats to photographic supplies.70 
Although the WAC had little to do with what tenants produced, its multiple tenancy 
projects demonstrate how the Corporation could facilitate the redeployment of surplus 
buildings to bring a positive impact on postwar economic stability. These efforts fit into 
the wider framework of government action plans since the Corporation was not the only 
public organization supporting reconversion as many federal departments, agencies, and 
the military actively supported reconstruction and rehabilitation through a variety of 
different methods, such as the “rent to a vet” campaign or vocational training programs.71  
Starting Points for Peace: Reusing Surplus Assets 
During the transition period between war and peace, munitions and supplies gained 
new uses and meanings in civilian life. Yet objects cannot choose their forms, functions, 
and intentions. Rather, those elements of their existence are imposed, colonized, or 
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created by their human owners.
72
 If the objects of war were to transition into useful 
peacetime purposes, their redeployment had to be controlled by human agency. Humans 
chose what things remained useful and which ones required modifications or destruction. 
Therefore, material demobilization was not a neutral process. Competing interests and 
intentions shaped disposal since everyone wanted to acquire assets in order to fulfill 
postwar ambitions. In effect, objects were essential to every postwar plan – whether those 
of businesses or individual citizens or government departments – and everyone needed 
things to improve living standards, attain goals, and profit. However, objects, or rather 
the lack thereof, could also be a chief obstacle to fulfilling postwar plans and aspirations, 
as their overall utility was curbed by the reality of finite supply, depreciating values, and 
deteriorating conditions. 
At the head of this process of material demobilization was the WAC. While it had 
little control over the assets once they left its possession, the WAC maintained control 
over their redeployment and redistribution through collection, storage, and sales. This 
allowed the Corporation’s staff to determine which objects were suitable for peacetime 
service, regulated who could acquire them, and to a lesser extent, help end users devise 
new uses for the objects they purchased. Contrary to the public criticism from Brown and 
other sources, the WAC did not just sell surpluses to big businesses or indiscriminately 
destroy them. If someone could pass the WAC’s screening process, had a strong business 
plan, could demonstrate some experience in the trade, and had the capital to cover down 
payments, then the Corporation was more than happy to do business. In other words, the 
overt corporate favouritism built into its mandate and operations did not preclude the 
reuse of objects purchased directly from its inventories. Nor did it preclude the reuse of 
objects resold by middlemen to end users. In fact, the WAC recognized and promoted the 
residual value and versatility of some of its products in order to boost sales and provision 
the postwar economy.  
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Many different types of government surpluses maintained residual value without 
major modifications. As we have seen, businesses were quite worried about these 
particular assets being reused in the civilian economy since they had the potential to 
scuttle markets for new goods. However, the government was not about to destroy these 
valuable assets for the sake of corporate profits and it recirculated them through 
established manufacturers and dealers. This gave businesses an opportunity to re-acquire 
their wartime production, refurbish it (or recondition it to meet civilian standards), and 
then resell it to end users. Motor vehicles, radio equipment, office furniture, electrical 
equipment, textiles, and a whole host of other types of goods were disposed of in this 
manner. Department stores and corporations specializing in consumer goods profited 
substantially from the reuse of surplus items, particularly since they were not benefiting 
from government economic priorities. In some respects, refurbished surpluses served as a 
stop-gap measure while the production of new goods restarted.  
Some department stores made an entire business out of the reusability of military 
surpluses. From 1944 to 1948, the Army & Navy Department Stores Ltd. in Regina, 
Edmonton, and Vancouver spent at least $259,521 acquiring thousands of different items. 
In 1947-1948 alone, it bought 25,453 woollen blankets, 9,530 aviation suits, 4,495 pairs 
of army boots, 5,150 pairs of trousers, 1,200 men’s serge blouses, 942,176 yards of nylon 
braided cord, 70,359 lbs. of rope, and 50,253 bed springs.
73
 All these items stocked 
shelves in stores during the immediate postwar period and sometimes customers were not 
even aware they were purchasing repackaged surplus goods. As Howe explained during 
his October 1944 radio broadcast “you may have bought some without knowing they 
were war surplus materials because they are unused goods and the corporation has 
disposed of them through the normal channels of trade.”74 It would seem that companies 
like Army & Navy Stores outfitted an entire generation of camping equipment and 
outdoor activities with new and old military gear that they acquired. 
A particular pattern in the sales of consumable goods is plainly obvious when 
examining the WAC’s sales data. Companies specializing in consumer products 
                                                 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, Radio Speech on CBC by C. D. Howe, 23 October 1944, 3. 
  
266 
 
purchased them for resell during a time when many were struggling to retool their 
factories or find new suppliers. For instance, General Steel Wares Ltd. bought back some 
of its household goods and resources for future production. In 1945-1946 it acquired 
70,000 enamel bowls, $6,379 worth of kitchen cutlery, $11,884 worth of machine tools 
and equipment, and 2,557,858 lbs. of steel sheets in five separate transactions.
75
 Textiles 
and clothing were purchased for resale in large amounts as well. The Canadian Overall 
Company bought 12,555 pairs of khaki overalls and 10,740 pairs of gloves, while the 
Canadian Hardware and Novelty Company purchased thousands of dollars’ worth of 
textiles and clothing for its business, including 15,300 pairs of khaki dress trousers and 
$39,670 worth of anti-gas equipment. Novack’s, a prominent company in London, 
Ontario, specializing in uniforms and clothing, bought 2,425 pairs of men’s black ankle 
boots in 1947-1948.
76
 The T. Eaton Company purchased a fair amount of surplus textiles, 
clothing, footwear, cafeteria equipment, and even some automotive parts and equipment, 
including 4,500 cardigans, 8,993 men’s combinations, 1,182 pairs of new winter boots, 
364 Tarpaulin assemblies, and 1,155 rear curtains for vehicles.
77
 Thus, whole generations 
of surplus items ended up on department store shelves either passed off as new items or 
mixed in with the trickle of new goods. 
Radio and electronics equipment were similarly scooped up by corporations 
specializing in the trade. The WAC’s biggest customer in this field was Canadian General 
Electric, which spent $3,168,038 from 1944 to 1948. Roughly half of that total was spent 
on purchasing lands and buildings, including the Montreal Locomotive Works, a large 
building in Peterborough, Ontario, another at 5400 Hochelaga St. in Montreal, and 
several old RCAF hangers in Amherst and Pennfield Ridge, Nova Scotia. The rest of its 
investment was spent on Mazda lamps, radio tubes, and vacuum tubes.
78
 Canadian 
Westinghouse made similar transactions, though it spent only $1,269,892 on several 
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purchases of machine tools, office equipment, typewriters, and furniture.
79
 Not only did 
these types of purchases enable both companies to resell products for profit, they also 
acquired important parts and electronic equipment, while better positioning themselves to 
expand production once the floor space and machinery were up and running.  For 
consumers and hobbyists, which included a fair number of veterans who had served as 
radio operators during the war, the first generation of postwar radio sets and parts they 
purchased from these companies were often old military models. As Kristen Haring 
explained in Ham Radio’s Technical Culture, old military models dominated the North 
American marketplace during the late 1940s. Moreover, surplus radio equipment was 
particularly appealing to hobbyists since it required significant technical engagement to 
tinker, repair, and modify. The postwar popularity of surplus radio equipment was 
reflected in the frequency of instructional articles in hobby magazines: CQ alone 
published ninety-nine articles on the subject between 1945 and 1955.
80
 
Public utilities and companies specializing in communications technologies 
purchased surplus radios, electronics, and other equipment from the WAC. The largest 
single purchase of electrical wiring was made by Universal Electric Company based in 
Montreal. For $6,122 it purchased 1,195,759 feet of “electrical wire and cable on reels.” 
Dominion Wire, Rope & Cable Company, the Hydro Electric Power Commission of 
Ontario, Saskatchewan Power Commission, Bell Telephone Company, Rogers Majestic 
Corporation, Wartime Housing Ltd., and an assortment of scrap metal dealers also 
purchased a variety of other surplus electrical stores, equipment, telephone lines, wires, 
transmission stations, and specialized factory floor space.
81
 Perhaps the single most 
important utility to be sold by the WAC was the Pacific Communications System. This 
network was built during the war to provide reliable communications within British 
Columbia, particularly between the interior and coastal regions. The Pacific 
Communications System was constructed as a joint effort by the government, all three 
Services (the RCAF operated it during the war), and several companies including the B. 
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C. Telephone Company. In mid-1946, the WAC decided “in the best interests of the 
public and all concerned” to sell the grid to B. C. Telephone, Canadian National 
Telegraphs, and Dominion Government Telegraphs so they could operate a reliable 
communications system from Victoria and Vancouver, to Prince George and Prince 
Rupert. Although it is difficult to calculate how much these companies paid for the 
facilities, they acquired a vast network of teletype and telephone circuits supported by 
16,500 miles of wire, 63,000 poles, and several power stations and switchboard sites.
82
  
   As might be expected, Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, purchased large 
amounts of motor vehicles, parts, equipment, production machinery, and some real estate. 
These big three car 
companies purchased a 
combined $10,587,978 
worth of surpluses from 
the WAC. The most 
common purchases 
were, unsurprisingly, 
motor transport spare 
parts, engines, trucks, 
and machine tools. Ford 
and Chrysler purchased 
the bulk of materials 
during the 1946-1947 
fiscal year and immediately put them into production lines or distributed them back 
through their established supply networks.
83
 Smaller car manufacturers and dealers also 
purchased from the WAC. For instance, Evans Motors Ltd. in Scarborough, Ontario 
bought ten 1942-model Ford Lorries and fifteen 1942-model Ford 3-ton trucks. The 
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Photo 15 View of rows of parts used to make army vehicles at the 
Ford Motor Co. plant. Most of these vehicles were for British forces. 
Photo was taken in March 1941. Source: LAC, National Film Board of 
Canada, Copy Negative: PA-117534 
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Toronto Motor Car Ltd. and Victoria Motors Ltd., based in Niagara Falls, purchased 
large amounts of spare parts as well as 1942- and 1943-model Ford trucks and fourteen 
personnel carriers (seven each).
84
 Another company specializing in the manufacture of 
automotive parts and accessories, Automotive Hardware Ltd., purchased $116,790 worth 
of motor transport spare parts and 134.3 net tons of nuts and bolts.
85
 Much like the radio 
manufacturers, these companies acquired assets to resell and parts to continue their 
maintenance businesses well into the postwar period. 
Practically every company involved in the aircraft industry purchased items from 
the WAC. Canadair Ltd. and Trans-Canada Air Lines purchased large amounts of 
equipment and real estate. Hangars and buildings at airports in Dorval, Moncton, and 
Winnipeg account for most of Trans-Canada’s purchases. However, some anecdotal 
evidence suggests that Trans-Canada was able to purchase thirty C-47 (DC3) twin-
engined Dakota transport aircraft stationed in Canada directly from the American firm 
Douglas Aircraft Company. This purchase did not involve the WAC, but the planes 
apparently remained in service until 1963.
86
 Canadair spent $4,152,852 on a variety of 
parts, equipment, vehicles, and Pratt & Whitney engines. However, the bulk of its 
expenditures ($3,886,821) were for the vaguely termed “Group Sales of Materials in 
Several Classifications” in Cartierville, Quebec, and therefore it is unknown exactly what 
was purchased.
87
 Several other smaller airlines availed themselves to the WAC’s 
inventories. Maritime Central Airways bought most of its Lockheed fleet from the 
Corporation, while MacKenzie Air Service Ltd., Hamiltair Ltd., Yukon Southern Air 
Transport Ltd., Superior Airways Ltd., and Thunder Bay Air Lines Ltd. bought a variety 
of Norseman, Lockheed, Cessna, and Gruman Goose aircraft.
88
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Flying clubs benefitted from reusing surpluses, both in financial and leisure terms. 
The Algoma Air Transport Company offers an interesting example. Based in South 
Porcupine, Ontario, and owned by Mr. and Mrs. Ed Ahr, Algoma Air Transport operated 
out of the local Porcupine Flying Club. The “luxurious flying club” was built around 
1940 for $35,000 and contained a lounge, lecture room, a club room, a small dining 
room, and seven bedrooms for visiting pilots.
89
 From 1944 to 1947, the Algoma Air 
Transport and Porcupine Flying Club outfitted their operations with surplus planes. A 
total of ten Anson Vs, six Harvards, three Lockheed aircraft, eight Cessna Cranes, one 
Beechcraft, and four Oxford Vs were purchased.
90
 Flying clubs in particular were well 
positioned to benefit from surplus aircraft. Early in the war the founding President of the 
Royal Canadian Flying Clubs Association, Murton Adams Seymour, approached the 
DND about using civilian flying clubs as training centres for air force pilots. The 
Association helped to establish twenty-six clubs before 1939 and many started doubling 
as Elementary Flying Training Schools in the BCATP.
91
 After the war, flying schools 
expanded with the supply of surplus aircraft. For example, the Royal Canadian Flying 
Clubs Association purchased eleven Cessna Crane and 150 Tiger Moth training aircraft 
which it probably resold to member organizations.
92
    
Perhaps the most lucrative product sold by the WAC was the fleet of surplus cargo 
ships. In response to significant losses during the height of the Battle of the Atlantic, the 
DMS formed the Park Steamship Company in April 1942 to construct, maintain, and 
operate Canada’s rapidly expanding Merchant Marine and its growth paralleled the fifty-
fold expansion of the RCN. Shipbuilding was contracted out to shipyards in the 
Maritimes, St. Lawrence, Great Lakes, and West Coast regions which constructed a total 
of over 9,000 different ships, including roughly 800 naval and cargo vessels, 3,300 
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landing craft, and more than 5,000 other marine craft.
93
 Thus, the needs of the war effort 
had forced the state to produce and maintain a large naval force out of all proportion to 
Canada’s prewar maritime policies and, as Michael Hennessy pointed out, greatly 
confounded officials preparing postwar priorities and plans.
94
  
Policymakers and the shipping industry understood that the maintenance of a 
postwar merchant marine would require government subsidies and supervision, but they 
were leery of the accompanying economic and political baggage. Canadian exporters did 
not support a government-run merchant marine, nor were they particularly thrilled at the 
higher labour costs. Old ties to British flagged-vessels that shipped Canada’s exports 
before the war and pressure from UK officials who wanted the British to control shipping 
inside the Sterling area added more disincentives for sustaining a state-run merchant 
marine.
95
 Furthermore, once hostilities ended and the Combined Shipping Adjustment 
Board rescinded its controls over the allocation of cargo capacities, a shipping surplus 
suddenly resulted as thousands of Liberty, Victory, North Sands, and Fort class vessels 
were released from wartime service. The Americans voluntarily laid up 2,000 Liberty 
ships or roughly 50 percent of the war-built Liberty fleet in an effort to prevent a collapse 
caused by overcapacity. European Allies were not prepared to take similar actions, and 
Denmark and Norway suggested that Canada follow the American example. As Hennessy 
concluded, British actions, the industry’s preferences, and international pressures set the 
stage for the “death” of Canada’s postwar merchant marine.96  
By the spring of 1946, the political will to maintain a merchant marine had 
evaporated and officials moved to divest Canada’s fleet of cargo vessels into private 
hands. However, Cabinet decided that the liquidation of cargo vessels would occur, 
wherever possible, to Canadian companies only. According to Hennessy about 140 ships 
were retained on Canadian registry of which 110 were the large 10,000 dwt (dead-weight 
                                                 
93
 Pritchard, Bridge of Ships, 267, 292-293 
94
 Michael A. Hennessy, “World War II and the Rebirth and Death of Canada’s Merchant Marine,” Journal 
of the Canadian Historical Association, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1995), 210-226. 
95
 Ibid, 210-226. 
96
 Ibid, 221. 
  
272 
 
ton) class.
97
 However, as S. C. Heal explained, several companies were only nominally 
Canadian, as Greek merchants were liable to form Canadian subsidiaries in order to 
circumvent the restrictions and profit from the disposal of vessels.
98
 From 1945 to 1947, 
the bulk of Canada’s merchant fleet was declared surplus and disposed of through the 
WAC. In order to facilitate the sale of cargo ships, the WAC hired Park Steamship to 
operate as its agent and an agreement was signed on 7 February 1946. Park Steamship 
sold cargo vessels on fixed contracts that required a 20 percent down payment with the 
balance owing over seven years at 3½-percent interest.
99
 There were allowances for 
depreciation and war damage, but since many of the vessels were brand new these 
allowances barely affected the final prices. In total, from 1944 to 1949, the WAC 
recouped a minimum of $130,011,791 from the sale of all types of ships, ship 
components, marine craft, and parts. Of that total, the sale of Park cargo vessels 
accounted for $64,792,003 and the sale of Fort class ships brought in $28,251,406.
100
  
The residual value of cargo vessels was extremely high since their wartime function 
was identical to the one they performed in peacetime. Moreover, most of the Park and 
Fort ships required few immediate repairs or renovations before entering peacetime 
service. However, as Heal noted, many companies undertook some alterations to better 
integrate their new vessels in existing fleets. In most cases, the modifications entailed the 
improvement of crew quarters, galley accommodations, and the addition of cranes for 
improved derrick capacity. Western Canada Steamships Ltd. purchased twenty-one Park 
ships from the WAC, thirteen more than the second biggest customer, Saguenay 
Terminals Ltd. Although it did not spend much money on modifications, Western Canada 
Steamships did give each new vessel a fresh coat of paint and emblazoned its logo on the 
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hull (Saguenay Terminals did the same thing).
101
 The reuse of these cargo ships was 
further amplified by their relative youth and the potential for prolonged usage. Each 
vessel was constructed at some point between 1940 and 1945 and therefore, barring war 
damage or disaster, most cargo ships enjoyed a long postwar career until the late-1960s 
when many were decommissioned and scrapped in Asian shipyards.
102
  
Another commodity made valuable by its reusability was construction equipment. 
The rapid expansion of industrial floor space and military facilities meant that the amount 
of construction equipment owned by the Canadian government sky-rocketed. The 
demands on all forms of building materials and machinery were substantial enough to 
form a special Construction Control in the WICB. The Construction Controller ensured 
that only the most necessary building projects received licensing and a bank of significant 
construction projects was put on hold as a result.
103
 At the end of the war whatever 
equipment was not needed by the crown was liquidated. Tractors, dump trucks, cranes, 
Caterpillar Tractors, power shovels, road paving equipment, generators, drilling 
machines, pumps, and hand tools were sold to a mix of priority holders and private 
interests across the country.
104
  
Although a large portion of the equipment went to construction and paving 
companies, priority holders definitely used their privileges to secure tools and machinery. 
The Provincial Governments were particularly eager to acquire construction equipment. 
The Department of Highways and Public Works from Nova Scotia and Ontario purchased 
asphalt distributors, Crawler cranes, excavators, trucks, and other equipment.
105
 The 
Saskatchewan Reconstruction Corporation, PEI’s Department of Reconstruction, the 
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Hydro Electric Power Commission of Ontario, and the cities of Port Arthur, Winnipeg, 
Gloucester, and the village of Ormstown acquired construction equipment. The federal 
departments of Labour, Mines and Resources, Public Works, Indian Affairs, and the 
DVA also purchased construction equipment to fulfill postwar agendas.
106
 A variety of 
equipment was sold on public tenders to private contractors, equipment rental companies, 
and construction companies, such as the Power Equipment Co. based in Port Arthur or 
Western Construction Co. in Edmonton.
107
 These types of sales helped improve and 
maintain the country’s infrastructure well into the postwar period. Sales to private firms 
and government departments ensured that construction equipment was available for 
housing, highway expansion, and urban development. If this equipment was not heavily 
worn out, it was highly reusable and an essential starting point for the postwar 
construction boom.
108
 
Items acquired on priority requests were usually those most needed for supporting 
local and provincial reconstruction and rehabilitation programs. These types of sales 
demonstrate how surpluses were reused to expand social and welfare services. 
Municipalities and provincial Civil Defence Committees received priority access to air 
raid precaution equipment, warning sirens, uniforms, and personal equipment.
109
 Judging 
by the timing of the sales, firefighting equipment was an urgent need for many 
communities and provincial governments. The largest sales of surplus firefighting 
equipment occurred in the fiscal year 1945-1946. The chair of Quebec City’s Civil 
Defence Committee, J. J. Gagnon, purchased $18,108 worth of “miscellaneous 
firefighting equipment.”110 Similar purchases were made by the City of Montreal, Nova 
Scotia’s Department of Labour, and the Government of PEI. The New Brunswick 
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Government bought $28,068 worth of “pumps with tools and accessories” while the City 
of Toronto purchased a Bickle Seagrave Trailer fire pump and accessories. The 
Laurentian Forest Protective Association Ltd., based in Quebec City, purchased six 
Bickle Seagrave fire pumps and 20,000 feet of rubber-lined hose. Given that the 
Laurentian Forest Protective Association paid $8,050 for six pumps while the City of 
Toronto paid $7,099 for one, shows how the quality of surplus goods could vary 
widely.
111
  
Some of the most important items acquired on priority claims were the assets 
reused in hospitals. In total the WAC sold a minimum of $3,665,532 worth of hospital 
equipment to a variety of institutions and interest groups. By far the most frequent client 
was the DVA, though it only purchased $242,240 worth of hospital equipment, medical 
and dental supplies, bandages, pharmaceutical supplies, and some hospital buildings.
112
 
The purchases were in line with the DVA’s expanding role in providing medical services 
to veterans. As part of the Veterans’ Charter and its provisions for rehabilitating the 
nation’s servicemen and women, the DVA had promised each veteran one year’s free 
general medical service after discharge. A precursor to medicare, this program proved 
wildly successful for all able-bodied veterans but it also required the DVA to improve its 
medical facilities, construct new hospitals, and budget for medical insurance for both the 
able-bodied and permanently disabled. Foreshadowing the war’s heavy casualty rates, the 
number of hospitals operated by the DVA and by its predecessor the Department of 
Pensions and National Health grew throughout the war. In September 1939 there were 
2,720 beds available, but by April 1946, the DVA possessed 12,088 hospital beds with 
plans to acquire another 8,590 and by the end of 1946 the DND had transferred two navy, 
fourteen army, and four air force hospitals through the CAAC to the DVA.
113
 Although a 
small portion of the DVA’s medical services and expenses on rehabilitation, the reuse of 
surplus medical supplies and facilities helped improve the quality of care for veterans 
particularly during the 1946-1947 fiscal year when most of the supplies and equipment 
was purchased.  
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A large amount of medical supplies and hospital facilities were sold throughout 
Canada. Notwithstanding the significant purchases of ambulances, trucks, and medical 
supplies from by the Red Cross and the French and Dutch governments, the WAC sold 
practically everything to priority holders and companies involved in the medical supply 
or pharmaceutical industries. Canadian municipalities, provinces, hospitals, and medical 
associations purchased all manner of items from beds and buildings, to consumable 
supplies like bandages and drugs. However, some transactions were bizarre such as the 
sale of seventy-five surplus South African frogs to the Ontario Department of Health in 
December 1945 for medical experiments.
114
 Private companies purchased items vaguely 
listed as “medical supplies & equipment” and a large amount of drugs. Three companies 
and the DVA cleared out the entire inventory of sulphonamide, a family of powerful anti-
bacterial drugs used extensively to treat wounds during the Second World War. The two 
smallest purchases were made by Merck & Co. Ltd., which bought 12,512 oz. of quinine 
sulphate, and Bell & Craig Ltd., which bought 4,399,000 tablets of sulphadiazine and 
686,988 tablets of sulphaquanidine. The DVA and Mark Export & Import Ltd. made the 
biggest purchases. In one $7,685 transaction – almost $2,000 less than Merck & Co. 
Ltd.’s – the DVA bought 600,000 tablets of sulphadiazine, 50,000 of sulphaguanadine, 
and 1,000,000 of sulphathiazole. Mark Export & Import Ltd. paid $53,109 for a 
whopping 368,000 tablets of sulphathiazole, 2,000,000 of sulphaquanidine, 1,000,000 of 
sulphonamide, 4,600,000 of sulphadiazine, and 2,000,000 tablets of the malaria 
medication, Atabrine.
115
 
Educational institutions also gained much from the reuse of surpluses. In general, 
two types of educational institutions purchased from the WAC: universities and the 
Department of Labour’s Canadian Vocational Training (CVT) program. The roots of 
these purchases stemmed from the fact that both universities and the CVT were 
completely overwhelmed with veterans after the war. As Peter Neary explained, by 31 
March 1951, 53,788 and 80,110 veterans had received support to attend university or 
vocational schools respectively. The legacies of such a program were fundamental to the 
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Canada’s postwar political, economic, and social development. It trained a cadre of 
returning service personnel, many of whom might never have attained post-secondary 
education without the government’s assistance through the Veterans Rehabilitation Act. 
This enabled them to pursue their studies and find meaningful and productive work in 
civilian life. Thanks to the government’s assistance, many veterans who served as clerks, 
mechanics, radio operators, pilots, or engineers were able to take that tactical training and 
experience and reapply it to practical, civilian careers after the war.
116
 The educational 
entitlements offered under the Veterans Rehabilitation Act were the most important and 
successful provisions of Canada’s original Veterans’ Charter. 
Although the educational entitlements were successful overall, universities and 
CVT schools faced some daunting challenges while in operation. In effect, the influx of 
students was more rapid than the growth of facilities. For instance, in March 1945 there 
were 3,607 veterans in the CVT program and a year later there were 36,341. Universities 
were similarly blindsided. In 1939 there were a total of 35,164 students enrolled in 
Canadian universities, but by 1946 there about 35,000 new students enrolled and 
supported by the government. Class sizes grew in record numbers; some went from fifty 
students in one year to well over 300 in the next.
117
 The numbers were overwhelming and 
educational institutions faced serious challenges to expand facilities and procure 
materials for classroom instruction. Moreover, the overcrowding in schools was 
compounded by material shortages and production delays which meant that new goods 
and building materials were not readily available. The universities and the CVT had little 
choice but to turn to the WAC for help. Thus, educational institutions reused government 
surpluses to fulfill their important function for veterans’ rehabilitation. 
Universities scrambled to make purchases from the WAC. In Montreal, McGill 
University spent at least $114,155 on acquiring scientific and professional equipment, 
consumer goods, cafeteria equipment, barrack stores, and kitchenware. The Universities 
of Ottawa, New Brunswick, Alberta, and Saskatchewan along with Laval University 
purchased similar items. In fact, the sale of barrack stores, cafeteria equipment, and 
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buildings was common to almost every university and provides some indication of the 
most pressing issues facing schools: the space to both teach and house veterans.
118
 The 
Universities of British Columbia and Toronto were the most active in utilizing the 
WAC’s inventories. In order to meet the expanding demand for classroom space, the 
University of Toronto’s Faculty of Applied Sciences occupied an 800,000 sq. ft. section 
of the DIL plant established in Ajax, Ontario. Located twenty-five miles from campus, 
the surplus buildings and worker huts were turned into makeshift dormitories and 
classrooms. The University also purchased 2,623 tons of coal, 4,000 blankets, 500 
mattresses, and 750 chairs to heat and outfit this significant amount of new real estate.
119
 
The University of British Columbia was perhaps the most desperate institution. The 
Great Depression had struck particularly hard and few new buildings were erected in the 
decade before the war. Consequently, it was ill-prepared for the influx of student-
veterans. In coordination with a $5 million construction program, UBC bought 112 army 
huts for student housing. Other huts and buildings, which had just been evacuated by the 
military, were purchased to provide thirty-seven classrooms that could seat 4,000 
students, another thirty-six were used as laboratories for 900 students, and one three-
section hut became the university’s new Faculty Club which opened on 5 January 
1947.
120
 As the Maple Leaf newspaper reported to its readers, “built to take care of a 
maximum of approximately 2,000 students, UBC solved the accommodation problem by 
converting the facilities of war to the immediate needs of peace. Wooden huts from army 
training camps, coastal defensive stations and aerodromes were brought to the campus to 
be used for every conceivable purpose connected with the activities of a modern 
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university.”121 There is no small irony that the veterans using the makeshift facilities as 
students were also possibly the same people who had worked and lived in the huts during 
the war. 
In some respects, the CVT program was almost entirely dependent on the WAC for 
its classroom materials. As R. F. Thompson, the Director of Training in the Department 
of Labour, explained to the SCWEE, the CVT program only purchased items from 
“outside” sources if it could not get them through the WAC.122 From the late 1930s and 
throughout the war, the Department of Labour ran a series of vocational and 
apprenticeship programs in cooperation with each province. These programs helped train 
war workers and by the end of the war a new curriculum was formed to train droves of 
discharged soldiers in a variety of skilled trades work, such as electrician, plumbing, 
radio technicians, machinists, mechanics, and construction work.
123
 These trades were 
critical to Canada’s future prosperity in the postwar period, as a generation of 
vocationally-oriented professionals were trained to build and maintain the houses, roads, 
cars, gadgets, and everything else ubiquitous to an expanding consumer society.  
Yet the program would never have been successful had it not been for the 
phenomenal amount of materials and facilities it acquired from the WAC. As Table 9 
indicates, up to 31 March 1946, the WAC sold $2,005,538 to outfit the CVT with 
thousands of machine tools, machinery, radio equipment, tools, saws, gauges, engines, 
transmitters, air conditioners, scientific equipment, tractors, typewriters, desks, chairs, 
adding machines, and thousands of dollars’ worth of other instructional equipment. The 
CVT even purchased several bowling alleys from the WAC.
124
 The CVT also spent at 
least $162,998 on bedframes, sheets, blankets, mattresses, pillows, benches, couches, 
tables, chairs, kitchenware, and other miscellaneous cafeteria and barrack stores. These 
items were in short supply and desperately needed to house veterans in residences, 
especially considering that some veterans travelled great distances to attend vocational 
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schools during the peak phases. Moreover, such purchases were doubly important given 
that few soldiers had acquired many possessions or civilian-style comforts while enlisted. 
Since the government had clothed, fed, and sheltered its service personnel during the war, 
it was crucial to continue doing so until they found the means to support themselves as 
veterans in civilian life.
125
 
 
In some cases the CVT could not acquire the items it needed from the WAC. For 
instance, sometimes the WAC did not possess the equipment in its inventory or it 
prioritized the sale of some items to private interests (as was the case with certain 
machine tools). In other cases, administrative delays with the WAC forced the CVT to 
search for items elsewhere and it spent approximately $600,000 on material and 
equipment from “outside” sources, particularly in the US.126 As Thompson explained:  
I must say that what we got were obtained, for the most part, from very small 
shops; say a man, probably an older man, had a small shop and wanted to sell 
out. Our representatives were scouring the country for those things and they 
would hear about it and they would take the opportunity to buy them…we 
have had to set up a lot of shoe repair shops, barber schools, hair-dressing 
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Table 9: Sales of Material For Educational Purposes, 12 July 
1944 to 31 March 1946 
Provinces Total ($) 
Canadian 
Vocational 
Training 
Program ($) 
Educational 
Institutions 
($) 
British Columbia 110,357.24 88,371.84 22,015.40 
Alberta 233,864.64 215,493.14 18,371.50 
Saskatchewan 221,154.43 213,377.63 7,776.80 
Manitoba 94,941.48 91,095.51 3,845.97 
Ontario 1,062,203.56 899,056.22 163,147.34 
Quebec 330,911.85 232,142.59 98,769.26 
New Brunswick 177,943.15 167,852.41 10,090.74 
Nova Scotia 91,801.18 74,729.99 17,071.19 
Prince Edward Island 23,853.45 23,418.75 434.70 
Totals 2,347,060.98 2,005,538.08 341,522.90 
Source: SCWEE, 20 June 1946, (No. 24, Book 3), 785. 
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schools, and all items that we bought outside were, for the most part, items of 
that kind that were not available from War Assets.
127
  
Although veterans and their associations were denied priority access to the WAC’s 
inventory, they were clearly benefiting indirectly from the sales of surpluses to 
institutions and organizations set up to assist with rehabilitation. 
Certainly educational institutions were deriving some benefits from the availability 
of surpluses. Yet this did not always translate into a harmonious relationship nor did it 
mean that educational institutions were satisfied with the arrangements. While Thompson 
was sympathetic to the WAC’s difficulties and the logistics of disposal, he noted that 
delays with the WAC forced the CVT to look elsewhere for the items it needed 
immediately.
128
 Perhaps the most outspoken critic of the WAC’s support for educational 
institutions was Charles E. Phillips, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Canada Newfoundland 
Educational Association (CNEA). The CNEA was a non-profit educational association 
formed by the provincial departments of education and the Newfoundland government to 
act as a forum for cooperation and consultation. On behalf of educational institutions, 
Phillips undertook a letter writing campaign in 1946 that attacked the WAC’s selling 
policies. In letters to Mackenzie King, Howe, Berry, and several members of the 
SCWEE, Phillips explained his concerns about the WAC’s unhelpful practices and 
questioned the merits of making educational institutions pay market rates for surpluses 
that were sometimes in deteriorating condition.
129
 Indeed, Phillips was angry about the 
WAC’s “indefinite loan” policy in which the Corporation loaned items to educational 
institutions indefinitely and at minimal cost (only the shipping and handling was 
charged). However, items were only made available in this manner after the WAC 
attempted to sell them commercially. If private interests or higher-level priority holders 
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purchased the items than schools boards were out of luck, especially on items like 
machine tools and other types of reusable equipment that everyone coveted.
130
  
Assets to Ashes? Recycling and Upcycling Surplus Assets  
Surplus supplies (and some munitions) were crucial to supporting economic and 
social reconstruction. The reuse of surplus assets provided businesses with items to sell 
during the postwar shortages and recirculated assets into the hands of organizations, 
institutions, and individuals who used those things to fulfill their postwar plans, improve 
living standards, and expand social services. Yet not everything was easily reusable in 
civilian life. Many items were purpose-built for the military and required extensive 
modifications to gain new forms, functions, and intentions. In other cases, pieces of 
weapon systems or items derived from destruction programs were adapted into 
improvised purposes. Thus, the reuse of surplus assets paralleled a pattern of recycling 
and upcycling that refashioned utility and meaning. A key factor in the recycling and 
upcycling of surplus assets was the ingenuity and creativity of the end user or the staff at 
the WAC and established businesses reselling the items. Despite the public criticism, the 
WAC did provision the second-hand economy while also promoting the recycling and 
upcycling of surplus goods, materials, and war junk.  
Creativity and ingenuity were essential to material demobilization because surplus 
assets were not always the first choice or designed for their new-found purposes. This 
was especially the case when upcycling things. Upcycling is the act of repurposing 
objects by valuing the material from which they are made and the form that they 
maintain. It differs from the concepts of reuse and recycling in subtle ways. The reuse of 
an asset, as we have seen, involves repurposing it by valuing the materials composing it, 
the form they are in, and seeks to maintain the intended function. The recycling of 
something occurs only when the asset is valued for its component parts or materials.
131
 It 
requires a certain level of inventiveness and originality to imagine a possible use or 
adaptation for something that others might consider inert or worthless. In effect, recycling 
war junk into something new or upcycling surpluses into different uses helped 
                                                 
130
 SCWEE, 20 June 1946, (No. 24, Book 3), 774-785; Ibid, 9 July 1946, (No. 26, Book 3), 840-865. 
131
 Szaky, Outsmart Waste, 65-75. 
  
283 
 
reinvigorate private enterprise after years of heavy government regulation and scarcity. 
Recycling and upcycling are innovative processes that privilege entrepreneurial genius by 
forcing people to purchase second-choice materials and adapt them to their needs before 
making a profit.
132
 Given the widespread shortages of new goods, people had to get 
creative in order to fulfill their visions of victory. This was a healthy, though somewhat 
inconvenient, by-product of reduction and destruction programs and helped transition the 
economy out of a wartime mentality. In other words, wartime controls and propaganda 
had preached all-out production, thereby privileging the consumption of goods and 
resources, but now that hostilities were over it was time to refashion, reconfigured, and 
conserve what had already been produced.  
To assist with material conversion, trade publications started publishing advice on 
how to recondition military surpluses and offered opinions about where future business 
opportunities might prevail. In 1945-1946, the Canadian Automotive Trade ran a nine-
part series entitled “Servicing Surplus Army Vehicles.” Written as instructional and 
informational references, the articles pre-empted the flood of surplus vehicles by a few 
months. The goal was to offer advice and information to “Garagemen and Dealers” about 
the peculiarities of military-patterned vehicles and the special steps needed to recondition 
or repair them. The first installment, “Is Servicing These a Military Secret?” instructed 
readers that they “should have this information handy when surplus army vehicles come 
in for service or reconditioning” because they had “a number of controls and other 
features not ordinarily found on standard vehicles.”133 The article then went on to provide 
short paragraphs of information on twenty-three different parts from light switches and 
lubrication, to fuel gauges, wheel bearings, and ignition switches. Subsequent articles in 
the series were focused more on specific aspects of military vehicles and trucks rather 
than a general overview. The second article informed readers that the tires and wheels on 
military-patterned vehicles were constructed differently and required an eighteen-step 
procedure for removing and mounting.
134
 The other articles covered a range of important 
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subjects: brakes, steering and axles servicing, steering repair, winches and special army 
vehicles, brake adjustments, power tire pumps, and transmissions.
135
  
The “Servicing Surplus Army Vehicles” series helped prepare the auto industry for 
a future reality. Since surplus military vehicles were going to be sold to Canadians on the 
domestic market, “garagemen and dealers” needed to familiarize themselves with these 
assets in order to adjust to a new marketplace and serve their clientele, especially since 
maintenance accounted for a large portion of profits in the automotive sector.
136
 
However, other contributors to the Canadian Automotive Trade seized on this reality and 
took things to another level by mixing fact and fantasy. In a somewhat overzealous article 
about future “opportunities for Garagemen and Dealers” to develop their businesses in 
the postwar period, Hiram McVicar wondered if the “corner garage” might not merge the 
automobile industry with aircraft servicing.
137
 Swept up by the rapid wartime innovations 
in aeronautics and aircraft manufacturing, McVicar believed that a future existed where 
airplanes would be as commonly used as automobiles. On this point he was emphatic, as 
the reliability of new aircraft models and the mass production of “light planes” would 
open new and better travel methods – if only the government relaxed its restrictions on 
airport construction, airworthiness certification, and pilot licensing.
138
  
According to McVicar the automotive industry had to adapt to the changing times 
by investing in aircraft servicing and the construction of small airports adjacent to their 
garages. Quoting Russell Gibson, president of Cub Aircraft of Canada, whose company 
planned to build 300 small-plane airfields across Canada, McVicar opined that any new 
business venture would have to mimic some of the services already offered by the 
automobile industry, such as “joy rides, flying instruction, charter flights, air taxi, and 
                                                 
135
 The other articles appeared in various issues of the Canadian Automotive Trade: “Brakes are ‘Special’ 
on Military Vehicles,” (August, 1945) 40-41; “Steering and Axle Service on Surplus Military Vehicles” 
(September, 1945), 68-71; “Steering Repair & Servicing on Surplus Military Vehicles,” (October, 1945), 
48-49, 94; “Special Army Vehicles,” (November, 1945), 40-41, 70; “Getting Down to Major Brake 
Adjustments on Military Vehicles,” (December, 1945), 40-41, 74; “Servicing the Power Tire Pump on 
Military Vehicles,” (February, 1946), 46-47, 94; “Servicing the Military Pattern Transmission,”(March, 
1946), 55-56, 74, 76, 80. 
136
 Edgerton, The Shock of the Old, 75-102. 
137
 Hiram McVicar, “Aircraft and the Corner Garage,” Canadian Automotive Trade, (May, 1945), 31. 
138
 Ibid, 31. 
  
285 
 
plane rental service.” He even added that “reconditioned used planes would be available 
as the development went forward” and if airports were combined with used-car lots it 
created a “drive-yourself” rental market for “visiting pilots.”139 Indeed, the automotive 
industry had to get in on the action now because new technologies, like the flying car, 
were on the horizon. McVicar professed that the “York Commuter” – a four-seat, high 
winged, twin-engine “flying station wagon” designed by the York Manufacturing Co. of 
New York – was the way forward.140 Although McVicar’s prophecies were flawed and 
the flying car turned out to be nothing more than a pipe-dream, they were indicative of 
how limitless imagination and creativity were in designing or improvising new 
applications for technologies. Indeed, wartime technological advances had proven their 
worth and reinvigorated further inventiveness, no matter how far-fetched or fanciful.  
Although the technological sublime was exhilarating and inspired some new 
innovations, there were many other entrepreneurs who took a less risky approach than 
McVicar’s suggestions. Rather than banking on new technologies taking off (pun 
intended), these entrepreneurs looked to the future by turning backwards, towards items 
that were already manufactured. These individuals banked on their abilities to transform 
or renovate old assets into new purposes rather invent something completely new, such as 
the flying car. David Edgerton used the term “Creole technology” to describe this type of 
technological adaptation. As Edgerton explained, “Creole” is most commonly used to 
describe “local derivatives of something originally from elsewhere (typically the white 
and black populations of the Americas).”141 However, instead of people, he applied the 
concept to the history of technology as a means of demonstrating diffusion, usage, and 
human agency. In other words, the term “Creole technology” implies that a hybrid exists 
between the new and old designs, purposes, and compositions. Creole technology is 
“derived, but different from, the originating case,” meaning that technology does not 
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remain constant and can be adapted to suit local conditions and requirements whenever 
and wherever it is used.
142
  
Changing an asset’s form, function, and intention according to new potential uses 
or local circumstances ensured the steady development of hybrid technologies in postwar 
Canada. Consequently, surplus assets often underwent a process of upcycling that 
physically altered usage, design, or composition. One of the most striking examples 
involved some attempts at converting steel helmets. In late 1944, an enterprising 
Scotsman, Alexander McPherson Wilson, was in negotiations with the WAC to purchase 
30,000 surplus helmets specifically for resale to farmers as “hens’ nests.”143 The obvious 
practicality of stripping out the helmets’ liners and flipping them upside down to make a 
convenient bowl for the chicken and its eggs was a notable hybrid of an old form and 
new function. Unfortunately, at the time, Wilson was not able to strike a deal with the 
WAC. Although his idea was clearly derived and different from the originating case, it is 
unclear if his “Creole” adaptation for steel helmets was ever attempted. 
The recycling and upcycling of surplus ships and aircraft are probably the best 
documented examples of Creole technologies derived from military surpluses. For 
instance, in Brantford, where large numbers of surplus aircraft were being stored by the 
WAC one interesting story emerged in October 1946. After being discharged from the 
RCAF, two veterans, Henry Denbe and William Bickerdike, partnered in Montreal to 
create a company they called Airplane Mechanical Salvage. The company specialized in 
disassembling surplus aircraft and upcycling parts (and junk) to construct a variety of 
new items. It also salvaged workable airplane components for resale in other industries. 
Denbe, who served at the RCAF’s testing and development branch in Ottawa, and 
Bikerdike, who was a pilot, had the requisite experience to make the most of the 
opportunity and pass the WAC’s background checks.144  
Airplane Mechanical Salvage also provided employment for many RCAF veterans 
who picked apart “the planes like a chicken” to recover as much “meat” (workable parts) 
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as possible.
145
 In 1946, the company purchased about 1,000 planes from the WAC: 500 in 
Brantford, 300 in Mont Joli and 200 at St Johns, Quebec. From these derelict planes the 
company developed “some of the finest car trailers, in more than one size, and 
wheelbarrows, Canada has had.”146 The trailers and wheelbarrows were pneumatic, had 
built in compressors, and cushioned wheels. Furthermore, the company recovered, 
refurbished, and sold a whole slate of other items, including starters, generators, lights, 
water-pressure tanks, gas tanks, batteries, hydraulic systems, “and a few other items” – 
all largely recovered from the Anson aircraft and other types they dismantled.
147
 In fact, 
their business was so successful that the biggest challenge was disposing of the aircraft 
frames once they were picked clean. 
The recycling and upcycling of surplus aircraft occurred in other ways as well. In 
one fascinating example, a veteran named John G. Lacourse purchased seven Ventura 
bombers from the WAC and located at the RCAF station in Burford, Ontario. Lacourse 
had the bombers shipped from Burford to the garage and service station he owned near 
Hannon, Ontario. Originally he wanted to fly them over, but he was unable to find a 
suitable landing site near his business. As a result, he rented several tow trucks to haul the 
planes in “one of the strangest convoys ever seen on Ontario highways.”148 The convoy 
was escorted by provincial police and when traversing Brantford, city police assisted in 
redirecting traffic. Even with the wings removed the Ventura bombers were so large that 
they took up the full width of the roads. As the Hamilton Spectator reported, “low 
hanging branches were stripped from quite a few trees by the tails of the planes, and a 
highway crew, following behind with a truck was kept busy removing them from the 
roadway. In Brantford, a Hydro pole was broken off and service temporarily affected.”149 
According to Lacourse, the efforts were worth it. Before moving the planes he stripped 
them down and sold all their equipment, wheels, motors, wiring, instruments, tubing, 
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toilets, chairs, scrap metal from the wings, and even some gasoline that was still in the 
tanks at the time of his purchase. The sale of the equipment and parts more than covered 
the planes’ selling price and his transportation costs to Hannon.150  
For Lacourse, though, the real prize was the seven remaining fuselages. In fact, 
Lacourse purchased the planes specifically to upcycle the fuselages into “family over-
night cabins” at his service station. “When stripped of all the fittings,” he told the 
Hamilton Spectator, “the body of the planes is large enough to permit room for a double 
bed in the tail and two bunk beds in the nose. Tables, chairs, and other furniture will be 
placed in the centre.”151 By purchasing surplus aircraft and renovating them so they could 
be converted into tourist cabins at his service station, Lacourse was both recycling and 
upcycling materiel into new and peaceful purposes. During a time of severe shortages in 
building materials, Lacourse improvised a hybrid between new and old uses for 
technology. In doing so, he was able to expand his business and build tourist cabins 
cheaply. Instead of paying a premium to construct a normal set of cabins, he adapted his 
plans to the availability of surplus aircraft and retrofitted them into his business 
operations. 
Canadian naval vessels underwent similar transformations. Although only ships 
sold as scrap were barred from reuse, there were many other vessels that proved highly 
adaptable to peacetime conditions. For instance, the tugboats, barges, patrol vessels, and 
small boats that had serviced the RCN during the war were often purchased by private 
interests and reused in similar capacities. In some cases, these ships required very little 
alterations as was the case with the ex-naval tug HMCS North Shore purchased by the 
Gilley Brothers Ltd. which operated out of New Westminster, British Columbia.
152
 Patrol 
vessels were particularly coveted by fishing companies. In some cases, the Navy’s patrol 
vessels were simply confiscated or loaned fishing vessels that were converted into 
various wartime roles, as was the case with HMCS Crest, a seiner originally named May 
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S and owned by Kunimatsu Saimoto, a Japanese Canadian living in Steveston, British 
Columbia. The vessel was confiscated in 1942 and used as a Canadian Naval Patrol 
Vessel until it was sold in 1945 to Gerrard Dal Secco who converted it back into a fishing 
boat.
153
 Other naval patrol vessels had similar fates. HMCS Valdez, which was listed as 
an “Ex Japanese Fishing Vessel” that was “requisitioned during the war,” was sold first 
to a J. O. Horan in Vancouver and then found its way to Nelson Bros. Fisheries Ltd.
154
 
Several other patrol boats, HMCS Standpoint, Skidegate, Moorlock, Merry Chase, Leelo, 
Kuitan, and Smith Sound, also ended up in the West Coast fishing business as seiners, 
trawlers, tug boats, or cargo haulers for the logging industry.
155
 
Given how many corporations and individuals were interested in acquiring surplus 
boats, many clients were not able to buy the ships they wanted and had to settle for 
second choices. In these cases, the newly purchased ship had to be sufficiently renovated 
and modified to perform its new tasks. According to a variety of sources and sales lists, 
this was a common occurrence. In one case, HMCS La Valee, a minesweeper sold to 
National Fisheries Ltd. in Vancouver, was converted over the summer of 1947 into a 
transport vessel for fish meat.
156
 In another case, an ex-RCN Fairmile, Q070, was 
purchased by the Radium Chemical Company in North Vancouver and subsequently 
converted to transfer “men and supplies” between “the mills owned by this company on 
the West Coast of Vancouver Island” and the home port of Port Alberni.157 Fairmiles 
fulfilled a variety of other purposes including salvage rescue and pleasure craft. However, 
sometimes the boats were not as useful as first envisioned. In one case, the Fairmile Q069 
was purchased by Mr. Garfield Weston and donated to the Sea Scouts at Vancouver in 
late 1945. But the vessel “proved unsuitable for the Sea Scouts” and they were looking to 
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sell it over the summer of 1947.
158
 The boat was probably too expensive to keep in 
operation. 
Perhaps the most intriguing examples of upcycled naval vessels related to the fate 
of Canada’s destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. These classes of ships were purpose-built 
for war and, while large numbers were sold for scrapping, a fair number found useful 
second lives. In some cases, that second-life could be in another country’s navy or it 
could be quite inglorious, such as the sinking of the venerable HMCS Dunver and 
Charlottetown to form breakwaters along the British Columbian coast.
159
 However, the 
postwar utility of corvettes was slightly more flexible. Corvettes could be readily adapted 
to a variety of purposes, though their conversions tended to require more financial 
investments. On the West Coast, Union Steamship Ltd. bought three Castle-class 
corvettes HMCS Leaside, St. Thomas, and Hespeler for $225,000 and four Bangor-class 
minesweepers, HMCS Bellechasse, Chignecto, Courtenay, and Miramichi for $80,000. 
According to the company’s Marine Superintendent, E. W. Suffield, Union Steamship 
completely overhauled the corvettes and turned them into passenger ferries. In response 
to an inquiry from the Navy about its former war ships, Suffield explained the 
modifications: “the main deck accommodation is staterooms of standard class, officer’s 
accommodation, saloon and galley. The foc’sale deck is deluxe cabin accommodation 
with passenger lounge in after end. The boat deck has observation room accommodation 
from the break of the bridge to the funnel.”160 The four minesweepers had yet to be 
converted. 
The key point here is that Union Steamship expanded its operations by turning 
corvettes into passenger ferries. All three vessels were altered to carry 100 first class 
passengers with twenty-five upper deck rooms and twenty-three standard deck rooms. 
The company also outfitted HMCS Leaside, St. Thomas, and Hespeler (renamed 
Coquitlam, Camosun, and Chilcotin respectively) with modern navigational aids and 
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radar (perhaps also purchased from the WAC). The Coquitlam had the longest route, 
ferrying passengers up the British Columbian coast from Vancouver to Prince Rupert, 
Alert Bay, Port Hardy, and Alaska. The Camosun and Chilcotin both operated in the 
vicinity of Vancouver and Vancouver Island.
161
 
Union Steamship also had some competition 
from Gulf Lines Ltd. which bought and 
converted a minesweeper HMCS Truro, an ex-
armed yacht, and a fairmile into passenger 
ferries. The Truro, renamed Gulf Mariner, was 
brought over from the East Coast through the 
Panama Canal and altered to service 500 day-
passengers. The ex-armed yacht, renamed Gulf 
Stream, had two 440 H. P. Vivian Diesel 
motors installed to replace the original steam 
engines and its passenger accommodations 
were built from the bridge to vessel’s stern. The 
new layout included five lounge cabins and a 
coffee bar. However, the Gulf Stream sunk on 
11 October 1947 and was “declared a total 
loss.”162 The fairmile, renamed Gulf Wing, 
underwent similar structural changes as the 
Gulf Stream but its new Vivian Diesel engines 
were only 320 H. P. and it was put into service 
quite quickly after the war. 
Certainly businesses and entrepreneurs 
profited from buying surpluses and 
transforming them into something new. 
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However, the profits derived from upcycled or recycled assets were not always financial, 
nor did companies always do the transforming. Indeed, in many instances it was the end 
users who gained the most from purchasing surpluses, though in these cases the profits 
were more aesthetic, intrinsic, or leisure-related. Fashioning wedding dresses from the 
silk, nylon, and cotton linings of parachutes is perhaps the most clichéd example. 
However, parachute linings were quite versatile and could be adapted into other things. In 
one case, several craftsmen and companies, including Bancroft Industries Ltd. and 
Canadian Hardware & Novelty Co., purchased thousands of surplus parachutes and 
altered the surfaces “free from threads” and reformed them “into smart ‘silk’ lamp 
shades.”163 Other popular items included brass metals or shell casings, sold for art or 
decorative purposes. This fuelled a new generation of “trench art” or items constructed by 
soldiers (or forged by counterfeiters) from spent cartridge casings or other things found in 
military environments. The most enduring of these “pieces” are the ashtrays designed 
from spent artillery shells that were often fixtures in Legion halls.
164
 
Other people purchased surpluses for purely leisure pursuits. For example, 
sometime in 1946-1947, an American civilian living in Pasadena, California named Bearl 
Sprott was able to acquire an ex-RCN armed yacht named HMCS Cougar. Sprott 
purchased the Cougar from Jack Gilmour Ltd., a Vancouver-based company that had 
originally bought the vessel from the WAC.
165
 He then proceeded to retrofit the Cougar 
into the ultimate pleasure-craft. According to a confidential list of postwar ship sales, 
Sprott added two new 300 horsepower diesel engines and closed the waists and 
quarterdeck to accommodate the housing and handling facilities for “a small float plane 
on the after deck.”166 A few months after purchasing the boat Sprott transferred it to a US 
registry and changed the Cougar’s name back to its prewar moniker: Breezin’ Thru. 
Indeed, Sprott’s renaming was remarkably appropriate and his yacht-plane contraption 
                                                 
163
 Berry, “Functions of War Assets Corporation,” 39. 
164
 Jane A. Kimball, Trench Art: An Illustrated History, (Davis, CA: Silverpenny Press, 2004), 331-336. 
165
 DHH, 81/520/8000-800 Box 242 – File 10, “Enclosure memo” Staff Officer (Intelligence and Trade) 
Esquimalt to Director Naval Plans and Development, 1 August 1947, 3; “Sales of $5,000 and Over,” in 
War Assets Corporation Annual Reports (1944-1949) compiled in author’s Sales Database. See also: Fraser 
McKee, The Armed Yachts of Canada, (Erin, ON: Boston Mills Press, 1983), 67-70, 81, 109, and 164. 
166
 DHH, 81/520/8000-800 Box 242 – File 10, “Enclosure memo,” Staff Officer (Intelligence and Trade) 
Esquimalt to Director Naval Plans and Development, 1 August 1947, 3. 
  
293 
 
must have made him the envy of every other boater wherever his pleasure craft went! 
However, in mid-1950, Sprott sold the boat to someone he called “the Duke” in 
correspondence with the purchaser’s agent and while on route to its new home in Spain, 
Breezin’ Thru was caught in Hurricane Charlie and sunk in the harbour at Kingston, 
Jamaica.
167
 
Conclusion 
The disposal of munitions and supplies was an integral part of reconstruction and 
rehabilitation. In selling its inventories, the WAC provisioned the postwar economy with 
the tools, objects, materials, and assets that were needed to complete postwar plans and 
objectives. Businesses, organizations, government agencies, and average citizens all 
benefitted from material demobilization, as they were able to reuse, recycle, and upcycle 
surplus munitions and supplies into productive peacetime purposes. Yet the ability to 
acquire and use objects was limited by severe material shortages, government policies, 
intense competition, and problems with industrial reconversion. This added greater 
importance and urgency to obtaining surplus assets, the availability of which helped 
mitigate the shortages by filling gaps in production or space in store shelves. Obviously, 
second-hand assets could not completely resolve the dearth of goods in postwar Canada, 
but they certainly took the edge off the crisis in several key areas. The WAC played an 
important role in stabilizing some of the political, economic, and social dislocation 
caused by the transition to peace. However, by the same token, the domestic marketplace 
was not always an ideal location to sell everything. Canada’s population and economy 
were too small relative to the vast quantities of unneeded government property, especially 
considering the selling restrictions on lethal assets and the array of weaponry, explosives, 
and ammunition accumulated by the military. International clients had to be found if the 
WAC was going to recoup as much money as possible.  
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Chapter 6 
The Diplomacy of Disposal: Settling War Claims and Selling 
Surpluses Overseas 
We want to try to do justice to the Canadian taxpayer, and we are proceeding with this 
disposal in close co-operation and collaboration with the British War Office and Ministry 
of Supply, especially in relation to the disposal of actual war-like stores to constitute the 
armies of Allied nations.
1
 
G. K. Sheils, Deputy Minister, Department of Munitions and Supply, 30 July 1945 
Introduction 
The WAC effort to maintain economic stability and supply the objects required to 
fulfill postwar plans was an important part of reconstruction and rehabilitation. The 
Corporation certainly prioritized the domestic marketplace when liquidating its 
inventories, resulting in an important peace dividend for the national economy and social 
welfare programs immediately following the war. Yet sales to the domestic market and 
Canadian customers were not the only outlets available, as foreign governments and 
international clients showed interest in Canada’s surplus materiel. The export of surplus 
assets to international clients and the disposal of Canadian-owned property located 
overseas deserve further analysis particularly given the types of commodities sold and the 
fact that Canadian citizens were not the only people to reuse, recycle, and upcycle 
Canadian surpluses. 
When hostilities ended, it was understood that the domestic economy and the 
military’s postwar requirements could never fully absorb the vast inventories 
accumulated during the war. Therefore, the large stockpiles of arsenals and equipment in 
the UK and the Netherlands posed as significant challenge to both the WAC’s mandate 
and the DND’s postwar planning. Returning assets to Canada was an expensive and 
potentially redundant undertaking. In effect, the transportation and storage costs involved 
in repatriating assets from Europe, just to declare them surplus in Canada, were not worth 
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it. This was especially the case if similar types and models were available in Canada in 
sufficient numbers to fill postwar military requirements or aggregate demand. 
The utility of international markets and alliances was obvious. Selling excess 
military stores already located overseas saved repatriation costs, while exporting 
surpluses from Canada ensured that the domestic economy would not get completely 
overwhelmed. Therefore, international markets provided important outlets that limited 
what items re-entered Canada’s domestic economy, while also helping with the 
reconstruction of Europe or the reconstitution of friendly militaries in the years preceding 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, the disposal of surpluses 
overseas also truncated the size and cost of Canada’s postwar destruction programs. This 
fortunate development resulted from the fact that Canadian industries procured only part 
of the munitions and supplies used by the country’s armed forces. Consequently, 
Canadian military units had to draw heavily from British supply channels to offset 
shortages. When hostilities ended, this created a situation in which Canadian soldiers 
were in possession of kit that the military did not own and had to return.  
The Canadian government also used the disposal of surplus munitions and supplies 
overseas as a means of settling war debts with the UK and the Netherlands. Entwining 
surplus military assets with war claims was mutually beneficial since Canadian assets 
were already stockpiled in those countries and there was an acute demand for all manner 
of weapons and equipment in a war-ravaged Europe. War debts were generally settled in 
two ways: either through a lump sum payment issued to offset the difference between all 
claims, or by transferring surplus munitions and supplies in lieu of money. This created a 
flexible system for settling debts in which surplus property played a central role. In using 
international sales as an outlet to protect the domestic economy, Canada dabbled in the 
marketplace for military surpluses by selling large quantities of merchandise and, while 
supplies lasted, enjoyed some prosperity.  
Yet the disposal of munitions and supplies internationally had mixed success and 
was far from straightforward. A large number of obstacles plagued the WAC’s efforts 
overseas. In his dealings with the Canadian Military Headquarters in London (CMHQ) 
and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa, Major-General D. E. Dewar, the 
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WAC’s Overseas Sales Director, encountered a range of issues while stationed in 
England from July 1945 to June 1946. Perhaps the biggest obstacles were created by the 
Army’s slow and sometimes flawed procedures as well as its rapid demobilization plans. 
Moreover, the postwar foreign exchange crisis meant that officials in the Department of 
Finance only wanted Canadian or American dollars for surpluses, which prevented 
Dewar from selling to clients who could only pay in their native currencies. DEA and 
DRS officials also hindered Dewar’s efforts through formal and informal diplomatic 
arrangements that closed off local British markets and required him to transfer any 
Canadian surpluses destined for the UK to the Ministry of Supply. Competition with his 
British and American counterparts also proved highly troublesome as the international 
market for military surpluses was hotly contested and easily flooded. 
During the war, the Canadian military had grown substantially in size and 
capability, but this growth was disproportionate to the country’s junior rank in world 
affairs. Therefore, when hostilities ended, Canada was primed to unload a large amount 
of weaponry, ammunition, and equipment. This brought Canada into the shadowy world 
of arms dealing. In fact, selling arms to reconstitute the armed forces of allied countries 
was perhaps Canada’s most important postwar role in the establishment of collective 
security arrangements.
2
 However, Canadian sales were often constrained by the interests 
and foreign policies of the UK and US. To navigate around British or American 
prohibitions, the DEA’s objections, and the questionable morality of selling arms, the 
WAC “demilitarized” every ship and aircraft it sold by removing the armaments and 
ammunition, while Cabinet stringently reviewed all trade proposals involving the export 
of arms (both new and used). Canada’s international disposal policies were driven by 
pragmatic necessities and were not overly concerned with how the asset was used after 
payments were received.  
In that sense, the WAC played a role in the diffusion of military technologies, with 
both positive and negative consequences. The WAC sold systems without weapons, 
which recouped some of their original value, but there was little stopping the customer 
from finding armaments and ammunition elsewhere. The Corporation also sold surpluses 
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to help in the reconstruction of postwar Europe and the associated humanitarian crisis, 
but this always came as a secondary consideration since the Canadian government and 
military had to satisfy postwar requirements before selling the remainder. The WAC also 
played a role in the reconstitution of allied armies, but the quantity and quality of the 
second-hand weaponry acquired was dubious and in all likelihood had a negative impact 
on the combat effectiveness of Canada’s Allies.     
The Disposal of Surpluses Located Overseas 
Canada’s global footprint of surplus munitions and supplies was not as large as that 
of the UK or US, but it still possessed some important transnational and international 
dimensions. In fact, the country’s alliances and imperial connections were extremely 
helpful in the disposal of assets used by its armed forces overseas. By using international 
markets and relying on Allies, Canada was able to reduce or even eliminate many of its 
liabilities for disposal. Just as it had during the war, Canada relied substantially on the 
UK in this regard. Despite Canada’s remarkable wartime productivity, only about 30-40 
percent of industrial output actually went to the country’s armed forces. Instead, the vast 
majority of production went to the nation’s Allies through the Mutual Aid program.3 As a 
result, when the war ended the ownership of all munitions and supplies in the hands of 
the Canadian Army had to be ascertained before disposal took place. After all, an Army 
using borrowed kit could not turn around and sell it for a profit without the original 
owner’s consent.4 
Over the summer of 1945 a special committee was established by the DND to vet 
all stores located in England and Northwest Europe in order to determine what objects 
were Canadian property. The committee, headed by an officer whose last name was 
Morrison (his rank and first name are unknown), was similar to the AOSAC except that it 
played a more direct role in examining property and accessing ownership. While the 
cynic might liken the Morrison Committee’s work to a bunch of bureaucrats and army 
officers counting their beans, the task of establishing ownership and tabulating stocks 
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was an essential if tedious component of postwar planning. Only once quantities and 
ownership were verified could surpluses be culled from available inventories for final 
disposal. Therefore, the bean-counting allowed the military to figure out what non-
Canadian property had to be returned to the British (or American) supply depots. In doing 
so, this helped them establish the military’s postwar requirements.  
Establishing the size of the postwar military was both a political and strategic 
choice. Yet it also came with the pragmatic implications of calculating material needs, 
projecting future consumption rates, and selecting kit from available stocks. In 
determining postwar requirements each branch of the military forecasted the retention of 
“sufficient consumable stores” on a range of “3 to 5 years based on the anticipated rate of 
consumption” in peacetime.5 Given the extensive production and procurement programs, 
the Services were in a privileged position of picking from pre-existing arsenals that had 
already been paid for and declaring the remainder surplus. As Colonel W. G. Denney, 
Director of Ordnance Services (Provision) in the MGO Branch, explained to the SCWEE, 
“although there are many new developments which may, in the near future, change the 
type of some weapons with which the Army fights, it is somewhat too early to assess all 
these. Therefore, it has been decided that we will start with such battle proven equipment 
as we have available, and that as new weapons and equipment are developed, the 
Canadian Army will share in this development.”6  
In addition to forecasting future material requirements and separating out Canadian 
property from British- or American-owned assets, the establishment of postwar 
requirements also had to be done in light of where Canadian assets were located. During 
the war, Canada had effectively built up two separate militaries on either side of the 
Atlantic. By the end of the war 1.1 million Canadians had donned a khaki uniform with a 
little more than half serving overseas. When Germany was defeated, combat forces were 
stationed primarily in the Netherlands and northern Germany, while the bulk of 
remaining reserves and service personnel were stationed in Britain and in the coastal 
areas of the continent along the First Canadian Army’s axis of advance. Major supply 
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centres were located at Camp Bordon and Aldershot in the UK and Apeldoorn and 
Deelen in the Netherlands.
7
 Back home in Canada, where the “other” half million served, 
Canadian forces were spread across the country at various training and storage depots, air 
bases, port cities and other strategic points. Major supply hubs were mainly located in 
central Canada, near places like Montreal, Valcartier, and Valleyfield in Quebec and 
Toronto, London, and Windsor in Ontario.
8
  
In establishing postwar requirements each Service first had to tabulate what 
Canadian property existed in their inventories both at home and overseas, and then it had 
to figure out if the stores in Canada were sufficient to fill future needs. This calculation 
was critical: if stocks in Canada were not sufficient to meet postwar requirements then 
munitions and supplies located overseas had to be repatriated. Inversely, if postwar 
requirements were satisfied by stores available in Canada then every corresponding 
category of kit in Europe was surplus. There was simply no need to pay transportation 
and storage costs just so items could be disposed of in Canada. Assets were only 
repatriated if the stores available in Canada were insufficient. As one member of the 
SCWEE remarked in response to his question about surplus declarations and repatriated 
vehicles, “there would be no reason for returning these [vehicles] from overseas. If [the 
Army] declared some surplus that were new here in Canada, then the Ordnance 
Department has pulled a boner, I would say.”9 
The military was intent on avoiding this “boner” and as a result everything that was 
considered surplus and located overseas was disposed of there, either by returning them 
to the original owner or through international sales. In doing so, Canada saved 
substantially on disposal costs. In May 1946, Colonel Denney explained the value of this 
strategy to the SCWEE. His testimony shows that almost every military asset brought 
home from Europe was deemed necessary for postwar purposes. Thus, the expense of 
returning (as of 2 May 1946) 8,312 military-patterned vehicles was justified since they 
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were not available in Canada in sufficient quantities at the time.
10
 These vehicles 
augmented forces already stationed at home, though he did admit that as postwar budgets 
were confirmed several hundred of the returned vehicles unexpectedly became surplus. 
However, the Army considered this number quite reasonable given that its original 
estimates were made over the summer of 1945 and largely based on envisioned budgetary 
allotments for the next fiscal year. As Denney stated, “I would like to point out…that an 
estimate of the requirements for the post-war army immediately at the cessation of 
hostilities takes considerable calculation and investigation…I think that to come within 
500 of the requirements was a fairly good reckoning on the part of the General Staff, who 
did the calculating practically ten months ago.”11  
In making solid estimates about postwar requirements and separating out Canadian-
owned property so that everything else could be returned to the UK or US, the Army (in 
particular) drastically cut back on what was dispose of at home and abroad. In effect, 
Canada was able to pass off its liability for final disposal and avoid a sizable and 
worldwide destruction program for military assets similar to those undertaken by the UK 
and US. For instance, although Canada possessed large numbers of surplus aircraft, the 
WAC never had to develop a large network of permanent boneyards around the world 
where tactical aircraft were stored until reduced. Instead, they temporarily used former 
RCAF air bases for storage space. Moreover, since large portions of Canada’s air fleet 
were returned to the RAF or retained by the RCAF for future use, few intact tactical 
aircraft were declared surplus. As a result, by May 1946, the WAC had received a total of 
6,790 aircraft (split between forty-three different types) totalling $362,548,093 in original 
value, but by the author’s count only 850 can be classified as tactical aircraft for a total 
original value of $81,656,893.
12
 Although the numbers increased over the following years 
(especially for Mosquito bombers), the remaining 5,940 aircraft were all obsolete models 
with some civilian application such as, trainers, transport, and reconnaissance types.  
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The British and Canadian militaries developed many informal arrangements for 
exchanging assets free of charge and without declaring them surplus. This occurred 
whenever both countries owned identical types of, for instance, vehicles or ammunition 
located inside each other’s borders.13 The general parameters for informal disposal 
arrangements were first studied over the summer and fall of 1944 and by February 1945 
Berry finalized a comprehensive memorandum on the subject after circulating it to the 
CAAC, the DEA, and the Privy Council. Although some corrections were made, the 
basic logic and structure of his recommendations were accepted and served as a key 
starting point for future war claims negotiations, particularly with the British.
14
 Berry’s 
recommendations were largely based around the Canadian-American disposal agreements 
outlined by the 33rd Recommendation of the PJBD. The key principle was the 
maintenance of sovereignty over the assets and property located in another country. 
Accordingly, each country involved retained the right to withdraw any property from the 
other for disposal either in Canada or another country. Berry’s recommendations also 
stipulated that disposal could only occur through established agencies. This meant that 
Canadian surpluses could only be sold through the Ministry of Supply in the UK and 
British surpluses in Canada could only be liquidated through the WAC. Other important 
clauses included stipulations on acceptable currencies, that any sale of property within 
the territorial limits of the other required approval from both governments or their 
representatives, and that the British government was allowed to “pool any such surplus 
property with similar items, held by them for disposal” and that a share of the net 
proceeds would be credited to Canada.
15
  
However, despite the thorough recommendations, an orderly liquidation of 
surpluses located in foreign countries was not always the outcome. Over the summer of 
                                                 
13
 LAC, RG24, Vol. 34394, File: 5130-2, “Memorandum for the CNAS,” E.H. Russell to M.A. Medland, 4 
May 1946; Ibid, “Memorandum for Deputy Minister,” H.T.W. Grant, 21 June 1946. 
14
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 4, CAAC Meeting Minutes, 24 August and 29 September 1944; LAC, RG2, Vol. 12, 
File: W-45-1, “re: International Aspects of Disposal of Surplus Materials,” W. D. Matthews, 16 September 
1944; Ibid, “Disposal of Surplus War Assets – International Agreements,” P. A. Cumyn, 20 December 
1944. 
15
 LAC, RG2, Vol. 12, File: W-45-1, “Crown Assets Allocation Committee: Recommendation for the 
Disposal of Surplus Canadian Property, Becoming Surplus within the Territorial Limits of any Allied 
Nation,” 5 February 1945; LAC, RG101, Vol. 4, CAAC Meeting Minutes, 24 August and 29 September 
1944. 
  
302 
 
1945, the difficulty of implementing arrangements and procedures devised on paper and 
coordinating them across multiple departments, governments, and militaries became quite 
apparent to those tasked with overseas disposal. Although establishing ownership and 
tabulating inventories eventually provided policymakers with an overall picture of what 
assets were available for sale or postwar purposes, it did very little to speed up disposal 
while the bean-counting and decision-making took place. In effect, while officials sorted 
out the details, others saw new opportunities. Starting around April 1945 average 
citizens, companies, organizations, and hospitals in the UK correctly predicted that 
Canadian forces would soon be returning home and started contacting officers at CMHQ 
about acquiring surplus equipment. Their appeals for help were met by a sympathetic 
audience, but despite their best intentions, these soldiers were unable to help. The 
Canadian Army was in the midst of its inventory appraisals for Pacific and postwar 
requirements. Nothing was technically surplus yet, so nothing could be sold. 
Yet the flood of requests and appeals for special consideration did not let up. 
British hospitals and clinics were particularly persistent in their representations to Major-
General Robert Marsden Luton, the Director of Medical Services at CMHQ. 
Impoverished, war-weary, and in some cases physically damaged, many British hospitals 
and their patrons – particularly in the London area – were in dire need of more supplies 
and improved facilities. In general, hospitals were searching for all manner of expendable 
stores, from bedding, stirrups, syringes, bandages, or narcotics, to some of the more 
specialized equipment like X-ray scanners, which was a recurring theme since X-ray 
equipment was in short supply and very expensive.
16
 One of the first requests Luton 
received was a 24 April 1945 letter from Colonel Kenneth Maitland, the Vice Chairman 
and Treasurer of the Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children. Maitland’s letter, written as 
a follow-up to an earlier telephone conversation, explained that the hospital needed to 
outfit a new branch opening at Banstead in Surrey and the hospital was hoping to acquire 
equipment at a low cost or as a free gift. The hospital’s five-page wish list was combed 
over the next month by Luton who figured that Canada could spare, among many other 
                                                 
16
 For examples see: LAC, RG24, Vol. 12590, File: 11/DISPOSAL MED/1, Letter from Queen Mary’s 
Hospital for the East End, 24 May 1945; Ibid, Letter from Bearsted Memorial Hospital, 7 June 1945.  
  
303 
 
things, nine baby cots, twelve bed cradles, three blood pressure apparatuses, four X-Ray 
viewing boxes, two Oxygen tents, and 100 rubber hot water bottles.
17
  
On June 22nd, Luton sent the request and inventory up the chain of command to 
Major-General E. G. Weeks, hoping that the supplies could be provided at “salvage price 
or as a gift to the hospital” since Maitland had been especially helpful to Canadians 
during the war.
18
 However, Luton’s request was at odds with official policy and 
procedures. CMHQ was not in a position to help anyone – not even a children’s hospital 
– because it did not know what was surplus yet.19 Moreover, through the on-going 
diplomatic discussions about surplus disposal, Canadian officials in Ottawa became 
aware that their British counterparts viewed these types of generous transactions very 
apprehensively, especially for stores that were easily convertible to civilian uses. Just as 
Canadian officials were concerned about the flood of American surpluses wreaking 
havoc in domestic markets and destroying prices for new goods, the concerns of British 
officials were magnified by the number of Allied armies stationed inside its borders and 
the fact that most would leave behind large amounts of surplus kit. Without any formal 
disposal agreements or settled war claims, these fears were prominent and concerning. 
Canadian officials no doubt found the British fears familiar, but for Luton and other 
CMHQ officers dealing with face-to-face requests, a different perspective developed. 
Weeks’s refusal should not have surprised Luton. A month earlier, on 11 May 
1945, Lieutenant-General P. J. Montague, the Chief of Staff at CMHQ, had relayed a 
CMHQ recommendation to NDHQ about the possible uses of Canadian-owned surplus 
medical and dental supplies. The recommendation (and correspondence), which crossed 
Luton’s desk while he compiled an inventory for Maitland, called for giving the nearly 
2,000 medical and dental officers stationed overseas priority access to purchase surplus 
stores for their own rehabilitation since many had closed or sold their practices to enlist. 
However, NDHQ refused the request because of severe shortages of medical supplies in 
Canada, stating that medical and dental officers “who have not yet set up a practice face a 
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difficult problem. Their plight however can only be considered as secondary to that in 
which armed service casualties (present and future) would be placed were we unable 
adequately to equip our own hospitals in Canada and overseas.”20  
In the absence of any formal claims settlement between Canada and the UK or 
much information on Berry’s February recommendations, it seems that Luton tried to 
improvise his own informal disposal arrangements that took advantage of the prevailing 
demand for surplus kit in Britain. Perhaps he hoped that common sense would prevail 
when his superiors learned of his actions, but this was not the case. In fact, Luton was 
working at odds with the policy parameters established in Ottawa. In the spring of 1945, 
and on the basis of Berry’s recommendations for the disposal of surpluses in foreign 
countries, an understanding was reached with the British when a Canadian delegation 
arrived in May at Cambridge for some financial talks with John Maynard Keynes and 
other British officials. The understanding was similar to the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” 
with the US, in that the Canadian and British governments agreed to let the British 
Ministry of Supply handle the disposal of Canadian surpluses in the UK by taking 
custody when necessary and by setting prices at or near market value. Whatever profits 
were collected from the sales was put in a suspense account and settled at a later date 
when the financial agreement and war claims settlements were finalized. Moreover, when 
dealing with countries other than the UK, Canadian officials in Ottawa urged caution and 
restraint in messages to their subordinates overseas.
21
 “To avoid embarrassment” and 
prevent officials from working at cross-purposes, all enquiries about Canadian surpluses 
were to be “directed through regular diplomatic channels in Ottawa by governments 
concerned” and officials overseas were to forward their remarks and comments to 
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contextualize the requests.
22
 Under no circumstances were officials in the Canadian Army 
to negotiate or make promises to foreign dignitaries and officials.  
However, the disposal arrangements devised in Ottawa and London remained 
incompatible with some local conditions. Indeed, for the WAC’s Overseas Sales Director, 
Major-General D. E. Dewar, using the proper channels became one of the biggest hurdles 
of his job. When Dewar arrived in England in July 1945 the disposal of surplus Canadian 
medical supplies immediately fell into his lap and became one of his first major tasks.
23
 
Inundated with enquires and pressured by Luton, Dewar wanted to make some quick 
sales, but instead faced bureaucratic delays and diplomatic hurdles, and until the CMHQ 
finished its stock taking, he had little knowledge of what was available. For example, to 
facilitate the sale of surplus medical supplies to British hospitals, Dewar convened a 
meeting with Luton and British officials from the Ministries of Health and Supply on 4 
September. At the time, it was unlikely that Dewar was fully briefed on the complete 
parameters of the Anglo-Canadian “Gentlemen’s Agreement” since Howe informed him 
of the arrangements in writing on 1 October. However, his dealings with British officials 
certainly clarified the situation. At the September meeting, Luton stated his intentions: 
there were currently 22,500 unused hospital beds in the UK, half of which would be 
returned to Canada, but the other half would need new owners. Moreover, other valuable 
equipment and supplies totalling about £400,000 were just sitting in storage. Luton was 
worried that the “value to humanity” would be lost if this supply of equipment remained 
unused and not maintained. He wanted to use Maitland’s hospital as a test case in which 
medical supplies were turned over for a nominal fee of £1,000.
24
  
Despite the need and cheaper prices, British officials resisted the overtures and 
openly spoke about destroying these supplies rather than purchasing them. Although the 
British officials did not object to the efforts to provide hospitals with supplies, they were 
looking at the bigger picture and worried that Canadian surpluses sold for such small 
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amounts would damage postwar prices for new goods, thus crippling the vital industries 
that were manufacturing or expecting to produce them in the postwar economy.
25
 British 
officials then referred to the parameters of Berry’s recommendations, citing the need to 
dispose of everything through the Ministry of Supply. Both Luton and Dewar were taken 
aback: it seemed as though Canadian and British officials had conspired to prevent any 
attempts at filling the urgent need in the UK. In a moment of exasperation at the meeting 
Dewar lamented the fact that “the Canadian Disposal Body did not visualize the 
humanitarian aspect and that any action towards donations or sales at nominal prices 
must be dealt with by the Canadian Authorities as a question of Government policy.”26 
Everyone’s hands were tied for different reasons and it was clear that gifts were not 
possible. However, Luton and Dewar were able to secure some discretion over where the 
Ministry of Supply sold the equipment in that they could earmark items for delivery (with 
a twenty percent discount) to those hospitals that had helped Canadians during the war.
27
 
Throughout Dewar’s tenure as Overseas Sales Director, a constant series of 
challenges and problems plagued his efforts. The sale of medical supplies in Britain was 
just the beginning and his frequent correspondence with Howe revealed much about the 
incumbent obstacles. It did not take long for Dewar’s frustration with the Canadian 
Army’s procedures to grow, particularly given their inherent flaws. To put it mildly, the 
Morrison Committee’s task was thankless and boring, the overseas equivalent of the 
government-wide appraisals that preceded the flood of surplus declarations discussed in a 
previous chapter. Like with bureaucrats in Ottawa, the monotony of paper-pushing 
quickly wore out committee members who started taking advantage of whatever shortcuts 
they could. According to Dewar, those shortcuts had serious consequences and greatly 
complicated his work once the inventory lists arrived at his office in London. As he 
explained to Howe, those in charge of making the inventories did so based solely on unit 
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war establishments and not by counting all the items available in depots or unit areas. In 
other words, committee members reasoned that if a unit was supposed to have X number 
of soldiers than it should also have Y number of socks or Z number of weapons – so there 
was no need to actually count everything. The reality, of course, was not so clear cut. 
This shortcut allowed the committee to quickly tabulate a general inventory for their 
superiors in Ottawa who were making the final decisions on all postwar requirements. 
However, for Dewar it caused confusion and delay since he needed exact totals for the 
purposes of marketing and sales negotiations.
28
  
The time it took to compile the lists and communicate them back to Ottawa for final 
approval also left Dewar without many goods to sell or indications of what might be 
unneeded in the future. Obviously he expected a postwar rush at some point but, as the 
summer turned to fall, Dewar grew exceedingly frustrated with the Army’s intransigence. 
On 3 September 1945, he wrote to Howe explaining that “the army has been extremely 
slow in getting forward to me their surplus lists. They have been handicapped by a lack 
of knowledge of complete Canadian requirements as well as the complete requirements 
of the Occupational Force” – all of which were being dictated to CMHQ from Ottawa.29 
For Dewar the problem was getting out of hand. With each passing day he and other 
Canadian officials were inundated with requests for all types of munitions and supplies 
(such as vehicles, weapons, and medical supplies) from Allied governments, hospitals, 
relief organizations, and individual citizens who all predicted an imminent Canadian 
withdrawal from Europe.  
However, Dewar had few items to offer and instead of consummating sales 
immediately, he was forced to politely inform customers to check back later when 
supplies might be available. Dewar felt as though he was missing a chance to take 
advantage of a materially-starved marketplace. Moreover, as he saw it, the window of 
opportunity was closing quickly, as rumours were rampant that other Allies were on the 
verge of liquidating their surpluses and this added further urgency to Dewar’s complaints. 
As he wrote Howe on 9 October, “I have been advised that the United States will put on 
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the market approximately 40,000 vehicles in Belgium within the next two or three weeks. 
For that reason I am continuing the pressure on the Army to release as many vehicles as 
possible before the floods come.”30 Indeed, with so much Allied kit likely to become 
available in Europe, getting a quick start on sales was essential. Prices and clients were 
only going to decrease in the future. 
Dewar’s pressure on CMHQ officers did result in some isolated successes. In 
September 1945, he arranged one of the first major sales of Canadian assets overseas. In 
exchanged for $5 million (USD) Canada sold about 3,600 trucks to Czechoslovakia and 
Poland through UNRRA. Although CMHQ was originally unwilling to write off the 
trucks as surplus, Dewar saved the transaction by prevailing “on CMHQ to give us a 
partial list in order to facilitate the movement.”31 As a result, CMHQ released the trucks 
from depots in the Netherlands and the whole transfer of assets was codenamed 
Operation Canhar. Overall, Canhar proved quite successful. Dewar’s work ensured that 
Canada found an early buyer for some of its surplus vehicles and the trucks arrived just in 
time to help save the harvest in Poland and Czechoslovakia which was the operation’s 
ultimate goal (note the merging of “CANada” and “HARvest”). Moreover, according to 
Susan Armstrong-Reid and David Murray the sale also helped improve UNRRA’s public 
image and offset some of the transportation issues that were plaguing the distribution of 
aid.
32
 However, like most disposal operations it was far from perfectly executed. 
Traversing the destroyed remnants of Germany to deliver the convoys of vehicles to the 
two Eastern European nations was a complicated undertaking. The convoys got lost 
multiple times when war damage caused detours and, inevitably, several accidents 
occurred on the treacherous journey across Central Europe and through different Allied 
occupation zones. The trip took several days to complete and accommodations (however 
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rudimentary) had to be arranged. Moreover, since it was a two-way trip for all 3,600 
drivers, a return trip had to be planned as well.
33
  
Over the fall of 1945, and after the Pacific war ended, the armed forces finally 
established their postwar requirements and the flood of surpluses that Dewar had 
predicted commenced. Unlike at home where the WAC was reorganizing and expanding 
its storage facilities to accommodate the surging inventories, Canada’s overseas disposal 
administration was completely dependent on the Army’s and Air Force’s logistical 
facilities. This proved to be quite a troublesome relationship given the amount of assets 
requiring liquidation, the summer inventory tabulations, and a lack of coordination with 
DND officials. In fact, it was only in early December that Howe and Berry found out that 
“the army expects to be out of Holland by February 1st [1946]” and that this timetable 
was arranged under the assumption that the WAC would somehow be in a position to 
accept all remaining surpluses overseas.
34
 However, according to Berry it was not 
possible or practical to build up a large staff of trustworthy and capable people to 
maintain custody of surpluses overseas in the short time “prior to the Canadian Army 
being sent home.”35 Perhaps Dewar summed up the situation best when he told Howe, 
“the main idea in the minds of the Canadian Military Organization over here is to get the 
troops back to Canada with all speed. This is perhaps very logical but it is certainly not 
going to facilitate the work of disposal.”36  
With all the Army’s facilities closing down and Canadian troops returning home, 
no one would be left in Britain and Holland to guard or maintain Canada’s surplus 
stockpiles. Although the new Minister of Defence, Douglas Abbott, assured Howe that 
the Army would find volunteers, the numbers fell far short of requirements and there 
were no guarantees that those with the necessary experience would agree to stay behind.
37
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The WAC was left scrambling in front of an avalanche without the personnel, 
administration, or supporting infrastructure. In an effort to help Dewar, Howe dispatched 
Colonel T. F. Flahiff back overseas. Flahiff, who had just returned from his inspection 
tour of Northwest Europe to start a new job as an assistant in the office of the Deputy 
Minister of Reconstruction, was still in Halifax when he received his new and 
inconvenient orders to cross the Atlantic again.
38
 In Britain, Dewar clambered to find the 
necessary manpower to help him and often had to improvise solutions. For instance, since 
the Army’s mechanics were being demobilized and sent home, the Army’s service and 
repair facilities were rapidly closing down at Camp Bordon. As a result, Dewar had to 
hire a local British company, Grantham Productions Ltd., to repair and retrofit surplus 
vehicles so they could be readied for sale.
39
  
Berry also tried getting Howe to pressure the Army to reconsider its timetable and 
stay another six months to facilitate an orderly liquidation. However, Abbott, who was 
brought in by Mackenzie King to expedite demobilization, politely declined. With the 
timetable set, Berry and Howe saw no alternative but to give Dewar the go-ahead and 
dispose of everything as quickly as possible. As Howe told Dewar in a Top Secret 
telegram on 12 December 1945, “the disposal of surpluses in Northwest Europe must 
now be shaped to coincide with availability of military personnel.”40 By the end of 1945, 
Dewar faced the reverse problem from the summer: he now had too many assets to sell in 
a very short time period. The pressure to liquidate stores quickly was intense since his 
mission was to recoup some of the original cost before the Army withdrew. Thankfully, 
Dewar proved to be a highly capable salesman for the WAC, but the job was immensely 
challenging as a never-ending series of obstacles complicated his efforts and limited his 
freedom of action. In February 1946, after several stressful months of heavy work, Dewar 
briefly considered resigning his post. Having served the DMS throughout the war as 
Director-General of the Arsenals and Small Arms Production Branch, Dewar was burning 
out. Adding to his burdens was the prolonged and unexpected separation from his wife, 
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whose arrival in Britain was derailed because of bureaucratic regulations surrounding her 
visa application.
41
 However, a cooler head prevailed, and Dewar continued as Overseas 
Sales Director until the post was terminated in June 1946. 
In late fall 1945, Dewar’s work started piling up as sales negotiations with the 
Belgian and Dutch Governments commenced. Unfortunately, few documents outlining 
the negotiations survived and no comprehensive list detailing everything purchased 
exists. According to Berry’s report to the WAC’s Board of Directors in February 1946 
roughly $2 million worth of surpluses were sold or in the process of being sold to those 
countries and “negotiations were under way with the Belgian Government for additional 
sales of tanks and armoured vehicles to perhaps $1,000,000.”42 Furthermore, from 1946-
1948, the Dutch also made several purchases from the WAC that were labelled as “Group 
Sales of Materials in Several Classifications” in the WAC’s annual reports. In total, these 
sales amounted to over $3 million, but unfortunately it is unknown what materials or 
classifications were exchanged. This suggests that these types of bulk purchases were one 
way to camouflage the amount and diversity of military assets liquidated from storage 
depots in the Netherlands.
43
  
Suffice it to say, the Dutch and Belgians bought many different things in bulk. In 
August 1945, the Dutch started negotiations for purchasing at least two divisions’ worth 
of personal equipment that could outfit those citizens being called up for police duties, 
and, eventually, for overseas service in the Pacific. These negotiations for the equipment 
continued throughout the fall and sometime in the fiscal year of 1946-1947 dozens of 
sales were finalized for a variety of other materials and equipment. For example, a total 
of $3,531,911 was paid to the WAC (in thirty-five separate transactions) for clothing and 
textiles by the Dutch government and the Canadian Red Cross for consignment to 
Holland. Some of the items purchased included approximately 200,000 pairs of trousers, 
150,000 blouses, 50,000 rifle slings, 35,000 blankets, 160,000 pairs of socks, and 
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thousands of pairs of boots and shoes.
44
 These types of sales put surplus uniforms and 
textiles to good use by providing many destitute Europeans with a change of clothes.  
The sale of surplus assets for humanitarian purposes was an especially lucrative 
business for the WAC. Not only did they provide a reliable outlet for unloading unneeded 
materials and supplies, but sales to foreign governments, UNRRA, the Canadian Red 
Cross, and several other charitable organizations helped attenuate a desperate postwar 
humanitarian crisis. Crushed under the weight of heavy and prolonged fighting, much of 
Europe and Asia lay in ruins. Allied militaries, local governments, and aid organizations 
struggled to cope with the wretched and starving mass of humanity displaced by the war 
and its aftermath.
45
 Although they certainly did not offset the entire crisis, surplus assets 
filled a gigantic vacuum in the supply of basic commodities and services. Clothing and 
textiles were some of the most coveted supplies and the Dutch were certainly not the only 
people to benefit from Canadian stocks. The Red Cross and UNRRA made particular use 
of old blouses, trousers, undergarments, coats, and boots. The Red Cross alone purchased 
at least $3,804,911 worth of clothing and textiles, some motor transport spare parts, and 
fifty-six ambulances. The items were shipped all over world: to China, Poland, Hungary, 
Yugoslavia, Germany, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, France, and Holland.
46
 
UNRRA and other relief organizations profited as well. One November 1945 shipment to 
Athens, Greece totaled 140,000 lbs. of “mixed civilian clothing.”47  
Against the back drop of a very cold winter and the war’s devastation, surplus 
medical supplies were particularly coveted. The Belgians purchased long lists of 
equipment and supplies from Canada, including aseptic furniture, sundry field medical 
equipment, X-ray apparatuses and accessories, laboratory apparatuses, surgical 
appliances, slings, assorted surgical dressings, and surgical instruments and appliances. 
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The French Medical Mission purchased nearly half a million dollars’ worth of narcotics, 
hospital equipment, and medical supplies, while the Dutch government purchased an 
entire hospital (No. 1 General Hospital) and all the medical stores consolidated at 
Nijmegen by 1st Canadian Army over the winter. Later in May 1946 (and as part of the 
war claims settlement), the Dutch purchased all the remaining medical and dental 
supplies situated in the Netherlands (mostly at Alverna), Canadian General Hospitals No. 
2, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 21, and all the remaining armoured and unarmoured vehicles located 
at the Deelen airfield.
48
  
Despite these achievements, Dewar faced many obstacles along the way. Aside 
from working with a timetable established that did not facilitate disposal, his problems 
also stemmed from another government department based far away in Ottawa: the 
Department of Finance. Despite the Hyde Park agreements and Canada’s best efforts to 
balance its payments between Sterling pounds and American dollars, at the end of 
hostilities Canada faced another foreign exchange crisis. As a result, Finance officials 
were less willing to accept other currencies when selling surpluses, such as the Dutch 
Guilder or Belgian Franc, and instead preferred to receive payments in Canadian or 
American dollars. In August and September, various deals were worked out with the Low 
Countries where local currencies were exchanged for surpluses under the conditions that 
the money “remain available” to cover the costs of occupation.49 After subtracting those 
costs, if sufficient credit remained in favour of Canada, both Belgium and Holland agreed 
to pay the balance in American money. Such an agreement was important for all parties 
concerned. It facilitated sales over the fall of 1945 and in the end served as the basis of 
the war claims settlements that are discussed in the following section.
50
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However, these currency agreements took several weeks to complete – and months 
to finalize into the war claims settlements – and therefore complicated Dewar’s task in 
the short-term. Would similar agreements need to be formulated with every nation 
interested in Canada’s surpluses? If so, then how was Dewar supposed to sell anything 
before February 1946? As the pressure for speedy sales mounted in December, Dewar’s 
work was severely limited by these conflicting policies and priorities. He now had lots of 
assets to liquidate but he could not sell to the highest bidder if payments were not in 
Canadian or American funds. As a result, the currency preference prevented Dewar from 
making several sales. For example, in April 1946 a potential deal with a Swedish 
customer fell through because Canada would not accept Swedish currency and no 
payments in Canadian or American dollars were possible.
51
 Dewar appears to have 
circumvented some of these restrictions by selling $845,921 worth of typewriters, a 
printing plant, paper, and office equipment to a British intermediary, R. A. Brand & Co., 
who tried reselling them to the Swedish buyers. Although the sale to R. A. Brand & Co. 
went through on Dewar’s end, new currency and export restrictions enacted in September 
1947 prevented Brand & Co. from selling to the Swedes. Consequently, they were unable 
to make payments to the WAC and, eventually, lawyers got involved.
52
 
In May 1946, Dewar requested additional time to complete potential sales with 
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Russia.
53
 His position as 
Overseas Sales Director was ending in June, but with an extra few weeks he was 
confident that several sales worth an extra few million American dollars could be 
arranged. He also believed that if Canada accepted currencies other than American or 
Canadian dollars, then even more sales would be possible. For instance, his contacts with 
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the Portuguese government informed him that it would purchase more Canadian 
surpluses, perhaps $5-6 million worth of remaining equipment, if it could use the 
Portuguese escudo instead of the American dollar.
54
 Although Southern Rhodesia 
purchased several types of vehicles and engineering equipment for just under a million 
dollars, Dewar was not able to complete many of these potential transactions because he 
was not granted an extension and Finance would not compromise on the currency issue.
55
  
Another set of problems that caused headaches for Dewar was the brewing 
competition between the Allies for a share in the marketplace. Every Allied country faced 
the disposal problem and in other countries, like the UK and US, the problem was 
exponentially larger and more complex than in Canada. The worldwide marketplace for 
military surpluses was finite, easily flooded, and hotly contested. In January 1946, when 
traveling in Holland to finalize the sale of clothing, medical supplies, vehicles, and 
personal equipment, Dewar received his initiation into this competition when he was 
confronted by suddenly cautious representatives of the Dutch Quartermaster General. In 
conversations with the Dutch officers, Dewar learned that the Head of the British Military 
Mission at The Hague had informed the Dutch Minister of War that the Canadians would 
not be able to “deliver complete equipment for a division and that if the Minister of War 
persisted in buying from [Canada], the [British] War Office would not be disposed to fill 
in the gaps.”56 Flabbergasted by the story, Dewar prevailed upon the Dutch and 
convinced them of the good faith of Canadians despite the “adverse reports” circulated by 
representatives of the War Office.
57
  
In retrospect the “adverse reports” emanating from the British Military Mission 
were not totally inaccurate since the Canadian armed forces were returning significant 
amounts of kit to British supply depots. To British officers it was clear that Canada could 
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not sell everything required by a full-strength division, but whatever they did sell hurt 
Britain’s share in the postwar marketplace for military surpluses. Something had to be 
done to protect potential outlets for disposal and hinder Canadian activities in the interim. 
Clearly, Canada’s speedy plans for demobilization were ruffling some feathers. 
Moreover, the hostility of British officials was also, perhaps, linked to Canada’s 
advantageous postwar position. As a medium-sized power with a sizeable army, but 
without significant occupation duties or major global security interests, Canada got an 
early jump on selling British-patterned kit. In doing so, Canadian sales were cutting into 
potential export markets for British surpluses and such actions were making some 
forward-thinking British officials anxious.  
Settling Debts and Selling Arms 
The sales arranged by Dewar over the fall and winter of 1945-1946 coincided with 
the negotiations of numerous war claims settlements between Canada and several 
countries including the UK, US, and Netherlands. Agreements with the British and Dutch 
followed a parallel timeline to the Canadian-American disposal agreements and, in 
general, a similar vein. However, there were some distinctive elements to the British and 
Dutch war claims settlements that deserve further attention, particularly in reference to 
the precarious postwar positions of these two European powers. The Dutch settlement 
also highlights the international significance of Canada’s postwar disposal program 
through which it sold surplus arms and equipment to help reconstitute the armed forces of 
future NATO allies.   
In general, the war claims settlements are overshadowed by the Anglo-American 
and Anglo-Canadian financial agreements negotiated throughout the fall of 1945 and 
winter of 1946 respectively.
58
 Although these two financial agreements were significant 
achievements, they differed from the claims settlements in their intent and scope. For the 
most part, the financial treaties were future-oriented agreements that sought to maintain 
                                                 
58
 An article in the Winnipeg Free Press called the claims settlement a “supplementary agreement.” See: 
Chester Bloom, “$1,250,000,000 Loan Made to Britain, Debt for Air Training Plan Is Cancelled by 
Canada” Winnipeg Free Press, 1 March 1946, 1. See also: Hector MacKenzie, “The Path to Temptation: 
The Negotiation of Canada’s Reconstruction Loan to Britain in 1946” Historical Papers/Communications 
historiques, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1982): 196-220. 
  
317 
 
postwar prosperity in trans-Atlantic trade by propping up the British economy with loans. 
The Anglo-American financial agreement provided the British with a five-year, $3.75 
billion loan with a two percent interest rate and it stipulated that Britain had to open up 
the Sterling area by converting more currency earnings into American dollars. The US 
and UK also negotiated a separate claims settlement to resolve the outstanding debts for 
Lend-Lease supplies and the sale of remaining American surplus property in the UK. 
Once completed in March 1946, it was appended to the financial treaty.
59
 The Anglo-
Canadian financial agreement furnished the UK with a 1oan of $1.25 billion over five 
years with a two percent interest rate. The loan’s purposes were threefold: it allowed the 
British to make their balance of payments between dollars and sterling, it helped maintain 
adequate gold and dollar reserves in London, and it required Britain to maintain certain 
obligations for multilateral trade with Canada. Although the financial agreement 
cancelled the outstanding $425 million owed Canada for the BCATP, the agreement was 
negotiated separately from the Anglo-Canadian war claims settlement, though both 
treaties were signed the same day in Ottawa, 6 March 1946.
60
 
By contrast, the war claims settlements were completed as a means of resolving any 
outstanding debts accumulated during the war. Rather than accommodating future 
economic stability, the claims settlements were more backwards focused and sought to 
wipe the slate clean by putting the signatories on an even financial footing. War debts 
were accrued in many ways – through credits and loans, lending or leasing military 
equipment and facilities, billeting troops, and damages attributable to service personnel 
after liberation. Luckily for Dewar, the settlement of war claims coincided with the 
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accelerated demobilization timetables and helped ease some of the pressure since assets 
were written off at the bargaining table and, in the case of the Dutch settlement, 
negotiations were handled personally by the DND’s Deputy Minister (Army) Alexander 
Ross while he was assigned to CMHQ.
61
  
The war claims settlements should not be confused with Canada’s billion-dollar gift 
or the larger American loan. In fact, the two types of treaties were kept intentionally 
separate in order to fulfill vastly different purposes. In Canada’s case, the extension of 
loans to Britain and several other nations (including the Netherlands) was intended to 
secure foreign markets for Canadian exports. The logic was simple: extending Canadian 
credits to other countries would secure foreign purchases of new products being 
manufactured by Canadian industries. It also fit with prevailing economic priorities 
favouring exports and the producer emphasis but, unfortunately, the loans never managed 
to stimulate economic growth in the way that policymakers hoped. Instead they 
precipitated another balance of payments problem in 1947 when Britain drew heavily 
from its loan in the early stages.
62
 However, since the loans were designed to stimulate 
new production in Canada, they could not be used to sop up the residues of old, wartime 
production. As a result, the loans could not be used to purchase Canadian surpluses 
unless special adjustments were granted, such as in the case of Nationalist China and the 
$25 million credit specifically set aside to cover weapon sales.
63
  
Apart from establishing financial solvency amongst Allied nations, there were four 
important hallmarks to Canada’s war claims settlements. The first, and perhaps most 
basic, was the bilateral nature of each agreement. There were very few – if any – 
multilateral war claims settlements between Allies. When first discussing international 
arrangements for the disposal of Canadian surpluses, Berry had originally proposed a 
series of multilateral agreements between all Allied nations, the creation of an 
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international committee to handle the disposition of surpluses, and the division of the 
world into zones through which the transfer of surplus would be intentionally blocked. 
These ideas were later amended in September 1944 and very few survived in the final 
version circulated in February 1945.
64
 In fact, the multilateral approach was largely 
dismissed as too impractical and eventually it was superseded by a series of bilateral 
agreements that were determined based upon the scope of wartime developments, debts, 
and the physical locations of surpluses at the end of the war.  
The second hallmark was the lump sum payment in exchange for title to the assets. 
This was the simplest method for settling claims as it established an approximate value 
for surpluses located in foreign countries and transferred ownership accordingly. Surplus 
assets became the pawns of peacemaking – something akin to reparations-in-kind – 
exchanged between allies to settle debts. The key negotiating challenge was in 
determining which country had to pay the lump sum, determining what properties were 
covered (and not covered) by the payment, and establishing a dollar figure acceptable to 
all parties concerned. In the Anglo-Canadian war claims settlement the British paid 
Canada $150 million in order to cancel all outstanding debts between the two countries. 
In the case of the Dutch-Canadian claims settlement, the Canadian Army paid the Dutch 
government $33 million to settle all outstanding claims, though most of that total was 
paid through the transfer of Canada’s formidable stocks of military hardware located in 
the Netherlands. 
Although the lump sum payment was not the only method available for enticing 
sales of leftover war junk or settling claims, Canada never really deviated from this type 
of arrangement.
65
 The lump sum payment worked for Canada given the narrow 
geographic dispersion of its surpluses (predominately Northwest Europe and the UK) and 
the fact that quantities were not sufficient to necessitate any special measures. As a result 
of these circumstances, Canada’s war claims settlements had to possess a repatriation 
clause, the third hallmark of claims settlements. The repatriation clause allowed either 
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country to remove or withdraw from the other whatever property it desired to keep. For 
instance, in the Anglo-Canadian war claims settlement, Article 3e cancelled all claims 
incurred by either Government in the disposal of surplus assets by combining Britain’s 
lump sum payment (Article 1) with the clearly stated caveat of Article 3e: “this 
Agreement shall not prejudice the right of either Government to remove any of its surplus 
war assets from the country of the other, either for its own use or for transfer to others.”66 
This qualifying statement provided the legal basis for both countries to repatriate 
whatever munitions or supplies were needed for postwar requirements, thereby ensuring 
that the high demand and ready market in Europe would not always take precedence over 
Canadian needs at home. The military was free to repatriate what it wanted, while the 
WAC also retained some flexibility to find other international customers. Largely based 
on the precedent of Berry’s February recommendations, this type of clause was used in 
all disposal agreements – informal or formal – and also legitimized any sales that were 
made by Dewar before the settlement came into effect. 
The fourth hallmark had to do with the origins of the claims settlements. Usually 
preceded by informal arrangements, the formal claims settlements were always a 
reflection of wartime developments and necessities. The main claims of the UK against 
Canada arose from the supplies and services it provided for all Canadian Army and Air 
Force personnel while stationed in the British Isles or in operations in Europe. This was 
known as “capitation rates” (or payments to the British for supplies, arms, munitions, and 
services overseas) and the DND had been unable to reach an agreement with the War 
Office to resolve the capitation rates for 1944 and 1945.
67
 For Canada, the main claims 
stemmed from several contracts completed after the Mutual Aid Board ceased 
functioning in September 1945. These contracts were for the production of several cargo 
vessels for the British Admiralty (the cost of which was born by the WAC) and the 
manufacture of new rolling stock for India since its existing railcars and transport 
infrastructure were badly worn out by the war. There were also several other claims 
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originating from munitions production or jointly-owned facilities, such as those of the 
Inspection Board or the BCATP.
68
 
The negotiations for the Anglo-Canadian war claims settlement happened 
concurrently with those for the loan agreement. However, they were much shorter in 
duration and occurred only at the end of February 1946, just before the loan agreement 
was finalized. R. B. Bryce, Canada’s main negotiator for the claims settlement, received a 
formal proposal on 25 February 1946 in which the British offered to pay Canada $150 
million in exchange for cancelling all claims. That Britain paid Canada (and not vice 
versa) to settle claims not only demonstrated the value of some of the post-Mutual Aid 
contracts for ships and rolling stock, but also the recognition that certain properties and 
assets in Canada equaled the balance owing for capitation rates. After reviewing the 
proposal, Bryce charted the mixture of claims and estimated costs in a memo to Ilsley and 
Clark. Although far from detailed, his calculations showed that “there was a rough 
balance between British and Canadian claims when the $150 million cash payment was 
taken into account.”69 As a result, the agreement was drawn up by 2 March with “very 
sweeping” and “general terms” in order to account for both “known and unknown 
claims.”70 The settlement also stipulated that any Canadian property left over in the UK 
or not slated for sale to another country would be turned over to the British Ministry of 
Supply by 15 May 1946.  
Following the settlement’s conclusion, some issues emerged when implementing its 
conditions in Britain. Although the sweeping terms covering “known and unknown 
claims” would greatly assist British officials in solving the dilemmas, the settlement was 
implemented while Dewar busily attempted to sell as much as possible. This created 
certain legal technicalities if sales were not completed before 15 May or if negotiations 
were ongoing at the time. While there was some leeway at first, by July 1946 British 
officials started flexing their muscles. Apparently, in an effort to make as many sales as 
possible, Dewar sold surplus assets to as many different business interests as possible. 
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Some companies were less than desirable and British officials took advantage of the 15 
May cut-off to prevent them from occurring. In one case, the Ministry of Supply and the 
Treasury impeded the sale of 120 Canadian Chevrolet lorries to the London & Suburban 
Commercial Vehicles (Brixton) Ltd. The deal was brokered by Grantham Traders Ltd. 
(the sister company of Grantham Productions hired by Dewar to repair Canadian vehicles 
at Camp Bordon), but the three companies were tarnished by their suspicious 
“commercial morality” and association with a controversial Member of Parliament for 
Grantham, Denis Kendall.
71
 Kendall, who was suspected of espionage and heavily 
involved in the black market according to MI5 and MI6 security files, was also closely 
associated with right-wing extremists during his time as MP.
72
 As a result, the sale was 
blocked but in September 1946 Grantham Productions suddenly retaliated by claiming 
that the Canadians owed them a startling £19,000 for repair work at Camp Bordon. The 
claim was quietly dismissed after consultations with Dewar.
73
 
Throughout his time in Britain, Dewar’s freedom of action was greatly limited by 
the British insistence on remitting all Canadian surpluses destined for British markets to 
the Ministry of Supply. This closed off the local marketplace and forced Dewar to broker 
sales with British merchants under export-only restrictions. In other words, the informal 
and formal arrangements between Canada and the UK disproportionately affected the 
terms and conditions under which Dewar worked. However, the situation was quite 
different in the Netherlands where the war’s devastation left so many people deprived 
and destitute. Consequently, Dutch officials were less scrupulous about eroding prices 
and controlling sales through government ministries. In fact, the need for equipment and 
supplies was so high that the Dutch were most interested in preventing assets from 
leaving their borders. This gave Dewar and Flahiff, who was stationed on the continent, 
wide latitude in Holland where the First Canadian Army was quickly demobilizing. By 
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March 1946 Dewar had sold $7,068,047 worth of materials to France, Belgium, UNRRA, 
and the Red Cross. In the following year he sold $7,665,550, of which $2,503,750 was 
from UNRRA for motor transport and the Dutch government spent $566,241 on spare 
parts and tools for Browning machine guns, motorcycles, ammunition, dental equipment, 
workshop equipment, and motor transport.
74
  
These sales to the Dutch government were over and above the large amount of 
munitions and supplies it acquired from First Army as part of the war claims settlement. 
Piggy-backing on the currency arrangements negotiated over the fall of 1945, the war 
claims settlement with the Netherlands was finalized on 22 May 1946. Under its terms all 
remaining Canadian military equipment on the continent (apart from the kit used by the 
occupation forces) was transferred to the Dutch military. In the claims settlement, the 
Canadian Army and Dutch Government agreed that the Army owed $33 million for the 
costs of occupation. In order to cover the payment the Army agreed to turn over $25 
million worth of surplus munitions and supplies to the Dutch while $8 million in Dutch 
payments on orders placed with Canadian industries were cancelled.
75
 In addition to the 
settlement of claims, Canada also negotiated a separate financial treaty with the 
Netherlands, signed earlier on 5 February 1946, in which the Canadian government 
agreed to loan the Dutch $25 million in credits for purchasing exports from Canadian 
industries and extended another $15 million for the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia).
76
  
Unfortunately, documentation on the Dutch claims settlement did not definitely 
identify what munitions and supplies constituted the $25 million total or how they were 
appraised. However, what is certain is that a substantial amount of munitions and 
supplies changed hands within a year following VE-Day. Even when accounting for the 
return of assets to the UK and Canada, the First Canadian Army was the largest military 
force ever fielded by the country, consisting of five fighting divisions (three infantry and 
two armoured) and many other auxiliary and supporting units. Given that the postwar 
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Army would never approach a similar size and considering its shrinking budget, the 
expense of repatriation, and its rapid demobilization, the Army was primed to unload 
surplus kit and needed an outlet quickly. The Dutch, by contrast, were in desperate need 
of everything and faced a growing colonial war in Indonesia. With First Canadian Army 
stationed in Holland and Northwestern Germany, it must have been a rather fortuitous 
moment when officials from both countries realized how closely their priorities aligned. 
The prized set of First Army assets was its formidable array of motor transport and 
armoured vehicles. Over the summer and fall, the bulk of First Army’s “A” (armoured) 
and “B” (unarmoured) vehicles were concentrated at the Deelen airfield, located between 
Arnhem and Apeldoorn, which became a glorified parking lot for Canadian vehicles. 
After conquering the Netherlands in May 1940, the Germans undertook an extensive 
construction program to build airfields for fighters. The facility was large and extensive, 
as its buildings, hangars, runways, and roads eventually covered an area larger than 
60,000 acres. The Canadians captured the shattered remnants of the airfield in April 1945 
and together with local authorities set about repairing and redeveloping the site.
77
 By the 
late fall, First Army designated Deelen airfield as “No. 1 Demob Vehicle Park” and every 
conceivable type of vehicle was sent there for storage and disposal. The “Deelen dump” 
was sub-divided into two areas, Deelen I where all the workable vehicles in good 
condition were stored and Deelen II was the junkyard where the derelict machines and 
broken vehicles were left.
78
 Amongst published accounts there is no consensus on how 
many vehicles ended up in Deelen, but the number is probably about 30,000. The Deelen 
Airbase Museum’s website states that Canadians left over 37,000 there in “rows and rows 
of vehicles, as far as the eye could see.”79 However, a 16 May 1946 inventory (probably 
of Deelen I only) taken just before the facility was transferred to Dutch control, counted 
27,931 vehicles (3,261 motorcycles, 3,163 cars and utilities, 13,310 trucks and tractors, 
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4,970 trailers 10-cwt to 40-ton, and 3,227 armoured vehicles).
80
 Whatever the total, a 
significant amount of vehicles exchanged hands. 
Although further research into Dutch records is needed, it is quite obvious that 
Canada directly equipped part of the Royal Netherlands Army immediately following the 
war. Moreover, it is also apparent that a sizeable amount of what the Dutch purchased 
from Canada ended up being redeployed to the Netherlands East Indies to fight against 
Indonesian revolutionaries. Indeed, it was no coincidence that the Dutch were scrambling 
to acquire “personal equipment for 50,000 men to be called up in the Netherlands” at the 
beginning of August, as Indonesian leaders declared independence shortly thereafter on 
17 August 1945.
81
 Thus, immediately following the war Canada turned into a quasi-arms 
dealer; as Christopher Kilford explained, outfitting its allies with military paraphernalia 
was one of Canada’s key contributions to the early history of NATO.82 The large 
Canadian military was rapidly transforming through substantial reductions, but its 
munitions would not easily disperse into civilian life at a similar pace as returning 
veterans. Therefore, Canadian munitions were not only demobilized, they were also 
remobilized by the Dutch.  
The colonial emergency was also one of the reasons why the Dutch government 
started objecting to the destruction of kit and captured German weaponry. On 19 July 
1945, the Dutch government officially protested the practice in a letter to the DEA, 
explaining that “the Netherlands Government…is encountering the greatest difficulties in 
its endeavour to equip her police and special security troops with the necessary weapons, 
and therefore if the arming of these units cannot be efficiently carried out the 
maintenance of peace and order is seriously threatened.” The letter also stated that at 
different salvage dumps in the Netherlands “goods which are not appropriate for use by 
the Allied troops are burned” and that the “bicycles, shoes, clothing, revolvers, carbines 
etc. etc.” that were still useable but nonetheless destroyed “[were] creating an 
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unfavourable impression on the population who are at present suffering from every form 
of shortage.”83   
The need to re-integrate the Resistance movement into the regular armed forces and 
undertake more training operations was a central preoccupation for the Dutch. As a 
result, the use of Canadian or German equipment for training and police purposes was 
stressed in official communications between Prince Bernard, the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Royal Netherlands Army, and Pierre Dupuy, the Canadian Ambassador to the 
Netherlands. On 2 August 1945, Dupuy relayed the substance of his encounters with 
Bernard to his superiors and attempted to impress the urgency upon them by pointing out 
that “the longer a decision [on surplus sales] was delayed the more difficult it would be to 
discipline [the Resistance fighters] and keep them well under control.”84 However, the 
sub-context to these protests was difficult to miss. Given the timing and continued 
correspondence on the issue throughout early August, some ideological and imperial 
motivations were likely at work. As Jennifer Foray and Kirk Goodlet point out, the 
“Indies Question” and the revival of the Dutch Empire through the re-conquest of its 
prized colony, Indonesia, was seen by Dutch leaders as a prerequisite for recovery and 
rehabilitation. Wider cultural and psychological factors pointed them towards the use of 
military forces to re-establish Dutch legitimacy by bringing “order” and “stability” to its 
Empire.
85
 In light of the ideological and imperial aspirations of Dutch leaders, statements 
to Canadian diplomats about the equipment’s usage in Holland were probably a 
smokescreen designed to obscure their intended destination and hide the precarious 
position facing the Dutch Empire fighting a revolution in its Pacific colonies with 
second-hand munitions and supplies.  
In a shadowy story with few supporting documents, surplus Canadian tanks, 
firearms, artillery, and ammunition ended up in Indonesia when the Dutch ramped up 
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their military presence in 1946 and 1947. The war continued until December 1949, 
though by that time Canadian surplus munitions and supplies were long used up. 
According to secondary sources, of the three Dutch divisions sent to Indonesia from 
Holland, one was completely outfitted with Canadian surplus weapons and equipment 
while the other two used kit procured from British sources.
86
 However, there are three 
additional layers of complexity that cloud a straightforward connection between the 
purchase, redeployment, and utility of Canada’s military hardware. In the first case, there 
was a constant drain on the sources of supply. Dutch scavengers or desperate civilians 
often raided the Deelen dump to steal equipment or items they required. Additionally, 
numerous vehicles and equipment acquired from Canada were refurbished or adapted to 
meet urgent civilian needs in Holland. Therefore, the mobilization of units for service in 
the East Indies was done in competition with a steady drain on parts and equipment along 
with the intrepid work of those engaged in material rehabilitation.
87
  
Second, by the time all the sales were finalized in May 1946, the Canadian Army 
had already picked through its inventories, returned the assets it did not own, and 
repatriated those it wanted to keep. Since militaries have an insatiable appetite for the 
most advanced and newest technologies, the Canadian Army kept the best materiel for 
itself, especially since the Army was preparing to redeploy an expeditionary force to the 
Pacific and postwar budgets had yet to be finalized at the time.
88
 Even when accounting 
for the Pacific Expeditionary Force’s planned reliance on American supply channels and 
the deceitful practice of categorizing whole tanks or armoured vehicles as “steel” or 
“chassis” in order to camouflage the size of weapons sales, the Dutch still received a lot 
of worthless junk. No doubt, they received substantial amounts of pristine and useable 
military gear, but it was always mixed in with the derelict leftovers Canada did not want 
to repatriate.  
Third, regardless of the quality and quantity of assets exchanged by the war claims 
settlement, their deteriorating condition throughout 1945-1946 is the most complicating 
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layer shrouding the diffusion of Canadian munitions. Much of Canada’s materiel in 
Northwest Europe went unused over the summer and since personnel were rapidly 
demobilized there were fewer mechanics around to maintain them. Canada’s weaponry 
was left “lying in open air depots in the Netherlands” and was “likely to be damaged by 
the heavy rains [that began] in September.”89 Under the circumstances of demobilization, 
it is highly probable that whatever was purchased by May 1946 had deteriorated (to 
varying extents) in storage and without proper maintenance. Thus, the materiel acquired 
by the Dutch was probably only really suitable for training and police purposes in the 
Netherlands – if at all – and may not have survived long when deployed on the frontlines 
in Indonesia. Although there is no doubt that some of the materiel the Dutch purchased 
was first-rate and battle-tested, it is equally obvious that a large portion of the kit 
outfitting the Dutch army had limited lifespans and was liable to deteriorate or 
breakdown rapidly especially in the challenging environment and climate of Indonesia. 
Without question the Army’s $33 million settlement with the Dutch was the single 
largest arms transaction, but it was an exception to the norm of international sales. The 
general pattern of Canada’s overseas disposal operations – which included either the sale 
of Canadian-owned property already located in foreign countries or exported from 
Canada to foreign buyers – followed a slightly different path. Usually the WAC’s 
representative was the main point of contact, though the Corporation always consulted 
with Howe’s office and the relevant officials in the DEA and DRS before making a sale. 
After all, this was Dewar’s main role as Overseas Sales Director. As we have seen, he 
arranged sales of Canadian property located in Europe, but strangely, he was not involved 
in the Dutch transaction. Furthermore, the sale of surpluses internationally was almost 
always done in smaller quantities and spread across many different customers. This 
meant that when the WAC sold its stockpiles internationally it did so in piecemeal 
fashion and not in bulk quantities. The Corporation certainly had preferential clients, 
especially American brokers who resold Canadian surpluses to foreign buyers, but even 
then a single broker or end user rarely cornered the entire stock. The general pattern of 
international sales never approached the scale or scope of the Dutch claims settlement.  
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Perhaps the most striking departure from the general pattern of international sales 
was the near unanimity that greeted the Dutch purchases in Ottawa. The sale of surplus 
arms and ammunition was a delicate business. Internally, Canadian officials disagreed on 
how best to approach weapon sales and, externally, Canada had to navigate around the 
confines of American and British interests which often limited options. Some officials in 
the DEA expressed misgivings about the final destination of Canadian weaponry and 
worried that arms sales would enable the violent repression of “colonial peoples” in 
Indonesia and other places.
90
 The DEA also worried that arms sales might disturb the 
regional balance of power and contradict policies or embargoes set up by Canada’s allies. 
Moreover, it was also difficult to determine local allegiances or how far the communist 
influence had spread.
91
 Thus, making international sales was an uncertain and risky 
business, as no one wanted to sell arms to the wrong people.  
Most of the DEA’s concerns were summarized by Norman Robertson, the Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a memorandum submitted to Cabinet in May 
1946. Robertson outlined three potential courses of action. The first was one where 
Canada refused arms sales to all countries except “those such as the United Kingdom and 
the United States with which we have exceptionally close political relations and a clearly 
established community of defence interests.”92 Second, Canada could “parallel” the 
policies of the US and UK, thereby permitting expanded sales to some additional 
countries, such as Brazil or Mexico. Third, Canada could institute no restrictions and 
“sell freely to all countries.”93 Robertson believed that option one was the best course of 
action as it supported Canada’s historic alliance systems but allowed some flexibility for 
Cabinet to review potential sales on a case-by-case basis. Option two left Canada in a 
discriminatory position of refusing some sales but favouring others, while option three 
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would elicit strong protests from the UK and US.
94
 On 24 May 1946, Cabinet adopted 
option one as its preferred policy. Although Robertson’s memo greatly influenced 
Cabinet’s future decisions on arms sales, the timing of this decision was not insignificant. 
By May 1946, Canada had already sold, exchanged, repatriated, or consigned most of its 
weaponry, ammunition, and supplies in Europe. In other words, during that critical 
interval between May 1945 and May 1946 the bulk of surplus lethal assets were divested.  
Up to May 1946, policies about the sale of weapon systems were generally guided 
by the necessity of disposal. It made pragmatic, fiscal, political, and economic sense to 
sell munitions to the Dutch and other close Allies. However, as the balance of payments 
crisis resurfaced and the range of clientele dried up, the stocks of surplus munitions and 
supplies continued to piling up. After all, surplus declarations only peaked in March and 
April 1946, and the largest volume of sales occurred throughout the whole calendar year 
of 1946. Thus, while nearly all of the military’s surpluses located in Europe were dealt 
with by May 1946, there still remained large quantities at home. Canada’s economy and 
military could never possibly absorb everything, so inevitably the WAC had to sell its 
commodities to international customers. International sales became a key outlet for 
unloading unwanted materiel, thereby saving Canadian taxpayers from funding larger 
destruction programs or, inversely, saving the domestic economy from absorbing the 
complete flood of assets. This situation became a source of tension and conflict in 
Cabinet, as Howe sought permission to sell both new and used weaponry to Nationalist 
China and several Latin American countries, while the new Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, pushed back.
95
 Howe’s logic was pragmatic as 
Canada had assets to dispose of as quickly as possible, but his position did not always 
conform to the local and international conditions that concerned the DEA.  
Canada could not barge ahead with sales, as external pressures from the UK and US 
limited the range of available options. The pressures came in two general forms. First, as 
already noted, the international market for military surpluses was hotly contested and 
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easily flooded. As a result, the Allies competed with each other for a share of the 
marketplace. Just as the British had reacted unfavourably to Canadian sales, the 
Americans were similarly displeased when Canada started infringing on potential 
markets. During the war’s latter stages, Canada sold some production surpluses, 
including weapons and vehicles, to Nationalist China. However, the Americans were 
hostile to these developments as they viewed Canada’s efforts as an encroachment into an 
American theatre of operations where the deployment and sale of American materiel was 
used to influence Nationalist strategy and tactics. Moreover, there were suspicions that 
the Americans were also trying to guard the Chinese marketplace for the disposal of their 
own surpluses.
96
  
The second external pressure was related to the first. Canadian arms sales were not 
only constrained by a competitive marketplace; they were also affected by British and 
American interests and foreign policies. Canada had little choice but to follow its more 
powerful Allies and keep its foreign policies in line with their objectives, which could 
preclude sales. For instance, the UK and US upheld an unofficial arms embargo during 
the first half of the Chinese civil war and therefore Canada could not sell weapons to the 
Nationalists until mid-1947. However, the embargo was never publicly announced, which 
allowed Cabinet to follow a dichotomous policy that both upheld and undermined the 
clandestine sanctions. Until the Americans lifted the unofficial ban, Cabinet denied all 
requests for munitions (for both surplus and new production) from Chinese 
representatives unless the request was made before the Mutual Aid program was 
terminated in September 1945. Throughout late 1945 and 1946 Cabinet approved several 
sales from the Mutual Aid backlog, but they were negotiated under new payment terms 
outlined by the Sino-Canadian financial treaty.
97
  
In the case of Latin American countries, Canada had little choice but to defer to 
American interests and decisions. American policy was decidedly against arming any 
Latin American state, though it was willing to grant export permits for Mexico and Brazil 
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possibly because both countries had fought during the war.
98
 Apparently, a major concern 
of the American State Department was to “discourage expenditures on military 
equipment which would seriously strain the economy of the purchasing country.”99 The 
US was insisting on cash payments for weapons since most Latin American republics 
were not “in a position to pay cash on a substantial scale. Peru and Chile [were] virtually 
bankrupt.”100 Moreover, the State Department was particularly hostile to Argentina and 
its leader Juan Peron. At American insistence, the sale of a single corvette, HMCS 
Barrie, to the Argentinian Navy was held up for two years, even though dozens of other 
Canadian ships were sold in Latin America through American brokers.
101
 
In order to navigate these international pressures and successfully dispose of 
surpluses to Canada’s best advantage, officials in the DEA and the DRS had to get 
creative. In the end, they came to an ingenious – if devious – set of compromises and 
initiatives that helped them bypass most reservations about dealing arms and avoid 
clashing with British or American interests. For those countries outside Canada’s 
traditional alliance systems, the government implemented a policy of selling only 
demilitarized assets. This meant that every ship or aircraft sold by the WAC was stripped 
of all armaments and ammunition before the sale was made. This effectively rendered 
munitions harmless and allowed Canadians to sell them without being considered 
weapons. In other words, demilitarized corvettes, frigates, and destroyers were no longer 
warships and could be sold as boats. As a result, every vessel entering the WAC’s 
custody had its armaments removed so as to facilitate its potential sale and conversion.
102
 
In the case of HMCS Barrie, when skeptical American officials finally relented and 
allowed the transaction to take place, the demilitarized corvette was renamed Capitan 
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Canepa by the Argentinian navy and turned into an oceanographic vessel with “five labs” 
that “probe[d] [Argentina’s] coastal waters.”103 
According to some newspaper accounts roughly 75 percent of all surpluses sold by 
the WAC went to Canadian businesses and citizens.
104
 However, this was actually an 
inflated and misleading statistic. In fact, when accounting for resales to third parties, a 
large portion of sales – certainly more than 25 percent – were made to foreign interests 
and companies. This discrepancy between policy, propaganda, and outcome was a 
product of the WAC’s reliance on brokers and established businesses. As we have seen 
with the sale of cargo ships, some brokers and foreign companies formed subsidiary 
corporations in Canada so they could tacitly fulfill the sale provisions and gain access to 
the WAC’s inventories. These corporate entities were only Canadian on paper, as there 
was never any intention of using the assets in Canada. People like Charles Babb, who 
was hired as an agent by the WAC, profited substantially from his dealings in surplus 
aircraft and by forming a Canadian subsidiary. The airplanes he purchased all went to 
third parties, many from Latin America.
105
 A similar trend existed with naval vessels. For 
instance, in September 1945, the New York based United Ship Corporation bought 
twenty-four corvettes from the WAC for $570,000 and at least twelve were resold to 
three Latin American countries. Chile bought HMCS Strathroy, Stellarton, and Thorlock, 
while Panama received HMCS Norsyd, Guelph, and St. Lambert. United Ship 
Corporation also resold HMCS Rivère du Loup, Lachute, Peterborough, Louisburg (II), 
Belleville, and Asbestos to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican government also 
acquired the frigate HMCS Carlplace for $140,000 in a direct sale from the WAC.
106
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The case of Aristotle Onassis, a Greek shipping magnate, exemplifies the point 
further. Sometime between April 1946 and March 1947, he purchased the demilitarized 
frigate HMCS Stormont for $70,000 through Constantino Konialdis, a broker based in 
Montevideo, Uruguay. The Stormont never returned to Canada, as Onassis brought it to 
Naples, Italy, and renamed it Christina (after his daughter) just before investing $4 
million converting it into a “floating palace” with ten guest apartments.107 Within a 
decade the Christina became synonymous with conspicuous wealth as Onassis had a full-
sized swimming pool installed and many other attractions. Perhaps, the strangest addition 
to this luxury yacht were the bar stools. Onassis had them covered in minke whale 
foreskin and reportedly loved to tell his female guests – who included Marilyn Monroe 
and Elizabeth Taylor – “Madame, you are sitting on the largest penis in the world.”108 
Onassis hosted many distinguished guests on his boat, including Winston Churchill, John 
F. Kennedy, and in 1956 Monaco’s Prince Rainier and Grace Kelly were married on 
board. In 1999, the ship was relaunched by new owners as the Christina O, a pleasure 
craft for the extremely wealthy (rental rates were reportedly $60,000 per day between 
2006 and 2009). According to The National Post, in 2013 the Christina O was moored in 
a shipyard outside London awaiting new owners. The reported asking price was $34 
million which makes HMCS Stormont, perhaps, the only surplus asset to substantially 
appreciate in value after the war.
109
 
Canadian officials and politicians were not overly concerned about where 
demilitarized assets ended up after the broker purchased them. Their complacency 
originated from the removal of weapons and the WAC’s reliance on American brokers. 
These conditions obviated any Canadian liability, as the export permits and conditions of 
any subsequent sale would happen under American laws. Once the WAC made the sale, 
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it was no longer considered a Canadian matter and this probably accounts for the fact that 
the Corporation rarely tracked assets after leaving its possession. Instead, transactions 
like the one with United Ship Corporation were listed as sales to American companies or 
American interests and the paper trail petered out.
110
 To be sure, the WAC entertained 
many offers for purchasing surplus munitions and supplies and it made a fair share of 
direct sales to foreign governments as a result. For instance, sales to the Venezuelan 
government recouped $3,312,166 in eleven transactions from 1945 to 1947. The 
Venezuelans purchased seven corvettes and at least 1,499 Dodge 3-ton trucks and 100 
Chevrolet 3-ton “tilting trucks.”111 Additionally, the Government of Jamaica spent 
$34,000 on “trucks and various spare parts” in 1946-1947, the Chilean Government 
bought three frigates, HMCS Joliette, Seacliffe, and Glace Bay, for $390,000, and Peru 
bought HMCS Poundmaker and St. Pierre in late 1947.
112
 Yet it is obvious that these 
direct sales were not the norm and that large numbers of surplus ended up with foreign 
interests through intermediaries. 
It would be easy to deride the WAC’s international sales and disposal policies, 
labelling it as an arms dealer. After all, Canada supplied a variety of new and used assets 
to its allies.
113
 Yet the arms dealer characterization might not be completely accurate. 
Canada’s postwar disposal policies and international sales walked a thin line between the 
two extremes of peacekeeper and arms dealer. In effect, Canada was both and neither at 
the same time. There is little question Canada sold arms to allies, but these sales usually 
had rational purposes that furthered Canadian interests, such as when the weapons were 
used to reconstitute an ally’s armed forces or settle debts incurred by the war. When 
dealing with non-traditional allies or trading partners, WAC officials restricted the types 
of assets it sold. Demilitarizing warships and aircraft, for instance, ensured that Canada 
was not selling any functional weapon systems thereby allowing officials to dispose of 
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surpluses while navigating around American and British embargoes or conflicting 
interests. In Canada’s case, the diplomacy of disposal was formed by a pragmatic 
compromise between ideals and intentions. 
However, once a demilitarized asset was sold, there was little stopping the 
purchaser from acquiring the armaments elsewhere. Therefore, Canada was also 
inadvertently selling arms, or perhaps more accurately, it was selling systems without 
weapons. Canada’s international disposal policies lived in the “grey zone.”114 Canadian 
officials in the DEA and DRS were satisfied with selling ships to American brokers even 
if they ended up outfitting the navies of dictators like Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, 
President of the Dominican Republic. Yet when Trujillo later tried to acquire armaments 
for the ships from Canada, he was firmly rebuffed and a similar request from the Chileans 
was also refused.
115
 After May 1946, Canada also started refusing new Dutch requests for 
armaments. Sometime in late 1946 or early 1947, the Netherlands Purchasing 
Commission wanted to order one million rounds of .303-inch rifle ammunition and an 
earlier request for “10,000 Sten machine guns and ammunition to be used in policing 
Indonesia” was made. However, Cabinet refused the sales “on the ground[s] that these 
would be used to pacify the native populations [in Indonesia]” and that “a million rounds 
of rifle ammunition [was] an excessive issue for normal police purposes.”116  
The sale of Mosquito bombers also followed a similar trajectory, though several 
contradictions emerged when Cabinet approved sales to some countries and not others. 
Since the RCAF expected to maintain some of its fighter squadrons with Mosquitos large 
batches were not declared surplus right after the war. However, once the RCAF settled on 
a postwar procurement strategy involving Vampire jets, the need for Mosquitos dropped 
substantially throughout 1946 and 1947. Consequently, Mosquitos started forming an 
increasingly large part of the WAC’s inventories. In early 1947, Argentina submitted a 
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request to purchase 100 Mosquitos from the WAC. However, the “grey zone” of these 
aircraft hardly existed, as few civilian uses were possible for the Mosquito. The twin-
engined bomber could carry a payload of 4,000 lbs. and was heavily armed with at least 
four 20mm cannons or four .303 Browning machine guns. In early April, when DEA 
officials broached the Argentinean proposal with the State Department, their American 
counterparts used the loaded terms “dismayed” and “disappointed” to describe their 
attitude if the transaction went ahead. Given American attitudes, Cabinet deferred to 
American opinions and refused the sale.
117
 
However, just a few months later, Cabinet jumped at the opportunity to sell 174 
Mosquitos to Nationalist China. On 25 August 1947, Cabinet formally approved the sale 
in light of several factors that signaled a slight deviation from policies and patterns 
established after May 1946. In this case, American policy towards arms sales in China 
had changed. Up to late 1946, the US and UK upheld their unofficial embargo, but with 
the Nationalist fairing so poorly, the Americans lifted it completely by May 1947 and an 
export permit for 131,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition was quickly granted.
118
 
Now the Americans were looking more favourably upon weapon sales to the Nationalists, 
but Canada had already been selling China munitions and supplies as part of its credit 
agreement.
119
 Despite serious reservations from the DEA and St. Laurent, Howe 
prevailed in Cabinet and gained approval for the Mosquito sale. The Chinese agreed to 
use $2.5 million of their Canadian credit for the purchase and separately pay $3.5 million 
for armaments and ammunition in American dollars. As Kim Richard Nossal pointed out, 
the 1947 exchange crisis made Cabinet especially eager for American dollars. 
Unfortunately, Cabinet never received the American money it was promised. As soon as 
the sale was approved, the Nationalist government reneged and wanted the whole sale 
applied to the military credit and Howe, “happy at the prospect of clearing the obsolete 
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Mosquitos from War Assets Corporation warehouses, pressured St. Laurent into agreeing 
to the Chinese request.”120  
Although sales to China fulfilled pragmatic purposes for Canada, the diffusion of 
military technologies was not necessarily productive for end users. As Victor Shiu 
Chiang Cheng explained, the battlefields of the Chinese Civil War were decidedly “low 
tech environments” and the Nationalists (as well as the Communists) had trouble 
incorporating modern technologies and weapon systems into their strategies and 
tactics.
121
 For example, the Americans supplied the Nationalists with a phenomenal 
amount of materiel. By late 1945, thirty-nine divisions in Chiang Kai-shek’s army were 
completely outfitted with standard American weaponry and the US also sold $900 million 
worth of war surpluses for $175 million.
122
 However, a variety of cultural, environmental, 
and logistical factors conspired to limit their effectiveness on the battlefield. For instance, 
surplus American uniforms and boots did not fit the “shorter and slighter Chinese 
soldiers” while many Chinese commanders had little experience with mechanized 
warfare and consequently did not deploy their tanks or mobile forces in accordance with 
the principles of modern warfare.
123
 Eventually, both sides developed an aversion to 
military technologies that Chiang Cheng described as “technophobic misperceptions.”124 
Canada’s sale of 174 Mosquito bombers fit into this problematic pattern. Like with 
the Dutch arms sales, the utility of these assets was dubious. Even for the most 
experienced pilots, the Mosquito bomber was a difficult plane to fly, so Chinese pilots 
faced a steep learning curve. However, reports from the Canadian Military Attaché in 
Nanking explained that this curve was likely insurmountable. Summarizing the situation, 
he stated “that the [Chinese pilots] were the best pilots according to Chinese 
standards…and [they] should not have had too much difficulty flying the aircraft,” but 
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while training in Canada “they were quite unused to aircraft of such speed and power.”125 
There were also concerns about reaction times which were “reported as being in some 
cases five seconds slower than the averagely good British or Canadian pilot.” 
Consequently, a higher number of crashes took place and a “small number of aircraft 
were written off in this training.”126  
There were serious problems with the logistical and maintenance services. After 
purchasing the Mosquitos the Chinese paid De Havilland to train pilots, ship the aircraft 
overseas, and provide in theatre technical support. However, De Havilland failed to meet 
its contractual obligations since the planes were not packaged correctly and many arrived 
damaged, while the seven or eight technicians sent to China were “unpunctual” and 
lacked “the requisite engineering knowledge” to perform their jobs.127 Moreover, aircraft 
assembly was behind schedule and the conduct of the Chinese officers did nothing to 
maintain control over the workers. According to the Attaché, “Chinese parties” 
responsible for the assembly work changed so frequently that, “it [was] not unusual to 
find scores of additional personnel gazing entranced at the entire proceedings.”128 
Perhaps, T. C. Davis, the Canadian Ambassador to China, summed up the situation best 
in his remarks appended as a covering letter to the Attaché’s report:  
I am afraid that this transaction is not going to be a very satisfactory one from 
the standpoint of the Government of China…In the first place, I do not know 
where they are going to effectively use these machines and, secondly, I think 
that a lot of Chinese crews are going to be killed in the attempted use thereof 
as it would seem that very few Chinese pilots are capable of safely operating 
this type of bomber.
129
 
Clearly, the utility of Mosquitos was suspect. The diffusion of military technologies was 
complicated by many factors that ultimately affected the types and utility of arms sales. 
In the end, it would seem that Canadian surplus weaponry might have done more harm 
than good for its Allies on battlefields in China and Indonesia.   
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Conclusion 
The disposal of Canada’s munitions and supplies had international significance and 
provided Canada with some advantages. Since the cost of repatriating assets just to 
declare them surplus was prohibitive, surplus stockpiles accumulated in Europe posed a 
special challenge. Over the summer of 1945, the military took stock of its inventories 
both at home and overseas to determine ownership and postwar requirements. If Canada 
did not own the kit then it had to be returned to British or Americans depots. Moreover, if 
stocks of munitions and supplies in Canada were sufficient for postwar requirements then 
every corresponding type of Canadian-owned materiel overseas was surplus and had to 
be sold there. This saved logistical expenses and reduced disposal liabilities. Coupled 
with its junior status in world affairs, Canada was able to embark on a rapid overseas 
demobilization program and quickly entered the market for surplus materiel, much to the 
dissatisfaction of the British and Americans. Furthermore, in order to facilitate the 
international disposal of surpluses, a series of informal and formal diplomatic 
arrangements were negotiated to regulate sales and, whenever possible, help settle 
outstanding war debts. International sales also offered Canada another outlet to alleviate 
the flood of assets in domestic markets, while also allowing the Department of Finance to 
accrue additional American or Canadian dollars off sales. 
However, international sales also came with some serious complications and 
consequences. For Dewar, the workload was intense as he lacked the necessary staff and 
organization overseas. Additionally, he was forced to operate under timelines and 
restrictions that did not accommodate the disposal process and sometimes scuttled his 
efforts. Sales of surplus supplies to UNRRA and the Red Cross went a long way in 
relieving strife, while sales of weaponry and ammunition helped reconstitute the armed 
forces of Allied governments. The WAC was not an arms dealer as it only sold weapons 
and ammunition to close Allied partners and demilitarized whatever else it sold to foreign 
interests. Although surpluses were highly coveted, their quality and durability was 
suspect. Therefore, it is doubtful that end users derived many advantages from the bulk of 
surpluses they purchased, as the eclectic collection of second-hand items deteriorated 
rapidly and the diffusion of Canadian materiel hindered combat effectiveness. 
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Chapter 7 
Drowned at Sea: Ammunition Destruction and Ocean 
Dumping 
The sea washes away all the ills of men.
1
 
Euripides 
Introduction 
From 1940 to 1945, Canada’s wartime economy produced 4.4 billion rounds of 
small arms ammunition and 72 million artillery shells. Although these production totals 
were vastly eclipsed by Canada’s major Allies, it still ranked as a substantial wartime 
achievement for a country of 11 million people. However, by 1945, these tools of death 
and destruction posed a serious dilemma for policymakers and military authorities. After 
years of conflict that wrought devastation across every corner of the globe, there were no 
illusions about how destabilizing and dangerous these items were to public safety and the 
rule of law. During the war, a large fraction of all manufactured explosives and 
ammunition was expended by Allied soldiers, while the ample leftovers far exceeded 
postwar requirements. Without a proper disposal strategy the dangers posed by these 
deadly assets were magnified by the mountains of ordnance piling up everywhere after 
hostilities ended. What would happen to all the surplus ammunition and explosives? 
Where would all this destructive potential end up?  
The government and military understood that all the munitions accumulated to fight 
the war would not simply dematerialize once victory was declared. The dangers would 
persist for as long as the objects maintained their primary forms and remained capable of 
fulfilling their intended functions. In the case of ammunition and artillery shells, that 
form and function was to kill and maim, so they would carry little value into peacetime 
and portend future disasters wherever they were stored. Therefore, victory in the Second 
World War precipitated a serious crisis in logistics and storage that became a major 
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headache for the WAC and the military. The quantities of ammunition and shells were 
especially problematic and they required a special set of policies and practices.  
This chapter begins with an examination of how destruction policies and practices 
for lethal assets evolved over time. Immediately following the war, a serious storage 
crisis developed as huge quantities of munitions piled up at factories, depots, and 
warehouses across the country. The storage crisis was exacerbated by three factors. The 
first was the inability of the WAC and the military to coordinate an ammunition disposal 
program that satisfied everyone’s needs. When combined with a second factor, political 
interference – in the form of adverse media reports about wanton destruction, prying 
questions from politicians, and bureaucratic procedures that prioritized making sales 
before destroying weaponry – a volatile situation developed and threatened to escalate 
once the flood of surpluses commenced and as the WAC started monopolizing 
destruction programs after its reorganization. The third factor was the limited amount of 
stowage space specially designed to house ammunition and explosives. After the war, 
bunkers and magazines were rapidly filled when military units demobilized and returned 
their armaments to storage. 
Few contemporaries appear to have recognized the full scope and danger of the 
storage crisis until July 1945 when the confluence of sales restrictions, storage 
requirements, departmental jurisdictions, stalled destruction programs, and the profuse 
quantities of weaponry, ammunition, and explosives piling up across the country resulted 
in the “other” Halifax Explosion. The fallout from the Bedford Magazine Explosion, as it 
was called later to distinguish it from the Halifax Explosion of 1917, served as a catalyst 
for policy changes and the acceleration of destruction programs throughout 1946-1947. 
The explosion pushed policymakers to consider public safety as the paramount issue and 
merged with growing fears about rising crime rates and gun violence that seemed to be 
sweeping across the country. When it came to the destruction of ammunition and 
explosives, the main concerns of policymakers were pragmatic and related directly to the 
profuse existence of dangerous assets, the technical aspects of the destruction process, the 
inconvenience of storage, and the continuing threat they posed to public safety.  
  
343 
 
The destruction method that best mitigated these concerns was ocean dumping, 
which became the primary method for disarmament used by all belligerent powers. In 
fact, the practice became so common it gained a colloquial moniker: “drowned at sea.” 
The long-term environmental and ecological consequences of throwing ammunition in 
the oceans were not considered a priority as a complex web of scientific and international 
precedents guided decision-makers away from such considerations and back to the reality 
of the moment: munitions accumulated to fight do not simply dematerialize when peace 
is declared. Instead, they require a location of deposit and diligent disposal methods in 
order to attenuate their potentially devastating impact on public safety. Rather than worry 
about the future effects of saltwater corrosion and the eventual release of all the 
carcinogens, chemicals, acids, and metals that formed each projectile tossed overboard, 
policymakers were more perturbed by the Bedford disaster. This time, unlike in 1917, the 
explosion was not caused by a chance collision of two ships in the harbour but by 
overcrowded magazines and a strained relationship between the armed forces and the 
government’s disposal administration. Under such circumstances it was imperative to 
destroy the dangerous assets as quickly as possible. In the wake of the Bedford disaster 
Canada’s ocean dumping program commenced with vigour. The military and the WAC 
worked out the issues that confounded their relationship in regards to ammunition and 
explosive disposal, as policies and procedures were adapted to limit delays in final 
disposition and the two organizations started working in tandem to alleviate the storage 
crisis. As a result, all types of surplus ordnance ended up on the ocean floor.  
Storage Wars: The Evolution of Destruction Policies and Practices 
Almost immediately after the CAAC and WAC were established in November 
1943, the three Services started declaring surplus small amounts of obsolete kit 
categorized as “war-like material which is a danger to life” and assets of a purely military 
design with “no known peace-time uses.”2  From January to May 1944, these declarations 
included, among other things, approximately 12,000 magazines of ammunition, and at 
least 797 cases of dynamite and 20,000 blasting caps left over in Newfoundland from 
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building the Gander-Lewisporte-Bishop’s Falls highway.3 As a result, in May the CAAC 
approved a special exemption to the DND that authorized its trained experts and weapons 
specialists to destroy all unneeded small arms, ammunition, and explosives without 
formally declaring them surplus through the CAAC.
4
 This exemption, renewed in 
September, mirrored the other exemptions issued by the CAAC and greatly cut down on 
the amount of munitions entering the WAC’s custody, while also saving the Corporation 
the cost of hiring weapon experts and building specialized storage facilities. To that end, 
the CAAC formulated two general policies related to weapons, ammunition, and items of 
a purely military design or lethal nature:  
(i) that where it was represented to the Committee that live ammunition was 
of no further use in the prosecution of the war or for any other purpose, and 
the cost and/or the hazard of unloading the same was such as to render 
unloading unadvisable, such live ammunition should be disposed of by a 
suitable method of elimination, such as dumping into the sea; 
(ii) that no general policy be recommended at the present time in respect of 
other items of purely military equipment declared surplus but the same be 
dealt with from time to time as they come before the Committee.
5
 
The first clause of this general policy was profoundly influential because it allowed 
the Services to destroy unneeded or deteriorating ammunition and explosives by dumping 
them in the ocean. Given its gravity, the CAAC sent the order to Cabinet for 
consideration. This resulted in PC6099 issued on 4 August 1944 that approved the 
disposal procedures for dangerous objects. PC6099 stated that if weapons, ammunition, 
or explosives were declared surplus, priority went to the DMS for war purposes and if no 
purchaser was found then the WAC could dispose of these items by “suitable method of 
elimination, such as dumping into the sea, reducing to basic materials should such 
reduction be considered economical and the hazard involved therein be considered not 
excessive”6 The second clause stopped short of enshrining ocean dumping as the only 
standard procedure for destroying war-like stores with no known peacetime uses. Instead, 
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the Committee reserved some flexibility by allowing for the development of ad hoc 
disposal policies for specific types of weapon systems. To policymakers this seemed like 
a prudent course of action; even if the weaponry and ammunition were labelled 
dangerous, some attempt at salvaging value was preferable to paying the costs of 
destruction. This way the CAAC and WAC maintained a free hand to explore other 
disposal options as lethal assets became available and PC6099 tacitly approved these 
arrangements by structuring the priority for selling ahead of destruction. However, this 
selling imperative would later become a major source of problems and precipitated a 
storage crisis within the military’s logistical infrastructure. 
Originally, the CAAC’s exemption served a very important function for both the 
military and the WAC. Prior to the end of the war it made perfect sense to authorize the 
Services to dispose of their surplus weapons and ammunition in accordance with their 
wartime objectives, strategies, and deployments. Therefore, disposal procedures were 
grafted into the armed forces’ pre-existing operational priorities that favoured the 
deployment of the newest and most advanced weapon systems. In other words, the 
CAAC’s exemption provided the Army, Navy, and Air Force with a free hand to 
cannibalize unneeded weapon systems and utilize surpluses as sources of spare parts for 
repair and maintenance purposes. The only types of tactical assets that were declared 
surplus before hostilities ended were obsolete weaponry that was badly worn out or 
completely unneeded.
7
 Thus, during the war the disposal of all weaponry and ammunition 
was mostly kept in-house and overseen through the DND’s disposal agencies connected 
to the AOSAC and the units in actual possession of the items. 
While the CAAC’s exemption allowed the armed forces to dispose of weapons and 
ammunition as needed, it also accommodated the WAC’s lack of storage space. Before 
the WAC’s reorganization and expansion, the Corporation operated few warehouses and 
relied heavily on custodial arrangements with the DND. Indeed, most of the items 
declared surplus – lethal or otherwise – by the Services between January 1944 and 
August 1945 never actually left the custody of the military until the WAC found a buyer 
or approved their destruction. Without any storage capacity of its own, the WAC was 
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completely dependent on the Services and had to relinquish a certain level of control over 
the fate and treatment of surpluses. In effect, the armed force’s exemption for disposing 
of weapons and ammunition was essential for creating workable custodial arrangements 
with the DND. It made practical and economic sense to enable the military to free up 
storage space by either breaking down items into smaller pieces or completely destroying 
the unneeded assets in its custody.  
However, these arrangements came with some inconvenient baggage which 
influenced the trajectory of disposal operations and led to the modification of the armed 
forces’ exemption in August 1945. As Chapter 2 explained, a number of problems 
plagued the custodial arrangements and cooperation between the Services and the WAC. 
These issues came to a head in mid-1945 when the WAC and armed forces first came 
under attack from politicians and public accusations about the wanton destruction of 
government property dutifully paid for by public money. Under the political and public 
fallout from the Penhold incident in February 1945, the WAC revised the CAAC’s 
exemption to the armed forces. In August 1945, the Corporation ordered the armed forces 
to stop all destruction programs involving weapon systems and equipment unless 
otherwise instructed by the Corporation.  
The only exception to the WAC’s new order was ammunition: the Services were 
allowed to continue destroying all types of ammunition and explosives without declaring 
them to the CAAC.
8
 This caveat was maintained because bombs and bullets lacked any 
obvious or widespread civilian applications but still occupied valuable storage space. 
Moreover, they also posed a serious danger to public safety if stockpiled in large amounts 
while awaiting orders for destruction from the WAC after it had explored all possible 
avenues for selling them. Furthermore, the policy change coincided with the WAC’s 
expansion and reorganization to better accommodate its increased custodial 
responsibilities through material clearance and warehousing operations. As a result, the 
newly created Supply Department gained two additional elements, the Scrap Disposal 
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Section and the Ammunition and Chemical Disposal Board, which took over most 
destruction programs involving surplus declarations of weapon systems, tactical 
equipment, and even ammunition (if the Services elected to declare it surplus through 
regular channels).
9
  
For a time, the Services gladly obliged the WAC and refrained from destroying 
weapon systems, while continuing to dump increasingly larger quantities of ammunition. 
Over the summer and fall of 1945 there were simply few surplus weapon systems 
available to declare. Canada’s participation in the Pacific war remained on the horizon 
until Japan’s surrender and each Service was in the midst of tabulating its inventories, 
budgets, and postwar requirements. However, once the flood of surpluses commenced, 
the WAC’s order to halt destruction efforts came back to bite everyone. With the 
curtailment of the DND’s special exemption for destroying all war-like stores, the WAC 
assimilated these new functions into its already overwhelmed operations. Coupled with 
the selling imperative built into PC6099 (and the requisite pre-sale storage requirements), 
the available space to physically store things was quickly consumed at supply depots and 
warehouses where munitions of all types started piling up next to radios, bedframes, and 
everything else from Canada’s wartime arsenal.10  
The space to physically locate assets was the critical postwar issue. This was 
especially the case since the Services had relied on the availability of storage space from 
civilian sources during the war but with hostilities over and budget cuts looming the high 
rental prices were one expense that was quickly targeted for cutting. For example, the 
Navy had 7.96 acres of leased or rented space from civilian sources on the books at the 
time of VE-Day, but by June 1946 that total had dropped to 1.09 acres.
11
 When the rental 
contracts expired, the surpluses inside those facilities had to be removed to the WAC’s 
warehouses, thus providing the armed forces with alternative storage space for their 
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unneeded things. However, unlike with non-lethal surpluses, the WAC was not prepared 
to or capable of providing the necessary facilities for all the surplus weaponry, 
ammunition, and explosives. While the WAC’s reorganization and expansion created 
fifty-one warehouses across the country, it had to rely on the military’s purpose-built 
magazines and ammunition bunkers. This meant that at ammunition depots and other 
bases where weaponry was stored, surplus and non-surplus munitions had to be stored 
together. This strategy saved the WAC from paying for transportation, maintenance, 
construction, and security, but it did very little to help the Services actively engaged in 
demobilizing personnel, slashing budgets, and consolidating inventories of munitions 
they wished to keep. In fact, when combined with the high rate of personnel turnover at 
ammunition depots and the relaxation of storage procedures to accommodate 
overcrowding, the possibility of disaster grew with each incoming shipment.
12
 
In hindsight, the looming crisis and subsequent disaster was fairly obvious. Both 
the military and the WAC were burning the candle at both ends. On the one end were the 
armed forces sifting through inventories to determine postwar requirements while a 
seemingly endless array of new and used equipment continued piling up at bases and 
depots. Like a speeding train, loaded down with many carloads of heavy materials, 
Canada’s war machine took time to slow down and come to a complete stop. War 
production had hit its peak in late 1943 and consumption rates spiked in 1944 and 1945, 
so the logistics of moving munitions overseas had also ramped up over that time. After 
VE- and VJ-Day, munitions shipments overseas tailed off while the residues of 
production programs continued to arrive from war factories, and shortly thereafter, 
repatriated units were demobilized and disarmed. This compounded the storage crisis that 
was already hitting acute levels in Halifax and Montreal. The key to avoiding disaster 
was in providing the necessary space and braking power for the train to stop. However, 
this proved difficult to do within the context of decreasing total storage capacities and 
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logistical arrangements designed to move products to the war fronts quickly, not hold 
them in prolonged stasis.
13
  
The military was expecting the WAC to be proactive and help absorb this abrupt 
reverse in its supply chain management, but at the candle’s other end, the WAC remained 
largely reactive. Overwhelmed with the flood of surpluses and stacks of paperwork the 
WAC hastily expanded and reorganized to better handle its increasing responsibilities. 
Delays in the destruction or sale of all types of assets developed and, in the case of 
weapons and ammunition, the time lags were compounded by selling restrictions and the 
necessity of testing for civilian applications. Throughout the immediate postwar period, 
the WAC was playing catch up and, in doing so, it was hindering the military’s 
demobilization plans. Where the Services thought they could count on the WAC to 
remove and relocate all types of surpluses, the WAC wanted the weapons and 
ammunition to stay put. In other words, the WAC sought to control large portions of 
lethal assets from within the military’s purpose-built facilities, rather than hastily fund the 
construction and management of new magazines nearby.
14
 
A further issue affecting the WAC were both the informal and formal disposal 
arrangements with Britain that took place over a parallel time frame. The agreements 
with Britain greatly affected the WAC’s operations because it created another source of 
surplus weapons (and supplies). Since the arrangements all stipulated that the WAC was 
the only organization designated to handle the disposal of all surplus foreign property in 
Canada, it came into possession of any surplus British (or American) ammunition and 
weaponry located in Canada. For instance, during the war the Royal Navy built up large 
stockpiles of naval weapons and ordnance in Halifax, but by May 1946 the British 
Admiralty had returned most of what it needed from Canadian ports “for present or 
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possible future reserve.”15 What remained required storage and was usually transferred, 
through informal arrangements, directly to the RCN “free of charge” and if the British 
munitions were not required by the RCN then the “remaining surplus Imperial stocks” 
were immediately reported to the CAAC “in accordance with usual procedure.”16 Given 
that the surplus ammunition was not owned by Canada, the RCN felt it was important to 
involve the CAAC/WAC because anything left behind “might be construed as being 
involved in the UK Settlement Account.”17  
The WAC also acquired lethal assets from other British sources in Canada, such as 
the British Admiralty Technical Mission (BATM) and the Joint Inspection Board of the 
United Kingdom and Canada. Since the BATM and Inspection Board were closely 
affiliated with the DMS, it made sense that their termination, decontamination, and 
disposal fell under its jurisdiction. As a result the British Admiralty’s magazines at St. 
Polycarpe and St. Lazare in Quebec were transferred directly to the WAC for disposal. 
Although all the arsenals at St. Polycarpe and St. Lazare (as well as other types of 
ammunition at Valcartier) were offered to the Services through the CAAC, only a small 
portion was claimed.
18
 The rest was tagged for destruction through late 1946 or early 
1947. Thus, despite the CAAC’s exemptions and the WAC’s attempts at saving the 
financial costs of ammunition and explosive disposal, the Corporation was nonetheless 
forced to fund its own destruction programs overseen by the Scrap Disposal Branch, the 
Ammunition and Chemical Disposal Board, and the PDC (which was transferred into the 
WAC’s organization in August 1946). Of course, before destruction or sale took place, 
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the items had to be stored somewhere safe, which usually meant cramming more lethal 
assets into already overcrowded depots. 
The WAC’s destruction program for ammunition paralleled the Navy’s dumping 
program and piggy-backed on the armed forces’ storage facilities and expertise, thus 
adding more burdens to an already strained relationship. Financial data indicates that over 
the fiscal year of 1946-1947 the WAC’s destruction program commenced when 
$472,903.19 was spent on ammunition disposal, including $182,056.82 on the demolition 
of “miscellaneous ammunition & explosives,” depth charges, and mustard gas.19 During 
the next fiscal year the Corporation spent another $456,925.47 on “ammunition disposal 
expenses,” including $243,394.00 from June to September 1947.20 However, because the 
Corporation lacked the space and expertise for handling these dangerous things, it paid 
the DND for these services. As a result, the Army received $775,285.83 in 1946-1947 to 
store ammunition for the WAC, but the following year this expense dropped substantially 
as only $21,887.92 was paid for the use of ammunition depots.
21
 This significant drop in 
storage costs demonstrates the rapid timeline for ammunition destruction. However, such 
diligent efforts, commencing around the midpoint of 1946, came too late to relieve the 
postwar congestion that developed in the military’s logistical infrastructure. In fact, the 
velocity of destruction programs in 1946-1947 was a direct result of events immediately 
following VE-Day when munitions and supplies were piling up and confounding the 
coordination between the WAC and armed forces.  
It did not take long for a disaster to strike in Halifax. On the evening of 18 July 
1945, a fire broke out around 6:30PM on the south jetty of the Bedford Magazine, 
Canada’s largest ammunition depot. The fire quickly spread to a nearby ammunition 
barge (or “floating magazine”) that exploded and ignited the surrounding piles of 
ammunition temporarily stored outside because of overcrowding inside the stowage 
bunkers. The chain reaction of explosions that resulted continued for more than twenty-
four hours, completely destroying the Bedford Magazine and terrorizing Haligonians who 
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had lived through a similar disaster twenty-eight years earlier. However, an orderly 
evacuation plan limited casualties to one fatality and several dozen injuries. Luckily, the 
1945 explosion was nowhere near as large or devastating as the earlier blast that levelled 
large parts of the city and killed almost 2,000 people.
22
  
The Bedford Magazine Explosion was a turning point in Canada’s postwar 
disarmament. In late July a committee, chaired by Lt-Col. Ogilvie, was established to 
investigate the explosion. The Ogilvie committee published two reports on the incident, 
the first in August (on the causes of and responses to the explosion) and the second in 
October (making 
recommendations for 
reconstructing the facility).
23
 
Despite extensive research and 
interviews with witnesses and 
first responders, Ogilvie’s 
committee could not definitively 
prove what started the fire, but 
concluded that the probable 
cause was careless smoking in 
combination with overcrowded 
storage facilities, a large 
personnel turnover, and a laxity 
in the enforcement of safety 
regulations.
24
 However, the fact that a fire originally started on a dock where an 
ammunition barge exploded into a chain reaction that engulfed an overcrowded 
magazine, indicates that Canada’s fledgling ammunition dumping program was at fault 
or, at least, indirectly responsible. Indeed, the Bedford disaster exposed the serious 
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Photo 17 Picture showing some of the devastation from the 
Bedford Magazine Explosion. Source: LAC, RG24, Vol. 
8070, File: 1270-41 Ammunition Disposal Committee, 
Bedford Basin, Colonel Ogilvie’s Reports, Copy Negative 
HS 1509-71.   
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storage problems plaguing the system of custodial arrangements for lethal assets and 
demonstrated the need for adapting existing procedures to better handle the disposal of 
ammunition and explosives. 
According to correspondence in August, November, and December 1945 between 
Berry, Howe, and several officials in the DND and DMS, the explosion threw off 
dumping timetables and inventory tabulations, and greatly affected the scope and nature 
of future destruction programs. In fact, the correspondence revealed that most of the 
ordnance that exploded was surplus ammunition awaiting destruction and a large portion 
appears to have been British in 
origin – thus putting the WAC’s 
role in the accident into clearer 
focus.
25
 However, in the immediate 
aftermath, the origin, ownership, 
and quantities involved were 
unknown to contemporaries since 
no one knew exactly what had 
exploded. As Captain R. W. Wood, 
the RCN’s Director of Naval 
Ordnance, explained in a letter to 
an official in the DMS’s 
Ammunition Filling Division, the 
lists of surplus ammunition that 
Berry had submitted to Shiels (on 
the Navy’s behalf) were now outdated and had to be cancelled “due to the explosion in 
Halifax where most of the surplus ammunition was held.”26 He continued, “in view of the 
above it is requested that the disposal of the ammunition as previously submitted be held 
in abeyance until a firm stock report is received from our Halifax depot at which time a 
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Photo 18 Picture showing one of the two major craters 
caused by the Bedford Magazine Explosion. This crater 
was made by ordnance improperly stored outside of the 
ammunition bunkers. LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 1270-
41 Ammunition Disposal Committee, Bedford Basin, 
Colonel Ogilvie’s Reports, Copy Negative HS 1509-64 
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new list will be forwarded.”27 Thus, a new inventory list had to be compiled while 
facilities and storage sites were repaired before any more surplus ammunition could be 
sent to Halifax and dumped. However, this was not possible until sometime in the spring 
of 1947, so in the meantime Canada’s dumping program shifted north to Sydney (where 
most ships were being decommissioned and de-ammunitioned) and south to Shelburne 
(where the WAC had established a temporary ship graveyard).
28
 
For Berry it seems that the Bedford Magazine Explosion served as a catalyst for 
change and in its aftermath he moved aggressively to address the situation. At the heart of 
his concerns was public safety which was now under threat from stocks of surplus 
ordnance accidently exploding. In the hands of trained specialists and purpose-built 
facilities, accidents of this nature were not supposed to happen, especially since none had 
taken place in Canada during the war. Berry’s concerns mirrored a growing alarm from 
politicians about the “flood of weapons going about the country” at the close of 
hostilities.
29
 In the fall of 1945, gun crime and weapon ownership became an increasingly 
larger political and social issue as the media and politicians worried about illegal gun 
sales and a purported increase in gun violence. As Blake Brown explained, by 1945 the 
RCMP had compiled a temporary wartime gun registry that had a total of 1,949,921 
registered rifles, shotguns, and pistols.
30
 Of course that total excluded the roughly 1.5 
million rifles, pistols, and machine guns manufactured for the war effort, as well as the 
rising number of unregistered firearms – especially those smuggled home as souvenirs by 
returning soldiers – which some conservatively estimated to constitute another 500,000 
weapons.
31
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A social catastrophe seemed imminent. Through the DMS and DND, the federal 
government had nurtured the expansion of an industrial war machine, purchased its 
death-dealing commodities in vast numbers, trained 1.1 million citizens in their use, and 
another 1.1 million in their manufacture. What would result from this wartime marriage 
of materiel and everyday life? Worst-case scenarios seemed to pop up everywhere, as 
several gun-related incidents in 1945 added fuel to the fire. In one poignant accident, an 
Ottawa boy was shot and killed by his friend showing off his father’s souvenir revolver. 
In another incident in late-October 1945, three thieves broke into the Canadian War 
Museum and stole weapons from several display cases, one of which was used in the 
shooting death of an Ottawa police officer, Detective Thomas Stoneman.
32
  
Perhaps the most notorious string of gun-related crimes in postwar Canada 
happened over the late summer and fall of 1945 in Southwestern Ontario. Armed to the 
teeth with handguns, four Sten sub-machine guns, and polka dot handkerchiefs covering 
their faces, the five-member Polka Dot Gang embarked on a spree of robberies that 
turned them into the “leading figures” of “a crime wave” that swept through Ontario.33 
On 18 October the Toronto Daily Star reported that “gangs” and criminals had netted 
close to $500,000 in stolen cash and bonds, though the Polka Dot Gang was only thought 
responsible for stealing a portion of that alarming total.
34
 From August to October, the 
Polka Dot Gang struck with impunity. Their largest single haul was $10,000 taken from a 
safe in Hamilton, but they also hit several creameries, dairies, packing plants, and a flour 
mill in Parkhill, Stratford, London, Guelph, York, and Port Dalhousie. On several other 
occasions they were thwarted from carrying out their heists, but they were never afraid to 
use force when necessary: the Toronto Daily Star reported that the gang had assaulted 
uncooperative employees, nearly killed a night watchman, and shot at pursing police 
officers in York Township.
35
 The Polka Dot Gang was eventually arrested after a 15 
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October heist during which they forced their way into the home of a St. Catharines 
businessman named Thomas Heit, but left witnesses who gave police the license plate 
number of their getaway car.
36
 These events, and others like them, came on the heels of 
other wartime incidents that conditioned fears of rising rates in juvenile delinquency and 
violent crime, despite the fact that Canada’s actual crime rate in 1945 had dropped from 
its peak in the 1930s.
37
  
It was in this apprehensive climate that Berry started pressing Howe to modify 
PC6099 and approve a new disposal policy in November 1945. In light of “recent events” 
and the termination of hostilities, Berry was concerned about the length of time that the 
WAC and armed forces were required to store surplus weapons and ammunition while an 
attempt was made to find customers and make a sale.
38
 This meant that a lengthy and 
costly delay was built into the disposal process that obstructed the start of any destruction 
program. Moreover, with the damaged storage facilities in Halifax and the delays caused 
after the explosion, ammunition destruction (which had heretofore been in continuous 
operation) was now running behind schedule. Berry wanted Howe to decide whether 
surplus weapons and ammunition would be kept for a “prescribed period” to await 
potential sales or if they should be destroyed immediately, “if no known sale for this type 
of surplus at the time it becomes available” was possible.39 Given the situation, it is clear 
that Berry preferred the second option. 
Howe wrote Berry back on 5 December and agreed with him. “The matter is so 
important,” he wrote in his short cryptic reply, a Council decision was required and it was 
brought up at the 12 December meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction.
40
 
At the meeting Howe explained that “in view of the lack of market, inadvisability in 
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certain instances of general sale, and substantial costs of storage, it appeared desirable to 
destroy the goods in question rather than retain them in storage.”41 The Committee 
concurred and approved a vaguely worded order to direct the WAC that “where no 
known sale for surplus small arms and ammunition existed, to proceed with mutilation 
and sale as scrap of the arms and ammunition involved.”42 Because Berry’s original 
concern was about storing lethal assets in expectation of a sale, ocean dumping was never 
expressly mentioned in this exchange since there was never any intention to sell the 
surplus ordnance already slated for dumping.  
However, the new 
orders drastically increased 
and accelerated the scope 
of all destruction programs 
since the armed forces and 
the WAC were now 
relieved of the necessity of 
stockpiling surplus 
munitions while attempting 
to sell them. At all times 
the over-riding 
considerations for the 
destruction of lethal assets 
were  speed and efficiency, 
the public’s safety and 
security, the safety of the specialists and technicians tasked with destruction, the financial 
costs, and, perhaps most pressing of all, freeing storage space at ammunition depots. As 
one official from the DND wrote to M. A. Medland, Wood’s successor as Director of 
Naval Ordnance, in May 1946, “it is intended to dump all surplus imperial stocks of 
ammunition and explosives stores held at [Royal Canadian Naval Armaments Depot]’s so 
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Photo 19 Picture showing the devastation of the Bedford Magazine 
Explosion. Note the unexploded ordnance scattered throughout. 
Source: LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 1270-41 Ammunition 
Disposal Committee, Bedford Basin, Colonel Ogilvie’s Reports, 
Copy Negative HS 1509-108. 
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that further stowage space which is urgently required may be made available at an early 
date.”43  
In the aftermath of the Bedford Explosion, concerns were coalescing in the minds 
of military officers and government officials. Naval officers, who were still debating 
postwar requirements and tabulating inventories over the summer, swiftly decided on the 
fate of all remaining ordnance in Bedford. Instead of inspecting all the ammunition still 
littering the blast area or consigned to “floating magazines,” the Director of Naval 
Ordnance was instructed “to proceed from the standpoint of clearance rather than of 
future use” and write off all stocks of ammunition and explosives in Bedford in order to 
commence “dumping at once.”44 Not only were these assets replaceable from other 
sources should the Navy require them in the future, but what had not detonated was 
probably damaged in some capacity, so there was little use in trying to sell them.
45
 
Indeed, at every step of the demobilization and disposal process, the concerns of 
policymakers were shaped by the immediacy and proximity of dangerous munitions as 
well as the technical feats required for purging them from their spheres of responsibility.    
Davey’s Storage Locker: Canada’s Ammunition Dumping Program 
When hostilities ended, the standard procedures for the disposal of all war-like 
stores were well-established on paper and tested with the limited amounts of tactical 
equipment declared surplus by the DND. The Services cannibalized what they needed 
and declared the remainder surplus. Any lethal assets entering the WAC’s possession 
were frozen from general sale and usually held by the armed forces (at depots or 
magazines or air bases) pending the Merchandising Department’s ability to sell to a select 
clientele that included foreign governments, allied armies, police forces, and dealers who 
acquired the requisite permits and passed the RCMP’s background checks. If the “single 
purpose implements of war” could not be sold and no possible civilian applications were 
                                                 
43
 LAC, RG24, Vol. 34394, File: 5130-2, “Memorandum for the CNAS,” E.H. Russell to M.A. Medland, 4 
May 1946. 
44
 LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 1270-41 Vol. 1, “Memorandum to the Minister,” 28 August 1945. 
45
 The biggest concern were the depth charges (Mark XI) which were particularly volatile and needed 
special attention to release the gasses building up inside them before dumping them at sea. LAC, RG24, 
Vol. 8070, File: 1270-41 v.1, G. Ogilvie to Douglas Abbott, 22 August 1945, 4. 
  
359 
 
discovered by the WAC then the items were referred to either the Scrap Disposal Branch 
or the Ammunition and Chemical Disposal Board for final disposition.
46
 At that point the 
assets were usually tagged for destruction either by scrapping, mutilation, incineration, or 
ocean dumping.  
The fact that there were four available options for destroying surplus weapons and 
ammunition demonstrates that drowning was not a forgone conclusion once surplus 
ordnance became available, nor was ocean dumping the sole method utilized by the WAC 
or the armed forces. However, given the numbers requiring disposal, the concerns for 
public safety, the desired speed and efficiency, and the international precedents 
established by Canada’s closest Allies, ocean dumping became the favoured destruction 
method for ammunition and explosives. The long-term environmental and ecological 
consequences of ammunition dumping were hardly considered relevant and largely 
ignored or misunderstood by the scientific community, military officials, and government 
bureaucrats making disposal policies. 
At first glance, scrapping and mutilation were obvious starting points and, as 
Chapter 4 explained, the favoured destruction method for all types of weapon systems 
since their materials and components were salvaged. However, scrapping and mutilation 
came with some baggage that made them less practical to implement with ammunition. 
To correctly scrap and mutilate ordnance, suitable amounts of time and care were needed, 
particularly given the technical nature of the task. A continuous supply of expertise was 
essential for ensuring quality control and efficiency, while storage facilities and extensive 
security precautions were required to guard against reassembly or thefts from storage 
areas.
47
 Overcoming these challenges meant forestalling the demobilization of trained 
weapons specialists and the acquisition of larger facilities where the objects could be 
securely stored before processing. In Europe and Asia, storage and manpower 
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arrangements were further complicated by the devastation wrought by Allied victory as 
well as the significant quantities of ammunition located there. At home, the rapid 
demobilization of Canadian personnel coupled with the fact that most munitions factories 
were quickly dismantled or reconverted to civilian needs meant that both the expertise 
and locations for scrapping ammunition shrank drastically after May 1945. Indeed, the 
amount of ordnance requiring destruction across the world was so large that scrapping 
and mutilation alone could not possibly finish the job within the context of 
demobilization and reconstruction timetables. 
A further challenge to mutilation and scraping was the explosive compounds and 
chemicals inside the war’s deadliest ammunition: artillery shells. Although some isolated 
successes demonstrated that scrapping shells could be done efficiently in order to recycle 
the metals in the casings, the time, effort, and numbers conspired to negate its widespread 
feasibility. How could every single shell be taken apart safely and in line with rapid 
demobilization schedules? And how would the millions of tons of chemical weapons 
produced but never used in combat be destroyed? In these cases, it was best to destroy 
these chemicals and impregnated materials rather than risk the death or injury of 
inspectors and specialists tasked with taking them apart and appraising what could be 
salvaged. Thus, it was clear that mutilation and scrapping were best for weapons systems 
(such as aircraft, ships, tanks, and firearms) that were composed of many reusable parts 
and materials, but they were not that useful for destroying the highly contaminated 
materials or small arms ammunition, artillery shells, and chemical weapons. 
Incineration and controlled explosions were the other available alternatives, and 
while utilized wherever feasible, they faced similar obstacles as scrapping and mutilation. 
Using explosions to destroy munitions had to happen in a place that was both safely and 
securely distant from any population centre but still within proximity of good and 
operational transit networks that could be devoted only to the movement of munitions 
rather than, for example, displaced persons or food or commercial goods. Finding 
suitable locations and facilities after the war was limited by the quantities requiring 
destruction, their proximity to military installations, industrial production, and, in Europe 
and Asia, the devastated nature of the transportation networks. Aside from storage and 
security concerns prior to detonation, another major obstacle was simply keeping pace 
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with cleanup operations. This was exceedingly difficult once landscapes were remediated 
and destroyed cities rebuilt. In this case, controlled explosions would need to move 
further away from rebounding population centres and storage sites, while any salvageable 
materials inside the munitions would literally go up in smoke. Indeed, reconstruction and 
rebuilding efforts seriously limited the space and time in which large explosions and fires 
could take place. 
The numbers were just too large to make controlled explosions and burns practical 
as the singular method of destruction, especially for TNT. To understand their 
impracticality, consider the total blast yields involved in comparison to the atomic bombs 
used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The blast yield from Little Boy, the atomic bomb 
dropped on Hiroshima, registered between 12 and 18 kilotons or the equivalent of 12,000 
to 18,000 tons of TNT exploding at one time. Such a large explosion is estimated to have 
killed in the vicinity of 70,000 people – many vaporized instantly or killed by flying 
debris – and at least another 20,000 over the following days from severe radiation 
poisoning.
 48
 Yet, hypothetically, if the quantities of conventional explosives requiring 
disposal were concentrated in one location and detonated together, the resulting explosion 
would have made Hiroshima look like a gentle gust of wind. According to Terrence 
Long, Chairman of the International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions (IDUM), there is 
a minimum of 80,000 tons of conventional ammunition on the seafloor around Cape 
Breton alone.
49
 Even if only a quarter of that conservative estimate is actually TNT, its 
blast yield – if it had been centralized and detonated in a single location rather than 
dumped at sea – would be 20 kilotons or the equivalent yield of Fat Man the atomic 
weapon that obliterated most of Nagasaki. 
Obviously, controlled explosions of such magnitude were not advisable. Yet if 
numerous smaller explosions and fires were organized another serious problem surfaces: 
longevity. Consider that France’s demineurs – the army unit created to collect and 
destroy unexploded ordnance in France predominantly from the Great War – utilize 
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explosive detonations along the Channel coast at Le Crotoy as their primary method of 
disposal. In performing this highly dangerous and deadly job, they collect and destroy 
roughly 300 tons of unexploded ordnance annually. Although this is a substantial total, 
the cleanup will likely continue for centuries!
50
 Because of better blasting caps and fuses, 
the Second World War yielded significantly less unexploded ordnance, but in 1945 it was 
the stockpiles awaiting future use that were most troubling.
51
 The numbers are simply 
mind-boggling: the Americans produced about 41 billion rounds of ammunition (all 
calibers, including artillery shells) and the Germans built 3.35 million tons of ordnance in 
1944 alone (and despite the intensity of bombing raids).
52
 Of course not all of these 
arsenals were tagged for destruction and large portions were already fired, but the 
leftovers may have taken centuries to destroy solely by fire and combustion.  
Thus, to destroy large stocks of ammunition and shells properly, a storage site and 
efficient destruction method were essential. The site had to be located somewhere 
inaccessible so that nobody could easily steal the items and the destruction method had to 
ensure that reassembly was not possible. The site and method had to accommodate the 
devastated nature of local conditions and take advantage of the available expertise, 
equipment, and transportation of the Allied armies. Above all, the site had to be large 
enough to store all the lethal assets, either as a whole or in parts, so that they would never 
again be used for their intended function. Finally, the destruction method had to be 
relatively quick and efficient so that it could keep pace with rebuilding efforts and 
demobilization, thereby adding even greater importance to the location’s indefinite size 
and proximity.  
In fact, the ideal option would combine the location and method together, meaning 
that the site where the lethal assets were placed was their destruction. As things turned 
out, a solution was close at hand, and it was also one that the Western Allies knew all too 
well. Wherever their armies had fought, the tyranny of distance was conquered before the 
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enemy was defeated. The vast bodies of water separating the war front from the industrial 
front posed the greatest geographic and logistical obstacles to victory.
53
 However, in 
peace, they became the ideal places for discarding the detritus of war. Not only did the 
Allies possess the available shipping capacity, but ground transportation networks would 
only need to ship munitions one way (to the ports). The water and seafloor provided the 
location and perimeter security thus rendering the assets completely inaccessible and 
unusable. Moreover, the objects could be dumped as a whole or in parts which limited 
handling and negated the need for extensive mutilation. At the time, the long-term 
corrosive powers of saltwater and the profuse amount of chemicals inside each shell were 
hardly considered relevant. Instead, the water’s colder temperatures were seen as ideal for 
insulating the bombs so they were less likely to ignite or explode accidently in the short 
term. Finally, as long as rough seas and bad weather were minimal, ocean dumping could 
continue without disruptions, far away from prying eyes, and in controlled locations so as 
not to disturb shipping or the fishing industries. 
In many respects the dumping of munitions in the oceans might appear today like 
some immoral transgression and that the Allies consciously perpetrated an environmental 
disaster in disarming themselves and their enemies. No doubt there is some truth to that 
assertion, particularly in reference to the dumping of chemical weapons, and later 
radioactive waste, but the objective here is not to debate the morality of dumping within 
the context of today’s growing environmental concerns.54 Instead, the objective is to 
understand why and how ocean dumping became a viable and widely-used option for the 
destruction of ammunition and some types of weapon systems. At the heart of the matter 
was the contemporary attitude towards the environmental impact of munitions dumping. 
There were simply few concerns about the effects of saltwater corrosion or the ecological 
consequences of introducing large quantities of chemicals, acids, metals, and carcinogens 
into marine environments. Instead concerns were focused on the pragmatic aspects of 
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disposal, the quantities involved, speed, and the public’s general safety if these items 
remained in storage facilities on land.  
Some discussion of the broader historical and international context helps clarify 
contemporary attitudes about the marine environment and the permissibility of dumping 
munitions. The precedents that guided policymakers to their decisions came in many 
forms. In fact, for both practical and symbolic reasons, humans have had a long history of 
dumping weapons and military accoutrements in water. For instance, in 1950 Danish 
workers digging a drainage pipe at Illerup near Skanderborg on the Jutland Peninsula 
discovered a major weapons deposit in what is now a dry lake bed. Archeological 
excavations and scientific testing found that most of the objects dated from 200 A. D. 
and, to the great surprise of all concerned, were identified as Roman in origin. Far from 
any Roman frontier, the items were dumped there by early Germanic peoples who were 
actively resisting Roman conquest at the time. The act of dumping was obviously 
significant to the dumpers since the objects were first captured in battle and then 
transported many miles before ending up under water. The fact that the lake at Illerup 
was chosen over some other bodies of water closer to the battlefield has led experts to 
conclude that the primary motivation for dumping was symbolic and religious. The 
thousands of objects at Illerup were thrown into the lake as a sacrifice to the gods for 
helping defeat the enemy.
55
 
Obviously, the actions of ancient cultures were far removed from those of modern 
societies and the choices of political and military leaders after the Second World War. 
Yet they demonstrate the Longue durée of human interaction with bodies of water. As 
Philip Steinberg explained in his book The Social Construction of the Ocean, throughout 
recorded history humans have used the world’s oceans and waterways for a variety of 
economic, political, and social practices. Societies, corporations, and governments have 
continuously consumed and regulated ocean space for their own advantages by 
controlling access, usage, transportation, resource exploitation, sovereignty, and 
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defence.
56
 However, Steinberg’s theoretical approach and political-economic focus 
ignored another critical aspect of how humans have historically interacted with and 
envisioned the oceans: as a place and means for discarding waste.
57
 For centuries, 
humans have used oceans, rivers, and lakes to “store” unwanted items or dispose of 
garbage, sewage, and more recently, munitions and atomic waste. As Joel Tarr explained 
in The Search for the Ultimate Sink, every process “be it natural, consumer, or 
production…requires location of a place of deposit, or a ‘sink.’”58 Most relevant for our 
purposes is Tarr’s contention that in the search for the “ultimate sink” for industrial 
wastes and urban pollution, the preferred option was the “cheapest and most convenient 
manner possible.”59 Unfortunately, this often meant pumping and dumping waste into the 
closest waterway or the ocean.  
The industrial revolution and rise of mass consumerism throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries resulted in a dramatic increase of marine pollution and ocean 
dumping that has left a frightening legacy for the twenty-first century. Some experts and 
environmentalists now believe that the oceans are on the brink of dying and that humans 
have “killed” their ecosystems with plastic, garbage, industrial wastes, radioactive 
materials, and discarded munitions.
60
 One recent study found that between 4 and 12 
million tons of plastic are dumped in the oceans every year, a shocking revelation 
connected to other pressing environmental concerns such as ocean acidification, global 
warming, over-consumption, and the birth of the plastic industry in the 1930s and 
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1940s.
61
 A contributing factor to creating this environmental catastrophe was the 
contemporary attitudes of government officials and scientists in the mid-twentieth 
century. As Jacob Hamblin explained, these attitudes centred on the phenomenon of 
“acceptable thresholds” or the idea that somehow water could repeatedly absorb a dose of 
pollution without affecting humans, marine life, or the ocean’s chemistry.62 In other 
words, the cumulative measurement did not matter as much as the individual dosage so 
the pollution of waterways and oceans could continue as long as it did not harm public 
health immediately following the act. There was little concern for the ocean itself or any 
consideration for the long-term effects that dumping could have on the marine 
environment. Somehow the water would recover and the pollutants would disappear.
63
 
Building on contemporary attitudes toward marine pollution, it is not difficult to 
understand how the ocean dumping of munitions entered the equation in the 1940s, 
especially since the precedent was already well established after the Great War. Because 
the First World War ended so unexpectedly in November 1918, and during a series of 
crushing Allied offensives in its last hundred days, a profuse amount of munitions were 
stockpiled across Western Europe, especially at the front and along the Channel Coast. 
As a result, the French and British organized various dumping operations along the coast 
at Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk under the auspices of the Ministry of Munitions and 
Ministère de la Guerre. In practice, however, the job was contracted out to several private 
contractors that purchased the munitions. These companies, such as F. N. Pickett et Fils 
and George Cohen & Co., bought the weapons for scrap resources and were obligated to 
destroy the unwanted remainder or unsalvageable items usually by dumping or 
incineration.
64
 The records of the British Disposal and Liquidation Commission provide 
some indication about their scope after the Great War. Despite the protests of British 
oyster merchants, who saw their stocks drop precipitously in the 1920s, several thousand 
tons of conventional weapons were dumped in the English Channel along with over 
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12,000 tons of mustard gas. However, the numbers were probably much larger than what 
was documented in this set of records.
65
 
When Canadians started dumping ammunition in the ocean in 1945, they were not 
trailblazers. In fact, the Canadian government and military were following the precedents 
set by their larger Allies, particularly in reference to the disarmament of Germany and 
Japan. When the Allies occupied the shattered remnants of Germany and Japan they 
immediately initiated a process of demilitarization and disarmament, while formal 
agreements were negotiated by subcommittees of the Allied Control Council.
66
 This was 
realpolitik in practice. Disarming the enemy was a central duty of the occupation forces, 
as it eliminated any challenge to Allied supremacy. Right as humanitarian aid trickled 
into devastated areas, the Allies undertook extensive surveys and inspections to facilitate 
an exodus of weapons, ammunition, scientific equipment, and production machinery. 
This process of demilitarization and disarmament is often discussed by historians in the 
context of rising tensions between the superpowers, the plundering of German scientific 
and industrial resources (both human and material), the removal of factories by the 
Soviets, or the improvement of future weapon designs and procurement programs in the 
early stages of the Cold War.
67
 Yet disarmament and demilitarization created a major 
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pragmatic dilemma: the Allies collected a massive array of munitions and supplies in 
Europe and Asia, but not every weapon or gadget was desired for postwar purposes. In 
fact, only a small fraction of what was confiscated had any residual scientific or military 
value, while the remainder was a serious security liability.  
The situation was further compounded by the demobilization of Allied armies and 
the downsizing of manpower and materiel requirements which produced a large amount 
of surplus Allied weaponry, ammunition, and equipment. Indeed, the British Army – just 
one branch of one country’s armed forces – estimated that it possessed 1.2 million tons of 
surplus ammunition in the UK alone.
68
 Thus, the amount of assets requiring disposal was 
even larger than captured weapons and leftover ammunition in Germany and Japan. It 
included all types of Allied weapon systems and ammunition spread across thousands of 
places, from small islands in the Pacific to storage magazines on the home front and 
everywhere in between. Since ocean dumping was seen as the most efficient and safest 
method of disposal for lethal assets, the bulk of unneeded Second World War-era 
ammunition wound up on the ocean floor. All types of ammunition were dumped along 
with many different types of weapons, from small caliber bullets to the largest artillery 
shells; from damaged aircraft to obsolete ships; from firearms to chemical weapons. 
There were few restrictions and no international oversight controlling the practice until 
1972.
69
 
It was within this wider international context that Canada’s dumping program took 
shape, both at home and overseas. As an important but middle-ranked power, Canada had 
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no formal occupation zone in Germany, but the Army still participated in Allied 
occupation duties in support of the British. Canadian soldiers actively collected and 
destroyed large amounts of enemy weaponry and ammunition. Over the summer of 1945, 
Canadian forces dumped into the Baltic and North Seas a minimum of six million tons of 
captured ammunition that had been collected from parts of the Netherlands and the 
Emden-Wilhelmshaven area in Northwest Germany. Major Frank Swanson, a 
correspondent for the Hamilton Spectator, reported in late July that “the last and biggest 
ammunition dumping program of the Canadian army is underway…It will see six million 
tons of enemy ammunition consigned to the depths of the North Sea under fathoms of salt 
water.”70 In reality though, Canada’s contributions to German disarmament were just a 
drop in the bucket as the Americans, British, and Russians dumped tremendous amounts 
in the Baltic. In fact, scientists now estimate that a combination of years of saltwater 
corrosion and water currents have spread rusting bombs over about one-third of the 
Baltic’s seabed.71 Today, munitions (both conventional and chemical) and their by-
products wash up on beaches regularly, while fishermen accidentally catch about 3 tons a 
year. In 2007, one expert told an audience in Berlin at an international conference on 
munitions in the Baltic, underwater explosions are now large enough that seismic 
instruments frequently detect them.
72
  
The main element of Canada’s dumping program was focused closer to home, on 
the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts. It was here that thousands of tons of weapons 
and ammunition were dumped with the approval of the Canadian government. Over the 
summer, Canadian military authorities started defining potential locations for dumping 
sites. In making these arrangements, however, they had to coordinate with provincial 
governments, companies operating undersea cables, and the shipping industry. In late 
June and early July, naval authorities in Ottawa and Halifax circulated a set of potential 
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locations with coordinates to several companies and the provincial departments of 
fisheries that bordered the St. Lawrence. Most replies were generally favourable. Some 
companies, such as the Halifax and Bermuda Cable Company Ltd., did not foresee any 
problems associated with dumping explosives, as the company viewed the proposed 
locations “as being normally safe as far as our cables are concerned” and its officials had 
“no reason to anticipate any break in communication from such activity.”73 A few 
changes were suggested by other companies, such as Western Union Wharf, because the 
proposed dumping sites were too close to their cables and secondary locations were 
devised.
74
 Although one might expect a vocal input and response from the provincial 
governments, both the fisheries departments in Quebec and Nova Scotia quickly remitted 
their approvals.
75
  
Ammunition dumping received approval, in one form or another, from a powerful 
consortium of provincial and federal officials, military authorities, and corporations. 
Remarkably, it appears that few military officials thought to contact leaders from the 
fishing industry or local communities and there was no concern about the long-term 
environmental impact of corroded shells on the ocean floor. In fact, the only 
environmental concerns appearing in this correspondence were preoccupied with the 
short-term risk of accidental explosions and the danger this posed to the supply of salmon 
in the area. As one undated message from the Naval Officer In-Charge (NOIC) of 
Quebec explained to his counterpart in Cape Breton: “Provincial Deputy Minister of 
Fisheries concurs in proposed area for dumping ammunition provided there will be no 
explosions during dumping as for next 6 weeks to 2 months salmon run from Gaspe 
Peninsula to North Shore will be on.”76   
On 14 September 1945 – just twelve days after the Japanese surrender at Tokyo 
Bay – a confidential memorandum to the Secretary of the Naval Board defined in broad 
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detail the scope of future dumping operations. The Director of Naval Ordnance ordered 
“that the following Naval Order…be promulgated” and he continued by outlining three 
areas approved for ammunition dumping on the country’s Atlantic coast:  
1) Off Halifax, NS 
Within a radius of (5) nautical miles from a position bearing 116° and distant 
forty (40) nautical miles from Chebucto Head Lighthouse. (Approximate 
location Latitude 44° 12’ N, Longitude 62° 42’ W) 
2) Off Sydney, NS 
Within a radius of five (5) nautical miles from Latitude 46° 19’ N, Longitude 
58° 39’ W. 
3) St. Lawrence 
Within an area bounded as follows: Southern Limit, Latitude 49° 30’N. 
Western and Northern Limit, the 100 fathom contour line bordering the North 
Shore of the St. Lawrence. Eastern Limit: Longitude 65° 30’W.77 
With these orders and approval from Canada’s government through PC6099 and 
Ogilvie’s report, dumping operations commenced with additional vigour particularly at 
Emerald Basin, the first location identified in Wood’s Naval Order. From the summer of 
1945 onwards, the Navy undertook the majority of dumping operations on behalf of all 
three Services and with increasing assistance from the WAC. Over this time, the bulk of 
unneeded Second World War-era ammunition disappeared from storage magazines and 
weapons’ lockers and – most likely – wound up in the ocean.  
It is difficult to quantify exactly what and how much was dumped into the oceans at 
this time. However, a comprehensive list remitted to the RCN’s Commanding Officer for 
the Atlantic Coast in Halifax provides some indications about the nature of Canada’s 
dumping operations. The list “of explosive stores jettisoned by H. M. C. Ships 
subsequent to ‘V-E’ Day” detailed all items dumped from May until September 1945 
localized to one port in the Maritimes: Sydney.
78
 According to the list 522,972 individual 
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objects were tossed into the ocean. This included 252,658 cartridges of .303-inch small 
arms ammunition, 101,729 cartridges of 20-mm Oerlikon ammunition, 19,992 cartridges 
of 2-pounder quick firing artillery shells, 2,305 depth charges, and thousands of other 
projectiles divided into 53 different categories of types and calibers.
79
 The intensity of 
dumping operations is quite striking considering that these items were dumped from only 
one port over the summer when postwar requirements were still in flux and war with 
Japan loomed ahead. Therefore, this inventory list constituted only a starting point, as 
dumping operations increased 
exponentially after Japan 
surrendered and postwar budgets 
were confirmed.  
A short comparison with 
Britain’s postwar ammunition 
dumping program might further 
illuminate the smaller scope and 
scale of Canadian dumping 
operations. Two undated reports 
published on Britain’s ammunition 
dumping program, which was 
mainly based at Beaufort’s Dyke in 
the Irish Sea and operated out of the 
military port of Cairnryan, estimated 
that at least 180,000 tons of 
ammunition was disposed of in 
Beaufort’s Dyke by the end of 1946. These reports suggested that .303-inch small arms 
ammunition, 20mm and 40mm Anti-Aircraft shells, mortar bombs, 500 lbs. High 
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Table 10: Disposal of Ammunition, Report 
for Week Ending 29 September 1945 
Type of Ammunition Dumped Quantity 
Depth Charges, Mk. VII 1,050 
Cartridges, Q. F. 4” Mk. XIX  517 
Cartridges, 20 MM Oerlikon 49,000 
Cartridges, B.L. 4”  
Full and Reduced Charges 
1,456 
Cartridges, Q. F. 3” 20 Cwt. 896 
Cartridges, Q. F. 2 Pdr. H.E./H.V. 71,512 
Cartridges, S. A. 9MM 58,880 
Cartridges, .303” 4,000 
Shell Q.F. 4.7” 93 
Shell, Q. F. 4” 714 
Shell, Q. F. 12 pdr. 12 Cwt.  91 
Projectiles, 1¾ Hedgehog  1,929 
Fuzes, Time No. 198 525 
Primers, D/C Mk. VII 170 
Source: LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1 
Disposal on Demobilization Ammunition and 
Explosives, “Disposal of Ammunition, Report for week 
ending 29 September 1945,” Superintendent (Naval 
Armament Depot, Dartmouth NS) to Commanding 
Officer Atlantic Coast, 3 October 1945.   
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Explosive (HE) bombs, hand grenades, and anti-aircraft rockets were the most common 
items tossed overboard.
80
  
 In terms of types, Canada’s dumping program certainly mirrored Britain’s, though 
it was much smaller. Although documentation is hard to find, two weekly summaries for 
the weeks ending 29 September 1945 and 6 October 1945 suggest a general pattern. 
According to these summaries dumping was a daily occurrence, unless adverse weather 
kept ships in port. Over the course of the week ending on 29 September “an estimated 
550 tons of ammunition” was dumped (by comparison the RAF was dumping 500 tons a 
day in Beaufort’s Dyke by November 
1945) and the following week 
inclement weather limited operations to 
just 350 tons.
81
 Tables 10 and 11 list 
the types and quantities dumped off the 
Atlantic coast over this two-week 
period. Furthermore, one weekly 
summary that divided the total tonnage 
dumped by ship from 9-13 October 
gives some indication about how much 
was dumped per day. On average the 
three vessels engaged in dumping that 
week carried about 30-35 tons daily. 
However, each ship did have one day 
that departed from this average: HMCS 
Poundmaker dumped 44 tons on 10 October, while HMCS Buckingham and Victoriaville 
dumped 55 tons on 19 tons respectively on 13 October.
82
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Table 11: Disposal of Ammunition, 
Report for Week Ending 6 October 1945 
Type of Ammunition Dumped Quantity 
Depth Charges, Mk. VII 100 
O. Q. F. 2 pdr. H.E./H.V. 89,956 
Mine Charge Cases 23 
Cartridges, U.S., 3” 50 Cal. 236 
Cartridges, S. A., 5” Vickers 196,140 
Cartridges, S. A., .30 Cal. 256,139 
Shell, Q. F. 4” Mixed 249 
Warheads 21” Mk. IV-VB 8 
Warheads 21” Mk. II 4 
Fuzes, Time No. 198 100 
Source: LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1 
Disposal on Demobilization Ammunition and 
Explosives, “Disposal of Ammunition, Report for 
week ending 6 October 1945,” Superintendent 
(Naval Armament Depot, Dartmouth NS) to 
Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, 12 October 
1945.   
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While dumping became a standard practice, it was far from an exact science and 
was replete with some serious challenges and obstacles. Perhaps the biggest was correctly 
navigating to the designated coordinates and remaining there for hours while the cargo 
was offloaded by hand. Since the ship could not anchor and was constantly in motion 
while dumping took place, the five-nautical-mile radius defined by the Director of Naval 
Ordnance was easily traversed and the cargo dispersed unevenly over a wide area, to say 
little about all the dumping that took place before the areas were defined. Dumping was 
also labour-intensive. Loose munitions were always dumped one at a time, by hand in 
order to limit bumping, sparks, mid-
air collisions, and accidental 
explosions. Other common methods 
were to lower a ramp and either roll or 
shove the ammunition overboard or to 
use “special gravity rollers where 
smaller types of ammunition were 
concerned.”83 Dumping was also 
limited by the amount each vessel 
could carry safely to the designated 
site. Multiple trips were needed which 
increased the chances of navigational 
errors and delays because of bad 
weather or rough seas.
84
 The travel 
times and dumping techniques greatly 
limited how much was tossed 
overboard in a single day, so dumping one stockpile could drag on for days and often 
take place in areas that were never officially recorded. Finally, to limit the handling of 
both deteriorated ammunition and chemical weapons, these objects were loaded onto 
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Photo 20 On arrival at the ammunition dumping 
ground off Cairnryan, members of the Royal Army 
Ordnance Corps (RAOC) place shells on gravity rollers 
that take the ammunition over the side of the ship and 
into the sea. Note the man in the background who is 
simply throwing ammunition overboard. © IWM (H 
42208) 
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surplus landingcraft in port and then towed out to designated coordinates and scuttled.
85
 
Of course, loading all these eggs in one basket created the potential for an unmitigated 
disaster, especially if handling procedures were not strictly followed in port (to say 
nothing about relieving the WAC of storing and maintaining surplus naval vessels sunk 
with the deadly cargo onboard). 
These challenges were perhaps best illustrated by one dumping operation that took 
place in February 1946 near Sable Island. The debacle, recounted in DND records and by 
John Bryden in his book Deadly Allies, developed into a comedy of errors since nothing 
went to plan and make-shift solutions were adapted to finish the job.
86
 On 18 February, 
LST No. 209 was loaded with its cargo of about 2,000 tons of mustard gas and towed out 
to sea by two tug boats hired from a private firm, Foundation Maritime Ltd. in Halifax. 
The two tugs and LST 209 were accompanied by a naval escort, the minesweeper HMCS 
Middlesex, and an old army supply ship, HMCS General Drury, carrying members of the 
local press, the Army’s disposal officer, and the WAC supervisor. However, while on 
route, the convoy hit a winter gale that threw them off course and prevented a scuttling 
party (provided by a Montreal-based private contractor Hayes, Stuart, and Coy Ltd.) from 
boarding the ship.
87
 An attempt was made to sink the LST with depth charges, but when 
it was discovered that 100 drums of mustard gas were stowed on the deck and not in the 
cargo hold, the use of depth charges was not advisable. At dusk when the weather 
cleared, the scuttling party boarded the LST but they botched the job when they 
“neglected to open the after sea cocks” and as a result the “hulk settled very slowly and 
was only half submerged at daylight the following day.”88 At this point the Middlesex 
was requested to “holed the after end (of the LST) with Oerlikon fire” and after 400 
rounds were expended the LST finally sank, roughly 200 miles from the designated 
position. Several of the drums were observed floating around the dump site afterwards 
                                                 
85
 Skaggerrak Report, 1-4.  
86
 John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada’s Secret War, 1937-1947, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1989), 
11-13. 
87
 Financial records seem to indicate that the WAC paid for the private contractors. War Assets Corporation 
Third Annual Report, 26; War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual Report, 20. 
88
 LAC, RG24, Vol. 8060, File: 1240-15 Vol. 1, “Report of Proceedings, Scuttling Hulk LST 209 Loaded 
with Mustard Gas,” Lt. Cdr. B. P. Young to Commanding Officer HMCS Scotian, 21 February 1946, 1-2. 
  
376 
 
and rifle fire from 50 to 70 yards was used to sink them.
89
 Indeed, dumping could be 
dangerous, improvised, and occur far away from sanctioned locations.    
Although some relatively detailed records were kept by the DND, there was little 
incentive to do so. This was not only because of the frequency and routine nature of 
dumping operations, but also because there was little civilian oversight. PC6099 and the 
CAAC’s exemption for the armed forces effectively limited the required documentation 
and the involvement of Canada’s disposal administration in overseeing this aspect of 
disarmament.
90
 As the handwritten marginalia of the Chief of Naval Administration and 
Supply (CNAS) explained in a 4 May 1946 memo, “there is little use in declaring 
explosives stores to Crown Assets as we have authority to dump all surplus stores of this 
nature and which we report periodically in accordance with CAAC letter 4th Sept. 
1945.”91 The Army, Navy and Air Force had a free hand when it came to dumping 
ammunition and they used it often, although they did periodically inform the Committee 
and Corporation about their activities. The WAC kept tabs on the situation, usually 
through regional supervisors and by covering some of the costs of dumping. In the wake 
of the Bedford Magazine Explosion it would appear that all parties involved in the 
destruction of ammunition achieved a satisfactory arrangement and procedure to carry it 
out, though preserving detailed records was not a priority.  
 Although the Navy did the lion’s share of dumping, it did not handle every aspect. 
In many instances, dumping was a joint operation between the three Services. Canada’s 
dumping program for mustard gas exemplifies this cooperation. By contrast, to the US 
and UK, the dumping of Canada’s chemical weapons arsenals were much smaller in 
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terms of tonnage and took less time to carry out, but they were nonetheless important to 
the country’s efforts at demobilization. At least two specific dumping operations were 
carried out by a joint Army-Navy task force (though there were probably more), first in 
February 1946 and then again in late September or early October 1947.
92
 In the two 
operations a total of about 3,000 tons of mustard gas was shipped by train from the 
Stormont Chemicals Ltd. plant in Cornwall, Ontario, to Halifax (1946) and Esquimalt 
(1947) for disposal. In both operations, the Army was responsible for the shipping and 
handling, while the Navy provided the vessels, navigation, and “other marine aspects.”93 
Despite the comedy of errors that befell the Halifax expedition, the lethal cargo was sunk 
in water 1,000 fathoms deep 
and “200 miles from Halifax 
and 60 miles South and South 
East of Sable Island.”94 In 
Esquimalt, the dumping took 
place over ten days, 100 miles 
out from the harbour at a site 
approved by the Ministry of 
Fisheries that was “well clear of 
the continental shelf.”95  
The Army also proceeded 
unilaterally and dumped 
ammunition in the Great Lakes. 
Although not substantiated in archival records, it appears that the Army used the Great 
Lakes as an emergency measure to maintain its own demobilization schedule while the 
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Photo 21 Drums of mustard gas awaiting disposal, 30 January 
1946. Each container was likely dumped in the ocean. Source: 
LAC, Series: Army, Z-4407-8, MIKAN no. 4462568. 
 
 
  
378 
 
Navy got its affairs back in order after the Bedford Magazine Explosion. Reporting for 
the Globe and Mail on 20 November 1945, James Vipond told readers about the Army’s 
test dump of 150 tons of obsolete ammunition jettisoned into seventy-eight fathoms of 
fresh water at Dyer Bay on Lake Huron, two miles from the Bruce Peninsula and several 
miles north of Owen Sound. The test, performed by the Great Lakes tugboat Northern, 
took several trips to complete and the twelve soldiers accompanying Captain J. M. 
Seldon, an ordnance expert in the Canadian Army, threw the ammunition and explosives 
overboard by hand. Seldon later explained to Vipond in an interview that it was not 
possible to salvage any materials from the shells and that the ammunition was obsolete 
since Dunkirk in 1940.
96
 However, this was just the tip of the iceberg. This successful test 
dump paved the way for future operations in Dyer Bay as the Army shipped at least 
another 1,000 tons of ammunition from Petawawa to Owen Sound. Adding to the 
operation’s success was the fact that the WAC sold the wooden boxes and metal 
containers used for storing the ordnance as 10,000 wooden tool boxes and 5,000 boxes 
for packing fish.
97
 One hopes that each container was decontaminated beforehand.  
Conclusion 
After the Second World War, the ocean dumping of ammunition, explosives, and 
weaponry was the primary method used by the Allies to disarm Germany and Japan as 
well as their own armed forces. This was a gigantic and global undertaking that put 
hundreds of millions of tons of conventional and chemical weapons at the bottom of Old 
Davey’s Locker. As a junior ally Canada played only a small role. Its armed forces and 
government officials were neither trailblazers nor pioneers, but the country still dumped 
hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. A 
powerful consortium of government officials, ordnance experts, military authorities, 
scientists, oceanographers, and corporations approved of the practice. During this time, 
the main concerns that guided policy formation and implementation were: public safety, 
the quantities requiring destruction, the financial costs, storage requirements, and the 
technical nature of the task. Ocean dumping appeared to be the miracle cure that 
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alleviated most problems. Moreover, it was a relatively quick, efficient, and pragmatic 
solution that was adaptable to almost all local conditions across the world. 
Once underwater, munitions quickly fade from memory but their toxic legacies 
persist. Contemporaries were not concerned by the effects of saltwater corrosion or the 
future dangers posed by all the chemicals, acids, metals, and carcinogens that formed the 
munitions. Over time, saltwater corrodes through each casing which releases the 
poisonous contents into marine environments. This threatens water quality, fish stocks, 
and the food chain, and complicates cleanup operations (since SONAR cannot distinguish 
between a clump of TNT and the ocean floor). Presently, the dangers of underwater 
munitions have never been higher. Anecdotal evidence suggests that cancer rates are 
more common in communities that depend on the fish harvested from dump sites, while 
chemical and conventional munitions frequently wash up on shores, killing or injuring 
people every year around the world. Moreover, oil and gas companies have constructed 
offshore drilling rigs and underwater pipelines in known dumping grounds where 
spontaneous explosions are common, such as in the Gulf of Mexico, the Irish Sea, and off 
the Atlantic coast of Canada.
98
 The environmental and ecological costs of ammunition 
dumping are one of the Second World War’s most pervasive but underappreciated 
legacies.  
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Conclusion 
Prologue to Peace, Epilogue to War 
We may be winning the war abroad but we have still to win peace at 
home…The disassembly job facing War Assets is in some respects even more 
difficult than the assembly job which has been done by other government 
departments. But its importance is paramount.
1
 
Editorial, 9 September 1944 
No matter the duration, distance, or devastation when conflicts end the implements 
of war require disposal. This dissertation explored how the Canadian government planned 
and implemented its disposal strategy following the Second World War, but its subject 
matter and conclusions are widely applicable to other conflicts and postwar experiences. 
For instance, when Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan ended in 2012, 
policymakers were beset with another disposal problem. Although it was not as large as 
the one facing their predecessors, it shared some striking similarities and challenges. In 
light of the global financial instability and the reduced spending priorities of Stephen 
Harper’s Conservative government, steep budget cuts forced federal departments to 
rapidly downsize and dispose of surplus inventories. Just like in the 1940s, the media 
coverage and public opinion were not always favourable to the changes particularly when 
the DND was forced to close military bases across the country, discard expensive 
armaments that it had recently acquired, and cannibalize old weapon systems for 
serviceable parts and equipment.
2
 As a result of this postwar transition, the federal 
                                                 
1
 LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, Newspaper Clippings, “More Volunteers Needed,” Financial Post, 9 
September 1944. 
2
 David Pugliese, “DND selling Equipment, Mothballing Base Housing to Meet Cuts,” National Post, 11 
April 2012 (Accessed 2 December 2015) http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/dnd-selling-
equipment-mothballing-base-housing-to-meet-cuts; Lee Berthiaume, “Royal Canadian Air Force Raided 
Museum for Search-and-Rescue Airplane Parts,” Ottawa Citizen, 15 September 2014, (Accessed 31 July 
2015) http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/royal-canadian-air-force-raided-museum-for-search-and-
rescue-airplane-parts; Lee Berthiaume, “Royal Canadian Air Force Taps into New Source for Spare Parts: 
An Aviation Museum,” National Post, 15 September 2014, (Accessed 31 July 2015) 
http://news.nationalpost-.com/news/canada/royal-canadian-air-force-taps-into-new-source-for-spare-parts-
an-aviation-museum; David Pugliese, “DND looks to save money on futuristic warship by stripping parts 
of older vessels,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 September 2015 (Accessed 28 September 2015) 
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/dnd-looks-to-save-money-on-futuristic-warship-by-stripping-parts-
off-older-vessels. 
  
381 
 
government’s current disposal agency, GC Surplus, was overwhelmed with a whole 
range of surplus assets produced by a shrinking bureaucracy and military.
3 
Media reports also revealed other challenges facing the DND that were similar to 
those in 1945. One of the more pressing was the repatriation of weaponry and equipment 
from Afghanistan. In 2012 and 2013, The Star and CBC News reported on the logistical 
difficulties facing the military in Kandahar months after Canada’s combat mission ended. 
The high costs of repatriating munitions and supplies from the war front had necessitated 
some careful planning. It is unclear how much kit was sold to the Afghan military and 
government, but the Canadian military decided to return its high-valued equipment 
through an expensive air and sea operation. The “low priority” equipment was supposed 
to be loaded onto trucks and shipped over land from the Kandahar airfield to the port at 
Karachi, Pakistan. However, after an American airstrike killed twenty-four Pakistani 
soldiers by accident, the Afghan-Pakistan border was closed until the Americans 
apologized some seven months later. The roughly 375 shipping containers full of tires, 
spare parts, and other types of equipment were “stranded” at the airfield, which resulted 
in a logistical “nightmare” that steadily grew more expensive since the containers had to 
be guarded and a special team sent to appraise their deteriorating conditions.
4
 
Just as in the 1940s, the destruction of perfectly useable munitions and supplies 
became a politically sensitive topic in the 2010s. In July 2015, the Ottawa Citizen 
reported that millions’ worth of military gear was being scrapped instead of sold to 
Ukraine. The optics did not look favourable, but the decision was reasonable given the 
circumstances. The issue at stake was not a government ignoring potential markets for 
surplus kit or unwilling to aid a beleaguered ally, but the incompatibility of Canada’s 
weapon systems with Ukrainian variants. The diffusion of military technology was not 
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possible because the Ukrainian forces used different types of systems and technologies. 
Any acquisition of Canadian assets by Ukraine required months of training and the 
creation of new logistical and maintenance procedures. Without any prospective buyers, 
there were few alternatives except to scrap the ten Husky and Buffalo armoured vehicles, 
194 LAV-2s, four specialized landmine detector vehicles, and 5,400 Eryx anti-tank 
missiles.
5
 The decision to destroy these surpluses was expensive since the vehicles alone 
had cost Canadian taxpayers $30 million in 2007. A further incentive for scrapping was 
the rising cost of maintenance and storage which would easily surpass any profits accrued 
from sales. Naturally, such actions were not popular with critics who were not aware of 
all the factors at play or whether components were salvaged from scrap heaps.
6
 
The disposal of munitions and supplies is an important but underappreciated 
element of military history. All too often scholarly inquiry is squarely focused on the 
mobilization, procurement, and deployment of new weapon systems; while little is said 
about how those objects were demobilized and disposed of when they were no longer 
required. This observation about a general historiographical trend in military history 
should not be taken lightly. It not only highlights the “boys and their toys” stereotypes 
about military historians, it also points to a set of challenging questions that need some 
consideration. When new kit is acquired by the military it replaces something else, so 
why are military historians not more interested in the disposal of old things? Why do 
military historians write studies focused only on the acquisition of new weapon systems 
and technologies? It is unfortunate that scholars are not more curious about how 
militaries discard their obsolete weaponry and clean up their battlefields after the fighting 
ends. Understanding why and how things are thrown away can illuminate a great deal 
about the past; perhaps even more than what gets kept and preserved over time. 
These questions also hint at a larger issue that contextualizes some of this current 
fascination with procurement. Since the Second World War ended, consumers (and 
military historians alike) have been inundated by a diverse material opulence grounded in 
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vast inventories of cheap and disposal products. The prevalence of disposability is 
everywhere and it is reaching alarming rates. Today, every North American is on pace to 
generate 102 tons of garbage over their lifetimes – that amounts of 7.1 lbs. of trash 
created every day, from birth to death.
7
 Living in a world dominated by garbage and 
planned obsolescence has created a cultural emphasis that privileges the acquisition of 
new things and new technologies. It is small wonder that military historians have shown 
little interest in derelict things, thrift, or the longevity of product lifecycles when the 
preponderance of disposability has simplified and minimized their complexity. As a 
result, the types of questions military historians ask about the past are conditioned away 
from understanding the mutability of objects or the political, economic, social, and 
environment significance of disposal operations. In effect, planned obsolescence has 
dulled the curiosity for how disposal works and affects lifestyles.  
This dissertation has shown that today’s extreme wastefulness was a luxury that 
few Canadians could afford in the 1940s. At that time, Depression-era thrift still 
influenced people’s instincts to conserve and derive as much value from junk as possible. 
Moreover, Canadians accurately predicted that the government and military would shrink 
in size once the war ended, thereby releasing surplus inventories into the economy and, 
with any luck, their personal possession. Everyone envisioned a postwar plan that was 
underpinned by a material world. After years of scarcity, Canadians wanted access to 
cheaper goods and higher living standards, but their ambitions and expectations were 
often trumped by the cold realities of supply shortages, unemployment, and the other 
transitional “shocks” prevalent after the war.8 This dissertation has also shown that the 
government and military anticipated the needs of peace and developed their own visions 
of victory. As early as May 1943, bureaucrats and military officers realized that they 
needed to develop a comprehensive disposal strategy for surplus munitions and supplies 
or else they risked serious political, economic, and social dislocation. However, despite 
their best intentions for creating an efficient disposal strategy, as operations unfolded 
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officials discovered their efforts were not always productive especially once the flood of 
surplus assets peaked in 1946.   
Contemporaries clearly understood that military assets do not simply disappear 
when they are no longer needed. Rather, objects require a concerted set of programs and 
policies to control their collection, storage, and final disposition. This dissertation 
documented the origins of Canada’s postwar disposal administration, its objectives and 
policies, and how it functioned. It showed that the disposal process was not neutral and 
nor was it perfectly implemented.  The establishment of the CAAC and WAC was the 
product of political, economic, and social pressures that forced the government into 
action. However, policies and procedures did not always conform to the expectations of 
some interest groups, while they deliberately favoured others. This provoked an evolving 
array of criticism that continually dogged the best efforts of the CAAC and WAC 
throughout their existence. Disposal operations unfolded through a process of trial and 
error and were constantly plagued by the battle against diminishing returns. Each policy 
and procedure enabled both positive and negative results, but they also required constant 
attention and careful adjustments that were not always possible at any given moment.  
The objects of war were accumulated on such a massive scale that large surpluses 
inevitability resulted. Some of these surpluses were in peak condition when the war 
ended, but they were also liable to rapidly depreciate in value given their condition, war 
damage, technological advances, or dubious civilian applications. The Second World 
War was incredibly wasteful and the CAAC and WAC faced the daunting task of 
minimizing the war’s waste through the reuse, reduction, recycling, and upcycling of 
munitions and supplies. Besides the vast quantities of leftover war junk, the war’s 
wastefulness manifested itself in other areas as well. The tens of millions of people who 
died worldwide between 1939 and 1945 stand as a stark reminder of the human tragedy, 
but the colossal expenditure of material resources should not be discounted. The 
“abnormal wartime depletion” of minerals, timber, coal, water, food, and other essential 
resources posed some serious dilemmas for policymakers who expected consumption 
rates to grow in peacetime even if soil nutrients were depleted, forests clear cut, and ore 
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deposits exhausted by wartime extraction.
9
 The Second World War also produced some 
dangerous environmental legacies, as its hazardous remnants are worldwide and range 
from abandoned kit in remote places to crumbling fortifications at tourist sites and from 
unexploded ordnance to polluted landscapes. However, the most serious environmental 
legacy stems from the ocean dumping of munitions, years of saltwater corrosion, and the 
leaching of carcinogenic chemicals into marine environments and the food chain. In the 
final reckoning, one could argue that the greatest single victim of the war was the planet 
Earth. Unfortunately, the wider community of military historians – especially in Canada – 
have been slow to address the study of warfare and its impact on the environment, which 
makes this field a unique and compelling addition to current paradigms and debates about 
the Second World War. 
This dissertation has also demonstrated how the disposal of munitions and supplies 
supported postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation to produce some positive and 
productive outcomes. Disarming and disbanding military forces might remove 
opportunities for utilizing the weapon systems for their intended purposes, but that alone 
will not eliminate or change their forms, functions, and intentions. Instead, these 
implements of war traversed a disposal process that reshaped and reconfigured them into 
peaceful purposes. The reduction, recycling, and upcycling of surplus war assets not only 
converted munitions and supplies to fulfill civilian needs, they also recovered resources 
and parts that supplied economic activity in the early postwar period. Although the 
convertibility of surplus assets provided a significant benefit, reusing munitions and 
supplies for their primary functions was still the most valuable and desired alternative. 
The sale of reusable items to corporations and foreign, provincial, and municipal 
governments were the most profitable transactions and allowed the CAAC and WAC to 
recoup as much money as possible. Through these efforts, the Canadian government 
operated a disposal strategy that implemented one of the first government-run initiatives 
designed to redistribute industrial production by managing a system that reversed 
wartime logistics to support peacetime consumption. 
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The history of the disposal of munitions and supplies after the Second World War 
is more than just a study of disarmament and demobilization; it is also a study of how 
munitions and supplies were transformed, reused, recycled, and upcycled into new or 
different purposes in peacetime. When the objects of war are repurposed or completely 
discarded to support postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation, they have fundamental 
consequences for postwar political, economic, and social developments. They shape the 
contours of the material environment that structures human experiences and become 
active legacies that participate in social, spatial, and human relationships in uneven 
patterns of utility and meaning. For those Canadians living in the 1940s, the disposal of 
munitions and supplies underpinned the transition from war to peace and provisioned 
postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation in ways that historians are only starting to 
understand. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
Disposal of Crown Plants, by Wartime Use of Plants, as at June 1, 1948 
Wartime Use of Plants 
Total 
Floor 
Space 
Proportion of Floor Space 
Retained 
by the 
Crown 
Made 
available 
to private 
industry 
For 
disposal 
Dismantled 
000’s 
sq. ft. 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Shipbuilding 1,958 4 77 4 15 
Aircraft 7,411 28 70 2 - 
Automotive 616 10 90 - - 
Guns and Small Arms 3,498 19 81 - - 
Small Arms Ammunition 3,519 30 68 - 2 
Ammunition Components 678 11 89 - - 
Ammunition Filling 7,804 80 1 2 17 
Chemicals and Explosives 4,594 25 30 - 45 
Instruments and 
Communications 
872 17 83 - - 
Miscellaneous Stores 67 - 100 - - 
Industrial Equipment 216 60 40 - - 
Basic Materials 2,267 28 71 - 1 
Totals 33,500 37 51 1 11 
Source: LAC, RG2, Vol. 79, File: C-85, Disposal and Peacetime Use of Crown Plant Buildings, 18, Table 
5. 
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Appendix 2 
 CAAC Standard Procedures, 1-10 
Standard 
Procedure 
Revision 
Date of 
Issue 
Title/Purpose 
CAAC 1 - 1 Apr 44 Issuance of Standard Procedures  
CAAC 2 
- 16 Apr 44 Report of Surplus 
A 8 July 44 
Reporting of Surplus B 4 Jan 45 
C 30 Dec 48 
CAAC 3 
- 16 Apr 44 
Surplus Crown Property – Schedule of Types 
A 6 July 44 
CAAC 4 
- 28 Apr 44 
Transfers, Allocations, or Sales of Surplus 
Assets 
A 6 July 44 
Transfers, Allocations, Priority, or Sales of 
Surplus Crown Assets 
B 3 Apr 46 
Transfers, Priority and Sales of Surplus 
Crown Assets to Federal Government 
Departments or Agencies 
CAAC 5 - 28 Apr 44 Requests for Allocation of Crown Surplus 
CAAC 6 - 29 May 44 
Demands for Material or Equipment in the 
Possession of War Assets Corporation Ltd. 
CAAC 7 - 27 Sept 44 Disposal of Ships 
CAAC 8 - 24 Apr 45 
Charges Involved in the Custody and 
Maintenance of Surplus Crown Real Property 
CAAC 9 - 1 May 45 
Disposal of Surplus Real Property Either 
Leased or Crown-owned (see Order in 
Council PC6204, 11 Aug 44) 
CAAC 10 - 19 Jun 46 Notice of Allocation 
CAAC 101 - 1 Mar 45 
Issuance of Standard Procedures Covering the 
Reporting and Disposition of Surplus In 
Canada Which is the Property of 
Governments other than the Canadian 
Government 
CAAC 103 - 1 Mar 45 War Surplus - Schedule of Types  
CAAC 102 - 15 May 45 Reporting of Surplus (in Canada) which is the 
property of governments other than the 
Canadian Government 
CAAC 201 
US 
- 15 May 45 
Disposal of United States of America 
Government-owned Immovables in Canada 
CAAC 202 
US 
- 15 May 45 Disposal of United States of America 
Government-owned Moveables in Canada Revised 1 Nov 45 
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